ESTIMATING THE FIRST AND (SOME OF THE) THIRD FACES OF COMMUNITY POWER

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The author provides an approach to estimating two dimensions of community power. The analysis of the first face of power concerns the direct causal impact of elected representatives, bureaucrats, notables, group leaders, individual activists, and citizens on policy decisions. The analysis of the third face of power concerns the capacity of such actors to influence policies indirectly by influencing the preferences of other actors. An examination of 28 issues in Lawrence, Kansas, suggests that only representatives significantly exercise the first face of power and that only group leaders may exercise the third face of power (through their ability to influence the preferences of representatives).

The study of community power once dominated the research agendas of urbanists. Despite the importance of discovering *Who Governs?* (Dahl 1961) or *Who Really Rules?* (Domhoff 1978), the search for community power was largely abandoned during the 1970s because ideological disagreements between pluralists and elite theorists retarded normal scientific progress (Ricci 1980). During the 1980s, the field was rejuvenated by new theories — particularly the economistic paradigm of Peterson (1981), the growth machine model of Logan and Molotch (1987), and the regime theories of Elkin (1987) and Stone (1989). By providing new explanations for the power of business and real estate interests and by redirecting attention to how power is organized to achieve collective goals, these new approaches have promoted optimism that important questions about community power can be resolved without the ideological rancor that characterized the previous era in the analysis of community power (Waste 1986, 204).

These developments have not, however, resolved the central questions that fueled the original pluralist-elite debate: To what extent and under what conditions is power in American communities distributed in a democratic manner? Urbanists are still unable to describe and explain variations in the

distribution of power within and across communities. To do so, at least three types of questions must be resolved. First, what is power? Pluralists have argued that power is the ability to have one's preferences affect policy decisions, but elite theorists have argued that this is merely *the first face of power*. Elite theorists have claimed that power is a much more subtle and complex concept. For example, they assert that the ability to suppress issues so that they never reach the resolution stage of the policymaking process constitutes an important *second face of power* and that the capacity to shape the preferences of participants in the policymaking process is an important *third face of power* (Lukes 1974). These various dimensions of power must be included within a comprehensive framework for the analysis of power (Clegg 1989).

Second, what kinds of actors should be compared in assessments about the distribution of power? Because pluralists have suggested that predominant power resides with elected representatives and the voting public and because elite theorists have countered that business and social elites (i.e., notables) actually control policymaking, it is clear that comprehensive analyses of community power must consider the power of representatives, citizens, notables, and perhaps other types of participants. Third, how can the power of various types of actors be measured? A methodology must be developed that provides comparable measures of the power of various actors along various dimensions in different circumstances.

This article addresses these issues regarding the distribution of community power. In the first section, a conceptual framework is presented for analyzing various dimensions of community power. In the second section, some alternative models of community policymaking are presented to suggest a typology of actors whose influence should be assessed in comprehensive analyses of community power. In the third section, a comparative-issues methodology is briefly described that has been used to estimate the first and (some of the) third faces of power in one community — Lawrence, Kansas. In the fourth section, the results of this analysis are presented. The implications for further research on community power are discussed in the conclusion.

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR
ASSESSING THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

One positive result of the earlier debates over community power is that some of the principle dimensions — or faces — of community power have been defined. In this section, the first, second, and third faces of power and systemic power are discussed to provide a framework for measuring the

power that is exercised in the resolution of community issues and to under-
stand the limitations of that framework.

THE FIRST FACE

The first dimension of power refers to the ability of actors to get what they
want in the resolution of policy issues. According to Nagel (1975, 29), "A
power relation, actual or potential, is an actual or potential causal relation
between the preferences of an actor regarding an outcome and the outcome
itself." Measures of the first face of power of particular types of actors (e.g.,
representatives, citizens, and notables) require that their preferences on
various community issues be measured and related to policy outcomes for
those issues. Those actors whose preferences are most strongly and directly
related to outcomes are most powerful — at least for those issues under
investigation.

This conception of the first face of power addresses several important
matters regarding the meaning and measurement of power. First, the concepts
of responsiveness and direct power can be distinguished. The extent to which
policies are responsive to the preferences of an actor type is measured by
zero-order correlations between their preferences and outcomes. Simply
because policies are responsive to an actor type — because community deci-
sions are normally consistent with their preferences — does not mean that the
actor type has power. For example, policies might be consistent with citizen
preferences even though citizens have had no influence on policymakers.
Perhaps representatives shape citizen preferences so that they are consistent
with their policies. Or perhaps notables have shaped citizen preferences and
policy outcomes so that both are consistent with elite concerns. As Nagel
(1975) said, power is a *causal* relationship between preferences and policy
outcomes. The direct power of an actor type is the direct causal relationship
between that type's preferences and outcomes; such relationships must
control for the preferences of other actor types and can be estimated by
standardized regression coefficients.

Second, this formulation recognizes that the first face of power cannot be
assessed on a single issue; it can only be estimated over a broad array of
issues. For a single issue, it is possible to determine whether or not a policy
outcome is responsive to (or consistent with) the dominant preferences of
various types of actors, but there would be no basis for inferring whose
preferences caused the policy outcome. Before inferring, for example, that
citizen preferences were the determining factor, the prudent analyst would
want to know if citizen preferences were reflected in policy decisions when
citizen preferences were at odds with those of representatives and notables.

In short, power can only be inferred from evidence that the preferences of an actor type prevailed over a range of issues, including issues when one actor type was opposed by other actor types.

Third, this formulation of the first face of power suggests that actors do not have to participate to be powerful. For example, if representatives correctly anticipate the preferences of inactive citizens (Friedrich 1963) and enact policies because of these preferences, the power of citizens is enhanced.

Fourth, this formulation allows for the possibility that power relations are often reciprocal (Simon 1953, 500-516) and for the stipulation that such reciprocity does not diminish the extent to which influence is exercised. Representatives may resolve certain issues consistently with the preferences of citizens in exchange for their votes in subsequent elections. That such an exchange involves reciprocal influence — such that citizen preferences affect issue outcomes at the same time that representatives affect citizen voting — does not diminish the power of citizens. Citizens have simply used their votes as a resource to achieve policy success.

In short, the first face of power concerns the ability of various actors to have their preferences affect the resolution of community policy issues. Such power can be estimated by measuring the preferences of various actors and policy outcomes and by relating these preferences to policy outcomes over a sample of community issues using ordinary-least-squares regression analysis.

THE SECOND FACE

Analyses focusing on the first face of power are insufficiently comprehensive to provide a complete description of the distribution of power in a community. According to Bachrach and Baratz (1970), there is a second face of power: the capacity of some actors to control the agenda of issues when the first face of power can be applied.

Measures of the first face of power provide distorted estimates of the overall distribution of power when the second face of power is applied to suppress issues. If the status quo is consistent with the preferences of some actors (e.g., notables), they may succeed in keeping issues that challenge the status quo from being placed on the policy agenda. The failure to include such *nonissues* in the sample of issues results in regression coefficients that underestimate notable influence. If citizen preferences oppose the status quo on suppressed issues, the omission of these nonissues in regression models leads to overestimates of citizen influence. Despite this problem, nonissues cannot be included in a matrix of data to attain better measures of the first face of power. By definition, nonissues are not issues, and they cannot be

included in a sample of issues. As a consequence, it must be understood that measures of the first face of power provide only a measure of the ability of actors to influence those issues that are on the agendas of governments (or perhaps other politically important organizations). The power that is exercised in the suppression of issues must be measured using separate non-decisional methods (Crenson 1971; Frey 1971).

In short, studies of the resolution of issues on the agendas of government have been subject to unrelenting criticism for failure to address adequately the second face of power. These criticisms have been well founded when they have pointed out that findings concerning the first face of power are inappropriately generalized to yield inferences about the overall distribution of power in communities. However, the internal validity of studies of the first face of power is not thereby undermined. Just as studies of issue suppression reveal much about the second face of power, studies of issue resolution reveal much about the first face of power.

THE THIRD FACE

The first face of power estimates the *direct* power of various actor types in resolving issues; the third face of power estimates the *indirect* power that various actor types (or structures) exercise when they affect the preferences of those actors having direct power (Gaventa 1980). Proponents of analyses of the third face of power contend that it is a mistake to assume that actor preferences are uncaused independent variables — that such preferences are internally generated through independent assessments of one's own interests and/or through independent judgments about the public interest. Instead, they argue that actor preferences may be influenced by others (or by structural properties of the overall social system). If this alternative interpretation is correct, the ability to influence the preferences of actors would seem to be an important aspect of the overall distribution of power.

Depending on the hypothesized determinants of actor-type preferences, estimates of the third face of power are either difficult or impossible to attain through studies such as that reported here. If the preferences of actors having direct power are thought to be influenced by the preferences of other types of actors, then accurate estimates of the third face of power are merely difficult to obtain. For example, suppose that notables influence representative preferences and that representative preferences, in turn, affect policy outcomes. In this case, notables could exercise ultimate (although indirect) influence on outcomes; even if analyses of the first face of power indicated that notables exercised no direct power, notables could exercise a third face of power by influencing representative preferences. The difficulty is that such

estimates of the third face of power are vulnerable because the relationships between notable preferences, representative preferences, and policy changes may not be completely identified; for example, representative preferences may influence notable preferences, or the preferences of other actor types may make spurious the coefficients obtained by regression models that are limited to analyzing the relationships among representative preferences, notable preferences, and policy outcomes. To overcome such difficulties, there must be a strong theoretical basis for identifying the relevant actor types and for specifying the causal directions among the preferences of various actor types.

The third face of power is impossible to estimate by the type of analysis proposed here if the preferences of actor types are influenced by exogenous variables—by some set of factors other than the preferences of those actor types that can be included in the model. For example, consider the possibility that *the capitalist ethic* permeates the local culture. The power of the capitalist ethic over the preferences of various actor types may be profound, but because such an ethic would be constant within a community, this effect could not be estimated by a case study of that community. Although such an ethic may work to the advantage of notables—reducing citizen opposition to their policy goals—the capitalist ethic should not be conceptualized as a dimension of the power of notables. Instead, the capitalistic ethic should be viewed as part of the distribution of systemic power in the community.

SYSTEMIC POWER

According to Stone (1980, 980), "Systemic power can be defined as that dimension of power in which durable features of the socioeconomic system confer advantages and disadvantages on groups in ways predisposing public officials to favor some interests at the expense of others." Systemic power thus concerns those aspects of the political setting that affect the probability that certain types of actors will have their preferences accommodated in policy decisions. Stone identifies systemic power as durable features of the socioeconomic system. For example, the need to increase the tax base to maintain or to enhance services without raising taxes prompts decision makers to resolve issues in ways favoring revenue producers (such as economic notables) rather than service demanders (such as lower-class citizens).

In addition to socioeconomic factors, other aspects of community settings may confer advantages and disadvantages on various actors, affecting the structure of systemic power. For example, the form of government may affect the distribution of power: Reformed institutions may favor bureaucrats and notables (Morlock 1974). The social composition of communities may affect

the structure of power: Officials may be more favorable to organized groups in heterogeneous cities (Getter and Schumaker 1978). The political culture may also affect the distribution of power: A strong capitalist ethic may make representatives and citizens especially sympathetic to the goals of economic notables.

In short, studies of community power that ignore systemic power are incomplete because "durable features" composing the setting of community politics do "favor some interests at the expense of others" (Stone 1980, 995). Indeed, the concept of systemic power is somewhat larger than that presented by Stone. In addition to those aspects of the socioeconomic system that tilt policy outcomes toward certain actors, the concept of systemic power logically includes all setting characteristics that persistently facilitate (or hinder) the capacity of various types of actors to achieve their goals. However, systemic power is a determinant, not a dimension, of power. The power of various actor types is measured by (1) the extent to which their preferences directly affect issue outcomes (the first face of power), (2) the extent to which they determine the agenda of community issues (the second face), and (3) the extent to which they influence the preferences of those actors having direct power (the third face). The concept of systemic power helps explain why some types of actors have greater or lesser amounts of each of these dimensions of power on a durable basis.

MODELS OF COMMUNITY POWER

Developers, realtors, downtown business people, bankers, industrialists, political parties, neighborhood organizations, environmentalists, feminists, and minorities are just a few of the many types of actors in community policy-making whose power could be estimated using the conceptual framework presented in the previous section. However, certain analytic problems can occur when numerous actor types are indiscriminately incorporated into analyses of community power. Beyond the obvious problem of attaining measures for each actor type on all issues within a sample, two statistical problems can arise. First is the problem that the number of independent variables in the regression models may approach the number of cases in the analysis. Because the number of issues under investigation is usually very small, regression coefficients indicating the power of each actor type may be unattainable if there are too many independent variables (one for the preferences of each actor type) in the model. Second is the problem of multicollinearity that occurs when the preferences of two or more actor types under consideration are highly intercorrelated, making regression coefficients sen-

sitive to sampling and measurement errors. If, for example, the preferences of developers and realtors were highly related, the standard errors of their regression coefficients would be great, leading to an inability to differentiate the underlying parameters of their power. Because of such difficulties, it is necessary to focus on a small number of actor types whose preferences are not highly intercorrelated. Nevertheless, if the analysis is limited to representatives, citizens, notables, bureaucrats, group leaders, and individual activists, the following widely cited models of community power can be evaluated.

ORTHODOX PLURALISM

Most pluralists regard elected representatives—especially mayors—as the most powerful actors in community decision making. But Dahl (1961) also recognized that, within their policy domains, economic notables and bureaucrats (such as school administrators and the directors of urban development agencies) have considerable power. By stressing the importance of *subleaders* as participants in various issue areas, Dahl also suggested that individual activists have significant power. By describing the role of the chamber of commerce, the Citizens Action Committee (for urban redevelopment), and ad hoc neighborhood organizations, Dahl suggested the power of group leaders. Finally, Dahl (1961, 163) maintained that elections provide inactive citizens with "indirect influence." Although pluralists have failed to provide precise estimates of the relative amounts of power held by representatives, bureaucrats, notables, group leaders, individual activists, and citizens, they have suggested the most comprehensive model of community power because they recognize the potential power of many types of actors. Other models emphasize the power of specific types of actors, suggesting that other actors can be ignored in parsimonious accounts of community power.

ELITISM

Elite theory holds that community policymaking is dominated by a small number of economic and social notables—persons who own or control disproportionate amounts of wealth and/or who are the most honored and prestigious persons in the community (Hunter 1953, 1980). Elite theory also suggests that such notables control the policy preferences of representatives, group leaders, and citizens; such actors thus are portrayed as having little independent impacts on policies.

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

According to orthodox understandings of representative democracy, elected representatives should use their best judgment to decide community issues, and voters should hold them accountable for their decisions (Pitkin 1972). To the extent that these ideals are realized, representatives are the most powerful actors in community decision making, citizens exercise significant but secondary levels of power, and notables, bureaucrats, group leaders, and individual activists are relatively powerless. By stressing the importance of the policy orientations of elected officials (Eulau and Eyestone 1968), by claiming a diminished role for political groups (Zisk 1973), and by ignoring the roles of bureaucrats, notables, and individual activists, the San Francisco Bay City Council Research Project (Eulau and Prewitt 1973) provided an empirical analysis suggesting that power is distributed according to the precepts of representative democracy.

THE POPULIST MODEL

Populists challenge the model of representative democracy by insisting that representatives should be agents of the people and enact policies that are consistent with *the will of the people*. This normative perspective has been reflected in economic theories of democracy (Downs 1957) claiming that representatives make policy decisions reflecting the preferences of *the median voter* to win reelection (Hoffman 1976). Studies of the relationship between citizen preferences and public policy (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1983) suggest significant levels of responsiveness to citizen preferences but leave unresolved the power of citizens; they fail to show that citizen preferences have a direct impact on policy decisions independent of the power of other types of actors.

THE ACTIVIST-DOMINANCE MODEL

Populists define *the will of the people* as the preferences among all citizens in the community as revealed, for example, by public opinion polls. However, in local politics, most citizens are not well informed about policy issues and/or do not communicate their preferences to officials (Peterson 1981, 116). The activist-dominance model thus recognizes that responding to *the people* often means responding to the wishes of those few activists who actively communicate their views to officials (Verba and Nie 1972, 267-85). If public officials equate activist preferences with public preferences or if activist preferences are perceived as legitimate expressions of intensely held

public concerns, individual activists may be powerful actors in community decision making.

THE HYPERPLURALIST MODEL

The hyperpluralist model (Wirt 1974; Yates 1977) focuses on the influence of those citizens who are leaders and members of interest groups. When organized groups exercise predominant power in the community, there is an absence of centralized leadership in decision making (Waste 1986, 124), suggesting that representatives, notables, and bureaucrats are relatively powerless.

THE BUREAUCRATIC-RULE MODEL

Modernization may have produced urban problems that are too complex to be understood and resolved by amateurs (like representatives and citizens). As a result, experts holding administrative positions — persons like the city manager and his staff, city planners, and engineers in the public works department — may now be highly influential in the resolution of issues. There appear to be two variants of the bureaucratic model. The service-delivery literature suggests that policy decisions are largely the result of bureaucratic preferences that are derived from professional norms, existing rules, and perceived public needs (Lineberry 1977, 153-54). In contrast, the literature on the new urban political machine (Lowi 1979, 177-85) suggests that bureaucrats interact with group leaders to dominate the policymaking process.

In summary, each of these models provides a plausible answer to the question about who exercises predominant power in the resolution of community issues. But empirical analyses of the power of representatives, bureaucrats, notables, group leaders, individual activists, and citizens are needed to determine the extent to which, and the conditions under which, these models are valid.

A COMPARATIVE-ISSUES ANALYSIS
OF 28 ISSUES IN LAWRENCE, KANSAS

To measure the distribution of the first face of power and assess aspects of the third face of power in a community, I observed 28 issues that became part of the governmental agenda in Lawrence, Kansas, at various times between 1977 and 1987. Located 30 miles west of Kansas City, Lawrence is in the midrange of American communities on the following important char-

actcristics: Its population is 56,000; its annual growth rate is 1.1%; minorities compose 14% of the population; its citizens are somewhat above national averages in various measures of educational attainment but are somewhat below such averages in terms of family income. Lawrence has reformed governmental institutions, as do most cities other than large metropolitan centers.

A COMPARATIVE-ISSUES APPROACH

Orthodox pluralists argue that the distribution of power can best be analyzed by a decisional method that determines the success of various kinds of participants on key issues (Dahl 1958). As part of a larger study, I have modified and developed the decisional method into a comparative-issues method (Schumaker 1991, 36-48). Like the decisional method, the comparative-issues method examines who succeeds on specific issues, but the decisional method focuses attention on the behavior of active participants on issues, whereas the comparative-issues approach focuses on the prefer-ences of such persons and the preferences of inactive persons, including citizens-at-large and those elites who have preferences about outcomes but who remain behind the scenes. Analysts using a decisional approach exam-ine a few key issues (to describe how the participation and influence of vari-ous actors tend to be limited to a specific policy domain), whereas a broader range of issues — the routine as well as the controversial — is sampled in a comparative-issues approach (to make inferences about the relative levels of power of various kinds of actors in policymaking generally).

SAMPLING ISSUES

To make causal inferences about whose preferences affect policy out-comes, a fairly large and random sample of issues is needed. Because there is no universe of issues from which to draw a random sample (Polsby 1980, 96), I simply sought to achieve a diverse and unbiased sample by selecting 28 issues as they arose, before outcomes were known. Efforts were made to obtain variation regarding the type of governing bodies charged with resolv-ing various issues, the levels of controversy surrounding these issues, and the types of political principles they embodied, but the sample is weighted toward issues resolved by the city commission and more controversial issues. There are also more issues involving economic growth (e.g., whether to permit a suburban shopping mall), land use (e.g., whether to downzone much of East Lawrence), and service provision (e.g., whether to close some elementary schools) than issues involving social welfare (e.g., whether to

establish lifeline gas rates for lower-income residents) or the regulation of morality (e.g., whether to restrict the sale of drug paraphernalia). Although the resulting sample is not random, it contains no known systematic bias, such as issues having outcomes that were known to reflect, for example, citizen or notable preferences. Although the Lawrence sample is thus an expedient one, this limitation does not vitiate the comparative-issues approach, since larger and more representative samples can, in principle, be drawn.

DATA COLLECTION

Interviews and survey research provided the data for this study. Interviews were conducted with (1) those elected representatives (city and county commissioners and school board members) in office when the 28 issues were resolved, (2) upper-echelon administrators in city government and the school district, (3) many persons ranked as most influential in the community, as indicated by a reputational study conducted by Bolland (1984), (4) leaders of community groups involved in governmental issues, and (5) other persons mentioned in newspaper accounts or minutes of meetings or cited by at least two other previously interviewed participants as one of their main supporters or opponents. A total of 239 interviews were conducted. In addition to yielding information about the policy preferences of respondents on the issues in which they were involved, the interviews provided data about the preferences of notables who claimed to be nonparticipants, the characteristics of involved groups, and the perceptions of representatives about public opinion.

Citizen preferences on each issue were obtained from five citizen surveys conducted in 1977 ($N = 373$), 1980 ($N = 512$), 1982 ($N = 269$), 1984 ($N = 406$), and 1986 ($N = 611$). Randomly selected respondents were first asked to indicate whether or not they were familiar with several recent and ongoing issues. Those persons who were familiar with an issue were then asked whether they supported or opposed the proposed policy change, if they supported some other policy alternative, or if they had mixed feelings.

From these interviews and surveys, comparable measures of the policy outcomes on each issue and the preferences of various actors about these issues were attained. These measures are as follows.

Policy Change

Each issue in the sample has a policy outcome score ranging from 0 to 100, depending on the degree to which the issue was resolved in a manner

that involved changes in previous policies. These scores were derived as follows. All interviewed participants indicated their degree of satisfaction with the outcome on a 5-point scale. Highly dissatisfied participants were scored as 0, moderately dissatisfied participants as 25, those with mixed feelings as 50, moderately satisfied participants as 75, and highly satisfied participants as 100. Mean satisfaction scores were then calculated for all unambiguous supporters and for all unambiguous opponents of policy change on each issue. The policy change scores for each issue were then calculated using the following formula:

$$\text{Policy Change} = [100 + \text{mean supporter satisfaction} - \text{mean opponent satisfaction}]/2.$$

Representative Preferences

During the interviews, elected officials were asked to indicate their independent judgments about each issue — whether, in the final analysis, they personally supported or opposed each policy change. Representative preferences on each issue are measured as a percentage of those representatives who were in office when major decisions were made regarding an issue and whose independent judgments supported policy change.

Bureaucratic Preferences

Bureaucratic preferences on each policy issue are simply the percentage of involved administrators supporting change.

Notable Preferences

The top 35 social and/or economic notables were identified by Bolland's (1984) reputational analysis. The preferences of economic notables and social notables were first examined separately, but their preferences were highly intercorrelated ($r = .77$); they were thus combined to minimize problems of multicollinearity. The percentage of notables supporting each project is the number of such persons supporting each project divided by the total number of such persons having unambiguous preferences regarding its outcome.

Group Leader Preferences

The groups involved in specific issues were identified through the interviews. Measuring group preferences by calculating the percentage of groups

supporting each policy change is inadequate because such a procedure counts each group equally regardless of its leadership, membership, or other resources. To address this difficulty, I developed a measure of group support that makes use of four additional pieces of information: the number of LEADERS who actively represented the group's position during the resolution of the issue, the number of persons in each group who were ACTIVISTS on an issue, the number of persons who were formally MEMBERS of each group, and the degree of COHESION among members of each group on each issue (as estimated by averaging respondent estimates of these group characteristics). The position of each group on each issue was then weighted by the following index of group leadership and membership:

Group weight = LEADERS + ACTIVISTS + [MEMBERS • COHESION],

where LEADERS is the number of active group leaders, ACTIVISTS and MEMBERS are measured on 5-point ordinal scales, and COHESION is measured on a scale from 0 to 1, where 1 represents a unified group. Net group support for each issue has been calculated by adding the resulting weights for each group supporting policy change and dividing by the weights of all involved groups.

Individual Activist Preferences

The interviews with participants also revealed the names of people who were active on issues but who were not public officials, notables, or group leaders. The preferences of these other activists have been calculated as the number of activists supporting policy change divided by the total number of activists involved in the issue.

Citizen Preferences

Citizen preferences were measured by public-opinion polls and by obtaining measures of representative perceptions of citizen preferences. Polled citizen preferences for each issue are simply the percentage of persons preferring policy change among those surveyed respondents who were aware of the issue and who had an unambiguous preference regarding its outcome. Perceived citizen preferences were attained by averaging representative assessments of citizen support for proposed policy changes. Because polled and perceived citizen preferences were reasonably well correlated ($r = .69$) and equally related to policy outcomes, they were averaged to yield the summary measure of citizen preferences used in this analysis.

TABLE 1:   The First Face of Power in Lawrence — The Extent to Which the Outcomes of
28 Policy Issues Have Reflected the Preferences of Various Types of Actors

Various Types of Actors	Responsiveness (Zero-order Correlations)	Direct Power (Beta Weights)	T
Representatives	.72**	.62**	2.72
Bureaucrats	.33*	−.24	−.93
Notables	.48**	.31	1.08
Mobilizers	.48**	.01	.06
Individual activists	.43**	−.19	−.81
Citizens-at-large	.58**	.26	1.22

NOTE: Adjusted R^2 = .44; F = 4.40; the significance of F = .005.
*SL < .05; **SL < .01.

These data provide a useful basis for illustrating the potential of a comparative-issues approach. Despite the limitations of these data, the findings presented here are based on reasonable measures of the preferences of various actor types and policy outcomes on a fairly large and diverse sample of issues in a fairly typical American community.

RESULTS

RESPONSIVENESS AND DIRECT POWER

The extent to which policy outcomes have been responsive to the preferences of representatives, notables, bureaucrats, group leaders, activists, and citizens is indicated by the zero-order correlations in Table 1. The higher the correlations across the 28 issues between the preferences of a particular type of actor and policy outcomes, the more such actors have achieved what they wanted in the resolution of policy issues. Table 1 reveals that the preferences of representatives and citizens are most strongly related to policy outcomes, and the preferences of bureaucrats, notables, group leaders, and activists are also significantly related (at the .05 level) to outcomes.

Such measures of responsiveness do not indicate whether these types of actors have achieved what they want as a result of their direct influence over policy decisions. As argued in the previous discussion of the first face of power, regression coefficients indicate the direct power of various actors by relating their preferences to policy outcomes while controlling for the preferences of other actors. Regression analysis suggests that representatives are the only kinds of actors that wield significant direct power in

Lawrence (B = .62). Notables and citizens have positive beta coefficients indicating positive direct influence, but these relationships are relatively weak (and only significant at the .20 level). These data suggest that the direct power of both notables and citizens is confined to a small number of issues and is not instrumental in the resolution of community issues generally. There are no direct relationships between policy outcomes and the preferences of bureaucrats, group leaders, or activists. (Because the analysis of the third face of power — which will be discussed in the next section — revealed that notable and bureaucratic preferences are highly interrelated, causing problems of multicollinearity, I examined revised regression models, omitting first bureaucrats and then notables from these models; however, the results were essentially the same as reported here.)

INDIRECT INFLUENCE AND THE THIRD FACE OF POWER

If citizens and notables influence the preferences of representatives, they may exercise more power than is suggested by the weak direct relationships between their preferences and policy outcomes that are revealed in Table 1. If bureaucrats, group leaders, and activists influence the preferences of representatives (or perhaps citizens and notables), they may exercise indirect influence over policy decisions. An analysis of the third face of power, reported in Table 2, enables inferences to be made about such indirect power.

It is plausible to argue that there may be reciprocal causal interrelationships between the preferences of all actors under consideration. Orthodox models of representative democracy suggest a bottom-up flow of influence, in which representative preferences are influenced by citizen-based preferences such as public opinion, group demands, and communications from individual participants. In contrast, elite and symbolic models (Edelman 1971) suggest a top-down flow of influence, in which citizen-based preferences are determined by elite manipulation and persuasion. Because there is no clear theoretical basis for specifying such interrelationships, the data in Table 2 are based on overidentified models. In column 2, representative preferences are treated as the dependent variable that is potentially influenced by the preferences of notables, bureaucrats, group leaders, individual activists, and citizens. In column 3, citizen preferences are treated as the dependent variable that is potentially influenced by the preferences of other actor types, and so on. The results show the presence of the third face of power, because the preferences of each type of actor appear to be influenced by the preferences of other actors; indeed, the adjusted coefficients of determination show that between one-third and two-thirds of the distribution of support for

TABLE 2:   The Third Face of Power—The Extent to Which the Preferences of Various
Actor Types Are Affected by the Preferences of Other Actor Types (Beta
Weights)

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables					
	REP	CIT	NOT	BUR	GRP	ACT
REPresentatives		.22	−.01	.21	.50**	.13
CITizens	.20		.06	.13	.10	.42**
NOTables	−.02	−.10		.82**	−.04	.59**
BUReaucrats	.30	.20	.73**		−.02	−.52**
GRouP leaders	.39*	.08	−.02	.00		.15
ACTivists	.15	.52**	.42**	−.42*	.21	
Adjusted R^2	.48	.43	.66	.62	.33	.54
F	5.85	4.91	11.50	9.80	3.61	7.07
Significance of F	.002	.004	.000	.000	.016	.001

*$SL < .05$; **$SL < .01$.

policy outcomes among various actor types can be explained by the prefer-
ences of other actors. But what is most suggestive in these results is the
specification of which actors do and which actors do not influence one
another's preferences.

The preferences of representatives appear to be independent of the pref-
erences of notables, bureaucrats, individual activists, and citizens; only group
leaders seem to have a significant effect on representative preferences ($B =
.39$). However, the data also show that representatives affect the preferences
of group leaders ($B = .50$). In short, because the model is overidentified, the
causal direction of the third face of power between representatives and group
leaders cannot be specified. Because group leaders may affect representative
preferences, which then directly determine policy decisions, group leaders
may have significant indirect influence over policy decisions.

The preferences of citizens appear to be independent of the preferences
of representatives, notables, bureaucrats, and group leaders. Citizen prefer-
ences may affect activist preferences ($B = .42$), and/or activists may affect
citizens ($B = .52$). Because activists have no direct power over policy
decisions, these results suggest that citizens do not exercise indirect power
through their ability to influence the preferences of other actors. Citizen
influence is restricted to direct influence such as when referenda decide issues
or when representatives set aside their preferences and act as instructed
delegates of the public. If activists have any causal impact on policy deci-
sions, their influence is indirect and limited, occurring because they influence
public opinion or perhaps notable preferences ($B = .42$).

The preferences of notables appear to be independent of the preferences of citizens, representatives, and group leaders. Perhaps notable preferences affect those of activists ($B = .59$) and bureaucrats ($B = .82$), but such a third face of power would not appear to enhance significantly their indirect power over policy decisions (because neither activists nor bureaucrats have significant direct power). Indeed, the power of bureaucrats appears to be limited to their ability to influence notables' preferences ($B = .73$) on those occasional issues when notables exercise direct control over policy decisions. Indeed, the power of bureaucrats may be reduced by the tension between their policy goals and those of activists.

In summary, the prevalence of the third face of power — of actors influencing one another's preferences — may not substantially alter estimates of the distribution of power in the resolution of community issues. For the third face of power to influence community decision making, actors must influence the preferences of other actors having significant amounts of the first face of power. The Lawrence data suggest that group leaders may significantly influence representative preferences, providing group leaders with indirect power, but there is no evidence that other types of actors have acquired significant indirect power by influencing the preferences of other actors.

THE COMPARATIVE-ISSUES APPROACH

The case study of the resolution of 28 issues in Lawrence provides a plausibility probe of the validity of the comparative-issues method. Since the results of this study seem plausible, further applications of the comparative-issues approach could contribute to normal scientific progress in understanding the distribution of power in the resolution of community issues.

The comparative-issues method suggests that the distribution of power on governmental issues in Lawrence is approximated by the representative democracy model. Direct power is exercised predominantly by elected representatives. To a lesser extent, direct power may be exercised by citizens. Community notables may also exercise direct power, more so than suggested by the ideals of representative democracy but less than suggested by elite theory.

The comparative-issues approach also suggests that indirect power can be wielded through the third face of power, when certain actors influence the preferences of other actors. But in Lawrence, occurrences of the third face of power do not seem to skew the distribution of power in undemocratic

directions, because neither notables nor bureaucrats are able to control representative and public preferences. Instead, the more prominent form of indirect power was wielded by group leaders, through their ability to shape representative preferences.

Because the present sample is limited to issues on the governmental agenda in Lawrence, the results may indicate little about the distribution of power in American communities generally. If one examined only economic-development policies or the policies of private (especially business) organizations that affect communities, the power of notables may be more pronounced. If one focused on the routine street-level decisions of city governments, the power of bureaucrats may be more evident. And conditions in other communities may lead to very different estimates of the power of various actor types than those provided here. However, achieving an overall estimate of the power of various actors in community policymaking is probably not the primary goal of students of community power. The more important theoretical questions concern the causes and consequences of variances in the distribution of power. The earlier work that has been done on how the distribution of power is affected by contextual conditions (see Lineberry and Sharkansky 1978, 182-86) and by policy domains (Peterson 1981) suggests important hypotheses, but this work proceeded without the conceptual and methodological advances that are now available. The comparative-issues approach can provide measurements of the distribution of the first and third faces of power in various policy areas, in various communities, at various points in time. When such measures are available, it will be possible to achieve a fuller understanding of systemic power — of how variations in cultural, economic, social, and political settings affect the distribution of power on a durable basis.

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