

Contextual Bases of Responsiveness to Citizen Preferences and Group Demands

**Russell W Getter and
Paul D Schumaker**

It is frequently asserted by democratic theorists that policymakers should be highly responsive to citizen inputs.¹ Because of its importance in normative theory, the concept of responsiveness has been the subject of many empirical investigations seeking to describe and explain the degree of responsiveness of American state and local governments.² However, broad generalizations regarding the degree of responsiveness of these governments and general explanations specifying the social and political conditions enhancing responsiveness have not been forthcoming.³ A major reason for the lack of cumulative knowledge in this area is that the concept of responsiveness to citizen inputs has been treated in a casual and often ambiguous fashion.

Most scholars agree that responsiveness occurs when citizen concerns and activities, treated as input variables, are reflected in public policy, treated as output variables. A lack of responsiveness occurs when policymakers adopt and implement policies which are independent of, and contrary to, citizen concerns. However, the ambiguity of this definition is apparent if one considers the multiplicity of types of citizen inputs to which policymakers can potentially respond. Various studies have examined, for example, the degree of policy responsiveness of state and local officials to individual requests,⁴ protest group demands,⁵ ad hoc groups,⁶ permanently organized groups,⁷ minority groups,⁸ and public opinion.⁹ Obviously policy responsiveness to one type of citizen input is conceptually and empirically distinct from policy responsiveness to other types of citizen inputs. Theoretical

This study was supported in part by a University of Kansas General Research Grant. We would like to thank Richard Cole, Terry N. Clark, Wayne Hoffman and Brett Hawkins for their helpful suggestions. In addition, the reviews from *Policy and Politics* were very helpful in preparing the final manuscript.

development requires investigations which examine and compare various types of responsiveness.


From the perspective of democratic theory, two dimensions of responsiveness are especially important: (1) responsiveness to public opinion, and (2) responsiveness to group demands. The importance of these two dimensions of responsiveness is suggested by a distinction which Robert Dahl¹⁰ drew over twenty years ago between populist democracy and polyarchical democracy. On the one hand, populist democracy denotes a political system in which the majority rules. This suggests that the predominant public opinion in a community should be reflected in policy. In a populist democracy, the policy preferences and priorities of each citizen — regardless of his level of information, interest, and concern — should count equally in the determination of dominant public sentiment and policymakers should act as the public's instructed delegates who enact and implement policy on the basis of dominant public opinion. On the other hand, polyarchical democracy denotes a political system in which group demands, rather than public opinion, are viewed as crucial citizen inputs. Instead of being responsive to majority wishes, policymakers in polyarchical democracies should be responsive to those citizens having such intense preferences that they take the time and trouble to join political groups.¹¹ Thus in a polyarchical democracy, public policy should and does reflect the demands of all legitimate groups in the community.

This paper will not attempt to resolve the normative question as to whether public policy should be responsive to public opinion or to group demands. Instead both public opinion and group demands are viewed as potentially important types of citizen inputs to which public officials can be responsive in making policy decisions. In Part I, a theoretical framework for investigating the policy responses of officials to these citizen inputs is presented. In Part II, measures of the degree of responsiveness to public opinion and the degree of responsiveness to group demands for each of 51 American cities are presented. In Part III, the political and environmental factors of these communities, which explain variations in these two dimensions of responsiveness, are investigated.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Our investigation of the policy responsiveness of local governments utilizes the theoretical framework depicted in Figure 1. This theoretical framework presents a view of the policy process which differs significantly from that used in traditional or mainstream analyses of the determinants of public policy.¹² In traditional literature, the concern has been to explain variations across jurisdictions in the levels of policy in specific issue areas. These studies have usually suggested that various environmental variables (like variables describing the demographic composition of communities) and political variables (such as the form of government or party competition) *cause* the observed variations in policy levels.¹³ Although these studies have made many useful contributions to our understanding of public policy, they also have been subjected to numerous criticisms.¹⁴ The theoretical framework presented in Figure 1 is intended to address the following deficiencies in the mainstream model of the policy process.

Figure 1 A Conceptual Framework Facilitating the Description and Explanation of Variations in the Degree of Responsiveness Exhibited by Local Policymakers



First, the mainstream model suggests that policy is *caused* by inanimate contextual variables describing the socioeconomic and political structures of states and localities. Without denying that contextual variables affect policy outcomes, the critics of the mainstream model point out that the distribution of policy benefits — which is the essential political science question — is instead directly caused by animate people-oriented demand activities. In a psychologically plausible theory of the policy process, these demand inputs and withinputs which affect policy decisions refer to the expectations, opinions, motivations, ideologies, interests and activities of people and not to such contextual factors as the class and racial composition of communities.¹⁵ Our theoretical framework recognizes the animate, people-oriented nature of demand inputs into the policy process by suggesting that two important demand stimuli that may affect policy decisions are public opinion and group demands.

Second, and very much related to the first point, is the observation that the mainstream model explains policy decisions by referring only to those factors which vary *across* political systems. However, critics have pointed out that the distribution of policy benefits is caused by factors which vary *within* political systems.¹⁶ It makes theoretical sense to view policy decisions to spend relatively large percentages of public funds in a given policy area as being affected by the distribution of mass and elite concerns within the community. For example, increased spending on environmental protection may be affected by citizens *within* a community giving a higher priority to environmental protection than to other service and policy areas. It makes less sense, theoretically, to view a policy decision to spend a large percentage of public funds on one policy, relative to other policy areas, as being affected by the distribution of mass and elite concerns *across* communities. Our theoretical framework recognizes that the distribution of policy in communities is affected by *intra*-community factors. It is our view that policymakers usually respond to the distribution of power and preferences *within* their community in distributing public resources. It is the distribution of demand inputs within the community which is the major stimulus requiring decisions resulting in differential degrees of policy effort across policy areas.¹⁷ Again, our theoretical perspective recognizes this by suggesting that the *intra*-community distribution of public policy effort may be affected by the *intra*-community distribution of public opinion and group demands.

Third, the mainstream model of the policy process has failed to yield parsimonious explanations of policy variations because it has used, as

dependent variables, policy decisions in each of numerous, *separate* issue areas.¹⁸ The result has been that we have separate explanations for such areas as welfare policy, police policy and education policy. Although it is important to recognize the variations which occur among policy subsystems, this discreet treatment of policy by each issue area has had the effect of retarding a broader, more inclusive understanding of the policy process at the community level. Because of the scarcity of resources, governmental decisions are inter-related. When governments spend more revenue, time and effort on a given policy they must give proportionately less revenue, time and effort to other policy areas. Thus the distribution of policy effort *across* the various functional subsystems of a community is the most fundamental political decision confronting policy-makers. When policy analysts examine policy decisions discreetly, they fail to consider the interrelatedness of policy decisions across various issue areas. By focusing on the distribution of public policy across issue areas, our model enables an examination of policy decisions in numerous issue areas simultaneously; the result is that more general explanations of the policy process are possible.

Fourth, the mainstream model of the policy process has viewed environmental and political variables as independent variables – rather than as specification variables – in the policy process. Although contextual variables may directly affect public policies (as when the lack of community wealth forces officials to reduce public spending), critics of the mainstream model have argued that the role of contextual variables in the policy process has been misinterpreted.¹⁹ In Eastonian theory, the political characteristics of communities are important not because they are independent variables directly causing policy variations, but rather because these contextual variables specify the conditions under which demand inputs are converted into policy outputs.²⁰ In other words, if one views policy decisions as being affected by numerous demand inputs and withinputs, the importance of contextual variables is that some contextual conditions (for instance, the presence of reformed governmental institutions) may enhance the extent to which some demand inputs (for instance, the concerns of the middle class) are reflected in policy decisions while reducing the extent to which other demand inputs (for instance, the concerns of the working class) are reflected in policy decisions.²¹ Our model recognizes this role which contextual variables play in the policy process by providing for an examination of how various contextual variables affect the *linkages* between public opinion and public policy and between group demands and public policy.²²

Fifth, the mainstream model of the policy process has been developed with little regard to its possible contributions to broader theoretical and normative issues. In contrast, the theoretical model presented in Figure 1 is explicitly concerned with a central issue in democratic theory: the policy responsiveness of governments to citizen concerns.²³ We recognize that, empirically, policymakers are responsive to many types of stimuli. The concerns of private elites, elected officials, city administrators and public employees are among the many demand stimuli affecting policy decisions. Relative to these elite-based inputs and withinputs, the mass-based inputs of public opinion may be little reflected in policy decisions. However, our concern is not to provide a complete explanation of variations in the levels of public policy effort. Instead, our concern is to contribute to democratic theory by determining how congruent the distribution of policy effort is with two types of citizen inputs — public opinion and group demands — and further to determine what kinds of socioeconomic and political conditions enhance the responsiveness of officials to these inputs.

In order to clarify further our theoretical framework, it is useful to consider our conception of political activity within communities — which results in inter-city variations in the levels and modes of responsiveness — and the political context which includes those structural factors of communities which may explain these variations in responsiveness.

Political Activity

Three concepts are used in this paper in analyzing the political activity within communities: (1) the distribution of public policy benefits indicates how local policy-makers allocate funds among various service areas (for instance, public safety, social services and transportation); (2) unarticulated citizen preferences refer to the public opinion in a community concerning how citizens think funds should be allocated among various governmental functions; and (3) articulated interest group demands refer to the level of organized group pressure on behalf of expenditures in various service areas. It is our contention that the relationships among these three political variables — public policy allocations, citizen preferences and group demands — constitute a critical part of the dynamic elements in the policymaking process within communities.

As shown in Figure 1, there are three linkages among these three political activity variables. The first linkage is concerned with the relationship between public opinion and the distribution of public policy

benefits. When communities attain a high level of congruence between public opinion and public policy, the inference is that local officials are highly responsive to the dominant public preferences in a community. The second linkage is concerned with the relationship between group demands and public policy. When communities attain a high level of congruence between group demands and public policy, the inference is that local officials are highly responsive to group demands.²⁴ The third linkage is concerned with the relationship between public preferences and group demands. If there is a strong positive correlation between the pattern of group demands and public opinion in a community regarding the allocation of policy benefits, then it is possible to infer that those citizens who are active members of groups are highly representative of all citizens in the community — the inactive as well as the active. In such circumstances, policy responsiveness to group demands results simultaneously in policy responsiveness to public opinion.

There are good reasons, however, for supposing that responding to group demands will not necessarily result in being responsive to the dominant citizen preferences in a community. It has frequently been observed that most citizens are not active members of groups and that those few persons who do participate in organized group activity tend to be socioeconomically advantaged relative to non-participants.²⁵ Because of the substantial differences in the policy preferences of high SES and low SES citizens,²⁶ group demands are not normally representative of the dominant but unarticulated preferences in the whole community. For these reasons we hypothesize that, in many communities, group demands and citizen preferences will be unrelated. In such circumstances, officials charged with allocating public funds will have two *independent* citizen-based stimuli — public opinion and group demands — to which they can respond.

There are, to our knowledge, very few studies in political science which have attempted to assess the relative degree of responsiveness to public opinion and group demands in policy adoptions.²⁷ Typically, political scientists investigate one form of citizen input — either public opinion or group demands — to the exclusion of the other form of citizen input. Indeed, it can be argued that one theoretical perspective in the study of the linkage between citizens and public policy focuses almost exclusively on the degree to which public policy reflects public opinion,²⁸ while a second theoretical perspective focuses almost exclusively on the degree to which policy reflects group demands.²⁹ In the absence of theory and research which investigates simultaneously the

degree of responsiveness to public opinion and group demands in actual policy adoptions, we are unable to hypothesize, on a priori grounds, whether public policy decisions will better reflect public opinion or group demands.

Perhaps there are variations across communities in the importance of public opinion and group demands as citizen inputs in the policy process. Such an assumption is consistent with the findings of Verba and Nie and Hansen³⁰ that there is substantial variation among communities in the degree to which public and private elites are responsive to citizen preferences. Such an assumption is also consistent with the findings of Eulau and Prewitt³¹ and Zisk³² that there is substantial variation among communities in the degree to which members of city councils are responsive to group demands. Given such variations, it is reasonable to suppose that, in distributing public resources, some communities will exhibit a relatively high degree of responsiveness to both public opinion and group demands; that some communities will exhibit a relatively high degree of responsiveness to either public opinion or group demands but not to the other type of citizen input; and that still other communities will exhibit little responsiveness to either public opinion or group demands.

The Political Context

These variations among communities in the level of responsiveness to public opinion and group demands exhibited by their governments may be explained by the contextual variables listed in Figure 1. It is our broad working hypothesis that certain environmental and political characteristics of communities are important in the policy process because they have the effect of causing government to be more or less responsive to various types of citizen inputs. Thus contextual variables that cause governments to allocate policy benefits in a manner reflective of public opinion and/or group demands should be positively related to our measures of responsiveness. Conversely, contextual variables that cause governments to allocate policy benefits in ways which are not consistent with the pattern of public opinion and/or group demands should be negatively related to our measures of responsiveness. Of course, some contextual variables may simultaneously enhance responsiveness to one type of citizen input (for instance, group demands), while retarding responsiveness to the other type of citizen input (for instance, public opinion). Therefore a major concern of this paper is to determine the types of contextual variables that affect the congruence between public opinion and public policy and between group demands and public policy.

In this regard, the most general hypothesis to be examined is that *political variables are more important than environmental variables in affecting the patterns of policy responsiveness in communities*. Many traditional studies of the policy process have found political variables to be less important than environmental variables in affecting policy levels.³³ However, political theory has suggested that political variables may be vitally important in determining the extent to which citizen inputs are *converted* into policy outputs.³⁴ Although certain environmental conditions can affect, to some extent, the level of responsiveness within a community, political conditions should be more important determinants of responsiveness. After all, it is such political factors as the level of party competition, the form of political representation, the level of professionalism in government and the pattern of citizen participation which encourage or discourage the effective communication of citizen concerns to policymakers.³⁵

This general hypothesis will be tested by examining the extent to which responsiveness to public opinion and group demands is enhanced or retarded by the socioeconomic and political variables shown in Figure 1. In this section, specific hypotheses concerning the effects of each of these contextual variables are briefly discussed.³⁶

1 Size of Communities. Responsiveness to both public opinion and group demands should be reduced in large communities. Citizens in large cities believe that municipal officials are less responsive to their preferences and demands than do citizens in small cities,³⁷ and these beliefs probably reflect the fact that the social distance between citizens and officials is increased in large cities.³⁸

2 Population Wealth. Responsiveness to both public opinion and group demands will be enhanced by the presence of many high SES citizens. Wealthier communities should be able to better satisfy the ongoing policy wishes of all citizens and groups in a community, largely because they have sufficient intra-community resources with which to meet citizen demands. Officials in wealthy communities should be particularly able to allocate resources in responsive ways, simply because they can afford the luxury of being responsive to various types of citizen demands. Less wealthy communities, however, may feel compelled to use their resources to support policies which officials consider important but unpopular, thus resulting in less overall responsiveness to citizen demands and preferences.

3 Population Heterogeneity. Responsiveness to both public opinion and group demands should be reduced by population heterogeneity. Heterogeneity results in a lack of consensus regarding policy preferences. Be-

cause of the diversity of citizen preferences in a heterogeneous environment, policymakers will be unable to discern — and thus will be unable to respond to — a dominant public opinion,

The exact effect of heterogeneity on responsiveness to group demands is more difficult to ascertain. It is conventional to argue that heterogeneous communities tend to have fairly well-developed organizational infra-structures which enhance the vitality of group life and presumably also enhance the responsiveness of officials to group demands.³⁹ However, another point of view suggests that responsiveness is more difficult to achieve in heterogeneous environments because policymakers cannot respond equally to the often conflicting demands of various types of groups.⁴⁰ The disparity in these views can be explained, we think, by considering the somewhat paradoxical effect of heterogeneity on group life and policy responsiveness. Heterogeneous environments provide the social structure necessary for interest group formation and vitality, but heterogeneous environments also tend to spawn political conflict among groups, thereby making the political efforts of each group less effective than they would be in a relatively non-conflicting homogeneous setting. Thus it is possible that heterogeneity will tend to reduce responsiveness to group demands, not because groups are not active in such an environment, but rather because policymakers cannot respond equally to conflicting group demands.

4. Community Power Structure. Responsiveness to both public opinion and group demands should be enhanced by the dispersion of power in communities. When communities have dispersed power structures, they are characterized by having a relatively large number of persons involved in initiating, bargaining and vetoing policy decisions⁴¹ and by having little effective involvement of business leaders in the policy process.⁴² The absence of business dominance in a community and the active involvement of many types of persons in the policy process should make communities increasingly open to various types of citizen inputs.⁴³

5. Party Competition. Responsiveness to both public opinion and group demands should be enhanced by the presence of party competition. According to the prevailing theory, party competition provides policymakers with the incentive to be attentive to public preferences in order to ensure job security.⁴⁴ Recent research suggests that officials facing stiff electoral competition are particularly attentive to group demands, for it is the members of groups who are most attentive to their actions.⁴⁵

6. *Voter Turnout.* Responsiveness to public opinion should be enhanced by high voter turnout while responsiveness to group demands should be reduced by high voter turnout. When voting levels are low in communities, voters do not constitute a representative cross-section of the population; those voting tend to be higher SES citizens, many of whom are also members of groups. Realization of this fact should encourage policymakers in communities characterized by lower voter turnout to be primarily responsive to active groups. High voter turnout means that the normally inactive, as well as the active, are participating in elections, thus encouraging officials to be attentive to dominant public opinion.⁴⁶

7. *Form of Government.* Responsiveness to public opinion should be reduced while responsiveness to group demands should be enhanced by the presence of reformed political structures. While this view tends to be the opposite of that put forth by the reformers who argued that reformed councils tend to think more of the community as a whole and less of factional interests in making their decision,⁴⁷ we nevertheless think the weight of research evidence is on our side. In a now classic article, Lineberry and Fowler⁴⁸ argue that reformed institutions — city manager government, nonpartisan elections and at-large representation — have insulated policymakers from citizens and therefore make it difficult for citizens to communicate their preferences to policymakers; in their words, the greater the reformism, the lower the responsiveness. However, this article fails to differentiate between various forms of citizen inputs, and it is thus impossible to determine whether responsiveness to both public opinion and group demands is reduced by reformed institutions.⁴⁹ It is our hypothesis that responsiveness to public opinion is particularly reduced. Reformism results in the dominance in local politics of professionals who are likely to put administrative considerations and efficiency ahead of public preferences when making policy decisions. In unreformed communities the effective policymakers tend to be politicians rather than bureaucrats. The primary incentive for politicians is to win the support of voters by responding to their preferences and needs.

The professional orientation which predominates in reformed cities might also reduce responsiveness to the particularistic demands of groups.⁵⁰ However, it must be remembered that both professional policymakers and the members of interest groups are, for the most part, middle and upper class citizens. Thus the demands of many community groups, particularly the influential business and civic groups, are likely to be congruent with the concerns of professional policymakers. The

result may be that the pattern of expenditures in reformed cities reflects group demands.

8. Media Coverage. Responsiveness to both public opinion and group demands should be enhanced by extensive media coverage of local politics. Although the role of media in local politics is one of the most neglected areas in urban research, there are theoretical reasons for supposing that media play a crucial role in linking citizens to policymakers. As Banfield and Wilson⁵¹ note, local newspapers exhibit wide variation in the degree to which they are concerned with civic and political affairs. When the media fail to give wide coverage to the normal, but unspectacular, events in local politics, it is increasingly difficult for residents to carry forth their democratic role as informed and knowledgeable citizens.⁵² Thus we would suspect that, in the absence of an adequate press, citizens would find it difficult to develop strong preferences regarding the distribution of policy benefits and would thus make few demands on policymakers. At the same time, the absence of widespread media coverage of policy decisions should free policymakers from public constraints, thus reducing overall responsiveness.

MEASURING RESPONSIVENESS TO PUBLIC OPINION AND GROUP DEMANDS IN 51 CITIES

In order to measure variations in the responsiveness of local officials to public opinion and group demands, data on 51 cities in the Permanent Community Sample (PCS) have been analyzed. This sample was selected because it has served as a useful laboratory for many studies of urban politics; it was thus possible to draw on the data collected by others, much of which is available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. Because these data have been described extensively elsewhere,⁵³ the PCS is not described here.

For each of the 51 PCS cities, intra-community analyses were conducted of the inter-relationships among public opinion, group demand and public policy variables. For this phase of the investigation, nine service areas were adopted as units of analysis: public safety, environmental protection, public health, social services, education, public transportation, libraries, recreation and public housing. For each community, the following measures of political activity were obtained: (1) the percent of revenue sharing funds allocated to each of the nine service areas; (2) the percent of the population supporting revenue shar-

ing allocations in each of the nine service areas; and (3) the extent of group demand within each of the nine service areas.

The proportion of total General Revenue Sharing funds allocated by the 51 PCS cities to each of the nine service areas under investigation were obtained from the Actual Use Reports for the fourth entitlement period (1974-75).⁵⁴ It should be noted that the use of these data is not without limitations. First, it is reasonable to suppose that a substantial amount of measurement error is present in these data.⁵⁵ Although there is no indication that the measurement errors that exist are either widespread or systematic,⁵⁶ such difficulties can obviously reduce the accuracy of our measures of responsiveness. A second limitation in using revenue sharing policy data concerns the generality of findings. Certainly, the representativeness of revenue sharing as a policy area is open to question. Had data regarding the distribution of locally generated funds or data regarding regulatory policy been examined, different results might have been obtained. Nevertheless, the use of revenue sharing data permits a comparative analysis of responsiveness using equivalent policy data for a broad variety of cities.

Data regarding public opinion were obtained by utilizing a modification of a simulation technique initially developed for state policy analysis by Frank Munger,⁵⁷ and most fully described by Ronald Weber.⁵⁸ Synthetic estimates of citizen preferences regarding the preferred allocation of revenue sharing benefits in each city were obtained using two types of data: (1) census data regarding the demographic (or citizen-type) compositions of each city, and (2) national survey data, obtained from the Opinion Research Corporation,⁵⁹ regarding the revenue sharing policy preferences of various types of citizens. By combining the preferences of each citizen-type and the demographic composition of each city, measures were obtained of the extent of public support for allocating revenue sharing funds to each of nine service areas in each of the 51 PCS cities.⁶⁰

Measures of group demands were obtained from a 1975 mail survey of agency officials in the 51 cities. The officials were asked to be informants regarding the activities of a variety of types of groups who were viewed as being potentially active in community politics. Approximately 54 percent of the agency officials who were contacted responded to the questionnaire. Indicators of the level of group demands in each service area were obtained by categorizing and aggregating the perceptions of these agency officials regarding the levels of activity of

groups who were the expected beneficiaries of revenue sharing expenditures in each service area. If informants failed to provide estimates of the level of activity by groups who were the likely beneficiaries of expenditures in certain service areas, we treated the level of group demands in that service area as missing data. Thus the number of service areas in which we obtained measures of group demands varies from community to community. This resulted in a decision to omit, in that part of the data analysis dealing with responsiveness to group demands, eight communities for which we only had data on the level of group demands in less than four service areas.

These data regarding the distribution of revenue sharing funds, public preferences and group demands were used in the construction of our measures of responsiveness. Responsiveness to public opinion in each city was measured by relating, using zero-order Pearsonian correlation coefficients, the extent of public support for spending revenue sharing funds in each service area with actual expenditures in each service area. Responsiveness to group demands in each city was measured by correlating the extent of group demand in each service area with the actual revenue sharing allocations in these service areas.

Table 1 reports the resulting measures of responsiveness to public opinion and responsiveness to group demands for the cities in our sample. These measures suggest two conclusions. First, the two dimensions of responsiveness reported here are not significantly inter-related (the Pearsonian correlation coefficient relating responsiveness to public opinion and responsiveness to group demands is only 0.07). This suggests that group demands and public policy are two distinct forms of citizen inputs. Because organized interest groups in communities are not very representative of the community as a whole, responding to group demands is unlikely to ensure a high level of responsiveness to citizen preferences generally.⁶¹ Second, there is a great deal of variability across communities in the extent to which public opinion and group demands are reflected in policy. For example, in some cities there is apparently a moderate amount of responsiveness to public opinion (in Manchester, $r = 0.29$) and/or to group demands (in Gary, $r = 0.76$). In other communities, there is apparently much less responsiveness to public opinion (in Amarillo, $r = -0.48$) and/or group demands (in Milwaukee, $r = -0.91$).⁶²

Table 1 The Levels of Responsiveness to Public Opinion and Responsiveness to Group Demands in 51 PCS Cities

PCS No. Community	RESPONSIVENESS TO PUBLIC OPINION	RESPONSIVENESS TO GROUP DEMANDS
	Pearsonian Correlation coefficient between simulated public opinion and the distri- bution of revenue sharing funds over 9 service areas	Pearsonian Correlation coefficient between group demands and the distribution of revenue sharing funds
00 Akron, OH	- 0.094	- 0.588
01 Albany, NY	- 0.039	_____ *
02 Amarillo, TX	- 0.475	- 0.518
03 Atlanta, GA	- 0.011	_____
04 Berkeley, CA	- 0.215	- 0.512
05 Birmingham, AL	- 0.311	_____
06 Bloomington, MN	- 0.050	- 0.319
07 Boston, MA	- 0.355	- 0.268
08 Buffalo, NY	- 0.045	_____
09 Cambridge MA	- 0.613	- 0.487
10 Charlotte, NC	- 0.388	0.552
11 Clifton, NJ	- 0.378	_____
12 Duluth, MN	- 0.227	- 0.788
13 Euclid, OH	0.188	- 0.483
14 Ft. Worth, TX	- 0.144	- 0.470
15 Fullerton, CA	- 0.390	0.017
16 Gary, IN	0.105	0.762
17 Hamilton, OH	- 0.043	0.019
18 Hammond, IN	0.090	- 0.157
19 Indianapolis, IN	- 0.087	- 0.769
20 Irvington, NJ	- 0.022	- 0.487
21 Jacksonville, FL	- 0.247	- 0.339
22 Long Beach, CA	- 0.389	0.583
23 Malden, MA	- 0.102	0.095
24 Manchester, NH	0.286	0.000
25 Memphis, TN	- 0.212	- 0.401
26 Milwaukee, WI	- 0.405	- 0.913
27 Minneapolis, MN	- 0.131	- 0.208
28 Newark, NJ	- 0.102	- 0.227
29 Palo Alto, CA	- 0.369	- 0.479
30 Pasadena, CA	- 0.356	- 0.165
31 Phoenix, AZ	- 0.139	- 0.464
32 Pittsburgh, PA	- 0.062	- 0.408
33 St. Louis, MO	- 0.382	- 0.329
34 St. Paul, MN	- 0.153	- 0.581
35 St. Petersburg, FL	0.201	0.218
36 Salt Lake City, UT	- 0.031	- 0.771
37 San Francisco, CA	0.224	- 0.515

Table 1 (cont'd)

PCS No.	Community	Responsiveness to Public Opinion	Responsiveness to Groups Demands
38	Santa Ana, CA	-0.175	-0.230
39	San Jose, CA	-0.120	-0.417
40	Santa Monica, CA	-0.286	-0.378
41	Schenectady, NY	-0.252	
42	Seattle, WA	-0.220	-0.599
43	South Bend, IN	0.091	-0.751
44	Tampa, FL	-0.301	-0.515
45	Tyler, TX	0.183	
46	Utica, NY	-0.009	-0.509
47	Waco, TX	-0.126	-0.325
48	Warren, MI	-0.102	-0.426
49	Waterbury, CN	-0.128	-0.419
50	Waukegan, IL	-0.039	

*No scores calculated because of excessive missing data regarding group demands.

THE EFFECTS OF CONTEXTUAL FACTORS ON RESPONSIVENESS

In order to account for variations in responsiveness patterns, the data in Tables 2 through 4 are presented. Table 2 presents data pertaining to the impact which selected environmental characteristics of cities, considered alone, have on responsiveness to both public opinion and group demands. Table 3 presents similar data pertaining to selected political characteristics of communities. In the Appendix, the measures of the environmental and political characteristics reported in Tables 2 and 3 are discussed. To obtain the results reported in these tables, multiple regression analyses were performed in which each dimension of responsiveness was regressed on, first, the environmental variables in the analysis and, second, on the political variables in the analysis. The degree of relationship between the responsiveness measures and each environmental characteristic is indicated by the zero-order correlation coefficient and the corresponding beta weights shown in Tables 2 and 3. In these tables, the beta weights estimate the independent impact of each contextual variable when the effects of the other contextual variables included in the model under consideration are controlled. These analyses, of course, fail to apply controls for both environmental and political characteristics *simultaneously* in the

estimation of the impact of a contextual variable on our measures of responsiveness. Thus we performed an additional regression analysis in which the responsiveness measures were regressed on those environmental and political variables that were significantly related to responsiveness in the separate analyses. The results of the joint consideration of these environmental and political variables is presented in Table 4.

Table 2 The Relationship of Policy Responsiveness to Selected Environmental Characteristics

	RESPONSIVENESS TO PUBLIC OPINION		RESPONSIVENESS TO GROUP DEMANDS	
	Zero Order Correlation	Beta Weights	Zero Order Correlation	Beta Weights
CITY SIZE				
1970 Population	-0.09	-0.14	-0.21	-0.31*
POPULATION WEALTH				
Percent with High School Education	-0.23	0.08	-0.13	0.11
Percent Professionally Employed	-0.28	-0.43*	-0.14	-0.15
HETEROGENEITY				
Percent Nonwhite	0.01	-0.04	0.24	0.20
Percent Foreign Stock	0.07	0.07	-0.10	-0.26*
Percent Catholic Population	0.14	0.03	-0.04	0.00
Coefficient of Deter- mination, R ²		0.14		0.15

*: Coefficients at least 1.5 times their standard errors.

Table 3 The Relationship of Policy Responsiveness to Selected Political Characteristics

	RESPONSIVENESS TO PUBLIC OPINION		RESPONSIVENESS TO GROUP DEMANDS	
	Zero Order Correlation	Beta Weights	Zero Order Correlation	Beta Weights
POWER STRUCTURE				
Index of Decentralized Power	0.24	0.02	- 0.22	- 0.01
Index of Business Dominance	0.00	0.15	0.21	0.03
PARTY COMPETITION	0.24	0.07	- 0.30	0.01
VOTING TURNOUT	- 0.03	- 0.20	- 0.23	- 0.27
POLITICAL REFORMISM	- 0.44	- 0.50*	0.15	- 0.23*
MEDIA COVERAGE OF LOCAL POLITICS	0.36	0.38*	0.51	0.42*
Coefficient of Determination, R^2		0.34		0.26

*: Coefficients at least 1.5 times their standard errors.

Table 4 The Relationship of Policy Responsiveness to Environmental and Political Characteristics, Considered Together

	RESPONSIVENESS TO PUBLIC OPINION	RESPONSIVENESS TO GROUP DEMANDS
	Beta Weights	Beta Weights
CITY SIZE		
1970 Population		- 0.12
POPULATION WEALTH		
Percent Professionally Employed	- 0.14	
HETEROGENEITY		
Percent Foreign Stock		0.44*
VOTING TURNOUT		0.22
POLITICAL REFORMISM	- 0.32*	0.32*
MEDIA COVERAGE OF LOCAL POLITICS	0.31*	0.55*
Coefficient of Determination, R^2	0.29	0.40

*: Coefficients at least 1.5 times their standard errors.

The results suggest that environmental variables are not very important in the explanation of responsiveness to citizen preferences and group demands. In fact, the coefficients of determination (R^2) indicate that only 15 percent or less of the variation in our responsiveness measures can be attributed to the six environmental variables under consideration. The results further show that, when all controls are applied, responsiveness to public opinion is not significantly affected by any environmental variables. Although one indicator of population wealth, percent professionally employed, is significantly related to responsiveness to public opinion in Table 2, even this relationship disappears when controls for political variables are introduced in Table 4. Thus our hypotheses regarding the effects of environmental characteristics on responsiveness to public opinion have not been supported by this analysis.

Responsiveness to group demands is significantly related to both city size and one measure of heterogeneity, percent foreign stock, in the multivariate analysis presented in Table 2. However, only the indicator of heterogeneity is related to this dimension of responsiveness in the more comprehensive analyses presented in Table 4. Cities with comparatively large foreign stock populations do not appear to be as responsive to group demands as less heterogeneous cities. While this tends to support our original hypothesis, such evidence must be evaluated cautiously. First, heterogeneity obviously means much more to most persons than simply a high percentage of foreign stock in a community. And the other indicators of heterogeneity are not related to either measure of responsiveness. Second, according to our hypotheses, heterogeneity should be negatively related to responsiveness to public opinion as well as to responsiveness to group demands. But in our analysis, heterogeneity and responsiveness to public opinion are not related. Hence one should interpret the observed linkage between percent foreign stock and unresponsiveness to group demands with due consideration for its limitations.

In short, the responsiveness of local officials to citizen inputs in their allocation of funds does not appear to be very dependent on environmental variables. This finding is significant because it suggests that local decision-makers may have considerably more discretionary power to affect important aspects of public policy than has been popularly portrayed in recent literature. While numerous other studies have suggested that many important policy decisions in local communities are highly determined by such environmental factors as the level of community wealth,⁶³ these factors do not appear to limit the extent to which

policymakers can be responsive to citizen inputs in the allocation of revenue sharing funds.

Political structure variables appear to have a greater impact than environmental variables on the responsiveness of local communities to citizen inputs in the allocation of revenue sharing funds. As shown in Table 3, six political characteristics — decentralized power, the dominance of business groups in communities, party competition, voting turnout, political reformism and media coverage — explain 34 percent of the variation in responsiveness to public opinion and 28 percent of the variation in responsiveness to group demands. However, most of the predictive power of these political structure variables appears to come from variation in two sources: reformism and media coverage. The other variables — decentralized power, business dominance, party competition, and voter turnout — are not significantly related to either measure of responsiveness when all controls are applied. Thus we must consider our hypotheses regarding the effects of power structure and electoral variables on responsiveness to be unsupported by these data. Decentralized power structures, high levels of party competition and high voter turnout do not appear to enhance the responsiveness of local officials to either public opinion or group demands.

More extensive media coverage is associated with higher levels of responsiveness to both public opinion and group demands. In fact, the evidence in Table 4 indicates that the media coverage variable may be among the more important factors affecting the level of responsiveness to citizen inputs. Political reformism is also related to responsiveness in the hypothesized directions. Table 4 shows that higher levels of reformism result in lower levels of responsiveness to public opinion and higher levels of responsiveness to group demands. Because the form of local government and the adequacy of media coverage appear to be the most important factors facilitating responsiveness in the allocation of revenue sharing funds, our hypothesis is supported that political institutions play crucial roles in facilitating the translation of citizen inputs into public policy. These findings also give relatively clear prescriptions for the types of changes in local politics that are required to enhance responsiveness to dominant citizen preferences. If we desire the enactment of policies which are reflective of public opinion, it appears that it is useful to urge the re-adoption of relatively politicized unreformed governmental structures and to induce the media to pay greater attention to local politics in their daily coverage of community affairs.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Generally, our findings show that cities vary widely in the degree to which they have been responsive to public opinion and group demands. In examining the factors that affect responsiveness, two general conclusions emerge. First, many of the environmental and political structure variables which we hypothesized would affect responsiveness are not, in the empirical examination, related to responsiveness. The evidence suggests, for example, that large cities are no more unresponsive than small cities, and that wealthy cities are no more responsive than less wealthy cities. Similarly, we found that cities with decentralized power structures were no less likely to be unresponsive than cities with more centralized power structures. In addition, party competition and voting turnout are essentially unrelated to responsiveness. Together, these findings suggest that responsiveness to public opinion and group demands is not significantly affected by various environmental characteristics of communities or by many political structures in communities.

Yet the question remains as to whether these findings are generalizable to a variety of policy areas or whether they simply pertain to the responsiveness of local officials in the perhaps unique policy area of revenue sharing allocations. Caution suggests that we recognize the possible uniqueness of revenue sharing policy decisions in local government.⁶⁴ The revenue sharing program gave unprecedented discretion to local officials to allocate federal funds in ways they considered useful. Given the financial pressures on many city budgets, some officials have obviously decided to use these funds for the sheer maintenance of governmental functions, without regard for public opinion or interest group pressure. Moreover, the relative lack of familiarity of most citizens and interest groups with revenue sharing, and its consequent lack of visibility, has accorded city officials wide latitude in the allocation of these funds. Thus the distribution of revenue sharing funds has probably failed to become highly politicized in most communities. Hence we find that citizen inputs frequently have little impact on the distribution of revenue-sharing funds, and such political variables as party competition and voting turnout do not facilitate higher levels of responsiveness to citizen inputs in revenue-sharing decisions.

The second important conclusion to emerge is that the level of responsiveness exhibited by cities in the allocation of revenue sharing funds tends to be due primarily to two factors: (1) the extensiveness of

media coverage of local politics and (2) the presence or absence of reformed governmental institutions. Greater media coverage enhances responsiveness to both public opinion and group demands, while the presence of reformed institutions tends to decrease responsiveness to public opinion and enhance responsiveness to group demands.

The critical importance of the media in the allocative process is probably due to its performance of two functions: it informs citizens and interest groups and it acts as a constraint on the discretion of local officials. It appears that substantial media coverage of the local policy-making process enhances the belief among policymakers that they will be held accountable to the public for their actions. Thus media coverage forces city officials to be responsive to citizen inputs.

The importance of formal governmental institutions in the policy process is that they affect citizen accessibility to government. In reformed cities, groups tend to have more access to public officials and thus officials in such communities are more responsive to groups. In unreformed cities, officials are more responsive to public opinion because the elected representatives in these cities have identifiable constituencies that are not, in most instances, identical with organized group interests, and because there are institutionalized mechanisms in unreformed cities, such as political parties, for the aggregation of mass demands.⁶⁵

APPENDIX

In this appendix, the procedures used to measure many of the contextual variables used in the analysis are discussed; those environmental variables (for instance, city population and percent age of nonwhites), which are not discussed below are common census statistics reported in the *County and City Data Book*.

(1). *Percent Catholic Population*. These scores were obtained from *Churches and Church Membership in the United States*,⁶⁶ and pertain to the counties within which cities are located. The scores are averaged for those cities crossing county boundaries.

(2). *The Index of Decentralization*. This variable indicates the extent to which decisions in a number of policy areas are influenced by a large rather than small number of actors. For a discussion of the 'ersatz method' used to create this measure and for the scores for the 51 PCS cities, see Clark.⁶⁷

(3). *The Index of Business Dominance*. This measure is based upon data reported in the original Permanent Community Sample data set. These data, obtained from ICPR, report judgements by community informants regarding the degree of influence possessed by various community groups; for instance, the Chamber of Commerce, industrial leaders, ethnic groups and the Democratic and Republican

Parties. Laura L. Morlock⁶⁸ has examined a similar list of community groups and, by use of factor analysis, has determined that these groups align themselves into two different clusters: business interests and non-business interests. On the basis of her analysis, we identified six groups as representing business interests (the Republican Party, newspapers, the Chamber of Commerce, industrial leaders, retail merchants and bankers), and we identified four groups as representing non-business interests (the Democratic Party, labor unions, ethnic groups and neighbourhood groups). We then obtained an average business influence score and an average non-business influence score for each community. A ratio of the business influence score to the non-business influence score in each community is then used as our index of business dominance.

(4). *The Index of Party Competition.* Party competition is measured utilizing several variables reported in the original PCS data set; (1) the degree to which neither party historically dominates the mayor's office; (2) the degree to which control of the mayor's office and the city council was split between the parties in 1966; (3) the degree of equality of influence between the Republican and Democratic Parties.

(5). *The Index of Reformism.* Governmental reformism is measured in this paper using a modification of a similar index created by Lineberry and Fowler.⁶⁹ Data were obtained from the *Municipal Yearbook, 1965* regarding form of government (mayor, manager, or commission), type of municipal elections (partisan or non-partisan), nature of councilmen's constituency (ward, mixed, or at-large), and the civil service practices of a community (the percentage of municipal employees covered by civil service). The index of increasing reformism was created by simply adding the extent to which a city had reformed characteristics of these institutions.

(6). *Voter Turnout.* This measure was obtained from a mail questionnaire sent to second-level city administrators in 1975.⁷⁰ These administrators were simply asked to indicate the percentage of population over 18 years who voted in the previous local election. This variable is measured in 35 cities in the PCS.

(7). *Media Coverage of Local Politics.* The adequacy of media coverage of local politics was also obtained from the 1975 mail questionnaire.⁷¹ City administrators were asked to indicate (a) the average proportion of the front page of local newspapers devoted to local politics, (b) the average proportion of headlines of local newspapers concerned with local politics and (c) the adequacy of newspaper coverage of revenue sharing decisions as judged by city administrators. The index of media coverage used in the analysis is an unweighted, additive measure of these three variables. These measures were obtained for 35 cities in the PCS.

NOTES

1. H.K. Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 209-10.
2. See for example, W.R. Shaffer and R.E. Weber, *Political Responsiveness in the American States*, (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1974); H. Eulau and K. Prewitt, *Labyrinths of Democracy: Adoptions, Linkages, Representation and Policies in Urban Politics*, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), 424-43; and S. Verba and N.H. Nie, *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 299-343.
3. P.D. Schumaker, 'Responsiveness to Citizen Demands and Preferences: Reflections on Past Findings and Future Research,' *Proceedings of the Missouri Political Science Association Annual Meeting* (1976).
4. M.K. Jennings and H. Zeigler, 'Response Styles and Politics: The Case of School Boards,' *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 18 (May 1971), 290-321.
5. P.D. Schumaker, 'Policy Responsiveness to Protest Group Demands,' *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 37, (May 1975), 488-521.
6. R. Prewitt and H. Eulau, 'Political Matrix and Political Representation: Prolegomenon to a New Departure from an Old Problem,' *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 63, (June 1969), 427-41.
7. B.H. Zisk, *Local Interest Politics: A One-Way Street*, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973).
8. A.K. Karnig, "'Private Regarding' Policy, Civil Rights Groups, and the Mediating Impact of Municipal Reforms,' *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 19, (February 1975), 91-106.
9. W.R. Shaffer and R.E. Weber, *op. cit.*
10. R.A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).
11. For a discussion of the intensity question, see W. Kendall and G.W. Carey, 'The Intensity Problem and Democratic Theory,' *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62, (March 1968), 5-24.
12. Formally, the mainstream model of public policy can be stated using the following equation:

$$(1) P_i = b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + b_3x_3 + \dots + b_nx_n + e$$
 where P_i refers to measures of policy levels in a specific issue-area (i); x_1 to x_n are various independent variables such as the environmental and political characteristics of communities; and e refers to the systemic error term. In the traditional analyses, Equation 1 is solved by cross-community analysis only. Thus if measures of public opinion or group demands are included in the analysis as independent variables, these measures of citizen inputs are treated — like the contextual variables in the model — as invariants within communities.
13. R. Dawson and J. Robinson, 'Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States,' *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 25, (August 1963), 265-89; T.R. Dye, *Politics, Economics, and the Public*,

(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); B.W. Hawkins, *Politics and Urban Policies*, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971); and M.S. Lewis-Beck, 'The Relative Importance of Socioeconomic and Political Variables for Public Policy', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 71, (June 1977), 559-67.

14. H. Jacob and M. Lipsky, 'Outputs, Structure, and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics', *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 30 (May 1968), 510-38; G.F. Schaefer and S.H. Rakoff, 'Politics, Policy, and Political Science: Theoretical Alternatives', *Politics and Society*, Vol. 1, (November 1970), 51-78; and J.M. Munns, 'The Environment, Politics, and Policy Literature: A Critique and Reformulation', *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 28, (December 1975), 646-67.
15. D. Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, (New York: Wiley, 1965), 41-7.
16. D.R. Morgan and S.A. Kirkpatrick, *Urban Political Analysis: A Systems Approach*, (New York: Free Press, 1972), Vol. 7.
17. Of course, policymakers also respond to demands generated by external factors such as national organizations and federal policies. (See T.N. Clark, *Community Power and Policy Outputs*, (Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications 1973), 5-11.) Our model could be expanded to accommodate these phenomena. For example, the extent to which city officials respond to federal pressures could be determined by viewing the level of federal pressure as variable within a community across policy areas. If the policies of the federal government encourage cities to spend more on mass transportation than on road construction and if a city subsequently placed greater emphasis on mass transportation policies than on road construction policies, they would be 'responsive' to the stimulation provided by the federal government.
18. Formally, Equation 1 is reanalyzed for each issue area. Different estimates of the effects of the independent variable are thus obtained for each issue-area.
19. H. Jacob and M. Lipsky, *op. cit.*
20. D. Easton, *op. cit.*
21. E.C. Banfield and J.Q. Wilson, *City Politics*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1963).
22. Formally, the notion that contextual variables enhance or retard the linkages between demand inputs and public policy requires a model of the policy process which provides for the interaction effects of contextual variables and demand input variables on public policy. Equation 2 provides a possible model having such interaction effects:

$$(2) P = b_{x_1} I_1 + b_{x_2} I_2 + \dots + b_{x_n} I_n + b_{c_1} C_1 + b_{c_2} C_2 + \dots + b_{c_n} C_n + b_{IC_1} (I_1 C_1) + b_{IC_2} (I_2 C_1) + b_{IC_3} (I_1 C_2) + \dots + e$$

where P is a measure of policy in different communities; I_1 to I_n are various measures of citizen inputs; C_1 to C_n are various contextual variables; and e again refers to the systemic error term.

This formulation enables an examination of how policy is affected by citizen input variables, (I), contextual variables (C), and the interaction of various citizen input and various contextual variables (IC). This model might seem to be a desirable model because it would examine both the independent and additive effects on policy of citizen inputs and contextual variables, and it would show the additional multiplicative impact on policy of the combin-

ation of certain contextual characteristics and citizen inputs. However, there are several reasons why we have chosen not to utilize Equation 2 in our analysis. First, this model implies that cross-community, rather than intra-community, variations in citizen inputs are the relevant determinants of public policy. Second, this model requires separate treatments of variations in policy levels in each issue-area under investigation. Third, as one increases the number of independent variables in the analysis, the equation quickly becomes insolvable when one's sample is small. With eight contextual variables and two citizen input variables, we would need to estimate 26 parameters to investigate the various additive and multiplicative relationships in the model. Reliable estimates of these parameters would not be possible in our analysis of 51 cities.

Because of these difficulties, we have formulated an alternative model for investigating the interaction of contextual variables and citizen inputs in their effects on policy. This model is presented in Equation 3.

$$(3) R_i = b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + b_3x_3 + \dots + b_nx_n + e$$

where R_i refers to two dimensions of policy responsiveness (e.g., to public opinion and to group demands); x_1 to x_n are various contextual variables; e refers to the systemic error term. This formulation has several advantages over the model presented in Equation 2. First, the two dependent variables – responsiveness to public opinion and responsiveness to group demands – are measured by intra-community analysis. In this phase of the analysis, it is possible to estimate the extent to which public policy is congruent with these two forms of people-oriented 'demand inputs' in each community. Then, in the subsequent cross-community analysis, which is conducted using Equation 3, it is possible to determine the extent to which various contextual variables enhance or retard the congruence between the distribution of public opinion and the distribution of policy effort and the congruence between the distribution of group demands and the distribution of policy effort. Thus the use of Equation 3 permits a direct test of the theoretical framework presented in Figure 1; it permits an examination of the extent to which the pattern of citizen inputs are reflected in the pattern of policy decisions in various communities; and it permits an analysis of how contextual variables affect citizen input-public policy linkages.

23. See H.K. Pitkin, *op. cit.*
24. It is important to recognize that the concept of responsiveness is distinct from the concept of direct influence. (See P.D. Schumaker and R.W. Getter, 'Responsiveness Bias in 51 American Cities', *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21, (May 1977), 251.) For example, when one says that public opinion directly influences policy outcomes, one is maintaining that the public opinion directly causes, or has forced officials to make policy decisions. (For a discussion of causal relationships as forcing relationships, see H.M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), 9-11). In contrast, when one says that policy-makers are responsive to public opinion, one is leaving open the question of the causal relationship between public opinion and policy. Policy-makers are responsive to public opinion if they adopt policies that are congruent with mass preferences even if they did not know

about or consider these preferences in making their decisions. For example, policymakers can be responsive to public opinion even if elite concerns rather than public opinion are the direct causes of policy, provided that elite concerns and public opinion are identical.

25. E.F. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People*, (Hinsdale, Illinois, Dryden Press, 1960); G. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963); A.N. Orum, 'A Reappraisal of the Social and Political Participation of Negroes', *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 71, (January 1966), 38-45; S. Verba and N.H. Nie, *op. cit.*
26. See, for example, F.J. Fowler, Jr., *Citizen Attitudes Toward Local Government, Services, and Taxes*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1974).
27. For an interesting exception, see R.E. Weber and W.R. Shaffer, 'Public Opinion and American State Policy-Making', *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 16, (November, 1972), 683-699.
28. See, for example, A. Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); W.H. Riker and P.C. Ordeshook, *Positive Political Theory*, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1973); W.E. Miller and D.E. Stokes, 'Constituency Influence in Congress', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 57 (March 1963), 45-56; W.R. Shaffer and R.E. Weber, *op. cit.*; and S. Verba and N.H. Nie, *op. cit.*
29. See, for example, D. Truman, *The Governmental Process*, 2nd Ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970); T.J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969); R. Prewitt and H. Eulau, *op. cit.*, B.H. Zisk, *op. cit.*; and L.L. Morlock, 'Business Interests, Counter-vailing Groups, and the Balance of Influence in 91 Cities'; W.D. Hawley and F.M. Wirt (eds.), *The Search for Community Power*, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1974).
30. S. Verba and N.H. Nie, *op. cit.*, S.B. Hensen, 'Participation, Political Structure, and Concurrence,' *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 69 (December 1975), 1181-99.
31. H. Eulau and K. Prewitt, *op. cit.*
32. B.H. Zisk, *op. cit.*
33. R. Dawson and J. Robinson, *op. cit.*; T.R. Dye, *op. cit.*
34. D. Easton, *op. cit.*
35. V.O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949); R.L. Lineberry and E.P. Fowler, 'Reformism and Public Policy in American Cities', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 61 (September 1967), 701-16; S. Verba and N.H. Nie, *op. cit.*; and S.B. Hansen, *op. cit.*
36. This list of contextual variables is based on a review of the theoretical and empirical literature concerned with the responsiveness of state and local governments (P.D. Schumaker, 'Responsiveness to Citizen Demands and Preferences: Reflections on Past Findings and Future Research', *Proceedings of the Missouri Political Science Association Annual Meeting*, 1976). The factors chosen for analysis here are those most often cited in the previous literature as important facilitators or inhibitors of policy responsiveness.
37. C.S. Fischer, 'The City and Political Psychology', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 69 (June 1975), 559-71; A.W. Finifter and P.R. Abramson, 'City Size and Feelings of Political Competence', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 39 (Summer 1975), 189-98.
38. S. Verba and N.H. Nie, *op. cit.*, 229-47.
39. E.C. Banfield and J.Q. Wilson, *op. cit.*; R. Prewitt and H. Eulau, *op. cit.*
40. S.B. Hansen, *op. cit.*, 1196.
41. T.N. Clark, 'Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures,

- and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities', in C.L. Bonjean, T.N. Clark and R.L. Lineberry (eds.), *Community Politics: A Behavioural Approach*, (New York: Free Press, 1971).
42. L.L. Morlock, *op. cit.*
 43. M. Aiken, 'Distribution of Community Power: Structural Bases and Social Consequences', in M. Aiken and P. Mott (eds.), *The Structure of Community Power*, (New York: Random House, 1970); and T.N. Clark, *Community Power and Policy Outputs*, (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1973).
 44. V.O. Key, Jr., *op. cit.*; W.L. Shade and F.S. Munger, 'Consensus, Conflict and Congruence: Policy-Making in the American States'. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, (September, 1973); C.F. Cnudde and D.J. McCrone, 'Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 63 (September 1969), 858-66; and S.B. Hansen, *op. cit.*
 45. R. Prewitt and H. Eulau, *op. cit.*, 433.
 46. S. Verba and N.H. Nie, *op. cit.*, Part III.
 47. H. Stone, D.L. Price and K. Stone, *City Manager Government in the United States*, (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940), 238.
 48. R.L. Lineberry and E.P. Fowler, *op. cit.*, 714.
 49. See A.K. Karnig, *op. cit.*, 92-3, for a critique of Lineberry and Fowler's analysis.
 50. E.C. Banfield and J.Q. Wilson, *op. cit.*; A.K. Karnig, *ibid.*
 51. E.C. Banfield and J.Q. Wilson, *ibid.*, 316-23.
 52. For a discussion of this aspect of democratic citizenship, see C. Cohen, *Democracy*, (New York: Free Press, 1971), 156-61.
 53. P.H. Rossi and R.L. Crain, 'The NORC Permanent Community Sample', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 32 (Summer 1968), 261-72; T.N. Clark, (1971), *op. cit.*; T.N. Clark, 'Research in Progress Using the Permanent Community Sample', Unpublished Paper, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago (1975).
 54. Only nine policy categories were used in this analysis for two reasons. First, the nine policy areas listed account for most of the revenue sharing allocations in American cities. See, R. Getter and P.D. Schumaker, 'Political Structure and Policy Responsiveness in the Distribution of Revenue Sharing Funds in 51 American Cities'. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, Dallas, (April, 1976). Second, the survey conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation, which was used to measure public opinion, coded citizen preferences for only these nine service areas.
 55. C.H. Lovell and J.L. Korey, 'Measuring the Fiscal Impact of General Revenue Sharing: Effects of General Revenue Sharing on Policy Choices in 97 California Cities'. Delivered at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, (September 1975).
 56. R.F. Barlow, R. Juster and G. Wilensky, 'Economic Aspects of Revenue Sharing in Municipalities', in *Revenue Sharing: A Selection of Recent Research. A Report Prepared by the Subcommittee on Inter-governmental Relations of the Committee on Governmental Operations*, U.S. Government Printing Office, (1975) 183-234.

57. F.J. Munger, 'Opinions, Elections, Parties, and Policies: A Cross-State Analysis'. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, (September, 1969).
58. R.E. Weber, *Public Policy Preferences in the States*, (Bloomington: Institute for Public Administration, Indiana University, 1971).
59. Opinion Research Corporation. 'The General Public and Community Leaders View the General Revenue Sharing Program', (Princeton, New Jersey: The Opinion Research Corporation, 1975).
60. A more detailed discussion of the procedures and validity of the simulation model used in this phase of the investigation can be found in P.D. Schumaker, 'Synthetic Estimates of Citizen Policy Priorities for American Communities.' Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Phoenix, (April 1977).
61. This discussion of the interrelationships between public opinion and group demand variables in the 51 cities is based on an analysis which is more fully presented in R. Getter and P.D. Schumaker, *op. cit.*
62. The many negative relationships between citizen inputs and public policy reported in Table 1 might be construed to indicate that most cities have been unresponsive to both public opinion and group demands in their distribution of revenue sharing funds. However, the reader should be warned that one reason for the very low levels of responsiveness reported in Table 1 was our decision to retain the service area of education in our analysis. Federal revenue sharing laws prohibit the use of revenue sharing funds for most educational purposes; thus most cities reported spending negligible amounts on education. However, the public opinion survey conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation which was used in the simulation of citizen preferences indicated that education was the top priority of most citizens. Thus our measures of public opinion in most cities showed high levels of support for allocating revenue sharing funds to education. Similarly, our survey of city administrators showed high levels of group demands in the area of education. In short, because of the sizable gap between citizen inputs and revenue sharing policy in the area of education a great deal of nonresponsiveness is indicated by our summary measures. We are simply pointing out that part of the lack of responsiveness indicated by our measures is due to federal regulations, and only part of the lack of responsiveness is due to local political factors.

Although one can argue, perhaps, that the decision to include education as a service area has artificially reduced the levels of responsiveness for cities in our sample, this decision has not substantially affected our analysis of the determinants of responsiveness. The omission of education as a service area would simply have increased our responsiveness scores for each city in a relatively uniform manner.
63. B.W. Hawkins, *op. cit.*
64. The uniqueness of the revenue sharing allocative process is supported by a comparison of the results presented in this paper with a somewhat complementary study of the responsiveness of locally generated funds. (See, P. Schumaker and B. Loomis, 'Mass Participation, Political Structure, and Policy Responsiveness in American Communities: The Case of Spending Levels and Priorities'. Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, (September 1975). That study suggested that in allocating locally generated funds communities are, on the whole, moderately responsive to citizen preferences and that dispersed power structures, party competition and high voter turnout enhance such

responsiveness.

66. Churches and Church Membership in the United States. (New York: National Council of Churches of Christ, 1956).
67. T.N. Clark, op. cit. (1971).
68. L.L. Morlock, op. cit.
69. R.L. Lineberry and E.P. Fowler, op. cit.
70. K. Hunt, 'The Impact of Media Coverage on Citizen Efficacy: An Analysis of Contextual Effects'. An Unpublished Honors Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Kansas (1976).
71. Ibid.