

In *Urban Policy Analysis*
edited by Terry N. Clark
Sage, 1981

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Citizen Preferences and Policy Responsiveness

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SINCE THE LANDMARK STUDY of Lineberry and Fowler (1967) into the relationship between municipal governmental structure and responsiveness, substantial attention has been given to investigating the responsiveness of city governments to citizen preferences. The central questions addressed in these studies include: (1) How responsive are local policymakers (Parenti, 1970)? (2) Which types of citizens (for example, active and inactive, blacks and whites) are most likely to have their preferences receive a favorable response from policymakers (Verba and Nie, 1972; Schumaker and Getter, 1977)? (3) On what kinds of issues are policymakers most responsive (Sutton, 1973; Schumaker and Loomis, 1979)? (4) By what processes are citizen preferences converted to responsive policies (Luttbeg, 1974)? (5) What are the barriers to responsive local government (Zeigler and Tucker, 1978; Weber, 1975)? (6) What types of citizen behaviors enhance responsiveness (Verba and Nie, 1972; Schumaker and Billeaux, 1978)? (7) What political, economic, and social characteristics of cities affect responsiveness (Eulau and Prewitt, 1973; Karnig, 1975; Getter and Schumaker, 1978a)? Although there is apparent agreement on the theoretical and practical importance of these questions, there is little consensus among urban scholars about their answers or about how to study them.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: This research was supported by the General Research Fund of the University of Kansas. My understanding of the ten issues presented in this chapter has profited from discussion and work with my colleague, Russell Getter. His numerous contributions are acknowledged and appreciated, though he bears no responsibility for the conclusions presented here.

In this chapter ten unresolved issues which have retarded cumulative research on responsiveness are considered. By focusing on these issues, it is possible to review and assess various approaches to the study of the responsiveness of local governments. The principal assumption underlying these assessments is that the purpose of focusing on responsiveness is to develop descriptive and explanatory theory, supported by convincing empirical evidence, concerning the linkage between the policy preferences of citizens of political communities and the public policies of their governments. It is assumed that the link between citizen preferences and governmental policies is always imperfect; various degrees of "translation error" (Godwin and Shepard, 1976) occur depending on the characteristics of the people involved and the organizational, political, social, and economic settings in which politics occurs.

When discussing these issues, attention will be focused on responsiveness of municipal governments to holistic citizen preferences. This focus is for purposes of brevity only. Clearly, the central questions about responsiveness concern how and why officials respond differentially to the diverse preferences of various subpopulations within communities. Thus, while the discussion emphasizes responsiveness to the public generally, it also pertains to questions about responsiveness to white citizens, to black citizens, to upper-status citizens, to lower-status citizens, and so on.¹ And while the discussion emphasizes responsiveness of municipal governments, it also pertains to other governmental bodies (such as school districts and county governments) in urban settings.

Some very broad recommendations for the future study of responsiveness result from analysis of the ten issues. The major conclusion is that large-scale cross-community investigations are currently feasible only through the utilization of crude surrogate measures of important components of policy responsiveness. Such studies may have important heuristic functions, but they cannot provide convincing evidence confirming central theoretical propositions. More rapid development and validation of theory on responsiveness may occur by conducting case studies using a common theoretical framework and methodological approach. While it is possible to indicate the broad outlines of such an approach, a number of problems must still be solved to make it operational.

THE CONCEPT OF RESPONSIVENESS

Like democracy and justice, responsive government is praised by almost everyone, though there is little consensus about the meaning of the

term. In this section, three issues involving the definition and measurement of responsiveness are considered.

Issue 1: In order to be considered responsive, to what extent must urban policymakers act according to citizen preferences?

According to Pitkin (1972: 209-210), political representation requires that policymakers "act in the interests of the represented, in a manner responsive to them . . . that the representative must not be found persistently at odds with the wishes of the represented without good reason in terms of their interest, without a good explanation of why their views are not in accord with their interests." This formulation, which is the starting point of most recent studies of responsiveness, is ambiguous about the extent to which responsive policymakers can act contrary to the will of the public.

Most researchers have emphasized the norm of not being "at odds with the wishes" of citizens. By defining and measuring responsiveness as the extent to which policies are congruent with citizen policy preferences, these researchers categorize as "unresponsive" any policy actions which are inconsistent with dominant preferences, regardless of whether these actions are justified by policymakers as meeting the real interests of constituents.

In contrast, Eulau and Karps (1978: 69) argue that policymakers need merely "stand ready to be responsive"—what Pitkin emphasized is "a potential for response rather than the act of response." Thus, in this approach, the proper indicators of whether or not policymakers are responsive are their role orientations or "representational response styles." If policymakers indicate in interviews or questionnaires that they consider the views of attentive publics or issue groups, they are categorized as responsive; those who claim to be immune from external pressures, acting instead on the basis of "self-defined images(s) of what community needs are," are labeled unresponsive (Prewitt and Eulau, 1969: 430).

Both of these formulations have obvious merit. If the purposes of studying responsiveness are to develop a normative theory of representative government or a standard for evaluating the performance of local policymakers, then the conception of responsiveness as congruence between citizen preferences and public policy may be inadequate. It does an injustice to the richness of Pitkin's notion of representative government. It is neither possible nor desirable for policymakers always to act in accordance with dominant citizen preferences. But if the purpose of studying responsiveness is to develop an empirical theory of the translation error which occurs in converting citizen inputs into policy, then responsiveness should be conceptualized as preference-policy congru-

ence. As suggested by Miller and Stokes (1963), there are two components to translation error: (1) the gap between actual citizen preferences and citizen preferences as perceived by policymakers, and (2) the gap between perceived citizen preferences and public policy. Both are identifiable using the congruence approach, as actual preferences can be related to perceived preferences and perceived preferences can be related to policy actions (Schumaker et al., 1979: 26). But studies of representational response styles tell us nothing about either of these gaps. The mere fact that policymakers indicate they are willing to listen to citizens and groups provides little assurance that they will accurately perceive public wants. An adequate theory of responsiveness must consider the extent to which policymakers misperceive citizen preferences and the role political institutions play in bringing about these misperceptions. And even if policymakers listen to and accurately perceive citizen wants, a responsive predisposition by officials does not ensure that their actual policy-making behavior will reflect citizen preferences. Thus, empirical theory about political linkages requires that responsiveness be conceptualized as congruence between citizen wants and public policy.

Issue 2: Does responsiveness connote a unidirectional relationship in which citizen preferences cause public policy, or does it connote mere correlation between citizen preferences and policy?

The relationship between citizen preferences and policy actions has two component parts: the influence of citizens on policymakers and the influence of policymakers on citizens (Edelman, 1971; Erikson, 1976: 28-30; Shaffer and Weber, 1974; Schumaker and Loomis, 1979). Because many normative democratic theorists (Pateman, 1970; Bachrach, 1967) hold that policymakers should respond to citizen initiatives, it has been questioned whether responsiveness is also achieved when policymakers influence public attitudes, bringing them into alignment with policy decisions.

There are several reasons for viewing responsiveness as preference-policy congruence without specifying how congruence is achieved. First, philosophical conceptions of political representation seldom suggest that policymakers should be merely reactive. As Eulau and Karps (1978: 69) point out, representatives have a "superior position" vis-à-vis citizens because they are chosen to make decisions. Policymakers should thus exercise political leadership, proposing programs and policies responsive to community needs (Burns, 1978). When such initiatives are supported by citizens, policymakers should not be labeled unresponsive merely because the initiative does not come from the people. Second, citizens seem better able to generate meaningful preferences in response to policymaker behavior than to articulate policy initiatives (Wahlke, 1978). Respon-

siveness as congruence recognizes that the requisites of representative democracy have been fulfilled if policymakers can maintain support for their activities. Third, disentangling the causal processes in the citizen-policymaker relationship is an important but complex methodological problem which need not be solved if responsiveness is conceptualized as congruence. Thus, while citizen influence over policy involves a unidirectional causal relationship flowing from citizens to policymakers, responsiveness should be viewed as congruence between citizens and policy without regard for the causal processes involved (Schumaker et al., 1979: 21-23).

Issue 3: Should responsiveness be analyzed principally as a dyadic or collective relationship between citizens and policymakers?

In the literature on state legislatures and congress, responsiveness is often viewed as a dyadic relationship of legislators and their districts (Kuklinski, 1978; Weissberg, 1978). However, studies of local responsiveness have normally adopted a collective perspective on representation. While dyadic representation concerns whether *individual* representatives respond positively to dominant citizen preferences in their districts, collective representation concerns whether *collective* decisions of a policy-making body are consistent with dominant preferences of all citizens in the political community. Weissberg (1978: 536-537) has argued that collective representation is the more useful concept because, unlike dyadic representation, it recognizes the importance of virtual representation, which occurs when citizen preferences are represented by policymakers other than their district representative. Since many American cities do not have ward structures which allow for dyadic representation, studying responsiveness of local governments from the perspective of collective representation is especially desirable.²

PUBLIC POLICY

Issue 4: What types of policy actions by urban officials should be considered to determine their responsiveness?

Eulau and Karp (1978: 62-67) have argued that "there are four possible policy-related components of responsiveness which, as a whole, constitute representation": policy responsiveness, service responsiveness, allocation responsiveness, and symbolic responsiveness. Policy responsiveness is concerned with policymakers being attentive to citizen preferences on "the great issues that agitate the political process." Service responsiveness involves bestowing benefits and advantages on particular constituents who request them. Allocation responsiveness is concerned

with pork barrel allocations of goods and services to specific spatial locations and has two distinct components in urban politics. One dimension concerns local officials seeking and receiving intergovernmental discretionary funds for community programs, projects, and facilities (Aiken and Alford, 1970; Clark, 1968). A second dimension concerns the intracity cross-neighborhood allocation of public services; when policymakers concentrate parks, police or fire services, or other public benefits in specific neighborhoods, they are exhibiting allocation responsiveness to the residents of that neighborhood (Levy et al., 1974; Lineberry, 1977, 1978). Finally, symbolic responsiveness is concerned with those "significant symbolic gestures . . . [by policymakers which] . . . generate and maintain continuing support of citizens."

Each of these is an important element of urban policy-making. Nevertheless, policy responsiveness is the concept that should receive the most attention by those interested in political linkage and translation error. Service responsiveness is peripheral to these concerns because such activities usually have no significant impact on public policy, at least when public policy is defined as those governmental activities having broad and persistent impacts on the public (Eulau and Prewitt, 1973: 473). The two dimensions of allocation responsiveness are also peripheral to these central concerns because they deal with policymaker behaviors without considering citizen preferences. Urban policymakers are not responsive to citizen preferences when they obtain a federal grant for a redevelopment project opposed by many citizens. And urban administrators are not equally responsive to preferences of lower-status and upper-status citizens when higher quality streets in upper-status neighborhoods are offset by expensive expressways in lower-status neighborhoods. Symbolic responsiveness is also a concept analyzed without adequate consideration of citizen preferences. If citizens prefer tangible policies instead of symbolic gestures, and if symbolic gestures fail to satisfy citizen concerns, it is difficult to see how policymakers who depend on symbols are responsive. Thus, only policy responsiveness deals with the linkage between citizen preferences and policy.

Issue 5: What efforts must policymakers make at various stages of the policy-making process in order to be responsive?

In their important study, Verba and Nie (1972: 300) suggested that "leaders are responsive if they accurately perceive citizen priorities, if they agree with the citizenry on the nature of community problems, and if they are active in trying to solve those problems." While this formulation asks only that policymakers share the same policy agenda as citizens, most students of responsiveness have demanded more policy-making behavior. For some, the test is whether policy enactments are consistent with citizen preferences (Shaffer and Weber, 1974). For others, enacted

policies should be fully implemented and/or enforced (Schumaker and Loomis, 1979).

These various approaches suggest that public officials make a variety of efforts to be responsive; they make themselves accessible to citizens; they hold hearings; they enact ordinances; they enforce laws; and they deliver services. In each such activity they may or may not behave according to citizen preferences. Thus to account for potential discrepancies in responsiveness of policymakers at different stages in the policy process, the level of policy effort by urban officials should be considered in each of three stages: (1) the institutional (agenda) stage, concerning the extent to which officials actively consider issues and weigh various courses of action or inaction; (2) the enactment stage, concerning the extent to which laws are made; and (3) the implementation stage, concerning the extent to which enacted laws are implemented and/or enforced (Getter and Schumaker, 1978b; Cobb and Elder, 1972).³

CITIZEN PREFERENCES

Issue 6: What citizen inputs should be analyzed to determine the level of responsiveness of urban policymakers?

The principal issue raised by this question is whether responsive policymakers consider only preferences of those citizens who communicate with them or if they somehow consider preferences of all citizens, including those who fail to articulate and communicate their desires (Verba and Nie, 1972: 268). Research has focused on responsiveness to specific group demands and individual requests (Karnig, 1975; Zeigler et al., 1974; Schumaker and Billeaux, 1978), responsiveness to public opinion (Verba and Nie, 1972; Hansen, 1975; Schumaker and Getter, 1977), and responsiveness to both group demands and public opinion (Getter and Schumaker, 1978a). A focus on responsiveness to public opinion provides the broadest understanding of political linkage. Studies of articulated demands capture mainly responsiveness to active, disproportionately upper-status citizens (Zeigler and Tucker, 1978: 5-6). But studies which fail to consider responsiveness to group demands and individual requests may not indicate to whom policymakers are principally responsive (Lowi, 1979: 167-197) and thus will fail to suggest why higher levels of responsiveness to public opinion are not achieved (Weber and Shaffer, 1972). Responsiveness to both public opinion and group demands should thus be studied.

Issue 7: How are articulated demands to be measured?

Investigations of responsiveness to group demands have been plagued by difficulties in measuring articulated demands. Crude indicators of

group organization (for example, membership in the NAACP by community) have been used in comparative urban research as surrogate indicators of group demands (Karnig, 1975). And case studies have focused on whether designated groups have received what they requested, without adequate consideration of counterpressures by other groups (Lipsky, 1970; Parenti, 1970). To move beyond these difficulties, several problems must be considered.

First is the operational definition of "demand" (Greenstone, 1975: 244). For example, it is often difficult to distinguish citizen communications seeking clarification of and/or justification for existing policies from communications indicating clear policy preferences. Second, because policymakers usually receive communications supporting conflicting policy positions, both support of and opposition to policy proposals must be included in the measure of "net demands." But this raises a third problem: In calculating "net demands," how are various communications to be weighed? Since there is little justification for considering a single telephone call from one individual as an equivalent demand to persistent communications from leaders of large and powerful organizations, it makes poor sense to treat all demands equally. To deal with this problem, group demands should be weighed by the amount of "pressure"—an index involving group resources and activities—which accompanies each demand (Getter and Schumaker, 1978b). However, research has not been conducted establishing a valid index of group pressure.

Even if these conceptual problems are solved, data problems remain. It would be desirable to gather information directly from a random sample of active groups and citizens regarding their policy goals, activities, and resources. But because little is known about the universe of citizen organizations concerned with local politics (Newton, 1976: 42), it is unclear how to sample active communications. Perhaps the most feasible strategy currently available is to narrow studies to a few issues (see issue 9 below) and use a type of network analysis which identifies, through interviews with public officials, those persons and groups who communicate their concerns and which then permits, using snowball sampling techniques, successive interviews with activists and group leaders themselves (Bolland, 1979). Yet, the feasibility of this strategy is inversely proportional to the number of issues and communities under investigation.

Issue 8: How should unarticulated citizen preferences be measured?

For intracommunity studies of responsiveness, survey research is the obvious method for measuring public opinion. Random digit dialing enables easy and inexpensive representative samples to be drawn (Cummings, 1979). Policy preference questions can be crafted to fit specific

issues appropriate to the community under investigation. Questions tapping the awareness of respondents about these issues can filter out "non-attitudes" (Converse, 1970). Although technical problems with survey instruments should not be minimized (Clark, 1976), it is clear that survey measures of citizen preferences can be related to public policy measures to obtain indices of the level and distribution of responsiveness within communities.

In cross-community research to date, however, the high costs of administering equivalent surveys in a large sample of cities have resulted in use of surrogate measures of citizen preferences. Four are considered briefly.

The crudest surrogate indicators of citizen preferences are census data concerning socioeconomic characteristics of city residents (Lineberry and Fowler, 1967; Godwin and Shepard, 1976). Although microlevel research suggests that socioeconomic variables are reasonable predictors of individual preferences (Fowler, 1974; Loverich, 1974), this strategy must be viewed cautiously for several reasons. First, it is unclear whether socioeconomic variables measure "preferences" or "need" (Sharkansky, 1971). Second, socioeconomic variables may be good predictors of citizen preferences in some policy areas but not in others (Dawson, 1973). Third, while preferences may be a function of socioeconomic variables, they are also a function of contextual variables (for example, local press coverage or specific community problems) not measured by socioeconomic characteristics (Brunner, 1977). Fourth, in analyses with socioeconomic variables as indicators of citizen preferences, responsiveness is measured by the degree of correlation across communities between socioeconomic characteristics of cities as independent variables and measures of public policy as dependent variables (Lineberry and Fowler, 1967). This strategy is questionable on theoretical grounds because responsiveness is a community-level property which should be measured on the basis of intracommunity political activity (Getter and Schumaker, 1978b). Thus socioeconomic characteristics are not adequate indicators of citizen preferences.

Referenda results provide another method of measuring citizen preferences in cross-community research (Erikson et al., 1975; Kulinski, 1978). But they raise two problems. First, referenda on equivalent issues should be analyzed in each city, but such data are not normally available in a national sample. Second, because the referenda voter tends to be disproportionately upper-status (Clubb and Traugott, 1977: 145), the preferences measured by referenda may not be representative of all citizens. Thus the usefulness of referenda data as measures of community policy preferences is limited.

A third way to estimate citizen preferences is to measure elite perceptions about the public (Clark and Ferguson, 1981: 18-19). As suggested in the discussion of issue 1, the problem with this strategy is that there are significant gaps between actual citizen preferences and elite perceptions of these preferences (Hedlund and Friesema, 1972; Miller and Stokes, 1963). Thus, if elite perceptions are to be useful as indicators of citizen preferences, research must be conducted to identify the characteristics of those elites most accurate in perceiving public concerns.

A fourth method for estimating citizen preferences involves simulation models (de Sola Pool et al., 1965; Weber, 1971; Schumaker, 1977). Simulation models first generate predictions regarding policy preferences of different "citizen types" living within communities, and then calculate community-level policy preference scores after weighing the preferences of different citizen types by their proportion in the community. Existing simulation models have been criticized on many grounds. The most important limitation of models currently in use is their assumption that citizen preferences are solely a function of selected demographic variables (Seidman, 1975: 335). Effects of community context on preferences are ignored. A second important limitation is that the model used assumes linear, additive relationships among demographic variables and citizen preferences, an assumption challenged on theoretical (Seidman, 1975) and empirical grounds (Kuklinski, 1977). Despite these limitations, however, it has been shown that simulation models can yield reasonably accurate estimates of citizen priorities among various municipal services (Schumaker, 1977).

In summary, simulation models probably provide the most valid and feasible method for estimating citizen preferences in a large number of cities for responsiveness studies. However, existing models have their limitations and are poor substitutes for survey research. Thus, the most valid measures of citizen preferences can be obtained only through survey responses in intracommunity case studies.

POLITICAL ISSUES

Issue 9: What political issues should be analyzed to determine the policy responsiveness of local governments?

Any community includes a huge number of issues. Some are of concern to many people, while others concern only a few. Some reach the institutional agenda; others do not.⁴ Some are very abstract (for example, reducing crime), while others are concrete (such as whether or not to increase police surveillance in a particular neighborhood). As suggested by Polsby, "there seem to be no satisfactory criteria which would identify a

universe of decisions [issues] in a community so that a sample of 'typical' or 'representative' decisions could in principle be drawn" (Frey, 1971: 1064). Given these difficulties, researchers have normally selected issues based on their political and/or scholarly interests or availability of data. Without more defensible criteria, it is difficult to assess the generality of findings from such studies.

One suggestion has been to focus on the "great issues which agitate the political process" (Eulau and Karps, 1978: 62). However, the criticisms by Bachrach and Baratz (1962) of the selection of key issues in the study of community power are equally relevant to the study of responsiveness. The analysis of only controversial issues is likely to result in distorted estimates of the overall responsiveness of policymakers, as evidence suggests that policymakers are most responsive on such issues (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Kuklinski, 1978; Schumaker and Loomis, 1979).

To avoid the problems involved in selecting only "great" or "key" issues, representative samples of key issues, routine issues, and nonissues would all have to be analyzed. However, because few citizens are likely to have well-informed preferences on routine issues (Zeigler and Tucker, 1978: 212) and because of difficulties in selecting nonissues (Wolfinger, 1971), this strategy seems foreclosed.

One possible approach to these difficulties is to develop "policy concepts" (Clausen, 1973: 16-17; Kuklinski, 1978) grounded in political theory and philosophy which suggest fundamental types of issues which all political communities must address. For example: (1) What should be the level of spending and taxation by local governments? (2) How should governmental resources be distributed among various functions or services? For example, should resources go to "people-helping" or "community-serving" functions (Wilson and Banfield, 1971: 1052)? (3) To what extent should property and industry be regulated, or to what extent should property rights be preserved? (4) To what extent should local government subsidize or benefit specific individuals and industries in pursuit of collective values, such as enhancing the employment base or preserving downtown business districts? (5) Should tax obligations be allocated progressively, proportionately, or regressively? (6) Should governmental benefits be distributed on a compensatory basis to the most needy, on a basis of equity where benefits are proportionate to contribution, or on the basis of equality? (7) To what extent should behavior contrary to community norms be regulated and subjected to criminal sanction?

Having developed a list of such fundamental issues, specific examples of these issues relevant to the community under investigation can be selected. The criteria for the selection of issues in communities are thus of two kinds. First fundamental issues are selected on the basis of their

significance in political theory and philosophy. Second, specific issues are selected for their relevance to the community under study and for their "degree of fit" with the chosen fundamental issues. Selecting issues on this basis has several advantages. First, although the criteria involve researcher judgments, these can be defended on nonarbitrary grounds. Second, the criteria provide a basis for selecting nonissues. For example, substantial inequalities in property tax assessments may not be a controversial issue in a community—and may even be suppressed as an issue—but the closeness of its fit to the fundamental tax obligation issue (number 5) and its probable relevance to the community suggest its analysis. Third, although citizens may lack information and informed preferences about some specific community issues, they are likely to have meaningful and measurable preferences on the fundamental ones. Preferences on fundamental issues may be reliable predictors of preferences on specific issues and used accordingly in the analysis of governmental responsiveness (Nisbet, 1975).

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CASE STUDIES

Issue 10: Should more attention be given to comparative urban (cross-community) research or to case studies as methods for studying responsiveness at the local level?

Research on community power, the conceptual parent of policy responsiveness (Schumaker et al., 1979: 20-25), began by conducting a large number of case studies. Because these studies were motivated by diverse ideological perspectives and were conducted using different and controversial research methods, they did not produce cumulative findings (Aiken, 1970). Perhaps as a consequence, much of the research on the responsiveness of local governments has been conducted using comparative analysis rather than case studies. But, as suggested by the discussion thus far, comparative research has not always produced cumulative findings, owing to diverse conceptual frameworks, arbitrary selection of issues, and inadequate measures of citizen preferences, group demands, and public policy.

In contrast, slow but steady progress can be made through case studies which avoid ideological, conceptual, and methodological quarrels. By conducting a variety of case studies using equivalent theoretical frameworks and comparable data collection procedures, the basis for future comparisons across communities can emerge. Or, by developing a deductive theory of responsiveness which predicts specific patterns of responsiveness in "crucial cases," there may be little need to validate theory

using inductive procedures and a large sample of communities (Eckstein, 1975; Schumaker, 1981). In short, case studies may provide the most feasible basis, at present, for developing a theory concerning the responsiveness of local governments to citizen preferences.

CONCLUSIONS

The following recommendations regarding the study of responsiveness emerge from considering the ten issues presented above. First, the patterns of responsiveness in specific communities, conceived as the degree of linkage and translation error between the preferences of various citizens and the actions of policymakers, should be investigated through case studies. Second, such studies should begin by selecting specific community issues because they represent fundamental philosophical issues confronting all communities. Controversial issues, routine issues, and nonissues should all be sampled. Third, public opinion on both the fundamental issues and specific manifestations of these issues should be measured through survey research. Samples should be large enough to allow disaggregation into various subpopulations (for example, blacks and whites) to enable investigations of possible differential or unequal responsiveness. Fourth, group demands, activities, and resources pertaining to the specific issues under investigation should be measured by interviews with policymakers, activists, and group leaders. Indices of "group pressure" in support of and in opposition to various policies should be developed. Fifth, for the issues under investigation, the policy efforts of governmental officials should be measured at the institutional, enactment, and implementation stages of the policy process. Sixth, the pattern of responsiveness in communities should be determined by relating these policy efforts to the preferences of citizens taken as a whole, to the preferences of various subpopulations, and to the demands of various types of groups. Seventh, the resulting empirical descriptions of responsiveness should be compared to theoretical expectations and previously completed case study findings to enhance cumulative theory and research.

Even if agreement on these points is reached, many problems remain. For example, what specific measurement instruments should be used in ascertaining citizen preferences? How are various group activities and resources to be weighed in order to develop indices of group pressure? How are policy efforts to be measured at various stages of the policy process? How are measures of citizen inputs and policy outputs to be analyzed to generate measures of responsiveness? And, perhaps most important, what is the prevailing theory for deriving 'theoretical expect-

tations" against which to compare research results? Important as these questions are, there seems little need to address them until agreement is reached on the ten issues discussed here from which they are derived.

NOTES

1. The concepts of differential responsiveness (Verba and Nie, 1972: 315-318) and responsiveness bias (Schumaker and Getter, 1977) permit assessment of the extent to which policymakers are more responsive to one subpopulation (for example, whites) than to its categorical counterpart.

2. This is not to suggest that it would be inappropriate to study how different sets of urban policymakers vary in their responses to citizen inputs. As Rossi et al. (1974) suggest, mayors, councilmembers, and heads of municipal agencies can display different responsiveness patterns.

3. Different measurement procedures must be used to determine policy effort at each stage. For example, the extent to which policymakers consider policy proposals at the institutional stage can probably be measured best through interviews with policymakers and group leaders. Policy effort at the enactment stage can be measured using documentary data (such as minutes of council meetings, ordinances, and administrative correspondence). And policy effort at the implementation stage may use both interview and documentary data (for example, of changes in personnel and resource allocations).

4. Some issues will not make it to the institutional agenda of municipal governments simply because other governmental units have jurisdiction in the area. Obviously, studies of the responsiveness of municipal government should consider only those issues within their jurisdiction.

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