

**PROTEST GROUPS, ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS
AND POLICY-RESPONSIVENESS**

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ABSTRACT

This paper is concerned with the political activity of citizens who are unincorporated in what Schattschneider has called "the pressure system". Under certain conditions, these citizens become protest groups by mobilizing for political action, organizing an issue-specific basis, and making demands on public officials through pressure processes. The paper argues that the degree of responsiveness of local communities to protest group demands is affected by various environmental characteristics of communities. A recursive model, which draws on the ethos theory literature, the community power studies, and the previous literature on protest group power, is developed and tested using two samples of data. These data suggest that the policy-responsiveness of urban communities to protest group demands is enhanced, either directly or indirectly, by the following environmental characteristics: (1) private-regarding political cultures, (2) economic development, (3) unreformed governmental institutions, and (4) dispersed structures of influence.

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In discussing the notion, made popular by group theorists, that the needs and interests of citizens in pluralistic political communities are well-represented by diverse interest groups, E. E. Schattschneider wrote that,

The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that ... about 90 per cent of the people cannot get into the pressure system.

The notion that the pressure system is automatically representative of the whole community is a myth fostered by the universalizing tendency of modern group theories. Pressure politics is a selective process ill-designed to serve diffuse interests. The system is skewed, loaded, and unbalanced in favor of a minority.¹

If most citizens and interests are not well-represented by organized interest groups, an important issue which must be faced concerns the ability of those citizens who are unincorporated in Schattschneider's "pressure system" to nevertheless mobilize for political action and become effective competitors for influence and privilege. Pluralists and elite theorists have given political science two divergent views of the ability of such citizens to become influential political actors.

According to pluralists, the lack of permanent organization need not be a constraint to effective citizen action. This was suggested by David Truman who argued that "potential groups" as well as organized groups are important forces in the determination of public policy in America.² Robert A. Dahl, however, is the pluralist who has most effectively developed the argument that previously unorganized citizens can effectively wield influence in pluralistic political communities. According to Dahl, power resources are widely dispersed among inactive and unorganized citizens as well as among active organized groups.³ It is merely that "the great body of citizens use their political resources at a low level."⁴ Nevertheless, these normally apolitical citizens can close "the

great gap between their actual influence and their potential influence," by mobilizing for political action. As an illustration of this point, Dahl described the case of the metal houses where Miss Greva and her neighbors in New Haven mobilized on an ad hoc basis, protested, and became effective petitioners in the New Haven political system.⁵

Yet, this view is disputed by many elite theorists. Critics have focused on the twin problems of the activation of normally unorganized groups and the subsequent effectiveness of such groups. According to Bellush and David, "pluralists fail to see the complexity of the political processes involved in activation";⁶ numerous structural and psychological barriers exist which prevent the rapid mobilization of unorganized citizens, even when governmental action threatens their primary goals and values. Bellush and David also argue that even if a group of citizens is politically activated, their chances of being influential are slim. Because such citizens are "political neophytes" lacking experience, skills, and material resources, they "initially enter the political process...at a distinct disadvantage."⁷

In short, pluralists and elite theorists disagree over the ability of unorganized citizens to mobilize for effective political action. This disagreement is of critical significance. What is at stake is whether pluralism, which in principle would have power and privilege dispersed on a relatively equal basis to all groups in society, degenerates in practice to a form of elitism where power and privilege, being concentrated in the hands of a few well-organized groups, is unattainable by normally unorganized citizens.

Transcending the pluralist and elite theorist perspectives, it can be suggested that political systems sometimes facilitate and sometimes hinder the effective mobilization of previously unorganized citizens. In other words,

political systems are sometimes receptive to newly mobilized citizens, as pluralists claim; and political systems are sometimes hostile to such citizens, as elite theorists claim. A concern for theoretical explanation requires a specification of variables which influence the varying degrees of the effectiveness of mobilization by previously unorganized citizens.

By examining the effects which various factors in the urban environment have on the effective mobilization of previously unorganized citizens, this paper attempts to provide such theoretical explanations. The paper is divided into four parts. In part I, the mobilization of normally unorganized citizens and the effects of environmental variables on mobilization are discussed in broad perspective. In part II, a recursive model which relates specific urban environmental variables to successful mobilization is developed. In part III, the samples and measures used in testing the model are discussed and preliminary findings are presented. The recursive model presented in part II is tested and discussed in part IV.

I. PROTEST ACTIVITY AND ITS ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

When previously unorganized citizens mobilize for political action, they become what are here labelled as protest groups. Protest groups are defined as groups of citizens who do not normally interact with government officials, but who, under certain conditions (when they perceive that their interests are threatened by the activities of others or when they perceive that the political system can be of use in furthering these interests), mobilize for political action and make demands on public officials through pressure processes.

This definition is useful for present purposes because it distinguishes protest groups from traditional interest groups. On the one hand, interest groups are highly organized, well-financed, and have professional full-time

leadership which provides constant and continuous access to government officials in pressing the interests of their group constituents. These are the organized, special-interest groups which constitute Schattschneider's "pressure system". On the other hand, protest groups are not organized for continuous interaction with government officials. Instead of being headed by professional leadership which provides constant access to government officials, protest groups are composed of citizens who are usually apolitical. As Dahl suggests, for these citizens, "politics is a sideshow in the great circus of life".⁸ Thus protest group interests are not incorporated into the pressure system and protest groups fail to have close continuing relationships with government officials. These are among the handicaps which protest groups must overcome when they mobilize for political action.

This definition of protest groups is also useful because it avoids making unnecessary assumptions about the nature of protest groups. In particular, it is often assumed that protest groups have the following characteristics: (a) that they are composed of low income and low status people, (b) that they have ad hoc organizational structures, and (c) that they use actions and resources of an "unconventional nature". However, these assumptions appear to be either empirically false or conceptually over-restrictive.

Much research indicates that those citizens who mobilize for protest action are seldom from the lowest socio-economic strata. Orbell, Matthews and Prothro, Ladd, and Eisinger have independently discovered, for example, that black participants in protest groups tend to have higher incomes and educational status than black non-participants.⁹ In a broader analysis of the link between socio-economic status and citizen participation, Verba and Nie also have found that those who engage in "issue-specific participation" tend to be disproportionately high in social status.¹⁰

Research also indicates that citizens who mobilize for protest action need not have ad hoc organizational structures; they may also draw in various manners on the organizational resources of previously organized groups. For example, protest groups may draw on the resources of recently-formed organizations which do not have continuous access to government officials. Protest groups may also be formed as an ad hoc coalition of relatively stable groups. Additionally, protest groups can be a sub-group of a permanent organization, drawing on some, but not all, of its resources. Recent research by Peter Eisinger has demonstrated this point. In a survey of protestors in Milwaukee, Eisinger found that most black protests were carried out by stable, on-going organizations, rather than by ad hoc organizations. Although few protestors belonged to permanent organizations, over one-half of the protestors surveyed indicated that the NAACP Youth Council, headed by Father Groppi, organized the protest activity in which they participated.¹¹ Such organizations as the NAACP Youth Council clearly do not have the resources nor the continuous access to public officials which would designate them as interest groups in Schattschneider's "pressure system"; but they may provide newly mobilized citizens with some resources to draw upon in their protest campaign.

The notion that all protest groups use actions and resources of an "unconventional" nature also appears to be excessively restrictive. Although protest groups may use tactics that are "characterized by showmanship or display of an unconventional nature,"¹² many citizens mobilize for political action and use such conventional political tactics as negotiating grievances with public officials, attending public meetings to express their grievances, and circulating petitions. Indeed, one explanation for the current lack of visibility of protest group activity in America is that protest groups are increasingly eschewing the

unconventional tactics of the 1960's and adopting more conventional tactics.

Thus, protest groups are defined as groups of citizens whose interests are not organized into the "pressure system", but who mobilize for action on an issue-specific basis. Such groups may be composed of low, middle, or high status persons. They may have ad hoc organizational structures or they may draw, in varying degrees, on the organizational resources of on-going organizations. Finally, protest groups can use unconventional or conventional strategies to place their demands before political authorities. By conceptualizing protest groups in this broad manner, it is possible to investigate the activity of a wide variety of citizens and groups who are unincorporated in the "pressure system."¹³

Protest group actions are not performed in a vacuum; they take place in the context of, and are presumably affected by, various environmental variables. The environmental context of protest activity is here defined to include those social, cultural, economic, and political characteristics of a community which -- although they may vary widely from community to community or vary substantially within a community over a long period of time -- are normally constant within the space and time of a particular protest incident. Thus, the environmental context is unalterable by protest groups, at least in the short-run.

Peter Eisinger has recently added to our understanding of the environmental context of protest activity by arguing that,

environmental variables are related to one another in the sense that they establish a context within which politics takes place. Furthermore, the possible linkages between this context and the patterns of political behavior become evident if the elements of the context are conceived as components of the particular structure of political opportunities of a community...(which) serve in various ways to obstruct or facilitate citizen activity in pursuit of political goals.¹⁴

In short, citizen action can take place in an "open" or "responsive" environment; such an environment provides opportunities for protest groups because it enhances

their chances for success. But citizen action can also take place in a "closed" environment; such an environment operates as a constraint on protest group action because it diminishes the chances for successful protest activity.

Although some research has been conducted in order to determine the relative openness of various social, economic, and political structures, Harlan Hahn argues that the area remains relatively unexplored.

By stressing an essentially anthropomorphic view of urban decision-making and by neglecting to emphasize the institutional constraints and opportunities that mold political behavior, some observers seem to overlook one of the most salient and significant elements in city politics. ¹⁵

Hahn suggests, however, that progress in this area can be attained by engaging in comparative urban research.

Increased research might be focused on social and political behavior within different institutional contexts. This emphasis seems to be especially appropriate in the study of local politics. Communities exhibit a wide range of variations, and they possess disparate social and political structures. ¹⁶

Research into the urban environment which affects citizen participation in general and protest group action in particular might envision the environment as having three types of effects. First, the environment might influence the propensity of citizens for political action. Second, urban environmental variables might act as "conditioning factors" which affect the relationships between citizen action and its correlates. Third, the environment might influence the responsiveness of urban political systems to citizen demands and interests which are voiced through various participation activities.

Eisinger has recently investigated the relationship between various aspects of the urban environment and the propensity of citizens to mobilize for protest activity. His research suggests that protest is most likely to occur in communities having unrefined formal governmental institutions, centralized power

structures, high formal representations of blacks on city councils, and a high amount of social disorganization.¹⁷ Because some of the environmental variables which are related to frequent protest activity are characterized by Eisinger as being aspects of an open environment (e.g., unreformed institutions and high black representation), while other such environmental variables are characterized as being aspects of a closed environment (e.g., centralized power structures and social disorganization), Eisinger argues that

The most frequent occurrence of protest takes place in cities with mixed open and closed characteristics.¹⁸

In addition to conceptualizing aspects of the urban environment as independent variables affecting the frequency of protest activity, aspects of the environmental context can also be thought of as "conditioning factors" which affect the relationships between protest group activity and its correlates.

Jennings and Zeigler argue that various contextual variables affect group activity in this manner.

It is possible that (electoral) competition levels and legal parameters serve as mediating devices in the linkage between complexity and support on the one hand, and group activity on the other hand. That is, even though electoral variables have little independent effect on group life, they may condition the association between other independent forces and group life.

In general, the findings support the view that electoral properties do condition the broader relationships in a systematic fashion.¹⁹

In order to clarify how environmental variables can have conditioning effects on citizen mobilization, two illustrative hypotheses can be suggested. First, environmental factors may condition the relationships between various independent variables and the propensity of citizens to mobilize for protest action. For example, the general relationship between the racial composition of a community and propensity of citizens to mobilize for protest action in the community may be affected by political characteristics of a community. When blacks are

are well-represented in positions of elected and administrative authority, a large non-white population may be correlated with a large amount of black protest action. In this case, sympathetic black officials might reinforce black protest activity and encourage increased black mobilization. But when blacks are ill-represented in positions of authority, a large non-white population may have little correlation with the amount of black protest action. In this case, black protest might not be systematically reinforced and black protest may occur only sporadically in response to peculiar events.

Second, environmental factors may condition the relationships between various independent variables and effective citizen mobilization. For example, it has been argued and demonstrated that whether protest groups utilize ad hoc or stable organizational structures in pressing their demands is only weakly related to attaining favorable policy responses.²⁰ Nevertheless, this weak relationship may be affected or conditioned by the urban political context. Unreformed governments have often been viewed as being particularly responsive to entrenched interests and groups; reformed governments were instituted, in part, to diminish the responsiveness of political systems to the well-organized interests in the community. In this regard, Greenstone and Peterson have argued that reformed governments have succeeded in widening the base of participation and influence in urban politics.²¹ This suggests that the adoption of ad hoc organizational structures may be positively related to protest group effectiveness in cities having reformed governments; for such organizations may best fit the reformed government ideal of broad, unorganized participation by citizens. However, the utilization of stable organizational structures may be positively related to protest group effectiveness in cities having unreformed governments; for such organizations may best fit the tradition which unreformed governments have of being responsive to organized interests.²²

The third manner in which the environmental context may affect protest group action is by directly influencing its effectiveness. For example, the responsiveness of urban authorities to protest group demands may be a function of certain economic, social, cultural, and political structures of the community. In regard to political structures, David Easton has written that the responsiveness of political systems to citizen demands should be a function of the "social and political distance" between authorities and citizens.²³ As communities have political structures which widen the distance between political authorities and citizens -- as communities adopt structures which insulate authorities from the public -- responsiveness to protest group demands should be reduced. Conversely, as communities adopt political structures which reduce the distance between political authorities and citizens, responsiveness to protest group demands should be increased.

Some political scientists suggest that the various political institutions now in existence in urban America insulate authorities from citizens and restrict effective citizen participation. Harlan Hahn, for example, has written that,

existing institutions of government provide those who wish to become involved in political decision-making with numerous constraints and opportunities. In general, however, the constraints imposed by political structures may appear to overshadow the opportunities for effective political participation.... If the goal of encouraging increased involvement in politics is considered one of the basic objectives of democratic governments, attention might be appropriately devoted to the invention of other institutions that would supplement elections as a means of reflecting popular sentiments.²⁴ (emphasis is added)

The need to invent new institutions stems from the presumed invariability of institutions in urban communities which insulate authorities from citizens. The bureaucratization of American cities is said to be one such constant factor which widens the distance between authorities and citizens. According to critics, bureaucratization has resulted in a high degree of fragmentation of power where

decisions are effectively made by administrative officials in specific agencies rather than by authorities charged with the overall direction of policy. These bureaucrats, according to Lowi, are loyal only to the mission of the agency and its related professional norms, and are unresponsive to either elected officials or citizens.

The New Machines are machines because they are relatively irresponsible structures of power. That is, each agency shapes important public policies, yet the leadership of each is relatively self-perpetuating and not readily subject to the controls of any higher authority.²⁵

David and Peterson, drawing on the argument of Lowi, have recently pointed out two characteristics of bureaucracies which tend to increase their distance from citizens and reduce their responsiveness to protest group demands.

Bureaucracies have a number of techniques by which they sustain their autonomy. First of all, the professionals directing the bureaucracy have an advantage in terms of experience, expertise, and control over information. They quietly carry out their business - in the manner which best suits them - while public attention is diverted elsewhere. Adaption may be necessary when a storm of public concern is immediately threatening, but, with patience, such turbulences can be weathered by hardy bureaucrats. Secondly, bureaucracies develop a coterie of producer and employee organizations to which they turn for advice and information, backing for their plans of expansion, and general public support. To shield the bureaucrats themselves from public controversies, these interest groups often carry on the battle for them.²⁶

In short, the process of bureaucratization of our urban governmental structures is said to have reduced the accessibility of authorities to ordinary citizens. There is thus a need to invent or discover new political structures which can serve as a counter-force to bureaucratization by reducing the distance between authorities and citizens.

Without disparaging the need to invent new structures which might serve this function, it is nevertheless possible that certain existing political structures may be more open and responsive than others. Given the wide variation in political structures in urban communities, it is likely that some such structures

tend to reduce the distance between authorities and citizens while others tend to increase that distance. Specification of these structures is a key task of community research.

There is, for example, considerable variation in the recruitment and electoral process in American communities. By reducing the vulnerability of authorities, some recruitment and electoral mechanisms appear to have reduced the accountability of authorities. In this regard, Prewitt and Eulau have shown that open recruitment processes (i.e., where councilmen do not attain office through sponsorship techniques) and competitive elections (i.e., where relatively high numbers of incumbants are removed from office) tend to increase at least the perception of responsiveness to ad hoc issue groups.²⁷

Other political structures may also be variable from community to community and affect the distance between authorities and citizens. In the next section, two such factors are considered -- the form of government and the centralization of community-making influence -- as a model of environmental variables and community responsiveness to protest group demands is developed.

II. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS AND RESPONSIVENESS: A MODEL


The ability of a pluralistic political system to incorporate and respond to the demands of citizens who are normally outside of the pressure system is of critical importance if pluralistic communities are to avoid becoming elitist systems responsive only to the demands of well-organized interest groups. In this regard, the responsiveness of political systems to newly mobilized, issue-specific groups of citizens appears to be dependent on various political, economic, cultural, and social factors in the environment. In order to develop this argument, this section will suggest a model relating several urban environmental

factors to the policy-responsiveness of communities to protest group demands.

A schematic diagram summarizing the model is given in Figure 1. The degree of policy-responsiveness of urban political systems to protest group demands is the dependent variable in the model. The following are the explanatory or independent variables: (1) the political culture of the community, (2) the economic development of the community, (3) the form of government in the community, and (4) the dispersion of influence in the community. In this section, these concepts and the hypothesized interrelationships among the concepts are discussed.

Figure 1

Environmental Variables and Policy-Responsiveness:
A Schematic Diagram



The concept of responsiveness has taken on a number of divergent meanings in recent political science literature.²⁸ In this study, the term responsiveness is conceptualized in a manner similar to one of the representational response styles identified by Prewitt and Eulau. Their research suggests that political authorities (councilmen) can be responsive to "self-defined images", "attentive publics", or "ad hoc issue groups". They characterize responsiveness to ad hoc groups as follows,

the council may not concern itself with cohesive attentive publics but may, instead, act in response to ad hoc pressures and petitions. Neighborhood groups, for instance, may organize on a sporadic basis, make claims on the council for some service or benefit, and expect

to be listened to by 'their representatives'. Under these conditions, councils placate or respond to specialized and transitory citizen groups. If in the first case the council represents attentive publics, in this case it represents issue-specific groups of citizens.²⁹

The concern in this paper is with the responsiveness of urban officials to the demands of citizens who mobilize on an issue-specific basis to present their demands and grievances. However, the present notion of responsiveness differs from that of Prewitt and Eulau in two respects. First, rather than being concerned, as were Prewitt and Eulau, with city officials' perception of their responsiveness to such groups, our concern is with the actual response of urban polities to protest group demands. Second, rather than being concerned with the extent to which city officials listen to ad hoc pressure groups, our concern is with the degree to which communities actually adopt policies which are consistent with the demands of protest groups. In short, responsiveness is here conceptualized as the congruence between the manifest or explicitly-stated demands of protest groups and the corresponding public policy of the urban political system which is the target of the protest groups' demands.

It should be noted that this conception of responsiveness establishes an "intermediate" standard of actions which communities must take in order to be considered responsive. Some theorists imply that giving a protest group a fair hearing constitutes responsive action.³⁰ Other theorists imply that only those systems can be termed responsive which actually alleviate the grievances of protest groups by bringing about real changes in their living conditions.³¹ Our notion of responsiveness requires more than simple access-responsiveness (granting a hearing to protest groups), but requires less than impact-responsiveness (actually alleviating the protest group's grievances). Because adopting responsive policies may not mean alleviating grievances (if, for example, the policies are not implemented or if they fail to be effective), it would be

preferable to deal with the more rigorous standard of responsiveness (impact-responsiveness). But to do so would create enormous problems of discovering and measuring the impact of policy responsive actions. Although estimating impact-responsiveness to protest group demands may be feasible in case study research,³² the absence of easily attainable data on the impact of policy makes such a goal impossible in a comparative study such as this. Thus, our concern is with policy-responsiveness or the degree to which urban communities adopt policies which are congruent with the manifest demands of protest groups.

One aspect of the urban environment which may affect policy-responsiveness is the economic development of the community; the responsiveness of urban communities should be enhanced by the availability of economic resources. In considering the factors which affect the responsiveness of political systems, Easton writes that the

physical environment external to the political system may impose insuperable burdens upon authorities who are seeking to meet feedback response. The systems in the environment of the political system may fail to provide the physical means for catering to the wants and demands of the members even where there is a serious effort to do so.

The economic and social level from which a system starts may be so low that it cannot introduce any significant measure of change into its environment without aid from outside the system.³³

Just as the level of economic development appears to constrain the ability of political systems to provide community services,³⁴ so may the level of economic development in a community constrain the ability of political systems to meet the demands of citizens who mobilize on an informal basis to make political demands. This straight-forward idea leads to our first hypothesis.

- (1) The more economically developed is a community, the more responsive will it be to protest group demands.

A second aspect of the urban environment which should affect policy-responsiveness to protest group demands is the value structure or political culture of

the community. Michael Lipsky has suggested in this respect that responsiveness should be affected by the norms of the community.

articulation of goals or tactics which significantly depart from established community values, even if strong organized opposition does not develop, may offend sensibilities in such a way as to diminish the saliency of issues.³⁵

In predicting the responsiveness of communities to protest group demands, Lipsky further argues that,

It is important to know not only if protest activity conflicts or conforms with community values, but how intensely these values are held.³⁶

This suggests that what is critical for protest groups is whether their specific actions and demands conform to community values.

But the political culture can also be conceptualized as facilitating or inhibiting responsiveness to protest groups generally, regardless of their specific demands. The literature on political ethos is suggestive in this regard. Banfield and Wilson have argued that communities can be characterized according to whether their dominant ethos is public-regarding or private-regarding. They maintain that a political culture which is dominated by a Yankee, middle-class, public-regarding, or unitary ethos tends to adopt policies which emphasize community-wide interests rather than specific "local" or private interests. But a political culture which is dominated by an immigrant, working-class, private-regarding, or individualist ethos is said to be responsive to competing, special, partial and private interests and groups.³⁷

The relationships between political culture and public policy which are suggested by the ethos theory have generally been investigated quite indirectly or by paying particular attention to policy which is responsive to "community" interests rather than by considering policy which is responsive to particular interests. For example, in a recent article Wilson and Banfield report that the

relationships between the holist (public-regarding) or local (private-regarding) attitudes of individuals and their attitude toward "community-serving" or "people-helping" policies are in accordance with expectations generated by the ethos theory.³⁸ But Wolfinger and Field, in another test of the political culture-public policy linkage, suggest that the link between the dominant political ethos and responsiveness to community-serving policies is weak, particularly if region is controlled.³⁹ However, there appears to be no direct test of the effect which political culture has on the responsiveness of urban communities to private and partial interests. This study seeks to help fill this gap by investigating the following hypothesis.

- (2) The more "private-regarding" is the political culture, the more responsive will a community be to the demands of protest groups. Conversely, the more "public-regarding" is the political culture, the less responsive will a community be to the demands of protest groups.

A third aspect of the urban environment which should affect the policy-responsiveness of urban communities to protest group demands is the form of government which prevails in a community. Again, the ethos theory suggests that reformed and unreformed governmental structures are not equally responsive to group demands in general and to protest group demands in particular. According to Lineberry and Fowler, unreformed structures were considered by those in the "good government" movement to be overly responsive to group and class pressures; the reformers proposed city manager government as a "no-nonsense, efficient, business-like regime, where decisions could be implemented by professional administrators rather than by victors in the battle over the spoils. Once established, these institutions would serve as bastions against particular interests."⁴⁰ Lineberry and Fowler have suggested, furthermore, that the intentions of reformers have been realized. They argue that, because the relationships

between socio-economic variables and public policy are greater in unreformed than in reformed political communities, it can be inferred that unreformed governments are more responsive than reformed governments to "cleavages" and "social conflicts".

The translation of social conflicts into public policy and the responsiveness of political systems to class, racial, and religious cleavages differ markedly with the kind of political structure....
The greater the reformism, the lower the responsiveness.⁴¹

If unreformed governments are more influenced than reformed governments by the particular characteristics, needs, and conflicts in their environments, then it also makes sense to suppose that such structures are more responsive to particular demands from protest groups and other groups within the community. In short, because reformed urban institutions were intended to insulate community policy-makers from the particular and private pressures of various active sectors of the community, the following hypothesis is suggested.

- (3) The more unreformed are the formal structures of government the more responsive will a community be to protest group demands.

Another aspect of the political environment which is said to affect the distance between authorities and citizens, and thus the responsiveness of authorities to the protest demands of citizens, is the dispersion of decision-making influence among community leadership. The linkage between dispersion of influence and responsiveness has been assumed by both elite theorists and pluralists. Elite theorists hold that because influence is concentrated in the hands of a few persons who identify with (or are identical with) the business elite of the community, and because these highly influential men have interests and values distinct from most citizens, communities having influence concentrated among such men tend to be unresponsive to the demands of unorganized citizens.

Pluralists hold that because influence is dispersed among many people in the community having a variety of interests and values, and because dispersion of influence increases the possibility of penetration of the political system by issue-specific group leaders, communities having dispersed structures of influence tend to be responsive to protest group demands.

John Mollenkopf, utilizing data on the mobilization of neighborhood groups, reached conclusions similiar with pluralist and elite theory assumptions.

Strong fusion of target, elite, and dominant interests through political entrepreneurship or custom decreases the likelihood that the target will desire or need to grant concessions.⁴²

Terry Clark, using data from his Permanent Community Sample, has recently reached what appears to be a similiar conclusion. Although Clark has found that centralized structures of influence are best able to provide a community with collective or public goods, Clark suggests that communities having decentralized structures of influence provide relatively high levels of "separable goods".⁴³ This suggests that communities having dispersed structures of influence are more open to those citizens making demands for particular services. Thus our fourth hypothesis is as follows.

- (4) The more dispersed is influence in a community, the more responsive will the community be to protest group demands.
The more concentrated is influence in a community, the less responsive will the community be to protest group demands.

These four hypotheses suggest the zero-order relationships between the four environmental variables in our model and policy-responsiveness. However, as suggested by the model in Figure 1, the environmental variables are perhaps also interrelated in theoretically interesting ways. In order to move beyond an eclectic listing of factors to an interrelated set of explanations which is essential to theory-building, interrelationships among the environmental variables

must be added to the model and investigated. A fully developed recursive model enables consideration of such possibilities as developmental sequences and spurious relationships.

As suggested in Figure 1, the form of government in a community may be affected by both the political culture and the economic development of the community. Both of these relationships are suggested by ethos theory considerations. Banfield and Wilson have written that whether communities adopt reformed institutions or maintain unreformed governmental structures is largely determined by their political culture. Communities where the Yankee public-regarding ethos is prevalent seek to "insulate the business of government" from political pressures by adopting reformed governmental structures. Communities having a dominant individualistic ethos tend to maintain unreformed structures.⁴⁴ These impressions of Banfield and Wilson have been subjected to systematic investigation and generally have been verified.⁴⁵

The notion that reformism in government is related to economic development is also derived from ethos theory considerations. One would expect that reformed governmental structures, which are the middle-class ideal, to be primarily adopted by prosperous communities. Thus there should be a negative relationship between economic development and unreformism.

The degree of dispersion of influence in a community may be affected by the form of government in the community, by the political culture of the community, and perhaps by the economic development of the community. The hypothesis that form of government is related to the dispersion of influence in a community has been most effectively argued and demonstrated by Terry Clark:

the characteristics of reform government may be interpreted as tending toward a less differentiated pattern than the "unreformed" alternatives of our index. . . . We must recognize reform government

institutions as an important mechanism of integration. These considerations suggest that reform governmental characteristics should lead to more centralized patterns of decision-making, as indeed they do.⁴⁶

In his examination of 51 American communities, Clark found that form of government was the independent variable in his model which best explained dispersion of influence.

The notion that political culture is related to the dispersion of influence in a community is derived from the work of Michael Aiken.

If (political ethos) factors are related to formal political structures, we could similarly expect them to be associated with informal political structures. This line of reasoning would lead us to expect that the ethnically heterogeneous and working-class communities to have diffused power structures and homogeneous middle-class communities to have concentrated decision-making arrangements.⁴⁷

Aiken's data is consistent with the notion that communities having individualistic (or immigrant) political cultures tend to have dispersed structures of influence.

The hypothesis that economic development increases the dispersion of influence in a community is frequently made in the community power literature. Michael Aiken writes, for example.

We would expect industrialized cities to have more diffused power arrangements than non-industrialized cities. Industrialization brings about greater structural differentiation which means that new centers of power and countervailing elites are likely to be created.⁴⁸

However, Aiken's own data provide only weak support for this hypothesis and the other major comparative community power studies of Gilbert, Walton, and Clark all report insignificant relationships between economic development and dispersion of influence in a community.⁴⁹ Thus, we expect only a weak relationship, if any, between economic development and power dispersion.

The relationships discussed in this section can be synthesized into a single recursive system of structural equations which examine both the direct and indirect

effects of four environmental variables on the policy-responsiveness of urban polities to protest group demands. Equations 1 through 3 accomplish this task.

$$(1) \quad R = B_0 + B_1G + B_2C + B_3E + B_4P + e_1$$

$$(2) \quad P = B'_0 + B_5G + B_6C + B_7E + e_2$$

$$(3) \quad G = B''_0 + B_8C + B_9E + e_3$$

where R is a variable indicating the degree of policy-responsiveness to protest group demands;
 G is a variable indicating the degree of unreformism in governmental structures;
 C is a variable indicating the degree of "individualism" in a political culture;
 E is a variable indicating the degree of economic development of a community;
 P is a variable indicating the degree of dispersion of influence in a community.

Equation 1 presents the direct and independent effect of each environmental factor on policy-responsiveness. If responsiveness is a function of the extent of "individualism" in a political culture, of unreformed governmental structures, of economic development, and of dispersion of influence, then b_1 , b_2 , b_3 , and b_4 should all be significantly positive. If the structural variables of form of government, political culture, and economic development affect responsiveness indirectly by affecting power dispersion (which in turn affects responsiveness), then b_5 , b_6 , and b_7 should show these relationships. Finally, if political culture and economic development affect responsiveness indirectly by affecting the form of government which a community has, then b_8 and b_9 should show these relationships. After discussing in the next section the samples and operational indicators used in this research, this model will be tested in Section IV.

III. SAMPLES, MEASURES, AND ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS

In order to test the above model, two samples of data have been collected: (1) a sample of cities having a measure of responsiveness based on a content analysis of case studies, (2) a sample of cities having a measure of responsiveness based on information attained from questionnaires. These two samples and the basis of their distinctiveness -- the different procedures employed in measuring policy-responsiveness -- are discussed below.

(1) The Case Study Sample. As part of a larger analysis on protest group activity, data on 93 incidents of protest group activity occurring in 45 cities were collected.⁵⁰ These data were derived primarily from a content analysis of published scholarly and journalistic case studies and unpublished dissertations describing protest incidents which were targeted at urban officials.⁵¹ The measure of responsiveness in the Case Study Sample is based on the policy-responsiveness of urban officials to the protest demands examined in the case study accounts. For each of the 93 incidents examined in the case studies, the extent of policy-responsiveness was measured along the following five-point scale.⁵²

- (1) Repressive responses where officials took no actions favorable to protest groups and instead took some actions which were unfavorable or repressive to them.
- (2) No response, where officials simply failed to take any action of either a repressive or responsive nature.
- (3) Minimal responses where officials took such actions as (a) establishing a program or law which is concerned with alleviating the protest grievance but which does not satisfy the protest group, (b) making token gestures, or (c) passing symbolic legislation.
- (4) Compromise responses where officials adopt policies giving protest groups some, but not all, of what they demand.
- (5) Responses where officials enact policies congruent with the demands of protest groups.

The responsiveness of the 45 cities in the Case Study Sample was then measured by using the responsiveness scores from our protest incidents. For cities having a single incident examined in the case studies, the responsiveness score assigned that incident was used as the measurement of responsiveness in the city sample. For a city having several incidents examined in the case studies, an average responsiveness score was calculated.

(2) The Questionnaire Sample: In order to complement the case studies sample, a second sample of protest incidents was collected by sending questionnaires to 300 officials in 46 cities. These questionnaires were sent to officials in agencies which are the chief providers of controversial municipal services: (1) occupants of city hall (managers and mayors), (2) school administrators, (3) directors of welfare departments, (4) directors of health departments, (5) directors of pollution and environmental control agencies, (6) directors of housing agencies, and (7) local model cities and urban renewal administrators. These officials returned 201 questionnaires, 119 of which were deemed usable.⁵³ Our measure of responsiveness in this sample is based on the policy response to protest group demands as reported by the city official informants. Scores of responsiveness for protest incidents were again measured along a five-point responsiveness scale, and a score for responsiveness of each city was again obtained by averaging the responsiveness scores for the several incidents occurring in each city.⁵⁴

It is not claimed that the samples attained by these procedures are random. As suggested by the data in Table 1, distinctly different types of protest activity and different environmental contexts are over-represented in each of our two samples. In the case studies sample, protest activity involving unconventional actions occurring in the 1960's is over-represented. The environmental variables of reformed governmental structures, centralized structures of influence, traditional political cultures, and weak economic

Table 1

A Description and Comparison of the Case Study Sample and
the Questionnaire Sample

	<u>Number and Percentage of Cities in the Case Study Sample</u>		<u>Number and Percentage of Cities in the Questionnaire Sample</u>	
Size of city				
Below 50,000	6	(13%)	6	(13%)
50,000 - 200,000	18	(40%)	11	(24%)
200,000 - 500,000	10	(22%)	12	(26%)
500,000 - 1,000,000	7	(16%)	12	(26%)
Over 1,000,000	4	(9%)	5	(11%)
Region				
Northeast	12	(27%)	9	(20%)
Midwest	5	(11%)	24	(52%)
West	6	(13%)	9	(20%)
South	22	(49%)	4	(9%)
Form of Government				
Reformed	17	(37%)	14	(30%)
Mixed	20	(44%)	22	(48%)
Unreformed	8	(19%)	10	(22%)
Political Culture				
Individualistic	4	(9%)	6	(13%)
Individualistic/Moralistic	14	(31%)	21	(46%)
Moralistic	7	(16%)	16	(35%)
Moralistic/Traditional	6	(13%)	2	(4%)
Traditional	14	(31%)	1	(2%)
Economic Development				
Median Income less than \$6,000	30	(67%)	19	(42%)
Median Income more than \$6,000	15	(33%)	27	(58%)
Power Dispersion				
Low Black Representation Ratio	18	(40%)	7	(15%)
Moderate Black Representation Ratio	11	(24%)	10	(22%)
High Black Representation Ratio	16	(36%)	29	(63%)
Actions of Protest Groups				
Mostly Conventional	12	(27%)	24	(52%)
Partly conventional, partly unconventional	13	(29%)	19	(42%)
Mostly Unconventional	20	(44%)	3	(6%)
Policy-responsiveness of the Urban Community				
Repressive	2	(4%)	0	(0%)
Non-responsive	14	(31%)	11	(24%)
Minimally responsive	9	(20%)	22	(48%)
Moderately responsive	10	(22%)	12	(26%)
Highly responsive	10	(22%)	1	(2%)

development are also over-represented. In the questionnaire sample protest activity involving conventional actions occurring in the 1970's was more frequently sampled. The environmental variables of unreformed governmental structures, dispersed structures of influence, individualistic political cultures, and economic development were more frequently represented in this sample. In short, because neither sample is random, caution must be exercised in generalizing on the basis of the data.

Beyond the differences in the two samples which are revealed in Table 1, two other differences can be noted. First, most of the incidents in the case studies sample were very conspicuous while those incidents in the questionnaire sample were less widely known and reported. Because there may be interaction effects between conspicuousness and some of the environmental variables examined in this study, this difference in the two samples may partially account for different relationships among the variables in the two samples.

Secondly, the possibility of two different types of bias in the two samples must be suggested. In the case studies, the scholars and journalists who provided the data appeared frequently to sympathize with, and share the perspective of, protest groups. However, in the questionnaire sample, the officials who served as informants may have viewed the protest incident from a different perspective. Such officials, for example, might over-estimate the policy-responsiveness of political systems while the data sources in the case studies might under-estimate policy-responsiveness. In short, there might be a "liberal" bias in the case studies sample and a "conservative" bias in the mail questionnaire sample.

For both samples, appropriate operational indicators of the four environmental factors in our model had to be ascertained. First, the concepts of economic development and form of government, which can be measured using routine operational

indicators will be considered. Then the concepts of political culture and dispersion of influence in the community will be examined in more detail; for the operational indicators of these concepts require substantial justification. In examining various measures of the four environmental variables, an effort is made to suggest the most valid measures. Because one criterion of validity is the pragmatic validity criterion, the zero-order correlations relating various measures of the four environmental concepts to policy-responsiveness will be reported as each concept is discussed. In Section IV, the most appropriate measure of each environmental concept is retained and investigated in a summary model of policy-responsiveness to protest group demands.

(1) Economic development. Measures of economic development are easily obtainable. In Politics, Economics and the Public, Thomas Dye uses four measures of economic development.⁵⁵ Two of these measures, the census statistics of median income and median education are appropriate for this study. The zero-order correlations which examine the hypothesis that economic development increases policy-responsiveness to protest group demands are given in Table 2.⁵⁶

Table 2
Economic Development and Policy-Responsiveness
(Zero-Order Correlations)

<u>Measure</u>	<u>Case Study Sample</u>	<u>Questionnaire Sample</u>
Median Income	.42*	.08
Median Education	.16	.14

The relationships are all consistent with the hypothesis that economic development increases responsiveness, but only the relationship between median income and responsiveness in the case study sample is statistically significant. Thus the median income measure will be used in the further analysis of a model of environmental factors and policy responsiveness.

(2) Form of Government. Operationalizing the form of government of a community is equally straight-forward. First, aggregate data regarding the presence or absence of unreformed characteristics (mayor-council government, partisan elections, and ward constituencies) can be examined. Secondly, following Lineberry and Fowler, form of government can be measured as a continuous variable depending on the degree to which cities have adopted reformed structures.⁵⁷ In this study, a simple three-point index of unreformism in government structure is adopted.

- (1) Totally reformed (the government is either manager or commission, elections are non-partisan, and constituencies are at large).
- (2) Mixed reformed and unreformed characteristics.
- (3) Totally unreformed (the government is mayor-council, elections are partisan, and over 50% of the city councilmen represent ward constituencies).

The zero-order correlations which examine the hypothesis that unreformism in government enhances policy-responsiveness are given in Table 3.

Table 3

Unreformism in Governmental Structures and Policy-Responsiveness

(Zero-Order Correlations)

<u>Measure</u>	<u>Case Study Sample</u>	<u>Questionnaire Sample</u>
Presence of mayor-council system	.20	-.02
Presence of partisan elections	.23	.19
Percentage of city councilmen having ward constituencies	.05	.05
Index of Unreformism	.23	.10

As hypothesized, unreformed characteristics appear to generally to increase policy-responsiveness. Because the index of unreformism incorporates the other three

measures of unreformism in city government, it will be used in further analysis.

(3) Political Culture. Operationalizing the concept of political culture presents more substantial difficulties. This concept has been traditionally measured in the comparative urban literature by the ethnicity (the census statistic on the percentage foreign born) of a community. However, the utility of this measure has been undermined in subsequent research by both detractors and proponents of the ethos theory. Perhaps most damaging to the notion that per cent foreign born is a good indicator of individualist (or private-regarding) cultures is the finding of Wilson and Banfield that various ethnic groups are not equally private-regarding and various indigenous groups are not equally public-regarding. For example, although Italians tend to have attitudes considered to be individualist, Irish and Poles are more ambivalent and Jews tend to have unitary (or public-regarding) attitudes. Moreover, while indigenous "Yankees" tend to have unitary attitudes, indigenous blacks tend to have individualist attitudes.⁵⁸ These findings suggest that aggregate measures of ethnicity will be very inaccurate measures of political culture.

Another indicator of political culture which may be relevant to the ethos theory is the impressionistic measures of political culture attributed to localities by Daniel Elazar.⁵⁹ Elazar identifies three major types of political culture, two of which appear to be closely related to the private-regarding and public-regarding cultures identified by Wilson and Banfield. The individualistic or I-cultures seems to correspond to the private-regarding or individualist ethos. According to Elazar, immigrant groups carried the I-culture across the country bringing individualistic attitudes and goals into the industrialized communities in which they settled. Moreover, the idea that such cultures are responsive to private and partial interests is suggested by Elazar's statement

that, in the I-culture, "public officials (are) committed to giving the public what it wants."⁶⁰ The moralistic or M-culture appears to correspond with the public-regarding culture. According to Elazar, Puritans and their Yankee descendents established a moralistic political culture which is "devoted to the advancement of the public interest. Good government, then, is measured by the degree to which it promotes the public good in terms of the honesty, selflessness, and commitment to the public welfare of those who govern."⁶¹ In short, such a culture should be hostile to the demands of private-regarding protest groups.

Yet, the moralistic political culture may not be the most hostile political culture to protest groups in Elazar's typology. The moralistic culture, after all, welcomes the participation of every citizen and group in the political affairs of a polity.⁶² In the traditional or T-political culture which Elazar identifies, the political order is "elite-oriented" and closed. According to Elazar, even political parties are of minimal importance in T-political cultures, since they "encourage a degree of openness that goes against the fundamental grain of an elite-oriented political culture."⁶³

Elazar's classification of political cultures may form a useful ordinal scale for measuring political culture. The following five point scale has been adopted:⁶⁴

- (1) Traditional political culture (T)
- (2) Moralistic-traditional political culture (TM or MT)
- (3) Moralistic or public-regarding culture (M)
- (4) Individualistic-moralistic political culture (MI or IM)
- (5) Individualistic or private-regarding culture (I)

In summary, two measures of political culture have been suggested: (1) the proportion of a community which is foreign born; (2) Elazar's impressionistic measures of political culture.⁶⁵ The data in Table 4, which relates both of these measures of political culture to policy-responsiveness, suggest that

Elazar's measurement of political culture appears to have the greatest pragmatic validity.

Table 4
Political Culture and Policy-Responsiveness
(Zero-order Correlations)

<u>Measure</u>	<u>Case Study Sample</u>	<u>Questionnaire Sample</u>
Elazar's Measures	.51*	.07
Per Cent Foreign Born	-.12	.09

Elazar's notion and measurement of political culture produces empirical findings most consistent with ethos theory expectations. The per cent foreign born measure is more weakly, and inconsistently, related to policy-responsiveness. It seems reasonable to conclude that the ethnicity measure has too much slippage in it to measure adequately the broad concept of political culture. Thus, the Elazar measure of political culture will be used in the remainder of this study.

(4) Dispersion Of Influence. Measuring the concept of dispersion of influence in a community has presented enormous difficulties for those engaged in comparative urban analysis. Perhaps the most widely used measure is Hawley's MOP Ratio which indicates the proportion of managers, officials, and proprietors in the civilian labor force.⁶⁶ Because a high MOP ratio suggests that power resources are diffused among many community subsystems, Hawley has argued that dispersion of influence is directly proportional to the MOP Ratio. Peter Eisinger has recently defended this measure on grounds of both face and pragmatic validity. According to Eisinger,

The (MOP) Ratio is not a meaningless one. It affords a measure of the distribution of occupational status and skills, two critical resources for the exercise of power. As such it offers one means of estimating the dispersion of potential power, or the degree of slack in the system.⁶⁷

Moreover, Eisinger, like Hawley, found the MOP Ratio valid because it yielded results consistent with theoretical expectations.

Nevertheless, the validity of the MOP Ratio as a measure of dispersion of influence has been seriously contested by Michael Aiken.⁶⁸ Aiken has argued that the MOP Ratio is negatively related to the degree of dispersion of influence in a community as measured by the in-depth case studies of community power investigators. Although one might discount such a finding on the grounds that these investigations are unreliable due to methodological and ideological distortions, Aiken has further shown that the negative relationship persists after controlling for the methodology and discipline of the researcher. Unless one argues that community power investigators normally obtained conclusions at odds with empirical reality, this finding seems devastating for the traditional interpretation of the MOP Ratio. Indeed, Aiken argues that perhaps

we can conclude that a high MOP Ratio is more likely to be characteristic of a city with concentrated power, not dispersed power as Hawley has argued.⁶⁹

Aiken's explanation for this finding is enlightening and suggests, perhaps, an alternative measure of distribution of influence. According to Aiken, the problem with the MOP Ratio is that it

contains numerous occupations in retail trade.... Thus cities that are high on the MOP Ratio are probably retail trade cities in the South...which are more likely to have concentrated power structures.⁷⁰

If what is desired is a measure which gets at the distribution of occupational status and skills (as Eisinger argues), and if the MOP fails to be an adequate measure because it is too inclusive in attributing such status and skills, then what is apparently needed is a more exclusive measure. The common census statistic, per cent of the labor force which are professionals, although it may be too exclusive, may be a measure of distribution of influence worth exploring.

Both the MOP Ratio and the per cent professional measures of the distribution of community influence appear to rely on a peculiar conceptualization of influence distribution, a conceptualization which is derived from Floyd Hunter's study of Regional City and which is apparently taken as axiomatic by most community power theorists.⁷¹ This is the notion that influence is distributed privately and individually rather than publicly and collectively. By arguing that influence in a community is an attribute of particular persons normally not engaged in official public life, Hunter set the parameters of the search for community power. The fact that different groups apparently enjoy different opportunities to influence political decisions through their location in public institutions was deemed rather insignificant. But it is clear that in American cities all groups do not share equally in formal and official political power bases. From a group and public perspective, then, it could be argued that influence is dispersed to the extent that all groups share equally in formal political power and influence is concentrated when some groups are excluded from sharing formal political power. Although this conceptualization of influence distribution does not address itself to precisely the same issues as the private and individualistic conceptualization of influence which has dominated the study of urban politics, it is concerned with a vital political characteristic of communities. Moreover, it would appear that such a conceptualization of the distribution of influence is more measurable in comparative research and, therefore, will lend itself more easily to theoretical development.

This study's conceptualization of distribution of influence as a public and collective concept will utilize a measure developed by Peter Eisinger: the black representation ratio. This measure is simply the proportion of aldermen who are black to the population who are black. It is assumed that blacks have

been and are currently the most powerless group in American communities. But the higher is the black representation ratio, the more influence is dispersed to relatively powerless groups. Eisinger's discussion of this measure suggests both its limitations and its strengths.

Representation in the form of elected officials -- limited here to aldermen -- does not guarantee blacks real power in a city, but it does indicate that certain types of political opportunities are available. Furthermore, it provides evidence that black spokesmen may speak from a legitimate and official forum. This is not a pre-requisite for the exercise of power, but it makes the problem of wielding power a lesser one in that access has already been achieved.⁷²

In summary, three measures of dispersion of influence in a community have been suggested: (1) the MOP ratio, (2) the proportion of a community's labor force which is professional, and (3) the black representation ratio.⁷³ With the above mentioned considerations in mind, the data in Table 5 lead to a relatively unambiguous conclusion. The hypothesis that the dispersion of influence in a community is positively related to policy-responsiveness to protest group demands is supported. The measure having the greatest pragmatic validity is the black representation ratio. Although the relationship between dispersion of influence by that measure and policy-responsiveness is not terribly strong, it is in the posited direction and, in the case studies, is statistically significant at the .05 level. The per cent professional measure of dispersion of influence is also related to policy-responsiveness in the hypothesized direction, but the weak correlation coefficients do not meet conventional standards of significance.

Table 5

Dispersion of Influence and Policy-Responsiveness
(Zero-Order Correlations)

<u>Measure</u>	<u>Case Study Sample</u>	<u>Questionnaire Sample</u>
Black Representation Ratio	.38*	.20
Per Cent Professional	.23	.14
The MOP Ratio	-.07	-.16

However, the relationship between the MOP measure -- as interpreted by Hawley -- and policy-responsiveness is not as hypothesized. This finding is not sufficient to require rejection of the proposition that dispersed structures of influence are more responsive to protest groups than are centralized structures of influence. Because the relationships between our other measures of power dispersion and responsiveness are consistent with theoretical considerations, and because of previously expressed dissatisfaction with the validity of the MOP ratio, it seems likely that Aiken is correct in his assertion that a high MOP Ratio is likely to characterize cities having concentrated, rather than dispersed, structures of influence.

IV. THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT AND POLICY-RESPONSIVENESS TO PROTEST GROUP

DEMANDS: A RECURSIVE MODEL

Thus far this study has shown that four environmental characteristics are related (although sometimes weakly) to policy-responsiveness in the hypothesized manner. However, no effort has yet been made to ascertain the independent effects of each environmental variable; nor have efforts been made to consider possible developmental sequences and spurious-relationships among the environmental variables and policy-responsiveness. By examining the recursive model developed in section II of this paper, further understanding of the interrelationships among various environmental factors and policy-responsiveness is attained. Data examining the recursive model are given in Table 6, which reports zero-order correlation (r_0) and regression coefficients (b_0), partial correlation (r_p) and regression coefficients (b_p), and partial standardized regression coefficients (B_p^*). Discussion of the data testing the model will be organized around the independent variables; the direct and indirect effects on policy-responsiveness of economic development, political culture, form of government, and dispersion of influence will be examined in that order.

Table 6

Estimates of the Interrelationships among the
Environmental Characteristics of a Community and Policy-Responsiveness

Relationship	Case Study Sample					Questionnaire Sample				
	r_o	r_p	B_p^*	b_o	b_p	r_o	r_p	B_p^*	b_o	b_p
RESPONSIVENESS with										
1. Unreformism (B_1)	.23	.07	.07	2.87	2.19	.10	.08	.08	1.07	.86
2. Private-Regarding Culture (B_2)	.51	.20	.27	4.34	2.31	.07	.03	.03	.58	.26
3. Economic Development (B_3)	.42	.14	.17	.05	.02	.08	.06	.06	.009	.007
4. Dispersion of Influence (B_4)	.38	.27	.26	.45	.31	.20	.19	.19	.089	.086
DISPERSION OF INFLUENCE with										
1. Unreformism (B_5)	-.02	-.23	-.24	-.24	-3.50	.05	.09	.10	1.15	2.42
2. Private-Regarding Culture (B_6)	.35	.36	.53	2.48	3.83	.06	.12	.12	1.11	2.46
3. Economic Development (B_7)	.21	-.08	-.10	.02	-.01	.09	.11	.12	.022	.030
UNREIFORMISM with										
1. Private-Regarding Culture (B_8)	.48	.46	.61	.24	.31	.41	.43	.44	.35	.375
2. Economic Development (B_9)	.21	-.17	-.20	.002	-.001	-.03	-.13	-.12	-.0003	-.001
PRIVATE-REGARDING CULTURE with										
Economic Development	.68					.22				

(1) ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. Earlier it was noted that there exists an apparent positive relationship between economic development and policy-responsiveness. The zero-order correlation coefficient of .42 between median income and responsiveness which occurs in the case study sample was seen as particularly strong and significant. However, as can be seen in Table 6, both the regression and correlation coefficients are greatly reduced when other environmental variables are controlled. This suggests that the direct and independent relationship between economic development and policy-responsiveness, although perhaps positive, is not strong. The zero-order relationship between economic development and responsiveness appears to be due, in large part, to their mutual relationship with other environmental variables.

One possible explanation for the finding that the partial relationships are significantly weaker than the zero-order relationships is that economic development may affect policy-responsiveness indirectly rather than directly. In other words, economic development may affect the form of government and/or the structure of influence in a community, which, in turn, affect policy-responsiveness. However, on theoretical grounds, one would not expect the zero-order positive relationship between economic development and policy-responsiveness to be explained by a developmental sequence with form of government as the intervening variable. Because reformed governmental structures are expected to be adopted by the most prosperous communities, there should be a negative relationship between economic development and unreformism in governmental structure; this would be indicated by a negative b_9 . Because unreformism should be positively related to responsiveness, this developmental sequence would relate economic development to unresponsiveness rather than responsiveness. The data in Table 6 suggests that this may be the case; in both samples there are negative (although weak)

relationships between economic development and unreformism in government; the partial correlation between these variables is $-.17$ for the case studies and $-.13$ for the questionnaire sample. This indicates that the positive zero-order relationship between economic development and policy-responsiveness is due to environmental variables other than form of government.

Another possibility is that economic development affects responsiveness indirectly, through its effects on the distribution of influence in communities. As suggested by Aiken, economic development may result in dispersed structures of influence (indicated by a positive b_7) which result in greater policy-responsiveness. The zero-order relationships in Table 6 suggest that there is indeed a weak but positive relationship between economic development and dispersion of influence. However, when the partials (which control for political culture) are examined, the positive relationship between economic development and dispersion of influence disappears. We are left with two very weak and conflicting estimates of the effects of economic development on dispersion of influence; for $r_p = -.08$ for the case studies and $r_p = .11$ for the questionnaire sample. This suggests that there may be no direct and independent relationship between economic development and dispersion of influence.

The positive relationship between economic development and policy-responsiveness does not appear to be explained by developmental sequences incorporating form of government and structures of influence as intervening variables. Instead, the positive relationship appears to be due, in large part, to the mutual relationship of these variables with political culture. In short, the positive relationship between economic development and responsiveness appears to be largely spurious owing to the fact that economically under-developed cities tend to have traditional political culture ($r_0 = .68$ in the case studies, and $r_0 = .22$ in the questionnaire sample), and, as we shall see, traditional political

cultures tend to be unresponsive to protest group demands.

In summary, it seems from our data that economic development is not a crucial variable in explaining policy-responsiveness. Economic development may, at times, directly enhance policy-responsiveness, but this direct impact appears to be weak. It seems reasonable to suppose that the only conditions under which economic development is a crucial determinant of responsiveness is when protest group demands require considerable community resources and when the community believes that the demands are legitimate enough to warrant the expenditure of such resources.

(2) POLITICAL CULTURE. In section III, it was argued that the more individualistic is the political culture, the more responsive is the community to protest groups; conversely, the more moralistic and traditional is the political culture, the more unresponsive is the community. However, the data in Table 6 suggest that the independent effect of political culture on responsiveness is not particularly strong. When the other environmental variables in our model are controlled, the direct effect of political culture on policy-responsiveness is substantially reduced. Part of this reduction is due to the previously discussed inter-relationship of political culture and economic development. But part of the reduction is also due to the inter-relationships of political culture with form of government and structures of influence in a community. In other words, part of the effect of political culture on responsiveness is indirect, through form of government. In accordance with ethos theory considerations, there apparently is an important developmental sequence whereby individualistic political cultures adopt unreformed governmental structures which are, in turn, relatively responsive to protest groups; conversely, moralistic and traditional political cultures adopt reformed governmental structures which are, in turn, relatively

unresponsive to protest groups.

Another indirect effect of political culture on responsiveness may be through the influence dispersion variable. The data in Table 6 suggest that there may be a developmental sequence whereby individualistic political cultures have dispersed influence structures which -- as we shall see -- are relatively more responsive to protest group demands, while moralistic and traditional political cultures have concentrated influence structures which are relatively unresponsive to protest group demands (the partial correlations between having individualistic political cultures and dispersion of influence are .36 for the case studies and .12 for the questionnaire sample).

In summary, political culture appears to be a concept having utility in a theory specifying the environmental factors affecting the policy-responsiveness of urban communities to protest group demands. In addition to individualistic political cultures being directly, although weakly, related to responsiveness, political culture is also related to two other structural variables which help explain policy-responsiveness: form of government and distribution of influence.

(3) FORM OF GOVERNMENT. The data in Table 6 indicate that form of government appears to be related to responsiveness as hypothesized by Lineberry and Fowler, but the weakness of the relationship is apparent. Although the correlation coefficients are reduced (indeed, significantly reduced in the case study sample) when controls are applied to the form of government - responsiveness relationship, the regression coefficients are only slightly reduced. This suggests that our notion of form of government as an intervening variable in a developmental sequence is essentially correct.

In addition to this direct effect of form of government on responsiveness, our model also suggests the possibility that form of government affects

responsiveness through its effects on distribution of influence in the community. However, the data are not consistent with this hypothesis. The zero-order correlations between form of government and distribution of influence are weak and the partials are inconsistent. It seems reasonable to conclude that there may be no significant relationship between form of government and distribution of influence.

(4) DISPERSION OF INFLUENCE. The final environmental variable in our model which may affect policy-responsiveness is the dispersion of influence in a community. The data in Table 6 reinforce our earlier confidence in the importance of influence dispersion as an important explanatory variable in a theory of policy-responsiveness. Because controlling for the other environmental variables only slightly reduces the relationship between the black representation ratio and policy-responsiveness, it is concluded that the distribution of influence in a community has an important independent effect on how political systems respond to protest group demands.


V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has attempted to develop and test a model explaining, by reference to environmental characteristics, the varying responsiveness of American communities to protest group demands. A summary model, which indicates that responsiveness is apparently affected, directly or indirectly, by political culture, economic development, form of government, and dispersion of influence is given in Figure 2. The direction of the relationships in the model are generally consistent with hypotheses derived from such traditions in the study of urban politics as the ethos theory literature and the community power studies.

Figure 2

Environmental Variables and Policy-Responsiveness:

A Summary Model



However, the inconclusive nature of the findings must be stressed. In general, the relationships are weak and do not meet conventional statistical standards of significance. Moreover, although the data in our two samples normally reinforce each other by showing relationships which are consistent in their direction, the two samples differ markedly in their estimate of the strengths of the relationships between the environmental variables and policy-responsiveness and among the environmental variables. In general, the relationships in the case study sample are much stronger than the relationships in the questionnaire sample. In the case study sample, for example, the four environmental variables explain a satisfactory 32 per cent of the variance in policy-responsiveness; but in the questionnaire sample, these same variables explain a rather dismal six per cent of the variance in policy-responsiveness.

The differences in the two samples raise important questions regarding the true underlying parameters of the model. In order to attain more reliable knowledge regarding the strengths of the relationships in the model, additional

research utilizing more accurate indicators of the policy-responsiveness of random samples of urban communities would be useful.

Still, the differences in the two samples may be due to the fact that the parameters of the model may vary under specifiable conditions.⁷⁴ In other words, the model relating environmental variables to responsiveness may be most appropriate for conditions which are over-represented in the case studies sample. In this respect, the model may be most valid under the following three conditions: (1) for protest occurring in the American South, (2) for unconventional protest, and/or (3) for conspicuous protest.⁷⁵ However, these are only possibilities, lacking clear theoretical justification or systematic evidence.⁷⁶ Additional research, therefore, might suggest and investigate the conditioning variables which affect the relationships between various environmental factors and policy-responsiveness to protest group demands.

The need for increased research along the lines suggested in this paper seems warranted. Knowledge of environmental factors which increase the openness and responsiveness of communities to the demands of citizens who are normally unorganized should be useful if political scientists are to be capable of giving knowledgeable prescriptions about various urban structures which can enhance effective citizen participation. Our findings that responsiveness to protest group demands is apparently enhanced by dispersed structures of influence and unreformed governmental structures (as well as by economic development and individualistic political cultures) is instructive in this respect.

FOOTNOTES

¹E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), p. 35.

²David Truman, The Governmental Process, 2nd. Ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), pp. 510-512.

³Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

⁴Ibid. p. 305.

⁵Ibid. pp. 192-199.

⁶Jewel Bellush and Stephen M. David, Race and Politics in New York City, (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 8.

⁷Ibid. pp. 9-10.

⁸Dahl, Who Governs?, p. 305.

⁹See, John M. Orbell, "Protest Participation Among Southern Negro College Students," American Political Science Review, (June, 1967), p. 450; Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1966), p. 418; Carll Everett Ladd, Negro Political Leadership in the South, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966); and Peter Eisinger, "Racial Differences in Protest Participation," American Political Science Review, forthcoming.

¹⁰Sidney Verba and Norman N. Nie, Participation in America, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 278-284.

¹¹Eisinger, "Racial Differences in Protest Participation", op. cit.

¹²Michael Lipsky, Protest in City Politics, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), p. 2.

¹³The status, organizational, and tactical differences among protest groups also become a matter of investigation. For a discussion of how organizational and tactical differences affect protest group success, see Paul Schumaker, "Urban Protest Groups: Explaining Successful Interactions with Political Authorities", A paper presented at the Western Political Science Association, Denver, Colorado, April 4-6, 1974.

¹⁴Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior," American Political Science Review, (March, 1973), p. 11.

¹⁵Harlan Hahn, "Reassessing and Revitalizing Urban Politics: Some Goals and Proposals", in Hahn, (ed.), People and Politics in Urban Society, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), p. 18.

¹⁶Hahn, p. 27.

¹⁷Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior," op. cit.

¹⁸Eisinger, p. 28.

¹⁹M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Zeigler, "Interest Representation and School Governance", in Hahn, op. cit., p. 215.

²⁰See Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action, (Chicago: Markam, 1971), p. 24, and Schumaker, "Urban Protest Groups," op. cit., p. 30

²¹J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, "Reformers, Machines, and The War on Poverty," in James Q. Wilson (ed.), City Politics and Public Policy, (New York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 278-286.

²²For a fuller discussion of this point and for evidence that the effectiveness of organizational stability is conditioned by the form of government variable, see Paul Schumaker, "The Power of Protest Groups: System Responsiveness to Citizen Demands", (An unpublished dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1973), pp. 169-170.

²³David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 437.

²⁴Hahn, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

²⁵Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969), p. 201.

²⁶Stephen M. David and Paul E. Peterson, Urban Politics and Public Policy: The City in Crisis, (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 6.

²⁷Kenneth Prewitt and Heinz Eulau, "Political Matrix and Political Representation: Prolegomenon to a New Departure for an Old Problem", American Political Science Review, (June, 1969), pp. 431-433, 435-440.

²⁸In other contexts, for example, the term "responsiveness" has meant (a) the degree to which community elites mirror the ideology, values, and attitudes of the inactive population (Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America); and (b) the degree to which collective mass opinion is congruent with public policy (William Shaffer and Ronald Weber, "Political Responsiveness in the American States," a paper presented at the APSA convention, 1972).

²⁹Prewitt and Eulau, p. 430.

³⁰This view is described, although not endorsed, by William Gamson, Power and Discontent, (Homewood: Dorsey, 1968), p. 51.

³¹See Michael Lipsky, Protest in City Politics, op. cit., Chapter 5.

³²See Lipsky, Chapter 5.

³³Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, pp. 448-449.

³⁴See Thomas Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

³⁵Lipsky, Protest in City Politics, p. 192.

³⁶Ibid. p. 191.

³⁷Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics, (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), Part III.

³⁸Wilson and Banfield, "Political Ethos Revisited", American Political Science Review, (December, 1971), pp. 1048-1062.

³⁹Raymond Wolfinger and J. O. Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," American Political Science Review, (June, 1966), pp. 306-326.

⁴⁰Robert L. Lineberry and Edmond P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities", American Political Science Review, (September, 1967), p. 701.

⁴¹Ibid. p. 715.

⁴²John H. Mollenkops, "On the Causes and Consequences of Neighborhood Mobilization," (A paper delivered at the American Political Science Association Convention, 1973).

⁴³Terry N. Clark, "The Structure of Community Influence," in Hahn, People and Politics in Urban Society, pp. 304-305.

⁴⁴Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, Chapter 11.

⁴⁵ See Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, "Political and Socio-economic Characteristics of American Cities," The Municipal Yearbook, 1965, (Chicago: International City Managers Association), pp. 947-952; Daniel Gordon, "Immigrants and Urban Governmental Forms in American Communities, 1933-1960," American Journal of Sociology, (September, 1968), 158-171; and Wolfinger and Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," op. cit.

⁴⁶ Terry N. Clark, "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Cities," American Sociological Journal, (August, 1968), p. 586.

⁴⁷ Michael Aiken, "The Distribution of Community Power: Structural Bases and Social Consequences," in Aiken and Paul Mott (ed.), The Structure of Community Power, (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 501.

⁴⁸ Aiken, p. 495.

⁴⁹ See Terry N. Clark, "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Cities," op. cit.; Claire W. Gilbert, "Community Power and Decision-Making: A Quantitative Examination of Previous Research," in Clark (ed.), Community Structure and Decision-Making: Comparative Analysis, (Scranton: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 139-156; and John Walton, "A Systematic Survey of Community Power Research," in Aiken and Mott (ed.), op. cit., pp. 443-463.

⁵⁰ See Paul Schumaker, "The Power of Protest Groups: System Responsiveness to Citizen Demands," op. cit., Chapter 3.

⁵¹ For other illustration of this data collection procedure, see Claire Gilbert, op. cit., and John Walton, op. cit.

⁵² Because of the subjectivity involved in attaining quantitative measures from the qualitative accounts in the case studies, two researchers made independent measures of policy-responsiveness for each protest incident. The correlation between these two measures was .93.

⁵³ The main sources of unusable questionnaires were (1) agencies indicating that they had not been the target of any protest group demands (n = 54) and (2) questionnaires returned with missing data on the measure of responsiveness because the protest was still in progress (n = 18).

⁵⁴ Again, two researchers independently coded the degree of policy-responsiveness from the data supplied by the informants. The correlation between these two measures was .90.

⁵⁵ Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public, op. cit., pp. 28-34. Two of Dye's measures are only appropriate for political units having a mixture of urban and rural characteristics. They are, therefore, ignored here.

⁵⁶Throughout this paper an asterisk (*) indicates statistical significance at the .05 level. Because no claim is made that the samples are random, the use of significance tests is not really appropriate. Significance is indicated only to help the reader determine the importance of the relationships.

⁵⁷Lineberry and Fowler, op. cit., p. 712.

⁵⁸Wilson and Banfield, "Political Ethos Revisited," op. cit., p. 1956.

⁵⁹Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States, (New York: Crowell, 1972), pp. 85-104.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 96.

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 96-97.

⁶²Ibid., p. 97.

⁶³Ibid., p. 99.

⁶⁴The idea of converting Elazar's nominal categories into a continuous variable is derived from Ira Sharkansky, "The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture: A Research Note," Polity, (Fall, 1969), pp. 66-83. The different transformations of Elazar's measures which occur in Sharkansky's study and this study reflect different theoretical purposes.

I have utilized Elazar's maps to estimate the political culture of each community in the two samples. The 5-point scale was adequate for all but a few cities which had what Elazar labelled IT or TI cultures. Because T and I are polar opposites on the present scale, it makes sense to view such cities as having two competing political cultures; such cities have been given intermediate scores of "3".

⁶⁵The Pearson correlation coefficients relating these two measures are -.35 in the Case Study Sample and -.17 in the Questionnaire Sample. In other words, high ethnicity is associated with a T-culture rather than with an I-culture, in contradiction to the implications of both the ethos theory and Elazar. This finding can be interpreted as indicating that the census measure, per cent foreign born, does not capture the political culture of communities dominated by families which are second and third generation immigrants.

⁶⁶Amos Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," American Journal of Sociology, (January, 1963), pp. 422-431.

⁶⁷Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," op. cit., p. 19.

⁶⁸Aiken, "The Distribution of Community Power," op. cit., pp. 502-503.

⁶⁹Ibid. p. 503.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).

⁷²Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," op. cit., p. 20.

⁷³The inter-correlations of these three measures are given in the following chart:

<u>Measures</u>	<u>Case Study Sample</u>		<u>Questionnaire Sample</u>	
	MOP	%P	MOP	%P
MOP Ratio (MOP)	1.00		1.00	
Per Cent Professional (%P)	.18	1.00	.18	1.00
Black Representation Ratio	-.35	.31	-.10	.22

Of particular interest is the finding that the black representation ratio is negatively related to the MOP ratio but positively related to per cent professional. This suggests that the MOP ratio, at least as conventional interpreted, may be measuring a different concept than are the other two measures.

⁷⁴For a discussion of the theoretical value of non-universal propositions (i.e., relationships which hold only under specifiable conditions), see David Willer, Scientific Sociology, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), Chapter 6.

⁷⁵See section III above for a discussion of the over-representation of these three conditions in the case study sample.

⁷⁶Indeed, subsequent analysis failed to substantiate that the model was most valid for protest occurring in the American South or for unconventional protest. When the case study sample was re-analyzed for Southern and Non-Southern cases, the model appeared to be most appropriate for Non-Southern cities, rather than for Southern cities. When the questionnaire sample was re-analyzed by subdividing that sample into communities experiencing predominately conventional or unconventional protest, the model was least valid for cities experiencing predominately unconventional protest.