

SUPPLEMENTARY
EMPIRICAL
TEACHING
UNITS IN
POLITICAL
SCIENCE

Policy Responsiveness and Fiscal Strain in 51 American Communities

Paul David Schumaker
Russel W. Getter
Terry Nichols Clark



**POLICY RESPONSIVENESS AND
FISCAL STRAIN IN
51 AMERICAN COMMUNITIES:
A MANUAL FOR STUDYING
CITY POLITICS USING THE NORC
PERMANENT COMMUNITY SAMPLE**

Paul Schumaker and Russell W. Getter
The University of Kansas

Terry Nichols Clark
National Opinion Research Center
The University of Chicago

We would like to thank the many individuals and organizations which have contributed to the data accompanying this manual. The Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan made available the data from Terry N. Clark's Comparative Study of Community Decision-Making. Mayors, councilmembers, and agency officials in the 51 PCS cities provided additional data through their responses to questionnaires distributed during the summers of 1975 and 1976. Other individuals and organizations which provided data reported here are identified in Appendix II.

1983

The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Preface

The publication of revised editions of SETUPS: American Politics in 1975 launched the Association's effort to develop and distribute innovative instructional materials, particularly those on recent research topics. The publication of the revised editions of SETUPS: Cross-National and World Politics, in 1977, continued and expanded this educational program.

These two series of SETUPS were written by political scientists working in College Faculty Workshops, supported by grants from the National Science Foundation and hosted by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The SETUPS proved to be useful, popular learning packages. Approximately 35,000 copies have been ordered for classes by faculty in over 250 universities and colleges in the United States, Canada, Australia and Europe. Since the format and applicability of the SETUPS was established, the Steering Committee for the Political Science Undergraduate Education Project invited faculty working at their own institutions to develop other SETUPS units. The test edition of *Policy Responsiveness and Fiscal Strain in 51 American Cities*, by Paul Schumaker, Russell W. Getter and Terry Nicholas Clark, published in September, 1979, was prepared in response to this invitation.

Chapter I.

Introduction

This manual comes with a set of data concerning some economic, political, and social characteristics of the 51 cities in the Permanent Community Sample (PCS).¹ In 1967, an initial survey of 12 key informants in each of the 51 cities was conducted by interviewers from the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at The University of Chicago. Subsequently, additional data have been added to the original data archive through the involvement of many researchers. Several mail questionnaires have been sent to policymakers, administrators, and informants in the PCS cities. Documents published in recent years by various federal agencies (for example, the U.S. Bureau of the Census) and by various organizations concerned with municipal affairs (for example, the International City Management Association) have yielded additional and current data concerning the PCS cities. The result is that measures on several thousands of variables regarding the PCS cities are currently stored on computer files. Some of these data are available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Other data are available, on request, from the authors of this manual.

This manual contains data on 78 variables, permitting analysis of two central problems confronting American cities: policy responsiveness and fiscal strain. The concept of *responsiveness* is concerned with the extent to which municipal governments adopt policies which are consistent with the demands and preferences of various groups and segments of the community. A variety of variables regarding responsiveness are presented which enable students to analyze questions such as the following: (1) to whom are policymakers in cities most responsive? (2) what political and social conditions make communities most responsive to citizen preferences? The concept of *fiscal strain* is concerned with the financial solvency of municipal governments. Data are presented on the extent to which each of the 51 PCS cities is experiencing various aspects of fiscal stress: rising expenditures, declining revenues, and indebtedness. In conjunction with other variables measur-

ing the demographic, political, and administrative characteristics of the PCS cities, these data permit students to investigate the sources of fiscal strain.

By focusing on both responsiveness and fiscal strain, we hope to present a more balanced picture of the problems confronting urban America. To increase the responsiveness of community policymakers, many reformers seek to "politicize" the city by adopting political structures and practices which make policymakers more sensitive to citizen inputs. But to deal with the problem of fiscal stress, reforms which "depoliticize" the municipal government are often suggested. For example, by giving professional administrators—like a city manager—greater control over the municipal budget, cities may be able to secure greater fiscal solvency even though these administrators may be less responsive than elected officials to the demands of poor citizens.² Thus, one issue that students will want to keep in mind as they work with this manual is the relationship between responsiveness and fiscal strain. Are cities which are highly responsive to various citizen inputs the same cities that experience extensive fiscal strain?

In order to facilitate analysis of responsiveness and fiscal strain by students who lack previous training in social science research and social statistics, the data accompanying this manual have been coded as categorical (dichotomous and trichotomous) variables. For example, Table 5 (see page 37) shows that the 51 PCS cities have fiscal strain scores ranging from a high of 138.26 (for Boston) to a low of 8.07 (for Santa Ana). Rather than report these exact interval-level scores, the PCS cities are assigned a fiscal strain score of 1 (if they have low fiscal strain, 2 (if they have a medium level of fiscal strain), or 3 (if they have a high level of fiscal strain). Presenting the data in this form permits students to use *cross-tabulation* procedures, a method of analysis requiring little statistical or mathematical background by students.

In order to accommodate students having background in correlation and regression analysis, the data in this manual are also available as interval-level variables. Although the text and the exercises discuss only the analysis of categorical variables, students having the necessary statistical background may wish to examine these interval-level data. The categorical variables are listed in Appendix A and are available on file 51CITIES from ICPSR. The interval-level variables have the same variable names as listed in Appendix A but, of course, lack discrete categories; these data are available on file 51PCSINT from ICPSR. The 51 cities are listed in the file in alphabetical order. You can check the identity of cities by comparing them with the city names in Table 5.

Each of the authors of this manual has been involved in collecting and analyzing PCS data over several years, and each has used these data in his teaching. As indicated in the footnotes, Schumaker and Getter have been most concerned with responsiveness while Clark and his associates have been most concerned with fiscal strain.

The Permanent Community Sample is a resource providing data on urban America for students and researchers in a variety of disciplines. A list of some 130 research reports completed using PCS data is available from T. N. Clark, 1126 East 59 Street, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637. A summary of ongoing work appeared in T. N. Clark, "Research in Progress Using the Permanent Community Sample," *Comparative Urban Research*, Vol. V, No. 1 (1977), pp. 60-71.

The data provided through this manual is intended to further cumulative research on urban life. We would, thus, be pleased to hear from persons who develop new approaches using the PCS in their teaching and research.

Chapter II.

Comparative Community Research

The purpose of this chapter is to acquaint you with the procedures involved in constructing and testing scientific theories about social, political and economic events in American cities. While you eventually will want to become more familiar with the concerns of systematic empirical inquiry, this chapter will provide you with an overview of the research process, thus enabling you to conduct your own analyses of the data provided with this manual.

The research process consists of a series of steps or stages which will normally enable a researcher to arrive at conclusions which are both scientifically based and theoretically relevant. When conclusions are scientifically based, they possess two main qualities. First, the conclusions are based on observable characteristics which have been identified and measured in ways which are readily communicated to other persons. Second, the series of steps followed by a researcher in arriving at the conclusions are presented in sufficient detail that they are potentially repeatable if another person doubts the essential validity of the researcher's conclusions. Thus, a study is scientific to the extent that it is based on observables and that the entire study is replicable.

A study is theoretically relevant when it contributes to a larger body of theoretical literature. For example, some political theories suggest that policymakers in representative democracies are supposed to be responsive to the preferences of their constituents.³ Thus findings concerning the political practices of cities which enhance responsiveness to citizen preferences should be integrated with prevailing theory and research on representative government. When research findings suggest that prevailing theory should be accepted, rejected, modified, or qualified, they are theoretically relevant.

In this chapter, we present five steps in the research process which, if followed, should enable you to reach scientifically sound and theoretically relevant conclu-

sions about the responsiveness and fiscal integrity of municipal governments. These steps are:

1. Formulation of a problem,
2. Formulating propositions and theories,
3. Defining concepts,
4. Formulating and testing hypotheses, and
5. Accepting, rejecting, modifying, or qualifying the body of theory from which the problem is drawn.

A. Formulation of a Problem

Research begins with a spark of curiosity about some problematic condition, situation, or area of inquiry. The spark for one's curiosity may be a class lecture on responsive government, a newspaper article on the New York or Cleveland fiscal crisis, a provocative essay by a social critic, or other possibilities. Often, the problem or question raised by these stimuli cannot be answered by simply consulting appropriate texts and scholarly literature. In these cases, the student might seek to resolve the puzzle by proposing original and creative solutions which are then developed and tested using the rigors of scientific inquiry.

(1) *Thinking in Terms of Variables.* The first task in seeking a solution to a research puzzle is to think of the problem or puzzle in variable terms. By variables we mean characteristics which take on different values among the units of observation and analysis (for this manual the units of observation and analysis are the 51 cities in the PCS). For example, since the 51 PCS cities exhibit varying levels of responsiveness and fiscal strain, these two concepts are variables. Other variable characteristics for the 51 PCS cities include voter turnout, community wealth, population size, and so on.

Because we are trained to observe differences among units of observations, it is usually quite easy to think in variable terms when comparing several cities. However, thinking in variable terms is more difficult when a research question refers to only one unit of observation. For example, if one asks the question, "why does Cleveland have fiscal problems?" one is not, necessarily, thinking in variable terms, since Cleveland has only one level of fiscal strain. Thus, it is generally more productive to think about research problems in terms of at least two or more units of observation and to rephrase the question to ask "why does the level of fiscal strain vary among cities?" or "why does Cleveland have so much fiscal strain in comparison with other cities?" By phrasing research questions in these ways, you will ensure that the phenomenon being explained exhibits variation.

It is also essential that the explanation for the phenomenon also exhibit variation. "Capitalism" or "being at war with Vietnam" or the "increased role of television" were all offered as explanations for urban disturbances in the late 1960s. The problem with these "explanations" is that they fail to explain why some cities experienced extensive disturbances while others did not. Because both riotous and non-riotous cities had equally capitalistic political economies, the constant "capitalism" does not account for inter-city differences in the level of urban disturbances. However, cities did vary in their levels of policy responsiveness to black citizens and

groups. If responsive cities experienced less rioting than unresponsive cities, this relationship between variables could be used to promote the proposition that a lack of responsiveness to minorities enhances the likelihood of their turning to violence.

In addition to avoiding the use of "constants" or invariants in the analysis of urban problems it is also useful to remember that thinking in variable terms is made more difficult by asking amorphous, vague research questions. For example, the question "How does city government work?" may not lend itself to precise problem formulation since there are no readily identified variables in the question. It is necessary, in this instance, to decompose this vague question into smaller parts, such as "does the form of city government vary among cities?" and "what effect does the form of city government have on fiscal strain?" These questions not only contain variables but they also are more precise and, therefore, researchable with the data in this manual.

(2) *Classifying Variables for Research Purposes.* Usually one cannot investigate all variables associated with a problem in one piece of research. Therefore, it is necessary to choose some variables for analysis, and to classify these variables in ways which will facilitate investigation of the research problem.

The first task is to select the *dependent* variable(s) for analysis. A variable is considered dependent when the purpose of an investigation is to explain its variation. For example, the concepts of responsiveness and fiscal strain are dependent variables when we ask "what causes the level of responsiveness or fiscal strain to vary among cities?"

Researchers must also select *independent* variables. These variables are causally prior to dependent variables and are used as explanations for research questions. For example, if the level of responsiveness in cities is affected by voter turnout (if high turnout induces policymakers to be more responsive), then voter turnout is a useful independent variable explaining variations in responsiveness.⁴

A third type of variable important to researchers is called a *specification variable*. This type is causally prior to the dependent and independent variables. Specification variables are given their name because they specify the conditions under which relationships are thought to occur among the independent and dependent variables. For example, a researcher may think that a high level of group participation will enhance responsiveness to groups—but only in large cities; in small cities, public officials may be aware of all community groups and thus respond to them regardless of their level of participation. In this type of research problem, city size is an important variable because it specifies the conditions under which the researcher thinks that group participation will affect responsiveness to community groups.

A fourth type of variable is called an *intervening variable*. These variables are causally prior to the dependent variable and causally a function of the independent variable. Thus, as shown in diagrams or "models," intervening variables lie between the independent and dependent variables. For example, a researcher may think that larger cities are more likely than smaller cities to attract a large percentage of black citizens, and that city governments are more likely to be responsive to black citizens when there is a large black population in the city. In this example, there is a *developmental sequence* where city size causes variation in the percentage of black citizens and the percentage of black citizens, in turn, causes variation in the level of responsiveness to black citizens. Thus, the percentage of black citizens is


referred to as an intervening variable.

A fifth type of variable is called a *spuriousness-producing or control variable*. These variables are causally prior to the dependent and independent variables, and are the sources of non-causal association, or correlation, between these variables. For example, wealthy cities may adopt city manager forms of government; additionally, wealthy cities may suffer little fiscal strain. If these propositions are true, then cities with city manager forms of government should exhibit low levels of fiscal strain, regardless of whether the presence of city managers causally reduces fiscal strain. In this example, our dependent variable (fiscal strain) and independent variable (form of government) are correlated or empirically related. Yet the relationship may be *spurious* (i.e., non-causal) owing to the confounding effects of the spuriousness-producing variable, city wealth. Because social scientists tend to make causal inferences on the basis of mere empirical associations between independent and dependent variables, it is essential that possible spuriousness-producing variables be introduced for control purposes.


(3) *Constructing a Model for the Analysis of Problems*. Complex relationships involving specification, intervening, and spuriousness-producing variables are common in comparative community research. To avoid ambiguity, many researchers find it helpful to diagram or "model" the relationships being investigated. In Figure 1, we have modeled the relationships discussed in the previous section involving intervening and spuriousness-producing variables. In these models, the causal directions of

FIGURE 1
Diagrams Involving Intervening and Spuriousness-Producing Variables

I. An Example of a Developmental Sequence



II. An Example of a Possible Spurious Relationship



the relationships are indicated by arrows (\rightarrow). A curved, broken line (\curvearrowright) is used to indicate an empirical relationship among variables that may be non-causal (i.e., spurious). Further, the direction of each relationship (i.e., whether it is positive or negative) is shown by the addition of plus or minus signs above the arrows.

For research projects more complex than those shown in Figure 1, researchers will often construct conceptual frameworks such as that shown in Figure 2. Such frameworks utilize the principles discussed thus far by presenting the problem in terms of broad categories of dependent, independent, intervening, specification and spuriousness-producing variables. Thus, in Figure 2, policy responsiveness and fiscal strain are the two major dependent variables. Four major categories of independent, intervening and possible spuriousness-producing variables are shown which may be helpful in explaining variation in policy responsiveness and fiscal strain. These broad categories consist of (1) the socioeconomic characteristics of cities (e.g., population density), (2) formal political structures (e.g., partisan or non-partisan elections), (3) informal political characteristics (e.g., the level of citizen participation), and (4) city administrative characteristics (e.g., the extent to which there is "overstaffing" of city agencies). This type of conceptual framework does not tell us why such variables are causally important; but it does help us order broad classes of variables and thus facilitates orderly thinking about the problem.


It is important to realize, however, that the construction of models or conceptual frameworks is only a prelude to scientific investigation. Such devices merely assist a researcher in thinking about the problem in general terms. For a more precise understanding of how the conceptual parts of a model or framework fit together, it is necessary to formulate propositions and theories about the problem.

B. Formulating Propositions and Theories

Propositions are statements of causal relations between two or more variables. Most propositions in this manual are two variable propositions involving one independent variable and one dependent variable. For example, one may formulate a proposition suggesting that a high level of policy responsiveness is brought about by a high level of citizen participation. In a similar way, one could formulate propositions using variables from several of the boxes shown in Figure 2. For example, reformed cities (i.e., cities with council-manager form of government) may have lower rates of citizen participation which, in turn, reduce policy responsiveness.

Propositions such as these are the key elements of a theory. The more such propositions we can develop, and the more they are interrelated in such manner that they reinforce and complement each other, the more powerful the theory. Just when political commentary ends and "theory" begins is, in part, a question of taste and presentation. One general definition of a theory is a *set of logically interrelated propositions and the conditions under which these propositions are valid*. One way that propositions may be linked to one another is by using the same dependent variable. For example, in this manual, most of our propositions are geared toward explaining two basic dependent variables: policy responsiveness and fiscal strain. Many different causes of these two phenomena are isolated in the following chapters, but most follow the sort of logical structure shown in Figure 2: they all lead to policy responsiveness or fiscal strain.

FIGURE 2
A Conceptual Framework for Examining Policy Responsiveness and Fiscal Strain



Another way that propositions may be linked to one another to form a theory occurs when one proposition consisting of a more general or abstract idea is developed, and several more specific and concrete propositions are deduced from it. One fairly abstract proposition about policy responsiveness is that *more open systems generate more responsive public policies*. The idea of an "open system" is fairly abstract, based on the notion that governments vary in their openness, or the degree to which they respond to forces outside formal legislative and administrative institutions. A closed system is one that responds minimally to changes outside it, illustrated by mayors and council members who ignore the preferences of citizens and the requests of organized groups. Given the normal workings of American cities, with regular democratic elections, one would expect that a highly closed system could be overthrown in the next election. But to do so demands that opposing candidates emerge and campaign well enough to displace the incumbents. In addition, voters must be sufficiently informed and active that they make good use of the electoral system. In these matters, it appears that cities still differ in the degree to which their political systems are open.

Previous theory and research on city politics suggest that open cities are likely to have the following characteristics: (1) a heterogeneous (i.e., racially and ethnically diversified) population, (2) "unreformed governmental" institutions (the mayor-council system, partisan elections, and ward representation), (3) high levels of citizen participation, and (4) decentralized power structures (i.e., many diverse types of actors involved in the policymaking process). Each of these variables should affect policy responsiveness. Moreover, propositions regarding these variables can be treated as more than the sum of their parts in the sense that each relates to different aspects of the same general proposition: more open systems are more responsive in their public policies. A powerful theory gains strength from the fact that it can lead to further propositions. Can you think of another characteristic that is likely to distinguish an open political system? Should it lead to more policy responsiveness? Is it consistent with the propositions already stated? These are the kinds of questions that one asks in developing and extending a theory.

C. Defining Concepts

Having developed a set of theoretically-related propositions, the next step in the research process involves specifying clearly the meaning of each concept being used in the analysis. In presenting these meanings it is usually helpful to review, first, the manner in which previous authors on the subject have used the term, and to indicate how the meaning you use is consistent with or different from other meanings. Second, you should always be attentive to the complexity of the concept at hand. For example, in reviewing the work on responsiveness, one may find different forms of responsiveness—responsiveness to poor citizens, to black citizens, to organized groups, to taxpayers, and so on. This suggests that responsiveness is a *multi-dimensional* concept. When a concept is multi-dimensional, it has several important but distinct aspects, and each aspect requires clear definition and differentiation from other aspects of the concept. In Chapters III and V, we argue that responsiveness and fiscal strain are multi-dimensional concepts, and we attempt to define their major dimensions.

In addition to indicating the precise meaning of the abstract concepts used in your analysis, it is also essential that you present *operational definitions* for these concepts. An operational definition simply tells the reader how the concepts under investigation have been measured in specific cases. There are, for example, many ways to measure the responsiveness of various cities to the demands of lower-income groups. You might attend meetings of the city councils in a variety of communities and observe how receptive or positive council members are to leaders representing lower-income groups. Or you might examine the roll-call votes of various city councils on a range of issues affecting lower-income groups. Or you can ask seasoned observers of city government for their judgments about the city's responsiveness to lower-income groups. Whichever measurement strategy you pursue, it is essential that you describe the strategy in sufficient detail that readers understand how your abstract concepts have been measured in concrete situations. Such descriptions are the operational definitions of concepts. Appendix B presents brief operational definitions of the variables used in this manual. More extensive discussions of our operational definitions of the various dimensions of responsiveness and fiscal strain are given in Chapters III and V.

D. Formulating and Testing Hypotheses

Like propositions, hypotheses are simple, declarative statements specifying a causal relationship between two or more variables. The difference between propositions and hypotheses rests in the context in which they are used. The word "proposition" refers to a relatively abstract relational statement drawn from an established theory while the word "hypothesis" generally refers to a less abstract relational statement which is more tentative than a proposition.

Hypothesis testing lies at the heart of the scientific enterprise. It is what enables researchers to have confidence that their theoretical statements are consistent with empirical evidence. The simplest way to test a hypothesis about city politics is to ask yourself, "Does it seem to be consistent with what I know about the cities with which I am familiar?" For example, you might check the hypothesis that large cities are less responsive than small ones, by observing a nearby central city and a nearby suburb. The suburban government may seem more responsive to its citizens, based on the way the two have been covered in the media and on the personal experiences you have had with both cities. It is useful to think of personal experiences like these as a first approach to validating a hypothesis. A second, more rigorous, method to test your hypothesis is to collect empirical materials in a more systematic manner for one or two cities, through newspaper clippings, interviews, etc. Hundreds of "case studies" of city politics have been completed in this general manner.⁵ Some are brilliant, others are mediocre. But even the most distinguished case study has the weakness that one is not sure if the results apply to cities in general or just to that one city.

(1) *Selecting Cases for Comparative Empirical Analysis: The Permanent Community Sample.* Probably the best way to overcome limitations of case studies is to collect data on a large sample of cities representing as closely as possible the total population of all cities. The Permanent Community Sample (PCS) was developed to facilitate such empirical analysis. The PCS includes cities which are sampling points

used by the National Opinion Research Center for its interviews of the American general population. They were chosen randomly from a list of all cities in the U.S., stratified by population size. These sampling points are cities where NORC interviewers are located who interview enough citizens from each city to comprise a representative sample of the entire U.S. population. By using these cities, we thus ensure that they are representative of places where the American population lives.⁶ The first variable, V1, in the data files (51CITIES or 51PCSINT) identifies by name and code number the 51 PCS cities. In Appendix A, a list of 77 other variables concerning some of the social, economic, political, and policy characteristics of these 51 cities is presented. These data provide a broad comparative basis for testing various hypotheses about community politics.

(2) *Hypothesis Testing Procedures.* When testing a hypothesis using comparative analysis, a researcher begins by determining the empirical relationship between operational measures of the relevant variables. For example, if one hypothesizes that fiscal strain is reduced by the presence of city manager government, appropriate indicators of fiscal strain (e.g., V2 in Appendix A) and city manager government (V40) should be empirically related through a procedure known as *cross-tabulation analysis*.⁷ If your hypothesis is correct, this procedure will reveal that most of the 20 PCS cities having city managers have little fiscal strain; and higher levels of fiscal strain would be observed in the 31 PCS cities without city managers.

When testing hypotheses, it is not sufficient to note the empirical relationship among variables. Three other tasks may be appropriate. First, the researcher may wish to know whether the relationship observed in the data is *generalizable* to all cities, or only the ones in the sample under consideration. Second, the researcher may want a summary measure of the *strength* of the observed relationship. Thirdly, it may be necessary to determine whether the observed relationship is *spurious* (or non-causal).

The extent to which an observed relationship is generalizable to other cities is ascertained through a test of *statistical significance*. This test of the observed relationship enables a researcher to estimate the likelihood that the observed relationship could have occurred in the sample by "chance" alone. Thus, using tests of significance, a researcher wishes to estimate how much confidence to have that the observed relationship did not just occur by mere chance in the sample, but rather will "hold true" for the population of cities. These estimates of confidence are usually expressed in probabilistic terms. For example, you may have seen an expression such as the following: $P < .05$. This expression says that the probability (p) is less than ($<$) five chances in one hundred (.05) that an observed relationship could have occurred by chance alone.

In addition to a test of statistical significance, a researcher may also wish to use a summary measure of the strength of an observed relationship. An example of such a summary measure is Kendall's Tau-C which we have used in Chapter V to summarize the relationships between fiscal strain and a variety of community characteristics. This measure is helpful in interpreting results because it approaches zero (0) when there is no empirical relationship among two variables. Additionally, it approaches +1.0 if there is a perfect (strong) positive relationship, and approaches -1.0 if there is a perfect negative relationship. Since it is beyond the scope of this manual to present the many formulae available to measure the strength of relation-

ships and describe their appropriate usage, a researcher who wishes to use these measures should consult the references at the end of this chapter.

Finally, a researcher may wish to determine whether an observed relationship is spurious. Our discussion of spuriousness-producing variables earlier in the chapter (see Figure 1) suggested that any empirical relationship between the presence of city manager government and fiscal strain may be spurious, due to the confounding influence of the wealth of communities. This possibility can be tested by using an indicator of community wealth (e.g., V32) as a control variable in a *multivariate analysis*. If the empirical relationship between city manager government and fiscal strain disappears when examining in separate analyses (a) only poor cities and (b) only wealthy cities; then the empirical relationship is indeed spurious. To understand more fully the appropriate techniques to test for spuriousness, you should consult your instructor or the suggested readings at the end of this chapter.

E. Accepting, Rejecting, Modifying, or Qualifying Theory

The purpose of hypothesis testing is to inform a researcher about the validity of specific propositions and theories. Are they supported by the empirical evidence? Should a researcher accept the propositions and theories as stated, or reject them? The answers to these questions may not be clear-cut, but rather depend on the researcher's judgment. And even if the answers to the questions are clear-cut, additional questions remain. For example, if one concludes that a proposition or part of a theory should be rejected, one still should attempt to ascertain *why* the proposition or theory was invalid. Your "explanation" may at first involve mere speculation, and then mature into new ideas and strategies for tackling your research problem. In this way, the cumulative process of scientific research goes on.

Regardless of one's results, it is essential that a researcher make those results relevant to the initial statement of the research problem. The research process is never complete until the results of one's hypothesis testing are evaluated in the context of the more general propositions and theories from whence they were drawn. In this evaluation process, the creativity and judgment of a researcher are at a premium. It is toward the development of these talents in you that this manual is dedicated.

F. Exercises

1. State a hypothesis involving the relationship between city manager government and fiscal strain. Draw on readings in your course to defend your hypothesis. Then construct a table showing the empirical relationship between these variables. Is the relationship statistically significant? Does the relationship still hold true when community wealth is controlled? Interpret your results by referring back to your original hypothesis.

2. Formulate a problem statement which expresses a relationship between policy responsiveness and some other economic, social, or political concept. This problem statement should be in the form of a question and should imply empirical testability. Then, to analyze this problem, (a) develop a hypothesis or set of hypotheses stating the causal relationships among these concepts (draw upon class

readings and other sources to justify your expectation that these concepts are causally related); (b) operationalize the concepts specified in your hypothesis with appropriate data described in Appendices A and B (i.e., select from Appendix A those variables which best measure your concepts, and consult Appendix B to understand and describe how these variables were measured); (c) estimate the results of your analysis (i.e., predict what the results of your cross-tabulations will be like if your hypothesis is correct); (d) perform the statistical analysis; and (e) interpret your results, indicating whether your hypothesis should be accepted, rejected, or modified.

G. Suggested Further Readings

There are many excellent texts on the methods of social research. Two which we have found to be especially informative and clear are Dickinson McGaw and George Watson, *Political and Social Inquiry* (New York: Wiley, 1976) and David and Chava Nachmias, *Research Methods in the Social Sciences* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976). A very good, but more complex, treatment of statistics remains Hubert Bialock, Jr.'s *Social Statistics*, 2nd Edition (New York: McGraw Hill, 1972).

Chapter III.

The Dimensions of Responsiveness

A. Community Power and Responsiveness

Political Scientists and sociologists have long debated the fundamental characteristics of the policymaking process of American cities. According to one view—the elite theory—power in American communities is concentrated in a small number of elites who control the policymaking process. In this theory, public policies of municipal governments reflect the concerns of these dominant elites. These elites may be public officials or private individuals. Robert and Helen Lynd, Floyd Hunter, and others have argued that private elites—mostly businessmen, bankers, and others who own or control most economic resources—are the actual, though sometimes hidden, power brokers.⁸ A variation of this elitist view is that publicly elected officials initiate most public policy. This view has been developed by Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone in studying city councilmembers in the San Francisco Bay Area.⁹ In this view, public officials are often free from outside pressures, either from private elites or nonelite citizens; it is primarily the preferences and priorities of these public elites which are seen as the principal determinants of municipal policy.

Other social scientists view elites within cities as less dominant in the policymaking process. According to a “pluralist” or “group” theory of city politics, the most powerful actors are diverse interest groups which are constantly pressuring municipal policymakers to adopt policies reflecting their particular interests.¹⁰ In this view, business organizations, civic groups, neighborhood groups, civil rights organizations, and community action groups are among the principal policymaking actors. And public policies reflect the demands of these groups.

A third view of municipal politics suggests that the ultimate determinants of municipal policies are the dominant views, beliefs, and preferences of the citizenry as a whole.¹¹ In the “populist theory” of urban politics, citizens’ policy preferences severely constrain the policy choices of public officials. Accordingly, electoral accountability keeps formal policymakers aware of majority preferences. Because community politicians try to avoid making unpopular policy decisions which could

jeopardize their future political careers, they learn to anticipate public preferences. As a result, the preferences of citizens generally are reflected in policy decisions.¹²

Variations of these three views of how cities make policy decisions have been debated for many years.¹³ Part of the debate has turned on the appropriate way to determine precisely "who has power?" in community politics. One approach is the "decisional method," in which the researcher asks key informants to identify the characteristics and activities of participants, as well as the policy outcomes, in key issue areas. This permits an assessment of the *direct influence* wielded by various individuals and groups in the city.¹⁴

The limitation in characterizing the "power structure" of cities using the decisional method is that persons and groups often have their preferences reflected in policy even though they fail to participate directly in the policymaking process. For example, Floyd Hunter maintained that the business elite in Atlanta seldom participated in the formal policymaking process, and, instead, delegated their work to their underlings.¹⁵ Yet, because the resulting decisions reflected the preferences of this elite, he argued that they exercised *ultimate power*. Similarly, Robert Dahl has argued that the many citizens of New Haven who failed to participate directly in the policymaking process (except to vote occasionally) nevertheless exerted *indirect influence* because political leaders implemented their preferences in policies.¹⁶ Because power refers to the ability of persons to obtain policy outcomes which reflect their preferences, studies which fail to consider indirect influence are incomplete and limited in scope. Yet most studies of community power have indeed ignored indirect influence, in part, simply because little in the way of a systematic procedure has been offered by which to measure this elusive phenomenon.

The concept of *responsiveness* provides a partial solution to this problem.¹⁷ Rather than focusing on participants who exert direct influence, as in the decisional approach, responsiveness focuses on *policy outputs*. Adopting a school busing program or spending more on highways are two examples of policy outputs. The responsiveness concept focuses on the degree to which such policy outputs are consistent with the preferences of different groups or sectors in the community. (Sector is a general term that may refer to ethnic, religious, or income groupings in a city.) If most citizens oppose busing and if school officials refuse to adopt busing policies, policymakers are being responsive to majority preferences. *Responsiveness* is thus defined as the *degree to which the municipal government pursues policies consistent with the preferences of a particular sector*. Note that this definition implies that responsiveness is specific to a given sector which may or may not encompass all local citizens.

Because most studies of community policymaking have focused on the concepts of power and influence (both direct and indirect) and because this manual focuses instead on the concept of responsiveness, it is important to understand the similarities and differences among these concepts. In order to exercise power or exhibit direct influence, persons must *participate* in the policy process, and this participation must *cause* policy outcomes which are consistent with the preferences of the participants. For example, the Chamber of Commerce has direct influence when it contacts councilmembers—supplying information and applying pressure—which induces these councilmembers to adopt a program (for example, a new expressway leading downtown) which the council would not have adopted in the absence of ac-

tion by the Chamber of Commerce.

In order to exercise indirect influence, persons need not participate, but their preferences must nevertheless be a causal factor affecting policy outcomes. For example, a city council may wish to build an expressway through a particular ethnic neighborhood in town, but drop the plan because they perceive, accurately, that the neighborhood would oppose such a plan. In this example, the neighborhood residents had indirect influence because their preferences affected policy outcomes even though they did not have to mobilize and participate in the policy process.

In order to be recipients of responsive policies, persons need not participate in the policy process *nor* must their preferences *cause* policy outcomes. All that matters is that the adopted policy be consistent with their preferences. Consider again the expressway example. Suppose that the council even failed to consider the opposition of the ethnic neighborhoods to the expressway plan but dropped the project for other reasons (for example, considerations of construction costs). In this case, the neighborhood had neither direct influence (because it did not participate) nor indirect influence (because its preferences were not a cause of the policy outcome). Yet the neighborhood was the recipient of policies responsive to it because the policy outcome was consistent with neighborhood preferences.

Thus, the concept of responsiveness is distinct from the concepts of direct and indirect influence, yet it is complementary to them. By investigating the responsiveness of municipal governments, it is possible to study the extent to which various groups of citizens and sectors of the community attain governmental policies consistent with their wants.

This discussion of the meaning of the concept of responsiveness suggests that the important question to be addressed about the responsiveness of city governments is not "how responsive are policymakers in this city?" Rather, students of urban politics should address the more precise question "to whom are policymakers most responsive?" In elite theory, policymakers are responsive to elite preferences; in pluralist theory, to interest group demands; and in populist theory, to public opinion. Each theory thus suggests an important type of stimuli to which public policy allocations may be responsive: (1) elite preferences; (2) group demands; and (3) citizen preferences. Of course, these three stimuli may be identical, or they may be distinct. For example, members of interest groups are often unrepresentative of the larger political community (many studies have shown that interest groups are composed of persons who are disproportionately upper-income).¹⁸ Thus citizen inputs communicated to policymakers through group demands may be quite different from citizen inputs which would be communicated through a public opinion poll of citizen policy preferences.

Given the distinctiveness of these stimuli, it is useful to conceptualize three distinct dimensions of responsiveness: (1) responsiveness to elite concerns; (2) responsiveness to group demands; and (3) responsiveness to citizen preferences. Because the level of responsiveness to each often varies from city to city, the three views of urban politics may each be partially correct. In some cities, policymakers may be most responsive to elite concerns, in others to group demands, and in still others to citizen preferences or public opinion. Thus the elite, pluralist, and populist views each provide a partial interpretation of city politics. In Chapter III we address the question of why some cities are most responsive to elite concerns, while others

are most responsive to group demands or to citizen preferences.

Recognizing the distinctiveness of elite concerns, group demands and citizen preferences is a useful starting point. But further distinctions are necessary to understand the responsiveness of municipal governments more fully. Different elites, groups, and citizens display different preferences and priorities. So we must ask to which types of elites, which types of groups and which types of citizens policymakers are most responsive. To address this question, elites, groups, and citizens can be categorized in many ways. Because of the importance of racial and class conflict and cleavage in contemporary urban politics, we have categorized groups and citizens on the basis of race and class, where classes are defined on the basis of income. This enables us to assess the extent to which various communities have been responsive to the policy preferences of these various types of groups and citizens: whites, "nonwhites" (blacks, Spanish-Americans, Asian-Americans, and native-Americans), lower-income persons, middle-income persons, and upper-income persons.


By knowing the level of responsiveness to groups and citizens with different racial and class characteristics, we can address a fundamental question in political science: "who gets how much of what they prefer in the authoritative allocation of values?" This question can be restated in somewhat less academic terms: To what extent do urban officials make policy choices that reflect the preferences of one racial group more than another? And to what extent do these policy choices reflect the preferences of middle- and upper-income residents rather than lower-income residents? A useful concept for addressing these questions is *responsiveness bias*. "Responsiveness bias toward the advantaged" occurs when policies reflect the preferences of white and upper-income citizens more than those of nonwhite and lower-income citizens. "Responsiveness bias toward the disadvantaged" occurs when policies reflect the preferences of nonwhite and lower-income citizens more than those of white and upper-income citizens. "Equality of responsiveness" occurs when policies reflect equally the preferences of citizens of various racial and class categories. Ascertaining the degree of bias in urban policymakers' responsiveness is one way to assess how democratic our cities are. Clearly there are weaknesses and simplifications to this approach, but to date nothing more adequate has been developed which is applicable to a national sample of cities.

B. Measuring Responsiveness and Responsiveness Bias

To measure community responsiveness, we have conducted analyses in the 51 PCS cities using the conceptual framework in Figure 3. In Table 1 this framework is applied to Milwaukee to illustrate our procedures for measuring responsiveness and responsiveness bias.

We began with data from a U.S. Census publication, *City Government Finances* to derive change measures in 10 expenditure areas for Milwaukee. Column 2 of Table 1 indicates how much Milwaukee spent in thousands of dollars during the 1973-74 fiscal year in the policy areas listed on the left-hand side of the table. Not that, unlike some cities, the municipal government of Milwaukee does not have jurisdiction for education and welfare (these are provided by special school district

FIGURE 3
A Conceptual Diagram of Political Activity Within Communities
Which Enables Development of Community-Level Measures of
Various Dimensions of Responsiveness



Linkage a measures the degree of responsiveness to elite concerns.

Linkage b measures the degree of responsiveness to group demands generally as well as the degree of responsiveness to various types of groups (e.g., lower-income groups, middle-income groups, upper-income groups, etc.).

Linkage c measures the degree of responsiveness to citizens' preferences generally as well as the degree of responsiveness to various types of citizens (e.g., nonwhites, whites, etc.).

and the county government). As there are no expenditures by the city in these areas, they were omitted as units of analysis for Milwaukee. Column 3 of Table 1 reports expenditures during the 1975-76 fiscal year. The data in columns 2 and 3 were then used to compute the percent change (increase or decrease) in spending in each policy area between 1973-74 and 1975-76 (see column 4). For example, spending in 1975-76 on police was 120 percent of the 1973-74 expenditure. In contrast, spending on low-income housing was only 74 percent of that in 1973-74. Such changes in spending can serve as indicators of policy priorities during the time period between 1973 and 1975. Column 4 in Table 1 thus shows that the policy priorities (from highest to lowest) for Milwaukee were: (1) streets; (2) police services; (3) libraries, (4) public health; (5) sanitation and sewers; (6) hospitals; (7) parks and recreation; and (8) low-income housing.

We can then ask whether these policy priorities were responsive to elite concerns, group demands, and/or public preferences. But, first, we must ask how each is measured. Elite concerns were measured by a mail questionnaire sent to city

TABLE 1
Measuring the Components of Various Dimensions of
Responsiveness in Milwaukee

Policy Area	Measures of Policy Priorities			
	1	2	3	4
	Municipal Jurisdiction	1973-74 Expenditures (in thousands of dollars)	1975-76 Expenditures (in thousands of dollars)	1975-76 Expenditures as Percentage of 1973-74 Expenditures
Education	No	—	—	—
Police	Yes	36,434	43,583	1.20 (2)*
Health	Yes	6,037	6,998	1.16 (4)
Welfare	No	—	—	—
Housing	Yes	20,591	15,289	.74 (8)
Streets	Yes	19,038	23,145	1.21 (1)
Parks and Recreation	Yes	10,037	10,607	1.06 (7)
Sanitation	Yes	24,996	28,180	1.13 (5)
Libraries	Yes	5,672	6,644	1.17 (3)
Hospitals	Yes	595	635	1.07 (6)

*The numbers in parentheses in column 4 and the numbers in columns 5 to 13 are rank-order priorities.

**MD signifies missing data.

Measures of Policy Priorities								
5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Elite Priorities	Group Priorities	Perceived Citizen Priorities	Simulated Citizen Priorities	Non- white Priorities	White Priorities	Lower- Income Priorities	Middle- Income Priorities	Upper- Income Priorities
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
T1	1	1	1	5	1	3	2	1
3	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	3
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7	7	7	5	2	5	2	4	5
6	T3	T4	4	6	4	6	6	6
T1	T3	T4	3	3	3	4	3	2
MD**	MD	MD	6	4	6	5	5	4
4	6	6	MD	MD	MD	MD	MD	MD
5	5	3	MD	MD	MD	MD	MD	MD

councilmembers in the 51 cities in the summer of 1976 (the response rate was 45 percent). The questionnaire asked councilmembers to indicate whether they had preferred to increase, decrease, or spend the same for each policy area (corresponding to expenditure categories). Aggregating the councilmembers' responses yielded measures of their priorities. Column 5 of Table 1 presents Milwaukee councilmembers' priorities ranked by decreasing priority. For example, police and recreation were the areas of highest priority, and low-income housing was the area of lowest priority to Milwaukee councilmembers.

Group demands were measured by the same questionnaire. Councilmembers were asked to indicate whether the dominant thrust of organized interest group demands had been to spend more, spend less, or spend the same in each of these policy areas. Again, responses were aggregated to generate group priority measures. As indicated in column 6, the pattern of group demands in Milwaukee seemed to indicate that policymakers received the most communication from groups favoring spending on police protection, and the least communication from those favoring spending on low-income housing.

Citizen policy priorities were measured in two ways. First, councilmembers were asked to indicate their assessments of whether Milwaukee citizens generally had preferred to spend more, less, or the same in each policy area. The aggregated responses of councilmembers generated measures of "perceived citizen priorities." As indicated in column 7, police protection was the highest perceived citizen priority and low-income housing the lowest.

Second, citizens' policy priorities were also measured using a simulation model. The model estimates the structure of citizen policy priorities in cities using national public opinion surveys and the demographic composition of cities.¹⁹ As measured by this simulation model, the priorities of all citizens in Milwaukee, and of distinct sectors of the community (nonwhites, whites, lower-income, middle-income, and upper-income citizens) are presented in columns 8 to 13 of Table 1.

Measures of various dimensions of responsiveness were then obtained by correlating the actual policy priorities as indicated by expenditure changes in Milwaukee (in column 4 of Table 1), with the various measures of elite, group, and citizen priorities (in columns 5 through 13 of Table 1). Table 2 presents correlations indicating the degree of congruence between the actual policy priorities pursued in Milwaukee and priorities of various community sectors. The more positive a correlation is between the preferences of a segment of the community and the actual policy outcomes, the greater the responsiveness to that segment. Thus, our results suggest that Milwaukee has been more responsive to group demands ($r = .52$) and to perceived citizen preferences ($r = .41$) than to elite concerns ($r = .14$). And, policies have been quite unresponsive to the preferences of nonwhite citizens ($r = -.66$) and lower-income citizens ($r = -.37$), while fairly responsive to white citizens ($r = .42$).

The data in columns 9 through 13 of Table 1 are particularly useful for creating measures of responsiveness bias. To assess class bias in the responsiveness of Milwaukee policymakers, we can simply subtract our measure of responsiveness to lower-income citizens ($-.37$) from the average of our measures of responsiveness to middle-income and upper-income citizens ($(-.09 + (-.03))/2 = .06$). Thus, the "class bias" score for Milwaukee equals $.31$. And to assess racial bias in the respon-

siveness of Milwaukee policymakers, we simply subtract our measure of responsiveness to nonwhites (-.66) from our measure of responsiveness to whites (.42). The resulting "racial bias" score for Milwaukee equals 1.08.

Our measures of bias toward whites for the 51 PCS cities are highly correlated with measures of bias towards upper-income citizens.²⁰ Thus to create a summary index of "responsiveness bias toward the advantaged" (white and higher-income citizens) in a community, we simply average these previous measures of bias. The index score for Milwaukee is .70, indicating that Milwaukee exhibits substantial responsiveness bias toward the advantaged. The logic of this procedure should be stressed. The more positive the score on the index of responsiveness bias, the greater the inequality of responsiveness in favor of advantaged white and upper-income citizens. The more negative the score, the greater the inequality in responsiveness in favor of disadvantaged nonwhite and lower-income citizens. The closer the index is to zero, the more equal the treatment of all types of citizens.

C. Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter, we have indicated some of the complexity of the responsiveness concept. Responsiveness occurs when local governments adopt policies which reflect the preferences of various actors in the community. Policymakers can be

TABLE 2
Levels of Responsiveness to Various Inputs: The Case of Milwaukee

Concept	Basis of Measurement: The Correlation Across Policy Areas Between Changes in Spending (Col. 4) and	Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation
Responsiveness to Elites	Elite Priorities (Col. 5)	.14
Responsiveness to Groups	Group Priorities (Col. 6)	.52
Responsiveness to Perceived Citizen Preferences	Perceived Citizen Preferences (Col. 7)	.41
Responsiveness to Simulated Citizen Preferences	Simulated Citizen Preferences (Col. 8)	.43
Responsiveness to Nonwhite Preferences	Nonwhite Preferences (Col. 9)	-.66
Responsiveness to White Preferences	White Preferences (Col. 10)	.42
Responsiveness to Low-Income Citizens	The Preferences of Citizens with a family income of < \$5,000 (Col. 11)	-.37
Responsiveness to Middle-Income Citizens	The Preferences of Citizens with family incomes between \$5,000 and \$15,000 (Col. 12)	-.09
Responsiveness to Upper-Income Citizens	The Preferences of Citizens with family income > 15,000 (Col. 13)	-.03

TABLE 3
Patterns of Responsiveness in the 51 PCS Cities*

Stimulus to Which Policymakers are Most Responsive	Equality of Responsiveness		
	Bias Toward the Disadvantaged	Unbiased Responsiveness	Bias Toward Advantaged
Elite Preferences	Charlotte, NC Fullerton, CA Hamilton, OH Memphis, TN Palo Alto, CA San Jose, CA Seattle, WA	Buffalo, NY Clifton, NJ Gary, IN San Francisco, CA	Akron, OH Phoenix, AZ Schenectady, NY Tyler, TX Warren, MI Waukegan, IL
Group Demands	Minneapolis, MN Newark, NJ	Albany, NY Euclid, OH Malden, MA Indianapolis, IN St. Louis, MO Santa Ana, CA Waterbury, CN	Atlanta, GA Cambridge, MA Duluth, MN Hammond, IN Jacksonville, FL Manchester, NH Milwaukee, WI Pasadena, CA South Bend, IN Utica, NY
Citizen Preferences	Amarillo, TX Berkeley, CA Bloomington, MN St. Petersburg, FL	Ft. Worth, TX Irvington, NJ	Birmingham, AL Boston, MA Long Beach, CA Pittsburgh, PA St. Paul, MN Salt Lake City, UT Santa Monica, CA

*Tampa, Florida, and Waco, Texas (the two remaining cities in the PCS), are not classified here because of missing data on one or more variables used in this classification scheme.

responsive to preferences of elites, organized groups and/or citizens generally. Moreover, policymakers can be more responsive to some types of groups and citizens than to others. One way of summarizing the patterns of responsiveness which cities can display is presented in Table 3. This classification scheme uses two criteria to describe the responsiveness of the 51 PCS cities. First, it considers whether policymakers are most responsive to elites, groups, or citizens. Second, it considers whether policymakers in each community are most responsive to disadvantaged or advantaged citizens, or whether each is treated about equally.

As can be seen, the cities in the PCS exhibit great variations in their patterns of responsiveness. For example, 19 cities are most responsive to group demands, 17 to elite concerns, and 13 to citizen preferences. The results also indicate that the PCS cities tend to be more responsive to advantaged citizens than disadvantaged citizens. Twenty-three of the cities exhibit substantial bias toward the advantaged while only 13 cities exhibit substantial bias toward the disadvantaged.

It is also instructive to note that responsiveness bias toward advantaged citizens is most pronounced when policymakers are most responsive to group demands. This finding is not surprising and is consistent with E. E. Schattschneider's observation that group politics is a decisively upper-income phenomenon.²¹ When city officials respond primarily to group demands, the wishes of disadvantaged citizens—who tend to be less well organized into interest groups than advantaged citizens—are often ignored.

Finally, the results in Table 3 suggest that bias toward the disadvantaged is most likely to occur when policy is most responsive to elite concerns. This finding is clearly at odds with the claim that if only policymakers would be more responsive to citizen and group inputs, the disadvantaged would receive better treatment. What these data suggest, instead, is that the tradition of "noblesse oblige" (that elites are generous to the less fortunate) can be found in many American cities.²²

A word of caution is appropriate. You should recognize that the results in Table 3 are based solely on changes in expenditures in the mid-1970s. These results might well be different if we looked at different years. In other analyses we have completed, for example, we find that expenditure policies in the mid-1970s were in part based on reactions to spending in earlier years. Cities with fiscal policies most responsive to the disadvantaged in the late 1960s and early 1970s, like Birmingham or Boston, adopted different spending priorities by the mid-1970s. They fall in our "bias toward advantaged" category in Table 3, in part, because Boston and Birmingham had been so responsive to the disadvantaged in previous years. Cities often go through cycles of this sort, responding more to pressures from organized groups or citizens in one period, and then moving in the other direction in the next period. These are simply some of the complexities of urban politics which are impossible to measure more adequately without spending thousands of dollars in research money. We are the first to recognize such measurement problems, but the basic question is, given measurement problems, do we find any patterns across cities which differ from those one could expect solely on the basis of chance? This is the central question of the next chapter.

D. Exercises

1. Can you think of other procedures by which you might measure policy responsiveness besides those suggested in this manual? How might your class best measure responsiveness in the community where your college or university is located? Can you think of any procedures by which to assess responsiveness in a large sample of cities from data which are readily available?

2. To what extent are the cities which have been responsive to citizen preferences in the allocation of revenue sharing funds (V8) the same cities which have been responsive to citizen preferences in the allocation of general expenditures (V9 or V10)? Speculate on your findings.

3. In footnote 20, we claim that responsiveness bias towards the preferences of white citizens (V18) is associated with responsiveness bias toward the preferences of middle- and upper-income citizens (V19). We attained this result by treating these measures of responsiveness bias as *interval-level* variables and using correlation analysis. However, in this manual, these variables are reported as *ordinal-level* rather than interval-level variables. Repeat our analysis, using the

nominal-level data provided for you and cross-tabulation analysis. Are the results obtained using nominal-level data the same as the results obtained using interval-level data?

E. Suggested Further Readings

The elitist perspective, with an emphasis on business actors, is developed by Floyd G. Hunter in *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953). Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt's *Labyrinths of Democracy* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973) emphasizes the crucial role which elected elites play in community politics.

The "group theory" tradition is central to American political science, and is illustrated by David Truman's *The Governmental Process*, 2nd Edition (New York: Knopf, 1970). Probably the two most important examples of the group theory approach in city politics remain Edward Banfield's study of Chicago, *Political Influence* (New York: Free Press, 1961) and Robert Dahl's *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), which studies New Haven.

The citizen preference perspective was developed most forcefully by Anthony Downs in *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). It has in turn been reshaped in different ways by numerous political scientists. One work concerning community politics in this general tradition is Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, *Participation in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), Part III.

The concepts of policy responsiveness and responsiveness bias are developed in two articles by Paul Schumaker and Russell Getter. See "Responsiveness Bias in 51 American Communities," *American Journal of Political Science* 21 (May, 1977), 247-281, and "The Contextual Bases of Responsiveness to Citizen Preferences and Group Demands," *Policy and Politics* 6 (March, 1978), 249-278.

Chapter IV.

The Conditions of Responsiveness

An important task for students of urban politics is to explain why communities exhibit the different patterns of responsiveness described in Table 3 of the last chapter. One approach to this task is to relate variations in responsiveness patterns to socioeconomic and political characteristics of cities. Cities vary in their socioeconomic characteristics. For example, some are more populous than others; some have a wealthier economic base, and some are more heterogeneous—including larger black and ethnic populations. Cities also vary in their formal political institutions. For example, cities may elect councilmembers from wards or from the city as a whole, and they may have partisan or nonpartisan elections. Cities also differ in their administrative practices. For example, public employees are unionized in some cities, but unionization is prohibited in others. Similarly, cities vary in many of their informal political characteristics (e.g., voter turnout may be high or low; businessmen and other organized groups may have varying levels of influence on public policy). In this chapter we discuss how these variables can affect the level and type of responsiveness.

A. City Size

Neither theoretical discussions nor empirical research have provided clear support for any relationship between city size—as measured by census population statistics—and patterns of political responsiveness. One might argue that responsiveness to citizens is greater in smaller cities, because groups and individuals should have more opportunities to communicate their preferences to political officials. As city size increases, distance between citizens and policymakers should thus increase, reducing levels of government responsiveness. Some empirical research supports this argument.²³ For example, public opinion polls show that citizens in large cities believe municipal officials are less responsive to their concerns than do citizens in small cities.²⁴

But the opposite argument can also be made. Political groups are generally more active in larger cities, and such groups doubtless provide policymakers with information about group preferences.²⁵ Racial minority groups may be especially active in larger cities with substantial nonwhite populations. Municipal governments in larger cities may also be less administrative and more political, and policymakers working in a political environment may be more responsive to citizen preferences. It has been found, for example, that larger cities tend to have more pluralistic political processes than small cities, and pluralistic cities generally are more responsive to citizen inputs.²⁶

Thus, the relationship between city size and patterns of responsiveness remains an unresolved but significant research question. The data in this manual can be used to analyze this relationship.

B. Economic Resource Availability

Cities differ in socioeconomic characteristics. When a city has many citizens who are well-educated and of middle- and upper-income, and few below the poverty level, it has a high "social rank."²⁷ Municipal governments in such cities have a wealthier tax base to support city services. One might hypothesize that wealthier cities could allocate their budgets more according to citizen preferences,²⁸ while poorer cities may be so financially strapped that public officials spend limited tax dollars on vital city services (e.g., sanitation, street maintenance, police and fire protection), even though disadvantaged citizens may prefer more spending on social services (e.g., health, welfare).

Although wealthy cities may be generally more responsive, it is unclear *to whom* they respond most. Since wealthier cities are composed of more advantaged citizens, one might expect policymakers to be more responsive to the middle- and upper-income citizens, if they are the electoral majority. However, a substantial body of research suggests that the wealthier is a community, the more it pursues policies beneficial to the disadvantaged.²⁹ Thus there are important unresolved questions concerning the relationship between economic resources and policy responsiveness.

C. Population Heterogeneity

Besides income and wealth, it is important to consider ethnic, racial, and religious composition. Cities with a high proportion of citizens who are of "foreign stock," nonwhite, or Catholic are sometimes called "heterogeneous." (It seems not to matter that 80 percent of all residents in a city may be "heterogeneous" in this sense; it still differs from the traditional idea that "homogeneous" cities are predominantly comprised of white Protestants. We yield, grudgingly, to general usage on this point.) It is unclear whether heterogeneous cities or homogeneous cities should exhibit greater responsiveness to citizen inputs. On the one hand, heterogeneous cities may be more responsive because they usually have many diverse and competing political groups and therefore more pluralistic power structures. Such pluralistic systems should be open to various types of citizen inputs.³⁰

On the other hand, in these heterogeneous cities, there may well be little citizen consensus on government priorities. Overall responsiveness to citizen inputs may decrease as the preferences and demands on policymakers become so diverse that officials can discern no dominant preferences.³¹ The extent of responsiveness in heterogeneous and homogeneous communities thus remains an open question, but one that can be addressed using PCS data.

We can also ask to whom policymakers are most responsive in heterogeneous communities. For example, city officials might be increasingly responsive to black interests as the percentage of blacks in a city increases. Yet it has also been argued that cities become most repressive of black concerns as blacks approach, but do not attain, majority status.³² We can address this issue by examining the relationship between the racial composition of cities and responsiveness to various racial groups.

D. Form of Government

In the late nineteenth century, most cities had what is now called *unreformed government*, consisting of a *strong mayor* and *partisan election* of councilmembers from *separate districts*. Many of these cities developed political "machines" which were able to influence the selection of candidates, and control the votes—sometimes through questionable means—in well-organized election districts. This situation led to the development of *reform government*, a program of legal arrangements adopted by many American cities in the first half of the twentieth century. The three basic reform institutions were the *professional city manager* who, according to reform ideology, should govern in a nonpolitical, businesslike manner and be responsible only to the council; *non-partisan council elections*, which should weaken the power of political parties; and *at-large election of council members*, which should make these officials more city-oriented and thus less concerned with the needs and desires of a specific area within a city.

The responsiveness of reformed institutions remains one of the major unresolved questions in urban politics. According to its advocates, reformed governments should be less responsive to special interest groups and more responsive to the concerns and needs of a "whole city."³³ Political machines were seen as overly responsive to factional interests in the city; at-large constituencies and nonpartisan elections might thus result in public policies which reflect the concerns of an entire city. If reformed institutions work as intended, we might suppose that when cities have reformed political institutions, responsiveness to citizen preferences would increase, while responsiveness to organized groups would decrease.

It is unclear, however, that reformed institutions have worked as intended. It may be that reformism today actually reduces responsiveness to citizen preferences while increasing responsiveness to group demands.³⁴ Reformed cities may be less responsive to the broad range of citizen preferences because professionals (e.g., the city manager) place administrative considerations and efficiency above public preferences when weighing policy alternatives.

How about responsiveness to groups? Policymakers in reformed institutions may be relatively responsive to group demands, but demands other than those of the ethnic and neighborhood groups to which the machines responded. In reformed

cities, business-oriented groups (e.g., the Chamber of Commerce) and civic groups (e.g., the League of Women Voters) are often major political actors.³⁵ Reformed cities can thus be highly responsive to group demands—particularly the demands of the most powerful city groups. And such groups are typically comprised of upper-income residents, rather than the lower-income residents of machine-oriented groups.

In summary, it has become commonplace to cite a 15-year-old article by Robert Lineberry and Edmond Fowler, which argued “the greater the reformism, the lower the responsiveness.”³⁶ But, as we argued in Chapter III, responsiveness is a multi-dimensional term. And it is still unclear *which type of citizen inputs* are most likely to be ignored by policymakers under alternative institutional arrangements. Again, the data presented in this manual provide an opportunity to investigate this issue.

E. Community Power Structure

As suggested in Chapter III, the distribution of power within communities has been a major concern of urban scholars. Two aspects of the structure of community power seem most likely to affect responsiveness patterns of cities. First, cities vary in the *number of direct participants* in the policymaking process. Cities with a relatively large number of persons involved in initiating, bargaining, and vetoing policy decisions—as measured by the “ersatz decisional method” of Terry Clark—have decentralized or pluralistic power structures.³⁷ When few persons participate directly in the policymaking process, power is more centralized. Because decentralized power structures have more “access points” for citizens and groups to communicate their preferences, one would hypothesize that more decentralized cities would be more responsive to citizen inputs. Yet, it can be argued to the contrary that when power is dispersed, a small number of (unrepresentative) groups may be able to gain control of some “veto point” in the policymaking process.³⁸ In this case, the presence of many participants may reduce responsiveness to citizen preferences and dominant group demands. Further, it may be that a more critical question regarding the power structure is not “how many participants are there?” but “who are the main participants?”

This leads to a second major dimension of the community power structure: the *identity of leaders* in the policymaking process. In some cities, the major leaders are elected officials, especially the mayor. In others, the major “influentials” in the city may be persons associated with private businesses and city newspapers. The extent of leadership provided by the mayor, businessmen, and newspapers provides measures of this aspect or dimension of community power. In general, one might expect that the more important the mayor, and the less important are businessmen and newspapers, the greater will be the responsiveness to citizen inputs.³⁹ After all, unlike businessmen, the mayor—as a publicly elected official—is held accountable for his actions at election time and thus has a greater incentive to be responsive to all citizens. One would also expect mayors, whose electoral coalitions often include lower-income citizens and minorities, to be more responsive to the disadvantaged.⁴⁰ Business leaders are instead more likely to be responsive to the more advantaged citizens whose views they share. Although these hypotheses are often discussed in the community power literature, they have received little attention in comparative ur-

ban research. The data provided in this manual permit you to investigate patterns of responsiveness in cities where mayors or businessmen are differentially important

F. Citizen Participation

Citizens can participate in many ways that affect responsiveness patterns.⁴¹ A principal mode of citizen participation is voting. Verba and Nie have suggested that greater voter turnout generates greater responsiveness by policymakers to citizen preferences. According to this argument, policymakers perceive that a high level of voter turnout means that citizens are attentive to their actions, and thus feel pressured by high turnout into being responsive. Yet, the counter-argument can be made that voting is a very blunt instrument for pressuring policymakers. Policymakers often receive little information about specific citizen policy preferences from voting behavior.⁴² And some leaders—private elites or public elites subject to little electoral competition—have little incentive to be responsive to voters. It is thus unclear whether the level of voter turnout will have any appreciable impact on responsiveness patterns.

Another mode of citizen participation is interest group activity. When interest groups are well-organized and active, they exert a good deal of pressure on policymakers. Verba and Nie argue that the higher the participation level through "communal" (e.g., interest group) activity, the greater the responsiveness of policymakers. But this responsiveness is directed primarily at citizens who are active participants in community groups. Whether group pressure enhances responsiveness to citizen preferences generally depends on how representative active interest groups are of the entire population. If interest groups are representative of most citizens, greater interest group pressure should enhance responsiveness. If interest groups are unrepresentative—and interest group members are often disproportionately upper-income⁴³—group pressure may actually reduce responsiveness to citizen preferences. Moreover, if interest group pressure comes largely from upper-income and/or white citizens, this may enhance responsiveness bias toward advantaged citizens. To understand how responsiveness patterns are affected by citizen participation it is useful to investigate the inter-relationships among a variety of citizen participation measures (e.g., voter turnout, pressures exerted by several types of groups) and a variety of responsiveness measures. Several such measures are included in our data file and are intended to facilitate these investigations.

G. Black Representation

Since the mid-1960s, more black Americans have been elected to city office. Yet cities vary in terms of black representation on city councils. To measure the black representation level, political scientists have constructed a "black representation ratio," a measure of the percentage of the council composed of blacks.⁴⁴ If blacks are represented in exact proportion to their composition in the city, the ratio equals one; if they are underrepresented, the ratio approaches zero (and equals zero if there are no black councilpersons). While political scientists have sought to discover conditions which enhance black representation, to our knowledge there

have been no systematic comparative studies of the consequences of high levels of black representation. One might expect that a city council which most accurately mirrors the entire population will best reflect the variety of citizen preferences. If true, more black representation would result in more responsiveness to citizen preferences, and less responsiveness bias. But there are several reasons why black representation may have little impact on responsiveness. First, blacks elected to city councils may differ enough from nonwhite citizens in terms of education or income that they may not represent general nonwhite citizen preferences. Second, black representatives may be too few to have much of an impact on policy decisions. For these reasons it is problematic whether black representation will indeed affect policy responsiveness. Again, the data in this manual provide an opportunity to assess the impacts of black representation.

H. Some Empirical Findings

Table 4 presents the results of simple cross-tabulations which address some of the hypotheses developed in this chapter. Relationships involve three independent variables concerning key political characteristics of cities—form of government, power structures, and voter turnout in cities—and responsiveness to elites, groups, and citizen preferences, as dependent variables.

TABLE 4
The Relationships Between Selected Political Characteristics of Communities and Responsiveness to Elite Preferences, Group Demands, and Perceived and Simulated Citizen Preferences: Results of Cross-Tabulation Analyses

Percentage of Cities with Indicated Political Characteristics Which Exhibit "High" Responsiveness to Indicated Stimulus	Stimuli to Which Cities are Highly Responsive			
	Elite Preferences	Group Demands	Perceived Citizen Preferences	Simulated Citizen Preferences
Form of Government				
1. Unreformed (N=11)	55%	91%	46%	64%
2. Mixed (N=12)	58%	58%	50%	50%
3. Reformed (N=28)	50%	52%	59%	39%
Extent of Business Leadership				
1. Low (N=28)	64%	75%	67%	61%
2. High (N=23)	39%	45%	39%	30%
Level of Voter Turnout				
1. Less than 40% (N=26)	42%	64%	56%	30%
2. Greater than 40% of Eligible Voters (N=25)	64%	60%	52%	64%
All Cities	53%	62%	54%	47%

To utilize cross-tabulation procedures, we first classified cities into discrete categories. For example, cities were classified according to whether they had (a) predominantly unreformed governmental institutions, (b) mixed reformed and unreformed institutions, and (c) predominantly reformed institutions. The table shows that 28 of the 51 PCS cities (or 55 percent) have predominantly reformed institutions, a figure quite representative of American cities. We also classified these cities according to whether business influence was relatively low (in 28 cities) or relatively high (in 23 cities). Finally, we classified communities according to whether voter turnout was relatively low—less than 40 percent of the eligible electorate (in 26 cities)—or relatively high—greater than 40 percent of the eligible electorate (in 25 cities). Then a determination was made about whether or not each city exhibited a high or low level of responsiveness to (a) elite preferences, (b) group demands, (c) perceived citizen preferences, and (d) simulated citizen preferences. As indicated by the “marginal percentages” at the bottom of Table 4, more cities (62 percent) were highly responsive to group demands than were highly responsive to elite preferences (53 percent) or citizen preferences (54 percent and 47 percent using our two measurement procedures).

The cross-tabulations in Table 4 support some of the theoretical propositions developed in Chapter II. “Open” communities with unreformed governmental institutions exhibit relatively high levels of responsiveness to group demands and simulated citizen preferences. Moreover, cities with a high level of business leadership—an indicator of “closed” communities—are less responsive to group demands and citizen preferences. When business influence is high, preferences of elected officials are also less reflected in policy, suggesting that the priorities of private business elites are the bases of public policy in business-dominated communities. Finally, Table 4 suggests that higher voter turnout is associated with high responsiveness to simulated citizen preferences. This is again consistent with the proposition about “open” communities enhancing responsiveness to citizen inputs.

Although the results in Table 4 are theoretically satisfying, we invite the student to question these tentative conclusions. The relations reported here may be spurious, and you may wish to test for such a possibility. Moreover, Table 4 reports data on only a few of the many community characteristics which may affect responsiveness. We have also left unexplored how community characteristics affect responsiveness to various organized groups (e.g., nonwhite or white) and various types of citizen preferences (e.g., upper- or lower-income). These are just a few of the many questions regarding the conditions of responsiveness which can be explored using the data made available in this manual.

I. Exercises

1. Examine the relationships between population size and responsiveness to white, nonwhite, lower-income, middle-income, and upper-income citizens (V11 to V15). Which types of citizens are most likely to have their preferences responded to in small cities?

2. Your results for exercise 1 should indicate that there is no significant relationship between city size and responsiveness to nonwhite citizens. Nevertheless,

city size and responsiveness to nonwhites may be related under certain conditions. Can you think of any specification variables which effect this relationship? Review the discussion of specification variables in Chapter II, and then develop and test two hypotheses involving city size, responsiveness to nonwhite preferences, and appropriate specification variables.

3. Which of the following variables seem to have the greatest impact on the level of responsiveness to white citizens: (a) percent foreign stock, (b) percentage of municipal employees covered by civil service, (c) whether or not municipal employees are unionized, (d) the level of municipal overstaffing, (3) the extent of black representation on city councils, or (f) the average education level of councilmembers? Discuss your findings.

4. Which of the six independent variables listed in question 3 seem to have the greatest impact on the level of responsiveness to nonwhite citizens? Discuss these findings.

J. Suggested Further Readings

Readings listed in the footnotes deal with each of the sets of key variables in this chapter. The single reading on which the chapter builds more than any other is Getter and Schumaker's "The Contextual Bases of Responsiveness to Citizen Preferences and Group Demands," *Policy and Politics* 6 (March, 1978), 249-279. But see also Part III of Verba and Nie's *Participation in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972). These issues are pursued in Terry Nichols Clark, ed., *Urban Policy Analysis, Urban Affairs Annual Reviews* 21 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981), chs. 2, 3, 4, 9, and 10.

Chapter V.

Fiscal Strain

In the fall of 1975, the New York City fiscal crisis brought to public attention a problem that has concerned city officials and urban analysis for some time: urban fiscal strain. Many cities are experiencing fiscal strain, although to a lesser degree than New York City. Fiscal strain is an imbalance between expenditures and available resources. Expenditures grow with expanding public services and payments on debt. Resources include the local tax base on which the city can draw for revenues, as well as certain non-local sources—especially intergovernmental revenues. In this chapter, measures are developed which indicate the extent to which each of the 51 cities in the Permanent Community Sample is suffering from fiscal strain. We also discuss some of the socioeconomic conditions, political characteristics, and administrative practices of cities which appear to affect the extent of fiscal strain on municipal governments.

A. Measuring Fiscal Strain

Like the concept of policy responsiveness, the concept of fiscal strain is complex and difficult to measure. The measures of fiscal strain reported in this manual were generated by starting with 29 separate indicators of the financial obligations and conditions of cities.⁴⁵ By analyzing these data using a procedure known as factor analysis, we have identified four dimensions of fiscal strain:

1. Common Functions
2. Long-Term Debt
3. Short-Term Debt
4. Tax Effort

1. *Common Functions.* The clearest beginning of fiscal strain can be found in high spending levels. Expenditures on common functions—those basic services which are common to most American cities—are a good basic measure of a city's spending level. The nine common functions include the census categories of police,

fire, sewerage, sanitation, highways, parks and recreation, financial administration, general control, and general building. Cities may have very high spending levels in these areas for any number of reasons. Service demands may be extensive. Costs of providing these services may be great, especially when public employee unions obtain generous labor contracts. Inefficiencies due to poor managerial practices and extensive political patronage may also contribute to high spending levels. But in any case, high expenditures on basic services increase the financial pressures on policymaking as they require high revenues from property taxes or other sources.

Some of the differences in expenditure levels across the cities are due to the range of functions which they perform: some cities are involved in education and welfare, others are not.⁴⁶ If a city government does not perform such a function, it may be performed by another level of government, such as a school district or county, covering the same geographic area. Several procedures have been developed to control for these differences in "functional performance" of government. The simplest is to study only common functions. Another is to analyze only percentage changes in expenditures instead of per capita levels of spending. A third is to sum all expenditures in a county area by all local governments—the "overlapping" government approach. A fourth is to create a measure of the range of functional performance of a city, and use this as a control in analysis. All four procedures are used in the literature on urban expenditures.⁴⁷ Although functional performance is something to keep in mind, it is often of surprisingly small importance in explaining municipal expenditure levels.

2. *Long-Term Debt.* To finance various capital improvements (streets, civic centers, cultural and recreational facilities, etc.) cities may sell long-term (often five to 30 years) municipal bonds to investors. The principal on these bonds must be paid off, and interest paid on the outstanding debt. If the population and tax base decline, these payments can become a substantial burden on cities, absorbing a large and expanding portion of the municipal budget.

3. *Short-Term Debt.* The need to pay bills and employee salaries regularly, while collecting taxes infrequently (usually at the end of the year), generates a situation commonly resolved by short-term borrowing. Most such debt is paid off before the end of the fiscal year and thus has little effect on fiscal strain. Only loans and notes outstanding at the end of the fiscal year are normally reported as short-term debt. Thus when short-term debt is reported, especially for several subsequent years, it can indicate that the city has difficulty meeting short-term cash flow problems. Although short-term debt is generally low for most American cities, it was a major problem in the 1975 New York fiscal crisis. Thus, data for short-term debt, which is available from the Census, is an important indication of urban fiscal strain. However, you should be cautioned that these data have some "noise" as they include notes for public housing and urban renewal guaranteed by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

4. *Tax Effort.* This shows how extensively city wealth is taxed. For example, when cities raise their *mill rates* for property taxes, they increase their tax effort. When cities have high tax efforts, they experience another aspect of fiscal strain. If a city is presently imposing very heavy taxes on residential and commercial property, its ability to raise taxes to cover increasing costs is restricted. For if the tax rates in a particular city become very high relative to other cities, businesses and residents

will have economic incentives to leave the city, thus reducing its tax base and exacerbating fiscal strain.

These four dimensions of fiscal difficulty are somewhat distinct and can be analyzed separately. They can also be summed in an overall index of fiscal strain. Table 5 shows such overall fiscal strain scores for the 51 PCS cities. New York City is not one of our 51 cities, but for purposes of comparison, a score was also computed for it. With a fiscal strain score of 169, it is clear that New York City's fiscal plight is significantly more severe than any of the other cities. Still, some of the sample cities are also high; Boston, San Francisco, Newark, Albany, Cambridge, and Malden have the highest fiscal strain scores. Others like Salt Lake City, Amarillo and Santa Ana have the lowest scores, indicating they have relatively few financial problems. To facilitate examination of the conditions leading to fiscal strain using cross-tabulation analysis, we have classified the 51 PCS cities as "high," "medium" or "low" on fiscal strain, as shown in Table 5.

TABLE 5
Fiscal Strain Scores for the 51 Cities in the Permanent Community Sample

HIGH		LOW	
Boston, MA	138.26	Long Beach, CA	46.23
San Francisco, CA	104.41	Milwaukee, WI	44.26
Newark, NJ	102.90	Palo Alto, CA	42.85
Albany, NY	100.57	Minneapolis, MN	42.54
Cambridge, MA	91.11	Tyler, TX	42.03
Malden, MA	89.79	Waco, TX	41.98
		Charlotte, NC	40.80
		South Bend, IN	39.83
		Indianapolis, IN	39.42
		Fort Worth, TX	38.71
		Euclid, OH	36.69
		Phoenix, AZ	35.62
		Bloomington, MN	34.46
		Duluth, MN	33.38
		Gary, IN	33.25
		Irvington, NJ	30.88
		Santa Monica, CA	30.80
		Schenectacy, NY	29.21
		Clifton, NJ	28.48
		Hamilton, OH	27.83
		Berkeley, CA	27.31
		Hammond, IN	27.31
		San Jose, CA	26.65
		St. Petersburg, FL	24.76
		Warren, MI	22.80
		Salt Lake City, UT	20.71
		Amarillo, TX	18.76
		Waukegan, IL	16.02
		Fullerton, CA	8.87
		Santa Ana, CA	8.07

MEDIUM

Buffalo, NY	88.44
Atlanta, GA	82.52
Waterbury, CN	80.76
Utica, NY	74.79
Seattle, WA	73.62
Jacksonville, FL	72.62
Manchester, NH	66.66
Akron, OH	62.52
Birmingham, AL	60.42
St. Louis, MO	58.50
Memphis, TN	55.98
Pasadena, CA	55.73
St. Paul, MN	52.58
Tampa, FL	48.73
Pittsburgh, PA	48.52

B. Fiscal Strain Conditions

Fiscal strain is unquestionably due to many factors. In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss some of the socioeconomic conditions, political factors, and administrative practices which can enhance fiscal strain.

1. *Population Size.* It is widely believed that municipal fiscal strain is most pronounced in large cities. According to one view of urban politics, the large, old, central cities have many more poor people who make extensive demands on city services. Surrounded by suburbs, these cities are unlikely to experience extensive economic development and growth. In fact, these cities often have declining populations as fewer new jobs or non-poor are attracted to declining cities.⁴⁸ Such large cities, therefore, are caught in a financial squeeze between increasing service demands and expenditures, and a constant or declining tax base.

2. *Population Characteristics.* If this theory which links fiscal strain to city size is correct, it is not only size which causes fiscal strain, but also the type of people who live in big cities. Big cities have relatively large numbers of poor citizens and relatively few affluent ones. This focus on population characteristics suggests that fiscal strain should be greatest in those cities with low population wealth on our index of social rank.

Another population characteristic which may affect fiscal strain is the ethnic composition of a city. For example, Terry Clark has shown that Irish-Americans are frequently very active in city politics and thus are more influential than one would predict by focusing on their small numbers.⁴⁹ Clark has also argued that Irish politicians have often used patronage (placing their supporters on municipal payrolls) and political exchanges (for example, awarding public works contracts on the basis of political support rather than on the basis of cost-efficiency considerations). Using these practices, Irish politicians may enhance their bases of support, but also increase fiscal strain. One might test this hypothesis by relating fiscal strain to the number of Irish residents in a city, controlling for possible spuriousness-producing variables.

3. *Form of Government.* Reformed institutions were created to make municipal government more businesslike and efficient. When cities hire a city manager and professional budgeting officers, they usually grant them extensive powers to develop tax and spending policies for approval by the city council. Do such cities attain the kind of financial control which reduces fiscal strain? Studies have shown that tax rates are lower in reformed cities than unreformed cities, suggesting that reformed institutions may be more efficient.⁵⁰ But reformed institutions are intertwined with other community characteristics: they are disproportionately adopted by cities with more highly educated and affluent residents, and it may be these characteristics, rather than reformism, which are most critical. Careful multivariate analysis, where, for example, the index of social rank is used as a control variable, is necessary to sort out these separate effects.

4. *Power Structure Characteristics.* Cities having centralized power structures, with community leadership often exercised by businessmen, should experience less fiscal strain than cities with decentralized power structures. When cities have centralized power structures, and thus fewer "access points," a smaller number of special interest groups are involved in making public policy. Thus, policymakers will

have to accommodate fewer costly demands by these groups in reaching policy decisions. Conversely, cities with decentralized power structures should experience greater strain as a result of their efforts to satisfy all influential participants in the policy process. As Terry Clark has argued, *decentralization generates separable goods*.⁵¹ Separable goods are municipal benefits provided to specific groups (e.g., welfare payments) or consumed primarily by specific neighborhoods (e.g., new parks). The extensive provision of these goods—which is promoted by decentralized power structures—should enhance fiscal strain. Conversely, Clark has argued that *centralization encourages public goods*, which are benefits—such as economic and fiscal health—shared by virtually all residents in a city.

Cities with centralized power structures also tend to have more politically active business leaders. They may be attentive to problems of economic growth, and urge cities to promote policies which protect the tax base. Moreover, they may bring to city government relatively efficient economic and financial practices which also reduce fiscal strain. By contrast, in cities with decentralized power structures, community leadership is more often provided by mayors and other elected officials. Because mayors have political incentives to be responsive to broad electoral constituencies, they are likely to pursue policies which bring short-term satisfaction to citizens and groups at the expense of longer-term investments promoting economic growth. For example, mayors may be more likely than business leaders to accede to demands by lower-income residents for more extensive social services and to demands by public employee unions for increased wages. Such policies, of course, generate higher fiscal strain levels. Thus, we hypothesize that more business influence and less mayoral influence means a lower level of fiscal strain.

5. *Interest Group Pressure*. In discussing “the democratic distemper” in America, Samuel Huntington has argued that Americans are increasingly joining special interest groups to pressure public officials to provide them with economically beneficial policies.⁵² This type of citizen participation, according to Huntington, has resulted in governmental officials at the federal, state, and local levels increasing expenditures to respond to these pressures. This same process at the local level has been discussed by Frances Fox Piven. She argues that the poor, minorities, the working class, and municipal workers have joined the older, predominantly middle class interest groups at the public “trough.”⁵³ While most cities do not have enough resources to satisfy all of these disparate groups, they have responded to enough group pressures to increase financial stress. We would expect, therefore, that fiscal strain would be highest where interest groups are most active, organized, and influential. (Note that these ideas about interest groups are related to the more general propositions in the last section regarding the relationship between decentralization and the provision of separable goods.)

6. *Public Employee Unions*. Perhaps one of the most significant changes in city politics in recent years is the development of public employee unions and associations. Sanitation workers, firemen, and policemen are among those municipal employees that have been permitted, in some cities, to form collective bargaining units to obtain substantial wage increases from city officials. The questions of whether municipal employees ought to have the right to form unions, to engage in collective bargaining, and to strike are still hotly debated issues, and many states and localities prohibit some or all of these activities. Thus, the extent to which public

employees are organized for collective bargaining varies among our sample cities. We hypothesize that cities which must deal with organized public employees have been forced to make agreements calling for higher wages and fringe benefits (especially pension plans) which will enhance fiscal strain.

7. *Municipal Employee Overstaffing.* Approximately 50 percent of all local government expenditures go to employee salaries. As the number of city employees increases, expenditures go up and cities should experience increased fiscal strain.

To assess the impact of the number of municipal government employees on fiscal strain, an "index of overstaffing" was developed. This index was created by estimating the number of employees one would expect to find in a city, given some of its basic socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., size, percent living below the poverty line, etc.).⁵⁴ If a city has more employees than other cities of comparable socioeconomic composition, it is overstaffed. Excessive staffing can reflect bureaucratic inefficiency and enhance fiscal strain.

C. An Overview of Empirical Findings

Table 6 presents a measure of association (Kendall's Tau-C) between indices of the variables discussed in this chapter and the summary index of fiscal strain. Statistically significant relationships are noted by asterisks. Note that coefficients

TABLE 6
Kendall Tau-C Measures of Association Between Various Contextual Variables and Fiscal Strain

Characteristics	Summary Index of Fiscal Strain
Socioeconomic:	
1. Population Size	.39*
2. Index of Social Rank	-.26*
3. Percent Nonwhite	.32*
4. Percent Residents of Irish Stock	.45*
Political:	
1. Index of Reformism	-.23*
2. Index of Decentralization	.30*
3. Index of Business Leadership	.03
4. Index of Mayoral Leadership	.25*
5. Index of Total Group Pressure	.11
Administrative:	
1. Public Employee Unionization	.35*
2. Index of Overstaffing	.46*

*Correlations are significant at the .05 level.

closest to zero fail to be statistically significant; this suggests that there is no empirical relationship between the two variables. Kendall's Tau-C also indicates whether a variable enhances fiscal strain (if the coefficient is positive) or reduces fiscal strain (if it is negative). The higher the absolute value of the coefficient, the stronger is the relationship between variables.

Table 6 suggests that most of our hypotheses regarding the factors affecting fiscal strain have some empirical validity. The only relationships which fail to be statistically significant at the .05 level are those between our index of group pressure and fiscal strain and between our index of business leadership and fiscal strain. Variables that seem to enhance fiscal strain include (1) a large number of residents of Irish stock, (2) overstaffing of municipal employees, (3) public employee unionization (measured by whether or not each city had signed a contract by 1972 for collective bargaining with the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Unions), (4) a large number of direct participants in the policymaking process (measured by the Clark index of decentralized power), (5) a high level of mayoral influence in community decision-making, (6) a large total population, and (7) a large nonwhite population. The contextual variables that seem to reduce fiscal strain include (1) a high level of population wealth (indicated by the index of social rank), and (2) reformed governmental institutions.

There are several reasons, however, why the results presented in Table 6 must be considered preliminary. First, these measures of association do not control for possible spuriousness among variables. In more complex analyses, which we encourage you to undertake, multivariate models can be used which introduce controls for possible spuriousness-producing variables. Several examples of such multivariate procedures are found in the articles cited, but as they vary in their level of complexity, we have decided to leave it to the instructor to decide which to use. Second, the analysis reported in Table 6 has treated the concept of fiscal strain in a summary fashion. As indicated in our discussion of the measurement of fiscal strain, this concept is four-dimensional. A more refined analysis would examine how contextual variables affect each of these four dimensions of fiscal strain: (1) per capita expenditures on common functions, (2) long-term debt, (3) short-term debt, and (4) tax effort. Third, the independent variables analyzed in Table 4 include only a selected number of summary indicators of the socioeconomic, political, and bureaucratic variables that may affect fiscal strain. By undertaking further analyses which examine how specific variables have independent impacts on various dimensions of fiscal strain, the student can develop a more precise understanding of the sources of fiscal strain in American cities.⁵⁵

D. Exercises

1. List the scores on the four separate fiscal strain indexes as well as the summary index (V2), for each of the 51 cities. Which cities have consistent scores on the four basic measures? Cross-tabulate each of the indexes with one another. Which indexes are most highly related to each other? Which are least related?
2. Would you expect that any of the four dimensions of fiscal strain are related to any of the dimensions of policy responsiveness? Why? State your expectations

as clearly as possible in a set of hypotheses. Test these hypotheses with the PCS data.

3. Is the relationship between Percent Irish Stock and common function expenditures spurious? Can you show that this is the case? (If you succeed, please send your results to T. N. Clark.)

4. Do larger cities score higher on the four indexes of fiscal strain? Can you show that any of the relations between population size and the fiscal strain measures are spurious or conditional?

5. Which type of communities tend to have strong mayors? Develop and test three hypotheses about the relationship between community characteristics and mayoral influence.

6. Which types of communities tend to have the most influential businessmen in the policy process? Develop and test three hypotheses about the relationship between community characteristics and the influence of businessmen.

E. Suggested Further Readings

Terry Clark's *How Many New Yorks?* (Chicago: Comparative Study of Community Decision-Making, Research Report #72, University of Chicago, 1976) discusses further indicators of fiscal strain and problems of multivariate analyses of fiscal strain.

The Clark paper on the "Irish Ethic" in *Ethnicity* (1975), 305-358, presents two general perspectives on analyzing urban politics and policy outputs. One stresses citizen preferences and public goods in the manner analyzed by Anthony Downs. The second emphasizes political exchanges of separable goods among political leaders and their supporters. Both are tested using several types of data at the city and individual levels.

NOTES

1. The National Science Foundation and The University of Kansas General Research Fund supported the collection of much of the data reported in this manual. We would also like to thank Michael O'Keefe, Robert Shapiro, and Charlene Serfert for their help in preparing the manual.

2. See Terry Nichols Clark and Lorna C. Ferguson, *City Money: Political Processes, Fiscal Strain and Retrenchment* (Chicago: Comparative Study of Community Decision-Making, Research Report #96, University of Chicago, 1983).

3. Hannah Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

4. Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, *Participation in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), Part III.

5. A partial list of the most important case studies on community politics is presented in Michael Aiken and Paul E. Mott (eds.), *The Structure of Community Power* (New York: Random House, 1970), 517-519.

6. Since data on the cities in the PCS were first collected using NORC interviewers in 1967, new data have been added from mail questionnaires and coded from various publications, such as the *U.S. Census*. Thus, this manual contains variables measured at different points in time. We have found, however, that most aspects of cities change fairly slowly. Consequently, data collected in 1967 is often a good indicator of community characteristics 10 years later and thus can often be used to explain current urban problems and policies.

7. We leave for the instructor the task of describing in more detail cross-tabulation analysis, tests of significance, measures of association, and multivariate data analysis techniques.

8. Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953), and Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown in Transition* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1965).

9. Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 62 (March, 1968), 124-143.

10. Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), and Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 191-283.

11. This literature is discussed in Terry Nichols Clark (ed.), *Citizen Preferences and Urban Public Policy: Models, Measures, Uses* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1976).

12. See Dahl, *Who Governs?*, *op. cit.*, 163-165.

13. Willis D. Hawley and Frederick Wirt (eds.), *Search for Community Power* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974).

14. See Terry Nichols Clark, "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Cities," *American Sociological Review* 33 (August, 1968), 576-593; revised version in Charles M. Bonjean, Terry Nichols Clark, and Robert L. Lineberry (eds.), *Community Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1971), 293-313.

15. Hunter, *Community Power Structure*, *op. cit.*

16. Dahl, *Who Governs?*, *op. cit.*

17. The concept of responsiveness is discussed more fully in Paul D. Schumaker and Russell W. Getter, "Responsiveness Bias in 51 American Communities," *American Journal of Political Science* 21 (May, 1977), 247-281.

18. See, for example, E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-sovereign People* (Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press, 1960).

19. This technique for measuring citizen preferences is rather complex, and thus is impossible to describe in this manual. A description of this technique and the results of efforts to validate the accuracy of the estimates of citizen priorities derived from the model are presented in a paper by Paul Schumaker, "Synthetic Estimates of Citizen Policy Priorities for American Cities," delivered at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Phoenix, Arizona, March 31-April 2, 1977. Copies of this paper are available upon request from the author, Department of Political Science, The University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66045.
20. The Pearsonian correlation between our index of responsiveness bias toward white citizens and our index of responsiveness bias toward upper-income citizens is .52.
21. Schattschneider, *op. cit.*
22. See Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, *The Irony of Democracy* (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1978) for a discussion of this theme.
23. See Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, *Participation in America*, *op. cit.*, 229-247.
24. Claude S. Fischer, "The City and Political Psychology," *American Political Science Review* 69 (June, 1975), 559-571.
25. Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, *Labyrinths of Democracy* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973).
26. Laura L. Morlock, "Business Interests, Countervailing Groups and the Balance of Influence in 91 Cities," in Willis D. Hawley and Frederick W. Wirt, *op. cit.*; Terry Nichols Clark, *Community Power and Policy Outputs* (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1973), Chapter 3.
27. Bryan T. Downes, "Municipal Social Rank and the Characteristics of Local Political Leaders," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 12 (November, 1968), 521-534.
28. Thomas R. Dye, *Politics, Economics and the Public* (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1966).
29. See, for example, Richard Dawson and James Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in American States," *Journal of Politics* 25 (August, 1963), 365-389; and Richard E. De Leon, "Politics, Economic Surplus, and Redistribution in the American States: A Test of a Theory," *American Journal of Political Science* 17 (November, 1973), 781-796.
30. Eulau and Prewitt, *Labyrinths of Democracy*, *op. cit.*
31. Russell W. Getter and Paul D. Schumaker, "Contextual Bases of Responsiveness to Citizen Preferences and Group Demands," *Policy and Politics* 6 (March, 1978), 249-278.
32. William Keech, *The Impact of Negro Voting* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967).
33. This argument is discussed by Robert L. Lineberry and Edward P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policy in American Cities," *American Political Science Review* 61 (September, 1967), 701-716.
34. This argument is developed by Getter and Schumaker, "Contextual Bases of Responsiveness," *op. cit.*
35. Laura L. Morlock, "Business Interests. . .," *op. cit.*
36. Lineberry and Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policy. . .," *op. cit.*, p. 714.
37. Clark, "Community Structure. . .," *op. cit.*
38. David B. Rosenthal and Robert C. Crain, "Structures and Values in Local Political Systems: The Case of Floridation Decisions," *Journal of Politics* (February, 1966), 169-196.
39. Schumaker and Getter, "Responsiveness Bias. . .," *op. cit.*
40. Robert H. Salisbury, "Urban Politics: The New Convergence of Power," *Journal of Politics* 26 (November, 1964), 775-797.
41. For a useful discussion, see Verba and Nie, *Participation in America*, *op. cit.*
42. Gerald Pomper, *Elections in America* (New York: Dodd Mead, & Co., 1968).
43. Verba and Nie, *Participation in America*, *op. cit.*
44. Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," *American Political Science Review* 67 (March, 1973), 11-28; L. Cole, *Blacks in Power: A Comparative Study of Black and White Elected Officials* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Albert Karnig, "Black Representation on City Councils: The Impact of District Elections and Socio-Economic Factors," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 12 (December, 1976), 223-242.
45. These measurement procedures are discussed extensively in Terry Nichols Clark,

Irene Sharp Rubin, Lynne C. Pettler, and Erwin Zimmerman, *How Many New Yorks? The New York Fiscal Crisis in Comparative Perspective* (Chicago: Comparative Study of Community Decision-Making, Research Report #72, University of Chicago, 1976).

46. Roland J. Liebert, "Municipal Functions, Structures, and Expenditures: A Reanalysis of Recent Research," *Social Science Quarterly* 54 (1974), 765-783; continued in *Social Science Quarterly* 55 (1974), 791-794; and *Disintegration and Political Action: The Changing Functions of City Governments in America* (New York: Academic Press, 1976).

47. Cf. Clark et al., *How Many New Yorks?* Terry Nichols Clark, Lorna Crowley Ferguson, and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Functional Performance Analysis: A New Approach to the Study of Municipal Expenditures," *Political Methodology*, Vol. 8, Fall, 1982, pp. 87-123, discusses 11 procedures for comparing non-common functions and suggests a new approach.

48. For an illustration of this type of argument, see Theodore J. Lowi's, *End of Liberalism*, *op. cit.*

49. Terry Clark, "The Irish Ethic and the Spirit of Patronage," *Ethnicity* (1975), 305-358.

50. Susan A. MacManus, "Tax Structures in American Cities: Levels, Reliance, and Rates," *Western Political Quarterly* 30 (June, 1977), 263-287.

51. Clark, "The Irish Ethic. . .," *op. cit.* A similar idea has been discussed by students of Congress, who suggest that the active consent of disparate interests frequently leads to omnibus bills that are expensive. Cf. David Mayhew, *Party Loyalty Among Congressmen* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966).

52. Samuel Huntington, "The Democratic Distemper," *The Public Interest* (Fall, 1976).

53. Frances Fox Piven, "The Urban Crisis—Who Got What, and Why?" in *The Politics of Turnoil*, Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven (eds.) (New York: Vintage Books, 1975).

54. This index is discussed in detail in Clark, *How Many New Yorks?*, *op. cit.*

55. These issues are pursued in Terry Nichols Clark, ed., *Community Development*, special issue of *Urban Affairs Papers*, 3 (Spring 1981), esp. papers by Clark, Anthony Downs, and Richard Nathan; Clark and Lorna Crowley Ferguson, "Fiscal Strain and Fiscal Health in American Cities: Six Basic Processes," in *Urban Political Economy*, Ken Newton (ed.) (London: Francis Pinter, 1981), pp. 137-155; and Clark and Ferguson, *City Money: Political Processes, Fiscal Strain and Retrenchment*, *op. cit.*

Appendix A: Codebook

V1.	Permanent Community Sample Identification Number		
V2.	Summary Index of Fiscal Strain		
	1. Low	30*	(58.8%)
	2. Medium	15	(29.4%)
	3. High	6	(11.8%)
V3.	Index of Per Capita Expenditures on Common Functions		
	1. Low	25	(49.0%)
	2. High	26	(51.0%)
V4.	Index of Long-Term Debt		
	1. Low	29	(56.9%)
	2. High	22	(43.1%)
V5.	Index of Short-Term Debt		
	1. Low	25	(49.0%)
	2. High	26	(51.0%)
V6.	Index of Tax Effort		
	1. Low	28	(54.9%)
	2. High	23	(45.1%)
V7.	Responsiveness to Priorities of Elected Officials		
	1. Low	24	(47.1%)
	2. High	27	(52.9%)
V8.	Responsiveness to Citizen Preferences in Distribution of Revenue Sharing Funds		
	1. Low	31	(60.8%)
	2. High	20	(39.2%)

*The first number indicates number of cities in each category; the number in parentheses is the percentage of cities in each category.

V9.	Responsiveness to Perceived Citizen Preferences in Distributing General Expenditures		
	1. Low	23	(45.1%)
	2. High	27	(52.9%)
	9. Missing Data	1	(2.0%)
V10.	Responsiveness to Simulated Citizen Preferences in Distributing General Expenditures		
	1. Low	27	(52.9%)
	2. High	24	(47.1%)
V11.	Responsiveness to Preferences of White Citizens		
	1. Low	26	(51.0%)
	2. High	25	(49.0%)
V12.	Responsiveness to Preferences of Nonwhite Citizens		
	1. Low	33	(64.7%)
	2. High	13	(25.5%)
	9. Missing Data	5	(9.8%)
V13.	Responsiveness to Preferences of Lower-Income Citizens		
	1. Low	32	(62.7%)
	2. High	19	(37.3%)
V14.	Responsiveness to Preferences of Middle-Income Citizens		
	1. Low	30	(58.8%)
	2. High	21	(41.2%)
V15.	Responsiveness to Preferences of Upper-Income Citizens		
	1. Low	29	(56.9%)
	2. High	22	(43.1%)
V16.	Responsiveness Bias Toward Advantaged Citizens in Distributing Revenue Sharing Funds		
	1. Disadvantaged	5	(9.8%)
	2. Unbiased	28	(54.9%)
	3. Advantaged	18	(35.3%)
V17.	Responsiveness Bias Toward Advantaged Citizens in Distributing General Expenditures		
	1. Disadvantaged	13	(25.5%)
	2. Unbiased	15	(29.4%)
	3. Advantaged	23	(45.1%)
V18.	Responsiveness Bias Toward Whites in Distributing General Expenditures		
	1. Blacks	13	(25.5%)
	2. Unbiased	11	(21.6%)
	3. Whites	22	(43.1%)
	9. Missing Data	5	(9.8%)

V19. Responsiveness Bias Towards Upper-Income Citizens in Distributing General Expenditures	
1. Lower Class	12 (23.5%)
2. Unbiased	17 (33.3%)
3. Upper Class	22 (43.1%)
V20. Responsiveness to Group Demands in Distributing Revenue Sharing Funds	
1. Low	33 (64.7%)
2. High	10 (19.6%)
9. Missing Data	8 (15.7%)
V21. Responsiveness to Group Demands in Distributing General Expenditures	
1. Low	19 (37.3%)
2. High	31 (60.8%)
9. Missing Data	1 (2.0%)
V22. Responsiveness to White Groups	
1. Low	18 (35.3%)
2. High	33 (64.7%)
V23. Responsiveness to Nonwhite Groups	
1. Low	39 (76.5%)
2. High	12 (23.5%)
V24. Responsiveness to Low-Income Groups	
1. Low	23 (45.1%)
2. High	23 (45.1%)
9. Missing Data	5 (9.8%)
V25. Responsiveness to Middle-Income Groups	
1. Low	23 (45.1%)
2. High	25 (49.0%)
9. Missing Data	3 (5.9%)
V26. Responsiveness to Upper-Income Groups	
1. Low	20 (39.2%)
2. High	26 (51.0%)
9. Missing Data	5 (9.8%)
V27. Responsiveness Bias Favoring White Groups	
1. Blacks	8 (15.7%)
2. Unbiased	10 (19.6%)
3. Whites	33 (64.7%)
V28. Responsiveness Bias Favoring Middle and Upper-Income Groups	
1. Lower Income	5 (9.8%)
2. Unbiased	30 (58.8%)
3. Upper Income	10 (19.6%)
9. Missing Data	6 (11.8%)
V29. Responsiveness Bias Favoring Advantaged Groups	
1. Disadvantaged	6 (11.8%)

2. Unbiased	12	(23.5%)
3. Advantaged	33	(64.7%)
V30. Stimuli to Which Policymakers are Most Responsive		
1. Elites	17	(33.3%)
2. Groups	19	(37.3%)
3. Public Opinion	13	(25.5%)
9. Missing Data	2	(3.9%)
V31. Population Size		
1. LT 250,000	30	(58.8%)
2. GT 250,000	21	(41.2%)
V32. Index of Social Rank or Population Wealth		
1. Low	26	(51.0%)
2. High	25	(49.0%)
V33. Percent Nonwhite		
1. LT 15%	30	(58.8%)
2. GT 15%	21	(41.2%)
V34. Percent Foreign Stock		
1. LT 20%	20	(39.2%)
2. GT 20%	31	(60.8%)
V35. Percent Catholic		
1. Low	25	(49.0%)
2. High	26	(51.0%)
V36. Index of Heterogeneity		
1. Homogeneous	25	(49%)
2. Heterogeneous	26	(51%)
V37. Percent Irish Stock		
1. LT .50%	29	(56.9%)
2. GT .50%	22	(43.1%)
V38. Region		
1. Northeast	13	(25.5%)
2. Rim South	9	(17.6%)
3. Deep South	2	(3.9%)
4. Midwest	15	(29.4%)
5. West	12	(23.5%)
V39. Form of Government		
1. Mayor-Council	27	(52.9%)
2. Commission	5	(9.8%)
3. Council-Manager	19	(37.3%)
V40. Presence of City Manager		
1. None	32	(62.7%)
2. Present	19	(37.3%)

V41. Partisan or Nonpartisan Elections		
1. Partisan	15	(29.4%)
2. Nonpartisan	36	(70.6%)
V42. Councilpersons Elected At-Large or from Wards		
1. Wards	7	(13.7%)
2. Mixed	12	(23.5%)
3. At-Large	32	(62.7%)
V43. Index of Reformism		
1. Unreformed	11	(21.6%)
2. Mixed	12	(23.5%)
3. Reformed	28	(54.9%)
V44. Index of Scope of Government		
1. Narrow	17	(33.3%)
2. Broad	34	(66.7%)
V45. Index of Formal Mayoral Power		
1. Low	24	(47.1%)
2. High	27	(52.9%)
V46. Clark Index of Decentralization		
1. Centralized	26	(51.0%)
2. Dispersed	24	(47.1%)
9. Missing Data	1	(2.0%)
V47. Index of Business Leadership		
1. Low	28	(54.9%)
2. High	23	(45.1%)
V48. Index of Mayoral Leadership		
1. Low	28	(54.9%)
2. High	23	(45.1%)
V49. Index of Balance of Influence Between Business-Oriented Groups and Countervailing Groups		
1. Business Dominant	26	(51.0%)
2. Balanced	25	(49.0%)
V50. Index of Influence of the Democratic Party		
1. Low	22	(43.1%)
2. High	29	(56.9%)
V51. Index of Influence of the Republican Party		
1. Low	29	(56.9%)
2. High	22	(43.1%)
V52. Index of Influence of Newspapers		
1. Low	10	(19.6%)
2. High	41	(80.4%)

V53. Index of Influence of Neighborhood Groups		
1. Low	31	(60.8%)
2. High	20	(39.2%)
V54. Percent of City Employees Covered by Civil Service		
1. LT 25%	29	(56.9%)
2. GT 25%	12	(23.5%)
9. Missing Data	10	(19.6%)
V55. City has Public Employee Union Contract		
0. No	32	(62.7%)
1. Yes	19	(37.3%)
V56. Growth of Bureaucracy Between 1960 and 1970		
1. Low	30	(58.8%)
2. High	21	(41.2%)
V57. Index of Overstaffing		
1. Low	30	(58.8%)
2. High	21	(41.2%)
V58. Councilmembers Satisfaction with Bureaucracy		
1. Low	23	(45.1%)
2. High	28	(54.9%)
V59. Black Representation Ratio on City Council		
1. Low	33	(64.7%)
2. High	18	(35.3%)
V60. Average Educational Attainment of Councilpersons		
1. LT B.A. Degree	27	(52.9%)
2. GE B.A. Degree	24	(47.1%)
V61. Average Self-Reported Liberalism of Councilpersons		
1. Low	30	(58.8%)
2. High	21	(41.2%)
V62. Average Self-Reported Burkeanism of Councilpersons		
1. Low	24	(47.1%)
2. High	27	(52.9%)
V63. Voter Turnout for City Elections		
1. LT 40%	26	(51.0%)
2. GT 40%	25	(49.0%)
V64. Number of Black Riots, 1961-1968		
1. None	22	(43.1%)
2. One or More	29	(56.9%)
V65. Extent of Militant Protest Group Activity		
1. Low	20	(39.2%)

2. High	24 (47.1%)
9. Missing Data	7 (13.7%)
V66. Level of Citizen Participation at Public Hearings	
1. Low	36 (70.6%)
2. High	15 (29.4%)
V67. Index of Total Group Pressure	
1. Low	31 (60.8%)
2. High	20 (39.2%)
V68. Index of Pressure by White Groups	
1. Low	26 (51.0%)
2. High	22 (43.1%)
9. Missing Data	3 (5.9%)
V69. Index of Pressure by Nonwhite Groups	
1. Low	29 (56.9%)
2. High	22 (43.1%)
V70. Index of Pressure by Lower-Income Groups	
1. Low	27 (52.9%)
2. High	24 (47.1%)
V71. Index of Pressure by Middle-Income Groups	
1. Low	22 (43.1%)
2. High	29 (56.9%)
V72. Index of Pressure by Upper-Income Groups	
1. Low	22 (43.1%)
2. High	19 (33.3%)
V73. Index of Pollution Control Effort	
1. Low	25 (49.0%)
2. High	23 (45.1%)
9. Missing Data	3 (5.9%)
V74. Index of Resistance to Public Employees Unions	
1. Low	22 (43.1%)
2. High	26 (51.0%)
9. Missing Data	3 (5.9%)
V75. Index of Open Housing Effort	
1. Low	19 (37.3%)
2. High	23 (45.1%)
9. Missing Data	9 (17.6%)
V76. Index of Effort to Provide Mass Transportatin	
1. Low	20 (39.2%)
2. High	27 (52.9%)
9. Missing Data	4 (7.8%)

V77. Index of Effort to Integrate Schools

1. Low	15 (29.4%)
2. High	31 (60.8%)
9. Missing Data	5 (9.8%)

V78. Index of Marijuana Decriminalization

1. Low	28 (54.9%)
2. High	19 (37.3%)
9. Missing Data	4 (7.8%)

Appendix B.

Data and Procedures Used in the Measurement of the Variables in the Permanent Community Sample File

The 78 variables provided in this SETUPS manual have been measured in a variety of ways. The purpose of this appendix is to describe, in a general manner, the data and methods used to measure these variables for the 51 PCS cities.

A. Fiscal Strain Measures: V2 Through V6

To measure the level of fiscal strain, 29 separate indicators of the financial obligations and conditions of each PCS city were considered. These indicators were drawn from the U.S. Census, *City Government Finances in 1973-74* and include a wide variety of measures used by municipal finance analysts. An analytical technique called factor analysis was then used to help isolate four specific dimensions of the fiscal problems of communities: an index of per capita expenditures on common functions (V3); an index of long-term debt (V4); an index of short-term debt (V5); and an index of tax effort (V6). A summary index of fiscal strain (V2) was then created by standardizing V3 through V6 and summing across these four variables. To permit cross-tabulation analysis, these variables were then dichotomized or trichotomized into the categories shown in Appendix A. The student who wishes additional information regarding these five measures of fiscal strain should consult Chapter V of this manual and bibliographic references in *How Many New Yorks?* by Terry N. Clark and his associates.

B. Measures of Responsiveness: V7 Through V15 and V20 Through V26

The general procedures for measuring various dimensions of responsiveness have been discussed in Chapter III. To summarize this discussion, a city exhibits a

high level of responsiveness to a particular type of input (e.g., citizen preferences, elite concerns) when its municipal government distributes resources among various policy or service areas (e.g., police protection, public health, parks and recreation, libraries, etc.) in a manner consistent with the policy priorities of those persons or groups presenting demand inputs. Conversely, a city exhibits a low level of responsiveness when its government distributes resources among service areas in a manner unrelated, or negatively related, to the policy priorities of those persons presenting demand inputs.

Two variables (V8 and V20) measure the responsiveness of city governments in their allocation of revenue sharing funds. Using data from the *Actual Use Reports* for 1974-75, which cities must file with the U.S. Office of Revenue Sharing, we first determined the proportion of revenue-sharing funds which each city allocated to each of nine service areas (e.g., social services, health, public transportation, etc.). To measure citizen preferences regarding the allocation of these funds, we used public opinion data obtained from a 1974 national survey administered by the Opinion Research Corporation concerning the public's attitudes about the revenue sharing program. Data from questions regarding how various types of citizens wanted local governments to allocate revenue sharing funds were incorporated into a simulation model which provided estimates of citizen priorities regarding the allocation of revenue-sharing funds at the city level. Measures of group demands regarding the allocation of revenue-sharing funds were obtained from a mail survey of the major appointed officials in the PCS cities, conducted during the summer of 1975. These officials provided data regarding the levels of activity and influence of various types of groups active in seeking revenue-sharing funds. These data enabled us to develop scores of the level of group demand for expenditures in various service areas. Thus, responsiveness to citizen preferences in distributing revenue-sharing funds (V8) was measured by correlating our indicators of citizen priorities regarding the allocation of revenue-sharing funds—as revealed by the simulation model—with measures of actual revenue-sharing allocations in various service areas. Responsiveness to group demands in distributing revenue-sharing funds (V20) was measured by correlating our measures of group demands in various service areas—as measured by the perception of city administrators—with measures of actual revenue-sharing allocations. Additional information regarding these measures is available in Getter and Schumaker (1978).

Nine measures of responsiveness reported in this manual are concerned with the responsiveness of cities in the allocation of municipal expenditures. Because the procedures and data used in measuring these variables are discussed in detail in Chapter III, we only summarize these measures here. The level of responsiveness to the priorities of elected officials (V7) was measured by determining the degree of correlation between changes in each city's policy priorities (as exhibited by changes in their allocations of funds to various service areas between 1973-74 and 1975-76) and the priorities of elected officials (as measured by a 1976 mail questionnaire sent to elected officials). When the priorities of elected officials are consistent with actual policy changes, a high level of responsiveness to the concerns of elected officials is indicated. Extensive responsiveness to group demands (V21) occurs when changes in expenditures across policy areas are consistent with the pat-

high level of responsiveness to a particular type of input (e.g., citizen preferences, elite concerns) when its municipal government distributes resources among various policy or service areas (e.g., police protection, public health, parks and recreation, libraries, etc.) in a manner consistent with the policy priorities of those persons or groups presenting demand inputs. Conversely, a city exhibits a low level of responsiveness when its government distributes resources among service areas in a manner unrelated, or negatively related, to the policy priorities of those persons presenting demand inputs.

Two variables (*V8* and *V20*) measure the responsiveness of city governments in their allocation of revenue sharing funds. Using data from the *Actual Use Reports* for 1974-75, which cities must file with the U.S. Office of Revenue Sharing, we first determined the proportion of revenue-sharing funds which each city allocated to each of nine service areas (e.g., social services, health, public transportation, etc.). To measure citizen preferences regarding the allocation of these funds, we used public opinion data obtained from a 1974 national survey administered by the Opinion Research Corporation concerning the public's attitudes about the revenue sharing program. Data from questions regarding how various types of citizens wanted local governments to allocate revenue sharing funds were incorporated into a simulation model which provided estimates of citizen priorities regarding the allocation of revenue-sharing funds at the city level. Measures of group demands regarding the allocation of revenue-sharing funds were obtained from a mail survey of the major appointed officials in the PCS cities, conducted during the summer of 1975. These officials provided data regarding the levels of activity and influence of various types of groups active in seeking revenue-sharing funds. These data enabled us to develop scores of the level of group demand for expenditures in various service areas. Thus, responsiveness to citizen preferences in distributing revenue-sharing funds (*V8*) was measured by correlating our indicators of citizen priorities regarding the allocation of revenue-sharing funds—as revealed by the simulation model—with measures of actual revenue-sharing allocations in various service areas. Responsiveness to group demands in distributing revenue-sharing funds (*V20*) was measured by correlating our measures of group demands in various service areas—as measured by the perception of city administrators—with measures of actual revenue-sharing allocations. Additional information regarding these measures is available in Getter and Schumaker (1978).

Nine measures of responsiveness reported in this manual are concerned with the responsiveness of cities in the allocation of municipal expenditures. Because the procedures and data used in measuring these variables are discussed in detail in Chapter III, we only summarize these measures here. The level of responsiveness to the priorities of elected officials (*V7*) was measured by determining the degree of correlation between changes in each city's policy priorities (as exhibited by changes in their allocations of funds to various service areas between 1973-74 and 1975-76) and the priorities of elected officials (as measured by a 1976 mail questionnaire sent to elected officials). When the priorities of elected officials are consistent with actual policy changes, a high level of responsiveness to the concerns of elected officials is indicated. Extensive responsiveness to group demands (*V21*) occurs when changes in expenditures across policy areas are consistent with the pat-

tern of group demands in a community (as indicated by information regarding group demands attained from the elected officials surveyed in the 1976 questionnaire). Responsiveness to citizen preferences in the distribution of general expenditure was calculated in two ways. To obtain V9, we relied on the perceptions of elected officials to measure citizen priorities and then correlated these measures of citizen preference with changes in expenditures across a variety of policy areas. To obtain V10, we used national survey data and a simulation model to estimate citizen policy priorities for each city; these simulated preferences were then correlated with changes in expenditure across a variety of policy areas to achieve measures of responsiveness to simulated citizen preferences in distributing general expenditures.

National survey data and the simulation model were also used to estimate the priorities of various subpopulations (e.g., whites, nonwhites, lower-income, middle-income, and upper-income citizens) in communities. Correlating such subpopulation priorities with expenditure changes in various policy areas provides the measures of responsiveness to various subpopulations reported as variables V11 through V15.

Measures of responsiveness to various types of groups (e.g., groups composed primarily of whites, nonwhites, lower-income, middle-income, and upper-income people), V22 through V26, were calculated from data attained from the 1976 mail survey of elected officials in the PCS cities. In this survey, mayors and councilmembers were asked to be informants indicating the racial and class composition of the most active groups in the community; in addition officials were asked questions regarding how responsive the city had been to the demands of each type of group. A scale of one (indicating very low responsiveness) to five (indicating very high responsiveness) was developed, and active groups in the community were scored on this scale. The measures of responsiveness to various types of groups are based on the average responsiveness score attained by all predominantly white, nonwhite, low-income, middle-income or upper-income groups which our informants listed as being most active in the community. These measures are discussed in more detail in Schumaker and Getter (1983). To facilitate analyses of responsiveness using cross-tabulation analysis, all responsiveness variables were dichotomized into (1) unresponsive and (2) responsive categories.

C. Responsiveness Bias: V16 Through V19 and V27 Through V29

When a municipal government is more responsive to the inputs of one type of citizen or group (e.g., the preferences of white citizens or the demands of groups composed primarily of whites) than it is to the opposite type of citizen or group (e.g., nonwhite citizens or groups composed primarily of nonwhites), the government exhibits unequal or biased responsiveness. As indicated in Chapter III, measures of responsiveness bias were attained by simply subtracting the level of responsiveness to disadvantaged (i.e., nonwhite and/or lower-income) citizens and groups from the level of responsiveness to advantaged (i.e., white and/or upper-income) citizens and groups. Thus, $V18 = V11 - V12$; $V19 = ((V14 + V15)/2) - V13$; $V27 = V22 - V23$; and $V28 = ((V25 + V26)/2) - V24$. Our summary measures of responsiveness bias favoring advantaged citizens (V17) and advantaged groups

(V29) were created by averaging the biases that a community exhibits along class and racial lines. Thus, $V17 = (V18 + V19)/2$, and $V29 = (V27 + V28)/2$. (For those cases having missing data on V18, V17 equals V19. And for those cases having missing data on V28, V29 equals V27.) The use of these procedures resulted in measures of responsiveness bias which are most easily interpretable when presented in trichotomized form. Bias toward advantaged citizens and groups was indicated by substantial positive measures. Bias toward disadvantaged groups was indicated by substantial negative measures. Equal (or unbiased) responsiveness was indicated when our procedures generated scores which approached zero. These procedures for measuring responsiveness bias are discussed more extensively in Schumaker and Getter (1977, 1982, 1983).

D. The Socioeconomic Characteristics of Communities: V31 to V37

The County and City Databook, published in 1972 by the U.S. Census, is the data source for the following variables describing the population characteristics, in 1970, of the PCS cities: population size (V31), percent nonwhite (V33), percent foreign stock (V34) (i.e., persons born outside of the U.S. or who have at least one parent born outside of the U.S.), and percent Irish stock (V37). Data on the Catholic proportion of each community (V35) was obtained from *Churches and Church Membership in the United States*.

Two summary indices of the demographic composition of the PCS communities are reported. The index of social rank or population wealth (V32) indicates the degree to which a community is composed of high-SES citizens. The index is based on a combination of three census variables: (a) percent of all persons over 25 years old having high school degrees, (b) the percent of residents whose 1970 family incomes exceeded \$10,000, and (c) the percent of residents whose 1970 family incomes exceeded \$3,000. The index of heterogeneity (V36), which indicates the level of racial, ethnic, and religious diversity in communities, is based on the following three measures: (a) percent nonwhite (V33), (b) percent foreign stock (V34), and (c) percent Catholic (V35). These socioeconomic variables are all presented in dichotomous form with the mean value of each variable often used as the cutpoint.

E. Formal Governmental Structures: V39 Through V45

The 1978 *Municipal Yearbook* is the source of data regarding the forms of municipal government. A summary measure of formal governmental structures (V43)—which indicates whether a city had predominantly reformed, predominantly unreformed, or a mixture of characteristics—was created on the basis of whether or not a city has a city manager (which is presented separately as V40), nonpartisan elections (V41), and at-large constituencies (V42). The index of scope of government (V44) was based on the work of Roland Liebert (1976): where a municipal government has formal jurisdiction for a large variety of policy areas (e.g., education, welfare, public health), the community has a broad scope of government. When instead states, counties, and special districts assume primary responsibility for numerous policy areas, a city has a narrow scope of government. The index of for-

mal mayoral power (V45) was based on provisions in the city charter concerning the authority vested in the mayor to vote on and to veto ordinances under consideration by the city council and concerning the ability of the mayor to appoint (and fire) the chief administrative officers in the city. Strong mayors possess extensive veto, voting, and appointing powers.

F. Informal Influence and Leadership Characteristics: V46 Through V53

During 1967, an extensive survey of 12 knowledgeable informants in each of the PCS cities was conducted (cf. Clark, 1971). These informants provided the data used to measure V46 through V53, and V66, in this data set. Clark's index of decentralization (V46) indicates the extent to which decisions in four policy areas (urban renewal, air pollution control, public housing, and the selection of mayors) are influenced by a large or a small number of actors. If there was a large number of actors, the city had a decentralized power structure. If there was a small number of actors, the city had a centralized power structure. A full description of the "ersatz method" used to create this measure can be found in Clark (1971). The indices of mayoral leadership (V48) and business leadership (V47) were created using the informants' perceptions of the extent to which the mayor and leaders of the business community were instrumental in initiating, negotiating, and vetoing decisions in the several policy areas used to create the index of decentralization. These measures are discussed more thoroughly in Clark (1973, 1976). The measures of the influence of the Democratic party (V50), the Republican party (V51), newspapers (V52), and neighborhood groups (V53) were based on the overall assessments by the informants in each city of the ability of these groups to affect the full range of policy decisions of the communities. These are discussed in Clark (1972).

The index of balance of influence (V49) is stimulated by the work of Laura Morlock (1974) and indicates the extent to which business-oriented groups (such as the Chamber of Commerce, retail merchants, bankers, and industrialists) have greater influence in a community than groups which often oppose business groups (e.g., neighborhood groups, civil rights groups, and labor unions). This index is discussed in more detail in Getter and Schumaker (1978).

G. Administrative and Personnel Characteristics: V55 Through V62

The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Union (AFSCMEU) provided the data, used for our measure of V55, on whether or not a city had a contract with AFSCMEU in 1972.

The degree of growth of municipal bureaucracies (V56) was measured by the change in the municipal labor force between 1960 and 1970. Data on these changes were obtained from the 1972 *County and City Databook*.

The index of overstaffing (V57) was measured using data from a U.S. Census publication, *City Employment in 1972*, listing the number of employees working in the nine common functions of municipalities in 1972. The actual number of employees in each city was then compared with the number of employees which a city was predicted to have on the basis of such demographic factors as population

size, percent residents below the poverty line, and percent nonwhite population. If a city had more employees than predicted on the basis of "need" (as indicated by these demographic variables), it is overstaffed. This variable is discussed in more detail in Clark (1976).

The Black Representation Ratio (V59) is a measure of the percentage of the city council which is composed of blacks divided by the percentage of the city population which is composed of blacks. Data on the number of black councilmembers in each city was drawn from the *National Roster of Black Elected Officials* for 1973. Blacks are underrepresented when this ratio falls substantially below 1.0.

Data regarding the attitudes and education characteristics of city councilmembers (V58, V60, V61, and V62) were obtained from the 1976 mail questionnaire of elected officials in the 51 PCS cities. Respondents were asked to indicate the number of years of formal education they had completed; the average education attainment of councilmembers (V60) was measured by aggregating and averaging these responses. The councilmembers were also asked to indicate, on five-point scales, how satisfied they were with the performance of municipal agencies, how conservative or liberal they viewed themselves, and how often they took policy stands that they thought to be contrary to the dominant preferences of their constituents. These data were then aggregated to obtain our measures of councilmembers' satisfaction with bureaucracy (V58), the average liberalism of councilmembers (V61), and the average "Burkeanism" of councilmembers (V62). City councils with aldermen who frequently perceive themselves as acting contrary to constituency preferences are labeled Burkean because the famous eighteenth century English statesman and philosopher, Edmund Burke, argued that elected officials should exercise their independent judgments and act independently of constituency pressures.

H. Citizen Participation Variables: V63 Through V72

Our measure of voter turnout (V63) was obtained from the 1976 mail questionnaire of elected officials; in this survey we asked aldermen to indicate the voter turnout (percent eligible adults voting) for the last local election. Discrepancies were resolved by phone calls to the city Clerk's office. The number of black riots between 1961 and 1968 (V64) were obtained from the Data and Program Library at the University of Wisconsin. These data were collected under the supervision of Professors Michael Aiken and Robert Alford. The extent of militant protest activity (V65) in the 51 PCS cities was measured by a mail survey sent to city administrators in 1975. These administrators were asked to provide data on how frequently groups which interacted with their agencies utilized such protest tactics as marches, sit-ins, boycotts, and public rallies between 1970 and 1975. Data on the level of participation by citizens at public hearings (V66) was obtained from the interviews conducted with informants during the original, 1967 survey of the 51 PCS cities.

The measures of group pressures (V67 to V72) were attained from the 1976 mail survey of elected officials. In the survey, councilmembers provided their judgments about (a) how active were various types of groups in local politics, (b) how well-organized were these groups, and (c) how influential were these groups. An index of group pressure was developed from these data for each group cited by the

councilmembers. The more active, well-organized and influential was a group, the greater was the pressure it exerted on local officials. A city's score on the index of total group pressure (V67) is based on the average pressure score for all groups cited by the councilmembers. Scores on the index of pressure by white groups (V68) is based on the average pressure score for all groups composed primarily of white citizens. Similar procedures were used to attain scores of pressure exerted by the following types of groups: nonwhite (V69), lower-income (V70), middle-income (V71), and upper-income (V72).

I. Policy Effort Variables: V73 Through V78

Variables V73 to V78 provide data on the extent to which cities have various services (e.g., mass transportation) or have various regulatory policies (e.g., laws proscribing water and/or air pollution). In a 1975 survey of newspaper editors, presidents of local chapters of the League of Women Voters, and mayors, data were collected on the extensiveness of policy enactments and on the extensiveness of enforcement and/or implementation efforts in a variety of areas of concern to local governments (Schumaker and Loomis, 1979). Cities exhibit a high level of effort in a policy area when state, county, or local governments have created laws and programs which are widely enforced or broadly implemented. In this manual, data are provided which indicates whether there is a *low* or *high* effort being made in each city to curb industrial pollution of water and/or air (V73), to resist the development of collective bargaining by public employees (V74), to promote racially open housing (V75), to provide mass transportation (V76), to integrate schools racially (V77) and to decriminalize the use of marijuana (V78).

References for Appendix B

- Terry N. Clark. "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities." In Charles L. Bonjean, Terry N. Clark, and Robert L. Lineberry (eds.), *Community Politics: A Behavioral Approach* (New York: Free Press, 1971).
- _____. "The Structure of Influence." In Harlan Hahn (ed), *People and Politics in Urban Society* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1972).
- _____. "Citizen Values, Power, and Policy Outputs," *Journal of Comparative Administration* 4 (February, 1973), 385-429.
- _____. *Cities Differ—But How and Why?* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1976).
- _____, Irene Sharp Rubin, Lynn C. Pettler, and Erwin Zimmerman. *How Many New Yorks? The New York Fiscal Crisis in Comparative Perspective* (Chicago: Comparative Study of Community Decision-Making, Research Report #72, University of Chicago, 1976).
- Russell Getter and Paul D. Schumaker. "The Contextual Bases of Responsiveness to Citizen Preferences and Group Demands," *Policy and Politics* 6 (March, 1978), 249-278.

- Roland Liebert. *Disintegration and Political Action: The Changing Functions of City Governments in America* (New York: Academic Press, 1976).
- Laura L. Morlock. "Business Interests, Countervailing Groups, and the Balance of Influence in 91 Cities." In Willis Hawley and Frederick Wirt (eds.), *The Search for Community Power* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974).
- Paul D. Schumaker and Russell Getter. "Responsiveness Bias in 51 American Communities," *American Journal of Political Science* 21 (May, 1977), 247-281.
- _____. "Structural Sources of Unequal Responsiveness to Group Demands in American Cities." *Western Political Quarterly*, 36 (March, 1983).
- Paul D. Schumaker and Burdette Loomis. "Responsiveness to Citizen Preferences and Societal Problems." In *South Atlantic Urban Studies*, Volume 3, by Samuel M. Hines and George W. Hopkins (eds.) (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1979), 38-66.