

## The Political Principles and Philosophical Assumptions of Globalism: Universal or Particular?

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According to Francis Fukuyama, the passing of the Cold War and accelerating globalization have produced a new political era of ideological consensus – an “end of history” where there is universal theoretical agreement that democratic capitalism is the best form of political economy everywhere and cannot be improved upon.<sup>1</sup> Less sweeping perspectives on these changes assert that an international form of democratic capitalism – often called “globalism” or “neoliberalism” - has indeed emerged as the current dominant governing ideology, though one that is nevertheless contested. Those working within alternative perspectives stress the deficiencies of globalism, claim that globalism serves particular interests, and believe that social progress depends on successful challenges to globalism. Most postmodern theorists seem satisfied with deconstructing the pretensions of globalism and giving voice to those oppressed by globalism. While honoring such work, I believe that political theorists should continue to search for the best political ideas and practices. The book-length manuscript from which this paper is drawn praises “progressive pluralism” as such a theory, but a central feature of that theory is that it is grounded in tentative social understandings that preclude any claim to universality. In this paper, I cannot pursue this larger argument and will focus on the more limited tasks of providing a (sympathetic) account of globalism, showing that its central ideas fall within the underlying consensus of pluralism, but arguing that globalism nevertheless has important limitations. If I succeed in these tasks, I hope that those committed to pluralist politics will be encouraged to join in the search for other more progressive theoretical perspectives within pluralism.<sup>2</sup>

Globalization refers to empirical accounts of the processes of increasing economic, social, and political interaction and interdependence among peoples living in different countries and cultures throughout the world. Globalism is a normative theory containing a set of interrelated political principles that advocate globalization and set forth prescriptions for achieving the benefits of globalization.<sup>3</sup> As implied by its name, globalism is an outlook that seeks a world in which “people, information, trade, investments, democracy, and the market economy cross national boundaries” more readily.<sup>4</sup> The open borders sought by globalists are thought to result in humans everywhere having greater opportunities to pursue freely chosen life-plans and having more resources (such as education, knowledge, leisure, and material goods) to attain these life plans. Globalists seek a world where borders are more easily permeated, facilitating economic exchanges and development, spreading democracy, and securing peace.

Advocates of globalism include international organizations like the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, libertarians like Johan Norberg and Tomas Larsson, academics like Fukuyama and Jagdish Bhagwati, journalists like Thomas Friedman, and political leaders like Margaret Thatcher and Bill Clinton. George W. Bush’s initiatives on behalf of immigration reform, tax reduction, and privatizing social security enable him to be seen as continuing and perhaps deepening the globalist agenda. In the next section, I draw upon the writings of such organizations and people to provide a *positive* and *comprehensive* portrait of globalism.

## The political principles of globalism

When studying a normative political perspective like globalism, it is important to first understand it sympathetically in order to avoid introducing biased interpretations of their ideas from the outset.<sup>5</sup> To be a comprehensive public philosophy, globalism must contain logically consistent and plausible answers to the perennial or great issues of politics regarding communities, citizens, structures, authority, justice, rulers, and change.<sup>6</sup>

It is also important to ask whether the principles of globalism are consistent with the underlying consensus of pluralism. Moral and social diversity is a fact of life in modern societies. Pluralism is the broadest theory available for reconciling such differences and achieving political stability. The underlying consensus of pluralism contains the most basic abstract principles of pluralist theory. To ask whether globalism is consistent with pluralism is to ask whether its more specific principles fall within the more abstract or general principles of pluralism.<sup>7</sup> In this section I show that proponents of globalism provide such principles.

### *Less dominant nation-states allow other communities to flourish*

Part of the underlying consensus of pluralism asserts the importance of people being part of many communities. Pluralists recognize the fundamental role of the nation as a political community, but they believe that people should also recognize themselves as members of other larger and smaller political communities and be part of many associations within civil society. Pluralists believe that identifying solely with one community, or even a few similar communities, is unhealthy for the individual and for politics.<sup>8</sup>

Globalists do not deny the importance of the nation-state as a contemporary political fact or as a normative force that gives meaning to our lives. Thomas Friedman, whose *Lexus and the Olive Tree* is regarded as one of the most compelling positive portraits of globalization, maintains that “the nation-state will never disappear, even if it is weakened, because it is the ultimate olive tree – the ultimate expression of whom we belong to – linguistically, geographically, and historically.”<sup>9</sup> But globalists believe that a more globalized economy will require reducing the strength of our identities with and allegiances to the nation-state. Overemphasis on nationalism leads to misguided economic decisions such as the pursuit of national self-sufficiency and the erection of trade barriers.<sup>10</sup> Excessive national pride and insufficient national self-esteem are important factors contributing to international conflict and war.<sup>11</sup>

Globalists seek to develop non-nationalist identities more appropriate to the age of globalization, such as with the global marketplace. Globalists would encourage us to identify with the global community and people who live beyond our borders as potential customers, investors, and workers. Such a global community is not a political community that is governed by a state that uses coercion to regulate our lives. It is a voluntary community, where people interact with particular others for mutual advantage.

Globalists like Fukuyama recognize that globalization has contributed to the disintegration of traditional community ties and thus to a breakdown of social order.<sup>12</sup> But they see such problems as transitory and believe that globalization will soon produce a richer more diverse community life. According to Fukuyama, we are beginning to witness a “return of religiosity” and a growth of religious communities. Rather than the orthodox, fundamentalist, and otherworldly churches of the past, Fukuyama believes globalization will spur the growth of new more benign churches that stress social bonds.<sup>13</sup> Norberg also sees globalization as leading to the breakdown of traditional cultural values of national and local communities, but these are

being replaced by more pluralist communities, such as large metropolises throughout the world having numerous ethnic and religious sub-communities offering a huge diversity of cultural choices within easily assessable locations.<sup>14</sup>

Globalists are pluralistic in this regard because they favor our having multiple community memberships, identities, and obligations. They seek to reorient people so that national identities play a lesser role in people's lives, so they form greater attachments to people in different countries and cultures, and so that their communities are more inclusive and pluralistic. Such communal arrangements should encourage tolerance, social mixing across ethnic and class lines, and mutual gain by peoples throughout the world.

### *More citizens means more producers and consumers*

The underlying consensus of pluralism contains two basic ideas about citizenship within political communities.<sup>15</sup> First, pluralists recognize that most existing communities have the right to determine the admission of outsiders on the basis of just admission standards, criteria, and processes. In order to control the character and destiny of a community, current citizens of nations (as long as nations are primary) and members of voluntary associations must have sovereign control over admission policies. Second, pluralists recognize that all people who have long resided within a community or who have been granted citizenship or membership are entitled to equal and extensive rights and must accept their commensurate obligations.<sup>16</sup> One of these rights is the capacity to leave a community, for no member of a pluralist society can be forced to remain in a community against her will. Other rights include the various liberties that ensure moral autonomy (the ability to choose and pursue one's own conception of the good life), subject to accepting the obligations imposed on citizens by pluralist governments.

Globalists believe nations should increasingly open their borders to immigrants from other places. According to Norberg, "It is a profound error to regard immigrants as a burden on a country. They represent a manpower and consumption boost that leads to market growth. More immigration means more people to work, spend, and hatch new ideas."<sup>17</sup> Norberg adds that the U.S. and Europe will need more immigrants in the future to pay taxes to finance public programs for aging and retiring populations. Some libertarian globalists seek "open admissions" policies that would allow people everywhere the liberty to reside and work where they wish and to become citizens of the political communities governing those locations.<sup>18</sup> While this position is outside the underlying consensus of pluralism, most globalists stop short of calling for open admissions. Instead, they want admission policies that apply more liberal criteria when determining the numbers and characteristics of applicants to admit into citizenship.

Opponents of globalism fear that less restrictive admissions will prompt nations to engage in a "race to the bottom," minimizing their communal provisions and welfare rights.<sup>19</sup> They believe less restricted admissions would enable the poor to attain citizenship in political communities offering extensive welfare provisions (social goods like education, health care, and social services that are distributed based on need rather than on the ability to pay) while encouraging revenue producers (such as corporations and wealthy individuals) to flee to places where taxes are low because welfare provisions are minimal. Such incentives would prompt all nations to minimize their communal provisions to avoid an influx of revenue consumers and outflow of revenue producers. However, globalists answer this objection by adopting principles of citizen rights and obligations that they regard as appropriate to the era of globalization.

For globalists, citizen rights – the accesses, services, and goods that are equally available to all members of the community – focus more on opportunities than conditions. Every citizen

should have the opportunity to vote and enjoy other political rights and there should be no permanent “second-class citizens” (like women or racial or religious minorities).<sup>20</sup> Of course, such equal political rights do not imply equal political influence, as one’s political power will depend on how effectively one employs one’s political rights. Globalists apply similar reasoning to other rights, especially in the economic realm. Citizens have equal legal opportunities to acquire property, employment, and profits, but they have no right to equal economic resources. In short, globalists are much like classical liberals in their conceptions of citizen rights. Globalists have sought to reduce significantly the welfare rights provided by contemporary liberals and democratic socialists, regarding such rights as undesirable because they infringe on the property rights of others, they reduce work incentives, and they distort markets. The reduction of welfare rights would ease fears that relatively unrestrictive immigration policies would attract unproductive poor people and drive out the most productive revenue-producers in a community.

In general, globalists do not uphold idealist conceptions of citizenship that citizens are obligated to be highly participatory in politics, highly informed about political affairs, and highly community-regarding. For example, Margaret Thatcher accepts a “public choice” theory of democracy that assumes citizens should vote their interests if it suits their interests – and that such sporadic involvement in elections is sufficient to hold democratic officeholders accountable.<sup>21</sup> Globalists see community members more as economic actors (as consumers, investors, and workers) than as citizens. As consumers and investors, they vote most effectively with their wallets, spending their incomes on the goods they prefer and investing their wealth in those opportunities throughout the world that will be most profitable.<sup>22</sup> Globalists believe economic production is most efficient and distribution is most responsive to what people want and need when made through market, rather than governmental, processes. Globalists believe that investor decisions to move their capital in and out of countries are more apt indicators of the effectiveness of public policies than are the votes cast by citizens.

In short, globalist principles regarding citizenship are within the underlying consensus of pluralism if they allow nations to determine admission to citizenship and if they provide for basic citizen rights and commensurate obligations. Globalist principles calling for relatively unrestrictive admission policies, minimal welfare rights, and limited citizen obligations are contested by others within pluralism, but they do not violate the most general understandings of pluralists.

### ***Capitalism must be governed, but not underwritten, by democratic governments***

According to the pluralist underlying consensus, each of our political communities require a variety of social, economic, and governmental structures to provide order and rules of conduct over our lives. Governments (and their military forces), business organizations, labor unions, churches, schools, and families are among the most important such institutions. Central to pluralist societies is the notion that these structures are countervailing powers to one another, ensuring that no one institution dominates people’s lives.<sup>23</sup>

Globalists stress the importance of two basic structures: free-market capitalism and representative democracy. Most globalists seek to enhance the role and importance of capitalism and reduce the role of the democratic state in the global political economy. As Friedman puts it, the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the age of globalization “was a victory of market forces above politics,” and he emphasizes how capitalism comprises the basic “hardware” of all political economies in the age of globalization.<sup>24</sup>

Globalists see free-market capitalism as the key to economic freedom and material prosperity. Free-markets allow and encourage people to specialize, innovate, invest, and make use of competitive advantages in ways that produce dramatic increases in prosperity and dramatic decreases in poverty.<sup>25</sup> The kind of capitalism that globalists prescribe is free-market capitalism - not "crony capitalism." Rather than economic enterprises prospering due to governmental privileges and protections, companies in a truly free market can only "hold on to a good economic position by improving production and offering people good products and services."<sup>26</sup>

But globalists do not seek to greatly weaken the democratic state, and instead are committed to state building.<sup>27</sup> As Thatcher puts it, "some commentators would have you believe that globalization spells the end of the state as we have known it over the centuries. But they are wrong: it does not. What it actually does is prevent - to some degree - the state from doing things which it should never have been doing in the first place."<sup>28</sup> Globalists thus seek some reduction of governmental role in the political economy, for example, through the privatization of certain public programs. But globalists understand that free markets are highly dependent on democratic institutions to provide effective rules that govern market activity. Such rules must preserve property rights, encourage investment and risk-taking, and provide the sort of political stability that can encourage people to invest their resources and energy into productive economic activity.

Indeed, in a temporal sense, most globalists believe that countries without democratic capitalism should first give priority to developing democracy rather than creating free markets. They suggest that democracy is a precondition for effective capitalism, as investors will not bring needed capital to countries governed either as autocracies whose arbitrary degrees make investments insecure or as "kleptocracies" where corruption is so extensive that it greatly enhances the costs of business.<sup>29</sup> The priority of "good government" over "free markets" is suggested by those analyses that claim that poverty and economic collapses are due to corrupt and undemocratic governments and to misguided policies by autocratic regimes rather than the results of exploitation and bad judgments by participants in free-market globalism.<sup>30</sup>

The organizations of civil society - numerous and diverse voluntary social associations - are of secondary importance to globalists, given their less intensive roles in the political economy. Still, globalists support such institutions for at least a couple of reasons. First, charitable groups and philanthropic foundations are an important alternative to the welfare state. Norberg believes "we have more to expect from philanthropic capitalists than from politics."<sup>31</sup> In addition, the voluntary organizations within civil society provide an important sense of identity and belongingness to people uprooted from local communities due to the mobility and rapid change that is a part of globalization. Friedman argues that such voluntary associations provide the roots that people require to balance the forces of globalization.<sup>32</sup>

By stressing the importance of a market economy, the democratic state, and the institutions of civil society within globalized communities, globalist principles about structures are within the pluralist underlying consensus. When globalists seek to shift the balance of power from governments to markets, progressive forces within the pluralist political system are likely to emerge to ensure that the state retain its role as a countervailing power to capitalist institutions.

### *Governments must provide stability, but not invade billfolds and bedrooms*

Within pluralist societies, there is consensus that the authority of government must be significant but limited. Pluralists accept the need for effective authority to cope with a wide array of social, economic, and security problems.<sup>33</sup> Although the authority of the state in pluralist

societies is limited, to ensure sufficient freedom for citizens to pursue their own conception of the good life, it is understood that government authority needs to be exercised in ways that constrain freedom in order to pursue public concerns, such as securing pluralist societies from their enemies, pursuing social justice, and fulfilling responsibilities to various human and ecological communities.

For globalists, governments should not be directly involved in producing or distributing most social goods; nor should they micromanage the decisions of private actors in the capitalist system. Instead, the role of government in the political economy should focus on providing only those regulations that are necessary to ensure market activity is conducted fairly, securing genuine market competition, ensuring the transparency of market activities, and controlling corruption. Among the kinds of governmental regulations that should be eliminated are those that protect and further private interests (such as bans and tariffs on imports in order to shield domestic countries from price competition), that set restraints on entry into the market (such as workplace safety standards that price developing countries out of global markets), and that serve dubious public interests at excessive costs.<sup>34</sup> While opponents of globalism often stress the need for governmental regulations for environmental protection, globalists respond that it is necessary to distinguish between those regulations that are clearly necessary to curtail a genuine environmental problem (such as depletion of the ozone layer) and those regulations that would be imposed at great economic cost to deal with dubious problems (like global warming).<sup>35</sup>

In addition to relaxing regulations that government imposes on industry, globalists believe that attaining the full benefits of globalization requires lessening tax burdens and reducing governmental spending. According to Norberg, taxation “results in many people not exerting themselves to work, invest, and hatch new ideas, because most of the proceeds will go to the government. It leads to firms devoting more and more time to tax avoidance – time that could be devoted to constructive work.”<sup>36</sup>

Reduced taxes would entail reduced governmental spending that could be accomplished by shrinking governmental bureaucracies (especially those involved in unnecessary regulations), privatizing public services (to achieve the economies of market competition that monopolistic public providers now escape), and reducing welfare, both to the poor who use welfare rights to escape gainful employment and to those corporate entities that seek subsidies to maintain their declining share of markets. However, globalists recognize that government authority is necessary for the provision of various public goods and social needs like education and health care.<sup>37</sup> Such public provisions are justified because they help everyone have greater opportunities and capacities to participate in the global economy.<sup>38</sup>

Still, the most important role of government is to provide security and peace for all, a role that libertarians have long understood<sup>39</sup> but that has been more forcefully asserted since September 11, 2001. As Thatcher asserts, “states alone retain a monopoly of legitimate coercive power – the power required to suppress crime at home and to maintain security against threats abroad.”<sup>40</sup>

Finally, globalists have little to say about the role of governmental authority in limiting freedom in order to ensure that individual behavior accords with widely held moral ideals within a community. Perhaps this is because globalists understand that moral restraints often take the form of economic restrictions (for example, restricting the extensive market that exists for selling eroticism and sex). Or perhaps this is because globalists are quite content to let local communities and voluntary associations like churches establish and promote moral codes, because the many moralities that exist in the various cultures and civilizations of the world make

raising moral questions at the level of large and pluralistic communities a volatile distraction from the business of producing economic prosperity.

Overall, the principles of globalists regarding governmental authority are well within the contested terrain of pluralism. It is difficult to see any globalist principles that are contrary to the underlying consensus within pluralism that calls for significant but limited governmental authority.

*Justice requires fair procedures, enhanced opportunities, and safety nets*

Pluralists accept that justice is a complex concept involving a variety of tradeoffs. They uphold the importance of legal justice – of providing formal and regularized procedures of resolving conflict and equal treatment under the law.<sup>41</sup> They uphold market justice, the idea that unequal incomes and wealth are legitimate if achieved by processes of production and exchange that reflect the free choices of individuals and are free of coercion and exploitation.<sup>42</sup> But fair legal procedures and market exchanges must be complemented with other principles of justice involving equality, need, and desert.<sup>43</sup> In pluralist societies, some policies provide certain social goods (like basic education) equally to everyone, other social goods (like welfare) to those in greatest need, and still other social goods (like administrative offices) to those who deserve them given their qualifications. Pluralists insist that no single conception of justice is universally valid. Pluralist politics involves continuous conflict over the emphasis given to various justice principles. But pluralist politics is not just power politics, where political outcomes simply reflect successful applications of political resources to achieve personal and group preferences. Pluralist politics involves appeals to justice in its myriad forms.

As discussed in the previous section, globalists emphasize “procedural justice,” or fair governmental rules of conducting business, and “market justice,” which claims that people are entitled to unequal holdings if these goods are attained through just processes of production and exchange. But they supplement such procedural justice with two additional principles: equal opportunity and the provision of floors.

For globalists equal opportunity means more than simply equal access of everyone – regardless of race, gender, sexual orientation, etc. - to market opportunities. Indeed, free market purists see no need for anti-discrimination laws because market forces provide sufficient penalties for prejudicial behavior. Nevertheless, most globalists would not only accept anti-discrimination laws but they would also support governmental programs like basic education and proper medical care that increase the market opportunities for people who cannot afford to purchase such stepping stones to market success.<sup>44</sup>

Second are provisions of minimal “safety nets” for those who are losers in the competition that occurs in a capitalist society and from those who are displaced when the “creative destruction” of capitalism causes corporations to relocate or go out of business. Thatcher recognizes that “a safety net of benefits for those who genuinely cannot cope” is a direct concern to the state.<sup>45</sup> And Friedman says that “we still need traditional safety nets – social security, Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps, and welfare” - but that we must also seek a “new equilibrium point” regarding such provisions. On the one hand, globalization may prompt us to increase welfare coverage where new social needs emerge; for example, universal access to the Internet may become a basic right in an era where such access is essential for learning, communicating, dealing with the government, and shopping for the best price. On the other hand, the elaborate welfare systems designed by liberal and democratic socialist governments during the Cold War era – to prevent workers from being attracted to communism – can be reduced.

Wherever the new equilibrium is established, however, globalists recognize that the affluence generated by globalism should be sufficient to afford some safety nets.

For globalists, justice involves no more than fair rules of conduct, enhanced equal opportunity, and minimal safety nets. Globalists deny the importance of social justice – or efforts to redistribute and equalize the wealth that is created by free market capitalism and globalization. Such efforts inevitably involve violating property rights and come at a cost of economic efficiency.<sup>46</sup>

Globalists are confident that their principles result in a just political order, and thus regard as totally unfounded depictions of globalism as a system of exploitation where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Their counter-attack is based both on narratives of how the processes of globalization have improved conditions of impoverished people in the third world and on statistical studies of comparative and international political economy.

As an exemplary narrative, globalists draw on the work of Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto to present the crucial case of expanding property rights within democratic capitalist societies, because property rights are usually portrayed as entitlements of the rich – as laws that protect the property of the rich while denying the poor access to needed resources.<sup>47</sup> However, according to de Soto, the poor often have extensive resources (land and buildings) worth trillions of dollars, but they often encounter huge obstacles in trying to convert their holdings into registered property to which they have legal rights. If these possessions of the poor cannot be claimed as property rights, they cannot be converted to capital, used as collateral for loans, or traded, and the poor face massive disincentives to improve their property to its more productive uses. In short, de Soto's work provides a basis for understanding how the conditions of the poor can be greatly improved by globalization providing a context of providing them the property rights that are essential to a capitalist economy and a central feature of democratic governments.

As for statistical evidence, globalists draw on numerous studies to document that globalization has greatly improved the conditions of people in the developing world, reducing both poverty and inequality. Globalists are primarily concerned with poverty reduction, and Jagdish Bhagwati succinctly summarizes their case.

“The scientific analysis of the effect of trade on poverty is compelling. It has centered on a two-step argument: that trade enhances growth, and that growth reduces poverty. These propositions have been supported by many economists and policy makers of very different persuasions over the years.”<sup>48</sup>

Their studies show that growth benefits the poor just as much as it benefits the rich.<sup>49</sup> They show that wages in the developing world have risen much faster than those in more developed nations during the first stages of the globalization process.<sup>50</sup> Perhaps most arresting is Norberg's claim that “the general pattern of higher globalization and greater income equality holds for most countries, both in mature economies and merging markets.”<sup>51</sup>

If such evidence is credible, it does much to counter the claim that globalism is an ideology that promotes the interests of the rich and developed countries at the expense of the poor and developing nations. And even if such evidence is not compelling, globalists seem to recognize a number of pluralist principles of justice. Only those libertarians within globalism that reject any conception of justice beyond legal and market justice seem to be operating outside the underlying consensus within pluralism, but reducing globalist conceptions of justice to libertarian ones seems an oversimplification.



*Multinational corporations have extensive power but do not rule the global economy*

Pluralists agree that political issues should be resolved democratically. In smaller communities, democracy may involve the direct participation and equal voting power of all members, but in larger communities, political rulers must be selected and resolve issues using the institutions and processes of polyarchy.<sup>52</sup> In a polyarchy, the most powerful rulers within communities are representatives of the public; such rulers are accountable to citizens through regular elections; all citizens have extensive political rights that enable them to oppose and replace rulers; and constitutional provisions limit the power of rulers between democratic elections.

Globalists believe that globalization has resulted in more democracy, which in turn produces more economic development and global peace. They point out that globalization has resulted in huge increases in the number of countries that are democratized – that have genuine electoral competition with universal suffrage, the political rights of free speech and freedom of opposition, and the rule of law.<sup>53</sup> Jadish Bhagwati summarizes the massive research linking globalization to democratization.

“Globalization promotes democracy both directly and indirectly. The direct link comes from the fact that rural farmers are now able to bypass the dominant classes and castes by taking their produce directly to the market thanks to modern information technology, thereby loosening the control of these traditionally hegemonic groups. In turn, this can start them on the way to becoming more independent actors, with democratic aspirations in the political arena... The indirect link, on the other hand, comes from... the thesis popularly attributed to (Seymour Martin) Lipset... that economic prosperity produces a middle class. This emerging middle class creates, however haltingly, an effective demand for democratization of politics.”<sup>54</sup>

The arrival of democracy results in replacing arbitrary degrees with the rule of law. Such laws secure property rights and provide the stability that encourages investment and economic development. The arrival of democracy has also reduced the frequency and intensity of wars because “democracies simply do not make war on each other.”<sup>55</sup>

Still, most globalists recognize that creating democratic institutions is one thing, and achieving democratic and relatively equal distributions of power is another. Who governs in the democracies of a global economy? According to Friedman, “the most basic truth about globalization is this: No one is in charge – not George Soros, not ‘Great Powers’ and not I.”<sup>56</sup>

This is not to say that globalism perceives or advocates an anarchistic society without rulers. Economists and political scientists have, of course, long maintained that in a democratic capitalist society power is so widely dispersed that no single person, group, or governing board controls the political economy. Capitalists assert consumer sovereignty – that economic decisions are ultimately determined by the preferences of consumers, and since we all consume goods and vote with our wallets, we all exercise some minuscule influence on what is produced and who is rewarded in the market. Democrats assert popular sovereignty – that political decisions are ultimately determined by the preferences of voters, as elections force political leaders to create policies that reflect “the will of the people.”<sup>57</sup> Given their commitments to capitalism and democracy, globalists seem to have principles that say that billions of consumers and citizens both rule and ought to rule in a globalized political economy.<sup>58</sup>

But most globalists would probably agree that this is an overly simplified portrait. As Friedman proceeds with his discussion of a political economy without rulers, he points to the tremendous influence of "The Electronic Herd of often anonymous stock, bond and currency traders and multinational investors, connected by (Internet-linked computer) screens and networks." This large and anonymous group of investors makes the crucial decisions in the globalized economy by determining what sectors of the economy and what locations will grow and prosper. Moreover, the power of investors extends to the political arena because governmental officials must anticipate the Herd's reaction to each political decision that is made. For example, political decisions to pursue inflationary policies, to run a budget deficit, or to increase welfare spending may all spook the Electronic Herd, causing investors to move their money out of that country, and prompting multinational corporations to have second thoughts about the wisdom of relocating in the unfavorable economic climate that such policies produce. This reduces the discretion of governmental leaders who have little choice but to pursue policies that entice the Electronic Herd to invest in their countries.<sup>59</sup> The implication, of course, is that the global political economy is not as democratic as suggested by the portrait of power being widely dispersed. In the final analysis, the relatively affluent investor class – not the vastly larger consumer class – makes the crucial decisions in the global market. And the needs and preferences of these investors, not the preferences of citizens, determine crucial decisions of governments throughout the world.

Such a situation should not, however, be viewed as problematic, according to globalists. First, the investor class is large and capable of continued growth. Globalization has generated enough affluence that stock and bond portfolios are common holdings of many citizens, especially through their retirement accounts. Second, not only is power widely dispersed among investors but also investors do not rule the day-to-day operations of the companies in which they invest. Indeed, Friedman stresses that in order to survive the intense competition of the global marketplace, companies have had to become more decentralized and democratized in their internal operations. Third, despite the great influence of investors in a globalized political economy, their power over political leaders should not be overestimated. As Norberg stresses, "If an economy is equally well-ordered, investors will not treat a social democratic state any differently from a libertarian nightwatchman state. One of the world's most globalized countries is Sweden, which also happens to have the world's highest taxes."<sup>60</sup> In short, political leaders have opportunities to respond to internal democratic pressures and to national cultures, even in the face of market pressures.

Globalists have little use for "perfect democracy" or for highly populist forms of democracy where citizen participation is extensive and policymakers have little choice but to respond to the fears and whims of voters. They believe, for example, that calls to democratize global institutions like the World Bank or the International Monetary Funds are profoundly mistaken, as these institutions need the flexibility and expertise to make technical judgments about the most economically effective decisions.<sup>61</sup> But nation states require democratically elected rulers. Globalists are committed to representative democracies comprised of elected officials who understand that reelection depends on the economic performance of their policies – and that economic prosperity is best achieved by providing effective and fair rules that govern market activity and by facilitating economic growth through participation in a globalized economy.

In sum, globalist principles about rulers seem generally to be within the underlying consensus of pluralism. In general, globalists support the polyarchies that exist in national, state, and local communities and would like to see non-democratic communities adopt polyarchical structures and processes. Only their apparent resistance to democratizing global institutions can

be construed as contrary to the underlying consensus with pluralism. However, it is not clear whether the current practice of holding leaders of global institutions accountable to the leaders of nation-states that they represent is insufficiently democratic to satisfy the broad norms of pluralism regarding rulers.<sup>62</sup>

*Stable democratic capitalism produces extensive and beneficial social change*

Pluralists recognize that economic, social, and political changes are sometimes beneficial, and that adequate and legitimate processes must be in place to bring about desirable change through peaceful means.<sup>63</sup> Such a broad pluralist understanding about change can easily embrace globalists. Some globalists claim to uphold the status quo while others claim to be revolutionaries. While there is some truth to both claims, a balanced assessment would be that globalists support rapid economic change and seek extensive and beneficial social change through moderate political reforms.

On the one hand, globalism is the governing public philosophy of much of the world. It is the "Washington Consensus" upheld by most leaders of Western nations, many rulers of developing countries, and the heads of international organizations. They see the world as increasingly structured and governed according to the principles of democratic capitalism. To the extent that they see these principles embedded in the policies of political communities throughout the world, they seek to maintain the status quo. To the extent that they see particular departures from these principles, they seek modest reforms that will move political communities closer to these ideals. From this perspective, globalism is the governing conservative but pluralistic outlook that is under attack by religious fundamentalists on the right and anti-global activists from the left. From this perspective, even progressive forces that seek to maintain but tame globalization through ordinary political action must admit that globalism merely occupies the right side of the pluralist continuum.

On the other hand, globalism is – or at least was - a revolutionary perspective. In the hands of such political leaders of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping, the ideas of globalism led to the breakdown of the old political order. During the Cold War era, globalism could be seen as a revolutionary outlook. This does not mean that its ideas were terribly new, as most had been prominent in classical liberal and libertarian thought. Nor does this mean that such "revolutionaries" violated the pluralist underlying consensus, as they sought change through peaceful reform measures. However, such globalists were revolutionary in the sense that they sought extensive changes that transformed formerly communist countries into more pluralist ones and that brought extensive changes to how developed Western nations were governed. Because the main ideas of globalism were "old wine in new bottles," globalism could be seen as incorporating the traditional - the tried and true - and thus be attractive to more conservative actors within political systems, leading to the seeming paradox that globalism produced "revolutionary conservatives" who wrought great political changes.

But the real sense in which globalism is revolutionary is not so much in its politics but in the social and economic transformations that it spurs. As new technologies such as the Internet have emerged, as trade barriers have been reduced, and as people and ideas breach the old walls and borders that contained them, we have entered a world of breath-taking innovation and change in our daily lives. Globalists admit that some of these changes are destabilizing – as people lose jobs in declining industries and as entire communities grow or collapse at a speed that was previously unimaginable. The tremendous competition within globalism and the great mobility of people, capital, and goods in globalized society, has led to a world that Friedman aptly

characterizes as “Darwinism on steroids.”<sup>64</sup> For globalists, this is not a frightening metaphor for two reasons.

First, evolution under globalism can be expected to be not only rapid but also highly beneficial. It will bring about changes that dramatically improve the lives of most people. It is producing more economic prosperity, more access to life-enhancing and life-prolonging innovations, and more social, economic, and political freedom. While we formerly were confined to the parochial worlds that we inhabited, we increasingly have the world at our command, whether through global telecommunications in the comfort of our homes, or by our easy access to people, ideas, and goods from other cultures in our local communities, or by our capacity to move easily beyond our own towns and nations and explore the possibilities that await us throughout the globe. Such experiences will “stretch” individual humans, prompting them to evolve into far more complex and enlightened beings than previously, and this will lead to higher stages of evolution for the human species.

Second, despite all these changes in our material lives, we can look forward to a certain stability in the realm of ideas. We will no longer have to invest great energy contesting fundamental political questions. As the successes of globalism become more apparent, so too will be the truth of Fukuyama’s conviction that we are at “the end of history.” Globalism – and its claim that capitalism, democracy, freedom, and equality are universally and eternally sound political ideals – will emerge as a political and social paradigm in the same way that Darwinian biology provides a paradigm for the life sciences. Once proponents of older ideologies die off and a universal consensus forms about the globalist paradigm, we can invest our energies to perfecting its application to our social lives.

Or so the globalist believes.

### **Critical analyses of globalism**

Globalism has, of course, been subjected to numerous criticisms from ideological competitors. Neo-Marxists suggest that globalism defends a global “Empire” characterized by extensive patterns of economic imperialism and political domination.<sup>65</sup> Ethnic nationalists regard globalism as an ideology that seeks to impose Western, white values and institutions on people of color and undermine indigenous cultures.<sup>66</sup> Greens (or deep ecologists) regard globalism as deeply homocentric, justifying exploitation of other animals and natural resources to satisfy human greed.<sup>67</sup> Postmodern feminists see globalism as highly androcentric, focusing on male values of materialism and domination and male practices of competition, while ignoring more androgynous values of compassion, sympathy, nurturing relationships and the like.<sup>68</sup> While such criticisms play a major role in public discussion and in showing that globalism has yet to become a consensually held public philosophy, they are of limited value because they are unlikely to generate discussions that leads to mutual and negotiated understandings. Such criticisms mainly generate defensive responses by globalists. Such accusations are met with denial, with stonewalling, or by simply changing the subject.<sup>69</sup> Consequently, I will not pursue such criticisms here. Instead, I will attempt to provide an evaluation of globalism using two kinds of analyses that might generate more productive discussions between globalists and their opponents.

First, the underlying philosophical assumptions of globalism will be described and assessed. Such an analysis will show that Steger’s charge that globalism is based on an inadequate materialist ontology is mistaken.<sup>70</sup> Nevertheless, I will argue that globalism is founded on assumptions about human nature, society, and epistemology that are problematic.

Second, globalism will be evaluated in terms of its ability to achieve various political goals. I will discuss four criteria that embody goals that globalists claim are their own primary objectives: economic prosperity, freedom, democracy, and peace. I will argue that we have good reasons for questioning claims that the application of globalist principles in fact ensures economic development, enhances freedom, promotes democracy, and creates the conditions for a world free of violent conflict and war. After supplying this “internal critique” of globalism, I will then conclude by discussing two additional criteria – the promotion of morality and the furtherance of social justice – that are not central goals of globalism but that globalists claim are not undermined by their principles. I will suggest that there are some important conceptions of morality and social justice that are endangered by pursuing globalist principles.

### **Inadequate philosophical assumptions**

Under girding all political worldviews are various philosophical assumptions, sometimes explicitly articulated and employed as the grounds for deducing political principles (as in classical liberalism) and sometimes unarticulated and not fully understood by their most ardent supporters. Understanding the philosophical foundations of a worldview is extremely helpful in explaining its principles.<sup>71</sup> And uncovering and examining the underlying assumptions of any theoretical perspective is useful for evaluating it, as attacking assumptions that are limited and contestable is an honorable approach to pointing out the weakness of a theory. What then are the philosophical assumptions of globalism? And are these assumptions compatible with the assumptions held by pluralists?<sup>72</sup>

### *A thick ontology of economic determinism?*

Pluralism thrives when people have thin ontological ideas, when they understand that their assumptions of ultimate reality (being) and the ultimate causes of the future of the world (becoming) are of little relevance to political life. Pluralists do not reject the existence of God or the primacy of the material world, nor do they deny that divine or natural forces can influence political events, but they insist that humans can resist these forces and attempt to make their worlds in a manner of their own choosing.<sup>73</sup> Pluralists assume that human ideas are a fundamental part of the world and have an existence independent of either supernatural or material reality. They also assume that these ideas will influence the future of the world, but which ideas will prevail is undetermined. The future of the world will depend on human choices and the resources that humans bring to bear on furthering these choices.

Globalist political principles appear thoroughly modern, as they are not dependent on assumptions about the supernatural. However, a materialist reading of globalism is certainly possible. Globalism has its philosophical roots in classical liberalism, which was initially based on the ontological materialism posited by Hobbes – that the state of nature was comprised simply of matter in motion.<sup>74</sup> Manfred Steger suggests that globalists have accepted the materialist assumptions of classical liberals. According to Steger, a central claim of globalism is that, according to the laws of political economy, economic necessity requires political communities to adopt capitalism and representative democracy.<sup>75</sup> In support of his argument that globalism is based on a materialist ontology, Steger cites extensively the most prominent popularizer of globalism, Thomas Friedman, who insists on the importance of a “golden straightjacket” in globalization – that governments have no real alternative to pursuing policies that support a global free market. A partial reading of Fukuyama can also lead to the assumption that globalists have a materialist foundation. In Part II of his *The End of History and the Last Man*, he suggests that modern science is “the regulator or mechanism that explains the directionality and coherence of history” and this is “in effect an economic interpretation of historical change, but one which

(unlike its Marxist variant) leads to capitalism rather than socialism as its final result.”<sup>76</sup> In short, globalists are thought to agree with classical liberals and orthodox Marxists in assuming that economic forces determine the future evolution of the political economy, but they believe that economic necessity makes inevitable global capitalism, not global communism.

However, Fukuyama goes on to assert that “economic interpretations of history are incomplete” and thus complements his analysis with a Hegelian emphasis that focuses on the crucial role of the emergence of the idea of equality as a way of fulfilling a human need for recognition of one’s worth and dignity.<sup>77</sup> Indeed, the overall thrust of Fukuyama’s theory is that globalism has emerged as a result of the victory of the ideals of capitalism, democracy, freedom, and equality in intellectual history. Other globalists appear to have accepted this verdict, as they deny that economic forces make globalization inevitable and that we have no choice but to defer to economic and market imperatives. For example, Norberg insists “the future is not predetermined. There is no single path, and there is nothing forcing us to accept globalization. Capital can be locked up, trade flows blocked, and borders barricaded. This happened at least once before, following the globalization of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century.... It is not ‘necessary’ to follow the globalization trend; it is merely desirable.”<sup>78</sup> Such assertions suggest that the ontological foundations of globalism are not based on a thick ontology of economic determinism and are instead consistent with the thinner idealistic ontology of pluralists. By recognizing the importance of ideas and moral judgments in the evolution of history, globalists avoid dogmatic assertions that globalism is “inevitable and irreversible,” despite Steger’s claim to the contrary.

#### *Forgetting the coercion that occurs within voluntary societies*

Pluralists believe that societies are normally continuous associations (that survive the entrance and exit of particular individuals into them), but that societies can be created or disbanded by acts of human will. Pluralists see most political societies as heterogeneous or diverse, being composed of people having different primary identities, interests, and (comprehensive) moral doctrines. Pluralists assume that differences in citizens’ ways of life are loosely organized around a variety of social cleavages (such as class, race, gender, age, ideology, etc.) and that the saliency of such cleavages varies depending on differences among societies and on the different issues confronting societies. No cleavage is fundamental.<sup>79</sup> Pluralists also assume that political societies contain civil society, composed of many voluntary organizations and groups. Such groups are important because they provide the basis of individual identities and moral understandings, a sense of belonging, and settings for pursuing common interests.

Like pluralists, globalists assume that societies are human creations that individuals develop and maintain for their mutual benefit. They assume that different associations serve different purposes. They value political associations, business and labor organizations, churches, schools, and a host of other societies because they enable people to pursue many interests through cooperative interactions with others. In short, globalists are pluralists in their understanding of the importance and diverse purposes served by the many human associations that have emerged from the “social contracts” that have brought people together to pursue common interests.

Globalists differentiate between two most basic types of societies: voluntary societies and coercive ones, and they assume that voluntary societies are preferred. Free markets exemplify voluntary societies, as they are composed of investors, property owners, workers, and consumers who continually enter and exit these societies in accordance with their own interests and free choices. States exemplify coercive societies. Though social contract theory provides a useful myth that states are voluntarily formed, ongoing states are composed of citizens sharing a common territory who are restrained in their freedom by coercive governmental power. While

some rules and regulations are required for economic, social, and political functioning, globalists prefer that these functions be performed by voluntary rather than coercive societies as much as possible.

The globalist assumption that states comprise coercive societies while other forms of human association are voluntary may lead globalists to underestimate the extent to which individuals are free of coercion and domination in societies outside of the state. Patterns of authority and domination occur in many societies, including in associations central to the “free” market. Workers who enter into “voluntary” employment contracts even when wages are at subsistence levels and working conditions are hazardous may do so only because of their desperation for the means of survival. Women who enter into marriages only to find themselves in patriarchal families may suffer extensive male domination. Parishioners may find themselves subject to the harassment and abuse of church leaders. Globalists assume that voluntary societies and communities are free of physical and legal barriers that prevent abused and exploited people from exiting them. Such an assumption diminishes their perception that there are extensive psychological, economic, and social barriers to people exercising their “freedom to leave.” Other ideologies – like Marxism, feminism, and various ethnic nationalisms – are far more likely to recognize the class, gender, and ethnic divisions in a society that leave some kinds of people dominated and feeling dependent on their counterparts. Failure to perceive the importance of such dependency within “voluntary” associations blind globalists to the need to develop political principles to address such problems.

#### *Overestimating human autonomy and narrowly construing human rationality*

The principles proclaimed by pluralists are based on the assumption that humans are equal in some basic ways. The life of each human is equally valuable and the interests of each human should be given equal consideration in governing a pluralist society. Each person should be morally free, having the capacity to choose and pursue her own conception of the good life. But pluralists recognize that people have very different motivations in life, ranging from getting rich to seeking unity with God, and thus no fundamental purpose or motivation can be attributed to humans to serve as a basis for pluralist public philosophy. Pluralists also recognize that people have unequal natural talents and unequal access to those social resources that help achieve their diverse goals, though they differ on the moral significance of these inequalities.

Globalist principles are based on much thicker and thus problematic assumptions about humans, about their equality, virtue, motivations, rationality, and autonomy.

*Human equality and inequality.* Fukuyama insists on the importance to democratic capitalism of the idea that humans are equal in their dignity, and there is no evidence that other globalists deny this assumption.<sup>80</sup> As in other liberalisms, globalists agree that the life of each human is equally valuable. Each human is thus assumed to have such rights as equal liberty (to pursue the good as she understands it). Globalists acknowledge that humans are obviously unequal in many self-owned capacities (e.g., intelligence, ambition, etc.) that can be employed in ways leading to legitimate inequalities in the opportunities and property that people enjoy and possess. But they assume that almost all humans have capacities that enable them to thrive, assuming that they live under conditions that encourage use of these capacities. Globalists believe capitalism rewards the use of these capacities and that democratic governments provide adequate safety nets for those having inadequate capacities to survive capitalist competition. Such ideas about human equality and inequality appear consistent with minimal pluralist assumptions.

*Human virtue.* Globalists do not believe that the institutions of democratic capitalism are premised on the assumption that people inherently possess those virtues that make democratic and capitalist institutions function effectively. The weak democratic institutions supported by globalists do not require humans to be public-regarding. Capitalist institutions are not based on assumptions that humans are naturally independent, hard working, and creative. Instead, globalists assume that both democracy and capitalism have “hidden hand” processes that produce outcomes that are socially good even if individuals are less than virtuous. Such assumptions also seem compatible with the minimal assumptions of human nature held by pluralists.

*Human motivation.* Like classical liberals, globalists see humans, for the most part, as “utility maximizers.” Our primary motivation is to obtain happiness by having freedom to live as we want and to acquire and use material goods in ways that enhance our pleasure and minimize our pain. Globalists recognize that individual conceptions of happiness have become more expansive, as there appear to be almost no limits to the quality and quantity of goods and services that we want.<sup>81</sup> Humans want increasing amounts of freedom and material goods, and we measure our satisfaction by how well we are doing relative to others around the world, rather than how well we are doing in terms of some natural (minimal) needs or even how well our fathers or immediate neighbors are doing. In addition to ever growing material wants, humans have acquired – especially through exposure to global technologies – enhanced wants to be entertained and amused.<sup>82</sup>

The assumption that humans seek to maximally satisfy an increasing number of economic and hedonistic desires can be seen as both empirically and morally deficient. While critics argue that humans seek, and should seek, goals other than material gain and sensual pleasure, this assumption has proven to be very powerful and effective for understanding much economic and political behavior. Perhaps the assumption would be challengeable if utility maximization is thought to be the only human motivation, but globalists do not make this assumption. Fukuyama acknowledges that humans have a spirited part to their souls (*thymos*, containing such emotions as anger, shame, and pride) that must also be satisfied.<sup>83</sup> In short, we are motivated not simply to fulfill our material desires but to be recognized as worthy human beings. Fukuyama claims that this need for recognition is satisfied by the development of liberal democracy, which gives everyone political rights. Criticisms of globalism that it has a limited conception of human motivation may thus be misguided, but these criticisms may point in an important direction. Does liberal democracy – the “imperfect” or weak forms of democracy that globalism defends – adequately satisfy human desires for equal recognition? A negative answer to this question is suggested when we consider the epistemological foundations of globalism and whether globalism satisfies democratic aspirations.

*Human autonomy.* Globalists seem to assume (along with classical liberals) that each individual is the best judge of his or her own good and should thus be as autonomous as possible. But such assumptions have been brought into question by both psychologists who study human happiness and by political communitarians who point to the social basis of human desires. The psychological field of “affective forecasting,” pioneered by Daniel Gilbert, has shown that people often do not know what they want. We erroneously predict the intensity and duration of the emotional pleasure we experience by attaining an object of our desire (like a luxury car or a promotion).<sup>84</sup> We mistakenly believe that increases in wealth and status bring proportionate increases in happiness.<sup>85</sup>

In addition to such reservations about human autonomy provided by psychologists, communitarians have argued that our wants are derived from society and are influenced by social pressures and norms.<sup>86</sup> Globalists may agree with communitarians that we get values and



aspirations by observing others around the world, but they maintain that these values and aspirations are highly varied. From all the cultural choices that globalization provides, each person can effectively choose what is best for him or her.<sup>87</sup> Such an assumption seems suspect, because it ignores those aspects of economic and political power that shape our preferences, creating wants for goods and policies that are quite distinct from any inner sense of our real needs. In any event, globalism has not satisfactorily responded to the criticism that capitalism and representative democracy do not merely respond to our genuine preferences but create false wants that detract from humans pursuing more meaningful lives.

*Human rationality.* Again, like classical liberals (and as assumed by economic free-market theorists), globalists assume individuals have economic (or instrumental) rationality - the ability to arrive at effective means to satisfy their personal desires. At the same time, globalists are doubtful that humans have much capacity for political rationality, a concept explored and appreciated by contemporary political theorists.<sup>88</sup> While economic rationality requires humans to know their own desires, political rationality requires humans to empathetically understand the desires of others. While economic rationality requires humans to examine their choices and select that option best serving their personal interests, political rationality requires humans to deliberate, negotiate, and compromise with one another under conditions of political equality to select an option that satisfies diverse interests and furthers common interests.

While assuming that people have adequate economic rationality, globalists seem skeptical that humans have the capacity for political rationality, claiming that our individual preoccupations prevent acquiring meaningful empathic understandings of others and discovering expansive common interests. Globalists of a libertarian bent believe that our political rationality is limited to discovering our common interests in physical security. More expansive efforts at political rationality (to provide for common interests by limiting human freedom and imposing taxes) are really exercises in economic rationality; such efforts are really just people employing political and governmental power on behalf of their individual interests.<sup>89</sup> (For example, educators may cite the needs of their students in seeking increased public funding of schools, but their real goal may be to increase their own salaries.) In short, globalists can be not only skeptical but also cynical about human capacities for political rationality.

However, we might be equally skeptical about the human capacity for economic rationality. The previously cited literature on affective forecasting casts doubt not only on people's ability to know what they want but on their ability to predict which of several available alternative means best satisfies their desires. People may be mistaken to believe that they will be better off having a \$1000 tax cut to help purchase a more luxurious car than having governments use tax revenues to provide better roads. Criticizing the assumption that most humans possess economic or instrumental rationality may seem to invite paternalistic government. If most citizens don't know the best means to their happiness, perhaps government should be "Big Brother" and assume responsibility for making more rational decisions for foolish citizens. However, the reason for questioning economic rationality is not to invite paternalism (as there is no basis for assuming that Big Brother is more rational than the average individual) but rather to reject the globalist assumption that economic or instrumental rationality should be privileged over political rationality. Both the economic and political rationality of humans are limited, as humans make mistakes when reaching decisions about their personal well-being and their well-being in community life. There is no evidence that human capacity for economic rationality so exceeds their capacity for political rationality that the political economy should be structured to maximize individual choice while minimizing opportunities for collective choice. Undue celebration of economic rationality and excessive skepticism and cynicism about political rationality severely

limits possibilities for effective collective actions to address social, economic, and political problems.

In sum, while globalists make some reasonable assumptions about human nature, they can be criticized for overestimating the autonomy of humans and underestimating the capacity of economic and political power to shape human desire. Globalism may be overly optimistic about human capacities for economic rationality and overly cynical about human capacities for political rationality.

### *A limited epistemology that depreciates political understanding*

On the one hand, pluralists reject the idea that there can be no moral or political knowledge.<sup>90</sup> Such an excessively weak epistemological assumption opens the door to cynicism and nihilism, leaving political issues to be resolved by the sheer application of power. On the other hand, pluralists reject the idea of certainty concerning political knowledge. Such an excessively strong assumption opens the door to elitism, oppression, and the imposition of one best way of life on everyone. Instead, pluralists assume that people can attain tentative political understandings.<sup>91</sup> They assume that moral and political knowledge arises from social agreements that find their way into constitutions, laws, and international agreements and treaties. While these agreements may be imperfect expressions of "Truth" (of what is clearly best for political societies), they provide a tentative consensus on right and wrong conduct that can only be revised by parties to the agreements in light of new conditions and understandings.

Globalists accept moral and religious subjectivism. Drawing from the liberal tradition, they accept that the goodness of particular religious and moral systems, of particular life styles, of aesthetics and taste cannot be objectively determined. The ends of the good life are subjective and reside in each individual's calculation of what makes him happy (attaining hedonistic self-interest) or satisfied (attaining enlightened self-interest). It is precisely this subjectivity that justifies the free market. Allowing production and distribution decisions to be decided by the market means letting each person pursue her own understandings of the good life and happiness. And this subjectivity also justifies liberal democracy. The separation of church and state and the preservation of various constitutional rights enable liberal democracies to govern in a way that denies religious and moral absolutists the capacity to impose their "truths" on others.

But just as classical liberals used the Cartesian method to convert this moral subjectivity into political certainty, into a deductive "science of politics,"<sup>92</sup> globalists may use inductive science to justify globalist principles. Essentially, such a science admits that ultimate goods are subjective, but that whatever are a person's ultimate values, there are certain known means to the achievement of diverse ends. You and I may have very different conceptions of what gives us happiness and satisfaction, but we both want security, liberty, opportunity, and wealth. Most importantly, we both want money, which is the most convertible resource enabling its possessors to live the good life (whatever one's conceptions of the good life).<sup>93</sup> Having converted diverse ends to common means to these ends, we need concern ourselves only with maximizing the attainment of these common means. How can we maximize freedom, opportunity, and wealth? The answers to these questions can be had by what Fukuyama calls "the logic of modern natural science"<sup>94</sup> – also known as economic or instrumental rationality. Essentially modern science is comprised of those methods that enable inter-subjective determination of the most effective and efficient means for attaining such penultimate goals as security, freedom, and money (while leaving aside whether they are effective means to our ultimate but subjective goals.<sup>95</sup> For example, economics has demonstrated the efficiencies of free trade (due to the law of

comparative advantage), of privatization (due to the advantages of competition over monopoly), and other globalist principles.

There is obviously great attraction in this globalist epistemology, in our using science to acquire ever more effective and efficient means to our penultimate ends. Such knowledge is non-zero-sum; if someone gains new scientific knowledge, it can be disseminated to all of us and used by all of us. Such knowledge is cumulative; once we acquire such knowledge, we cannot use it up or diminish it; we can always maintain it and we might add to it. Thus, such knowledge is tentative; future scientific discoveries may well lead to new and better understandings of the best ways of achieving the penultimate desires of humans. Such knowledge is neither some sort of absolute and eternal truth to be imposed on others nor is it just subjective opinion dealing with individual tastes and thus beyond inter-subjective agreements.

Yet, such an epistemology is limited, as can be revealed by considering two illustrations. First economic rationality is always bounded rationality; it involves demonstrations of cause-effect relationships among a limited number of theorized variables while ignoring latent cause-effect relationships that are beyond the bounds of one's theory. For example, economic rationality might demonstrate a new technique that produces large increases in economic productivity, but that technique might have other effects (such as environmental deterioration) that remain unknown because they are outside the boundaries of the scientific theory. Second, scientific rationality might be able to tell us quite a bit about the consequences of a particular policy on our penultimate ends, but when these consequences are positive in some respects but negative in others, it provides no way of rendering an overall judgment. For example, economic rationality may conclude that taking down Saddam Hussein is good for our security but bad for our economy, but it cannot calculate whether the gain in security outweighs the economic costs because there is no ultimate end through which we can make that determination.

The antidote to the limitations of economic rationality is political rationality. Political decision-making can be of various sorts. Cynical globalists stress the worst forms of political decision-making: the power politics that occurs in autocratic and democratic regimes alike whereby the powerful make decisions on the basis of their own interests. Without question, many political decisions are made in this sort of way, but there is another better form of decision-making involving the principles of progressive and deliberative democracy.<sup>96</sup> Political rationality under the principles of deliberative democracy involves a genuine search within a political community for the common good and for social justice. While the precise contents of these goals cannot be specified, there is conviction these goals can be approached by democratic processes that are highly inclusive (that involve all affected segments of society), that are highly open in terms of the range of considerations that are brought to bear on a decision (that include the conclusions of economic reasoning as well as judgments about those matters that lie beyond the reach of economic rationality), that are highly deliberative (insofar as participants try to listen to and incorporate the concerns of others into a solution), that involve negotiation and compromise (given the inevitability of conflicting interests and views), and that are resolved by previously agreed upon rules. Political rationality leads not to truth, but to temporary understandings of how to proceed in the absence of ultimate truth. Political rationality enables a community to use the collective power of the state to take remedial action against problems that remain unaddressed by individual decisions in the market place.<sup>97</sup> By adopting an epistemology that depreciates political rationality, globalists underestimate the necessity of the kinds of tentative social understandings that are required if a community is to address some of the ills that remain after the benefits of economic rationality and globalization have been realized.

## Dubious attainment of desirable consequences

The previous section focusing on philosophical assumptions examines and criticizes the “beginnings” of globalism – the foundational ideas from which its principles are deprived. Such criticisms may be viewed as intellectually valuable but of little political use.<sup>98</sup> In politics, public philosophies will and should be evaluated for what they accomplish. In this section, our evaluations turn more pragmatic, as we consider the consequences or observable effects that follow from the adoption and implementation of globalism.

### *Uneven and unsustainable economic prosperity*

It is difficult to argue with the assessment that free-market globalization has enhanced economic prosperity around the world. As documented by Norberg, the average income of people, adjusted for purchasing power and inflation, has doubled in the past 30 years and there have been dramatic increases in education and life expectancy while there have been dramatic decreases in world hunger and infant mortality.<sup>99</sup> Moreover, these increases are especially great in those countries having democratic and capitalist institutions.<sup>100</sup> Even critics of globalism concede that globalization has delivered significant aggregate economic advances due to the diffusion of knowledge and technology and the benefits of free trade and migration.<sup>101</sup>

However, while globalization has normally delivered prosperity, there are also cases of “deleterious globalization.” According to Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, globalization only delivers prosperity when national governments manage their own economies.<sup>102</sup> Globalization can deliver economic crisis and stagnation when global institutions like the IMF require countries to liberalize financial markets, raise interest rates, balance budgets, and adopt other aspects of “Golden Straitjacket” in order to qualify for loans and other forms of financial assistance. Stiglitz illustrates this point by describing the financial crisis that hit Thailand in December, 1997. According to Stiglitz, Thailand had managed to avoid boom-bust cycles by tightly regulating bank loans used to speculate in real estate. However, the IMF nixed these policies, leading to over-investments in office space which led investors to question Thailand’s economic climate, producing a stampede of withdrawal of investments from Thailand. Globalization can also transform a relatively prosperous country into a “submerging nation.” According to Carmen Ferradas, such has been the fate of Argentina, where neoliberal economic politics have resulted in economic collapse, creating widespread unemployment among the “piqueteros” (factory and farm workers) and the “caceroleros (the middle class).<sup>103</sup> Such cases do not invalidate the proposition that globalization generally delivers economic prosperity, but they do remind us that the rigid application of globalist principles – in this case the liberalization of financial markets – can produce economically disastrous results.

Moreover, it is not clear that the gains in economic prosperity that have occurred under globalization lead to widespread feelings of economic well-being. Some research suggests that a key aspect of globalization – increased foreign direct investment in a country – results in workers in such countries feeling less economically secure.<sup>104</sup> There are also concerns about whether economic prosperity can be sustained. Martin and Schumann theorize that globalization will give way to “a global crack-up” and a future where “mass prosperity will eventually become no more than a blip of economic history.” The key to this bleak future is what they see as a 20:80 society. The highly mechanized and efficient global economy will be able to be run by 20% of the work force, and economic competition will not permit global corporations to keep unnecessary labor on their payrolls. This will finally bring about the conditions depicted by Marx almost 150 years ago, a dramatic gap between productive capacity and effective demand for the goods produced by the global economy, as most people will be living in widespread economic deprivation.<sup>105</sup>

### *Losses as well as gains in freedom*

Because freedom is a multidimensional and complex concept, it is difficult to measure and analyze historical trends and comparisons among nations in ways that demonstrate that globalization promotes freedom. Still, it seems difficult to doubt that globalism has produced greater economic freedom (to work, consume, and invest as one wishes), social freedom (to move about the world as one likes), and political freedom. Freedom House tracks changes in political freedom and claims that, in 2002, only 47 states violated fundamental political rights. While this may seem substantial, violators of rights are those sorts of countries (Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Turkmenistan, etc.) that have been most uninvolved in globalization. During the past two decades, there have been large gains in the number of countries providing more extensive political liberties to their citizens.<sup>106</sup>

Despite these obvious gains, critics of globalism can point to governments reducing the civil liberties and legal rights of citizens as they engage in a “permanent war abroad” and tightened security measures at home as a result of the globalization of terrorism.<sup>107</sup> Even if such restrictions in freedom are seen as due to terrorist threats that are independent of globalization, critics also raise legitimate questions about the distribution of freedom and the realization of various types of freedom.

The types of freedoms that seem most enhanced are the “negative” freedoms of individuals, on people being increasingly free from governmental constraints. Contemporary liberals remind us that, in addition to negative “freedom from,” there is also a “positive” conception of freedom (the capacity to choose one’s own path) and that governments have played a significant role in reducing illiteracy, disease, discrimination, poverty, and other obstacles that disadvantaged persons face in being able to live the sorts of lives they would freely choose.<sup>108</sup> It is not clear that positive liberty is more abundant today than in the past or that positive liberty is more evenly distributed among persons confronting different degrees of natural and social disadvantages. Insofar as globalization has led to the dismantling of certain aspects of the welfare state in many countries, one might suppose that the positive freedom of some disadvantaged people has indeed been reduced.

There is also another kind of freedom, the collective freedom or capacity of communities to determine their own destiny, that might be endangered by globalization. The familiar example of companies leaving communities, to relocate in more profitable locations elsewhere, illustrates this loss of collective freedom. Globalization and the easy mobility of capital may leave communities with little freedom to determine their own fates.

### *Wider but thinner democracy*

Again, critics have a difficult time refuting the globalist claim that “never before in human history has democracy, universal suffrage and the free formation of opinion been as widespread as they are today.”<sup>109</sup> Fukuyama documents the “worldwide liberal revolution” that shows a “pronounced secular trend in the democratic direction,” and democracy breaking out “of its original beachhead in Western Europe and North America.”<sup>110</sup> Under the impetus of globalization, democracy has made significant inroads into those parts of the world that have not had cultures conducive to democracy.

Still, critics of globalism can raise two important objections. First globalization has resulted in a large shift of power from national arenas to international ones. Despite some claims that the global economy is ungoverned, “laws, rules, and standards are being written to guide and channel global commerce. Government officials and international experts – often helped by the very industries and corporations they seek to regulate – are weaving a legal and supervisory web around the global economy.”<sup>111</sup> It is hard to describe as democratic those institutions – like the World Trade Organization

and the International Monetary Fund – that make these rules. According to critics, “a good old boys network” of like-minded officials who are committed to globalist ideology populate these institutions.<sup>112</sup> The kinds of contentious groups that sometimes succeed in getting access to policymakers in domestic politics are usually frozen out of any sort of hearing in international organizations. The work of the WTO and the IMF is so vast and complex that it is difficult for democratic bodies like the U.S. Congress, the media, and various watchdog nongovernmental organizations like Global Trade Watch to monitor their work. The result is a deluge of international rules and regulations that often supercede those made under more democratic processes within nation states.

Second, the quantitative increase in the number of democracies that have emerged throughout the world does not mean that there has been any increase in the quality of democracy within nations. If democracy is conceptualized as an ideal where people are political equals, then all countries fall short of being fully democratic and the question is “how democratic are each of our political communities?”<sup>113</sup> The criteria used by globalists to signify that a country is democratic are typically quite minimal. Having formally competitive elections is required, but the degree of competition is seldom assessed and so the extent to which policymakers are really accountable to voters is not determined. Having universal suffrage is required, though the extent to which there are barriers to voting and disincentives for voting is not determined. Freedoms of the press and the opposition are required though the extent to which the press and opponents have capacities to effectively monitor governments is not determined. Critics of globalism are justified in supposing that globalization has prompted most political communities to become less - not more – democratic. As markets have increased in importance and governments have declined in importance under the impetus of globalism, citizens have withdrawn from politics and are thus less available for democratic participation.<sup>114</sup> While “strong democracy” requires deliberation and the employment of political rationality, globalists are skeptical about these sort of procedures, so there is no reason to believe that the spread of globalization has led to stronger democracies in those communities and countries where formal democratic arrangements exist.<sup>115</sup>

#### *A state of war amidst the democratic peace*

Globalism claims to advance peace and nonviolent resolution of conflict by bringing ideological consensus to what previously was an ideologically divided world, by making trading partners of those who were formally ideological rivals, and by spreading democracy - creating “the democratic peace.” Perhaps it is true that “the number of wars has diminished in half during the past decade,”<sup>116</sup> but the worldwide “war on terrorism” has certainly heightened our sense of living in an era where peace remains elusive. Critics can point to the imperialist aspect of globalization and hold globalism responsible for the spread of such destabilizing emotions as envy, hatred, and vulnerability that can trigger both acts of terrorism and preemptive attacks by those who feel threatened by terrorism.<sup>117</sup> As Stiglitz points out, “September 11 brought home a still darker side of globalization – it provided a global arena for terrorists.”<sup>118</sup> While Fukuyama claims that globalization has removed “barbarians from the gates,”<sup>119</sup> it is perhaps more true that it has spawned a significant number of angry people who are able to use global technologies to endanger communities everywhere. Moreover, globalization has increased the weapons that are available for use by terrorists and rogue nations who are outside the global system. It can also be argued that participants in local and regional wars, as well as terrorists, have increasingly destructive capabilities due to increases in the international trade in arms and weapons.<sup>120</sup>

#### *Revisiting the moral implications of capitalism*

Religious fundamentalists and Islamic terrorists are keen to point out the immorality of the global political economy, as they see globalization as involving the export of American decadence and vices in ways that undermine the strong moral standards of their traditional communities. Globalists have two responses to the charge that a global political economy undermines traditional moral values.

One response is to argue that globalization does not diminish morality but rather prompts moral pluralism.<sup>121</sup> From this perspective, globalization results in the intermixing of peoples from different moral traditions, as Muslim mosques, Buddhist temples, Christian churches, and other religious assemblies become interspersed in communities throughout the world. As Fukuyama points out, there is evidence that globalization has not prompted people to turn away from such sources of moral guidance but rather has prompted them to become more deeply involved in such communities, as they seek to compensate for the lost traditions of their formerly parochial and morally dogmatic local communities.<sup>122</sup> In this view, globalism is not so much responsible for moral decline as for moral choice.

A second response – exemplified by Margaret Thatcher - is to defend the morality of globalism. Globalism protects individual rights, provides fair procedures of economic competition, and promotes honest government. It also generates a great deal of wealth and, as Thatcher claims, “money is morally neutral – it’s what you do with it that counts.”<sup>123</sup> More money generated by globalism can be used for good ends, in ways that make life good and lives truly valuable.

Perhaps these are adequate responses, but critics of globalism are probably justified in raising all the old moral questions that have long been asked of capitalism – as globalism is, after all, capitalism writ large. It is sufficient here to remember some of these questions: Does globalism make money what Walzer calls a dominant good, a good so important and powerful that it invades and undermines the proper distribution of other goods, as when money enables its possessor to buy political office?<sup>124</sup> Does globalization make our lives overly competitive, producing – as Friedman says – “Darwinism on steroids,” creating in people such competitive instincts that cooperation and companionship are devalued? Does global competition undermine the most fundamental human equality – equal self-esteem - as winners in global competition attain a false sense of superiority and losers acquire a false sense of inferiority?<sup>125</sup>

### *Poverty reductions that fail to provide justice as fairness*

As an intense brand of capitalism, globalization generates and sustains extensive economic inequalities. In a free-market system with private ownership of the means of production, some people succeed and become enormously wealthy while others fail and live in poverty. One globalist response, of course, is to see no injustice in such inequalities. Like libertarians, they sometimes claim that the concept of social justice is a fraud, a mere rhetorical device used by those who want to use governmental coercion to deprive the successful of their justly acquired property and to redistribute it to those unfortunate enough or undeserving enough to be able to sustain the sort of economic existence they would like.<sup>126</sup>

Another globalist response, however, is to claim that globalization does in fact produce social justice. Rather than exploiting poor people in developing nations, multinational corporations are said to generate opportunities that raise people out of poverty. Even a critic of current globalization processes, Amartya Sen, has produced data showing that, after adjusting for inflation and purchasing power, the average annual income of persons throughout the world have increased from about \$2500 in 1965 to almost \$5000 in 1998.<sup>127</sup> Linda Lim has found that NIKE workers in Southeast Asia were paid three times the minimum wages typically paid in that region of the world.<sup>128</sup> Johan Norberg and Surjit Bhalla cite data from the World Bank showing that absolute levels of poverty have declined from 42% of the world’s population in 1980 to 20% in 2003.<sup>129</sup> If globalization is responsible for such changes, then egalitarian liberals like John Rawls would have difficulty denying that globalization has failed to satisfy a major criteria for social justice – that globalization has “advantaged the least advantaged.”<sup>130</sup>

Norberg also produces data regarding the gini coefficient (the widely used summary index of inequality) to show that for the whole world, there has been a 10 percent decrease in income inequality between 1967 and 1997.<sup>131</sup> Recent studies by Bhalla and Sali-i-Martin provide further evidence that globalization is reducing economic inequality.<sup>132</sup> If such studies are correct, then even democratic socialists would have difficulty denying that globalization has achieved their conception of social justice, which involves attaining more economic equality.

In sum, globalists can argue that globalization has generally improved the circumstances of the poor and reduced economic inequality, and they can remind us of their own justice principles that call for safety nets of those remaining people who have not benefited from globalism. What more could the advocates of social justice demand? Or put another way by Norberg, "If everyone is coming to be better off, what does it matter that the improvement comes faster for some than for others?"<sup>133</sup>

Critics of globalism can respond to this question in two ways. First, they can challenge the empirical evidence. They can point out that globalization has done little to alleviate worldwide poverty, as "85% of all humans live in underdeveloped countries with average per capita gross domestic products that average around \$1200... and that 50 percent of the world's population live on less than \$2 a day."<sup>134</sup> They can point to studies showing that globalization has resulted in a "shift in the composition of the economy away from manufacturing and toward services (that) tend to lower overall productivity and overall wages."<sup>135</sup> They can also point to studies showing that income inequality has increased during periods of intense globalization. For example, Paul Hirst and Graham Thompson provide data showing significant increases in income inequality since 1970.<sup>136</sup> A United Nations report claims that between 1975 and 1997, real per capita Gross Domestic Product increased 53 percent on average in the industrialized countries and decreased 15 percent in the poorest.<sup>137</sup> That report also states that "the income gap between the fifth of the world's peoples living in the richest countries and the fifth in the poorest was 74 to 1 in 1997, up from 60 to 1 in 1990 and 30 to 1 in 1960."<sup>138</sup> And economist Branko Milanovic reports that "the bottom 5 percent of the world grew poorer, as their incomes decreased between 1988 and 1993 by 25 percent, while the richest quintile grew richer. It gained 12 percent in real terms."<sup>139</sup> Globalists like Bhagwati dismiss these studies as a "ludicrous" preoccupation with "data mongering," because inequality cannot be judged outside of particular contexts.<sup>140</sup>

Even if it difficult to sort out such contrasting empirical claims, critics of globalism can make a compelling theoretical argument that globalization does not produce social justice. Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen, elegantly answers Norberg's question as follows:

"Even if the poor were to get just a little richer, this would not necessarily imply that the poor were getting a fair share of the potentially vast benefits of global economic interrelationships. It is not adequate to ask whether international inequality is getting marginally larger or smaller. In order to rebel against the appalling poverty and the staggering inequalities that characterize the contemporary world – or to protest against the unfair sharing of the benefits of global cooperation – it is not necessary to show that the massive inequality or distributional unfairness is also getting marginally... [larger]. When there are gains from cooperation, there can be many possible arrangements. As the game theorist and mathematician [and fellow Nobel laureate] John Nash discussed ... (in "The Bargaining Problem" published in *Econometrica* in 1950...), the central issue in general is not whether a particular arrangement is better for everyone than no cooperation would be, but whether there is a fair division of the benefits. One cannot rebut the criticism that a distributional arrangement is unfair simply by noting that all the parties are better off than they would be in the absence of cooperation: the real exercise is the choice *between* these alternatives."<sup>141</sup>



In short, globalization is a highly abstract term for summarizing a wide host of arrangements and "deals." One deal (in many) may involve a particular investment in an underdeveloped country which yields huge economic gains. If international investors reap 70% of the gains, local elites reap 20% of the gains, and local workers reap 10% of the gains, the local workers may be less poor than they were and perhaps even in a more equal position than they were, but would the division of benefits be fair? From the perspective of local labor, many other distributions would seem much more fair. This means that social justice involves a fair deal in particular situations where gains are to be distributed, and while there is no absolutely just deal, there are some deals that are fairer than others. Getting a fairer deal involves having more equal distributions of power and bargaining rules that are less tilted in favor of the wealthy. Globalists, however, are blind to the fact that capitalist arrangements always give investors more power than workers and the implications of that fact for fair distributions. Globalists view the rules that are made to govern the bargaining situations as neutral when they in fact are developed by those who dominate the resources of capitalism. In short, social justice will not result from fair bargains until the bargaining processes and the institutions that make the rules governing these processes are more strongly democratized.

### Conclusions

Globalism is not the final political philosophy that culminates intellectual efforts to understand a good and just global society. It is rather the dominant governing ideology of our times. Its principles and underlying philosophical assumptions fall within the range of ideas that are acceptable within the underlying consensus that sustains pluralist societies. Perhaps this assessment means that globalism is a minimally acceptable grand political theory for our times, but surely better public philosophies are possible.

If we use the familiar idea of a right-to-left spectrum to locate political worldviews, the friends of pluralism fall in the moderate middle of that spectrum, and these ideologies are attacked by those on the radical right (such as Islamic Fundamentalists) and those on the radical left (such as the neo-anarchist protestors against globalization). Globalism is a pluralist ideology, but one that falls distinctly on the right side of the pluralist continuum. This paper provides criticisms of globalism that are made by those pluralists who reside to the left of globalists. While globalism is the dominant discourse of governmental and business leaders, it is probably the case that these pluralists to the left of globalism are dominant within academia. Our challenge is to develop a coherent statement and defense of a "progressive pluralist" public philosophy that will incorporate the beneficial insights of globalism while providing plausible alternatives to its limitations.

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Fukuyama (1992) understands that this consensus in the realm of ideas does not mean that all political communities are governed by these ideals.

<sup>2</sup> I believe there is widespread academic and political support for pluralist politics and thus for the basic ideals of pluralism, such as the equal dignity and moral autonomy of all individuals, social pluralism, and democracy. Of course, there are many critics of pluralism, but they usually endorse such pluralist ideals and merely seek to remedy the gap between pluralist ideals and pluralist practices. Deeper critics of pluralism are usually religious fundamentalists and communitarians who reject such pluralist ideals, stressing that political communities should be united around a monistic conception of moral goodness. Because moral and social pluralism is a fact of modern societies, I regard such critics of pluralism as dangerous.

<sup>3</sup> As Larner (2003) correctly points out, there are multiple neoliberalisms (or globalisms), just as there are many liberalisms, conservatisms, and other such worldviews. Nevertheless, I am interested in grand theory, in providing the most general account of globalism. While grand theories always oversimplify the practices of those who pursue the goals of an ideological tradition, they serve many useful academic and political purposes.

<sup>4</sup> Norberg, 2003: 8-9.

<sup>5</sup> Because the most comprehensive treatments of globalism have thus far been drawn largely from criticisms of globalism, the adequacy of these treatments can be questioned. Perhaps the leading example is that of Steger, 2005.

<sup>6</sup> A framework for describing grand political perspectives –viewed positively as public philosophies, viewed negatively as ideologies – is developed and applied to leading outlooks of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries in Schumaker, Kiel, and Heilke (1996). The essential methodology is to identify leading proponents of each outlook and interrogate their writing to determine their responses to the perennial issues of politics.

<sup>7</sup> The idea of an underlying consensus within pluralism has long been prominent in historical treatments of the United States (Hofstadter, 1948; Hartz, 1955), in studies of political ideas of people living in pluralist societies (McClosky and Zaller, 1982), and by political theorists analyzing the pluralist tradition (Dahl, 1961). As used here, such an underlying consensus is related to that of an “overlapping consensus” developed by John Rawls (1987, 1993: 133-172). Rawls argues that people in pluralist societies hold many “comprehensive moral doctrines” (or conceptions of human and social goodness), but that these doctrines have certain political principles in common, which comprise pluralism’s overlapping consensus. Rawls discussion of an overlapping consensus is directed towards establishing the importance of such a consensus for political stability and to demonstrating that it is more than a “modus vivendi.” Precisely because people hold competing moral doctrines, no single doctrine can be used to attain widespread allegiance to the principles of pluralism, yet such allegiance is necessary for its stability. Such allegiance cannot be a mere strategic compromise - a calculation that it is best to tolerate other moral doctrines politically to ensure no group will impose its doctrine on those holding different ones. Instead, despite their many differences, all doctrines affirm the moral goodness of the ideas in the overlapping consensus on the bases of their own reasoning. For example, all pluralists are committed to the equal dignity of all people, but they recognize that there is no need for consensus about the underlying basis of that equality. The ideas that “we are all children of God” or “we are all connected to a collective unconscious” may generate necessary belief in basic human equality. But secularists may reject such religious and spiritual foundations and instead base human equality on such beliefs as “we are all equally material beings whose suffering of pain and capacity for pleasure deserve equal consideration” or “we are all equal in our being members of this society.”

Given such concerns, Rawls does not provide much specification of the substantive content of pluralism’s overlapping consensus; he merely stipulates that this consensus will specify certain rights, give priority to these rights, and assure citizens “all purpose means” to use effectively their rights (Rawls, 1987:

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18). The ideas within the underlying consensus specified below are much more expansive, seeking to provide a more comprehensive set of basic common principles that pluralists having different outlooks might affirm if they deliberated on the great issues of politics. Of course, in the absence of such deliberation, I am far from certain that all pluralists would accept the principles proposed here. They are offered in the spirit of tentativeness that I believe is itself central to pluralism's underlying consensus.

The underlying consensus specified here provides only the most general guidance on the perennial issues of politics: it contains basic principles regarding the communities to which people owe their greatest allegiance, the institutions that should structure these communities, the requirements, rights and responsibilities of citizenship and leadership, the legitimate authority of governments, the requirements of justice, and the means of acceptable change. While Rawls claims that the overlapping consensus is "political, not metaphysical" and thus avoids underlying assumptions, I suggest that pluralism's underlying consensus also includes agreement on basic philosophical assumptions that are the bases of pluralist political principles. However, such assumptions are "thin" (or minimal); it is the thicker assumptions about ontology, human nature, the nature of society, and epistemology that generate conflict both between pluralists and non-pluralists and within pluralism.

Pluralism does not insist on either an enduring or unanimous underlying consensus. Pluralism only requires that *most* people in existing pluralist communities have allegiance to some core ideas. Modifications and improvements in the underlying consensus by future pluralist communities are possible and indeed likely. My depiction of this consensus is thus intended as a description of current core ideals of pluralism, not as enduring ideals for politics. While these ideals are imperfectly realized in actual political communities, they are not utopian and beyond the grasp of people committed to pluralism. Instead, they are realizable "here and now" (Miller and Walzer, 1995).

<sup>8</sup> For example, see Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus (1982), Putnam (2000), and Cigler and Joslyn (2002). Accepting the idea of multiple-community identities leaves unresolved many very important issues about community, and thus pluralist societies (including a pluralist global order) will experience conflicts between those who would give greater or less priority to global interconnections, national sovereignty, states rights, and local control. But the friends of pluralism do not deny any of these identities or seek to dissolve any of these communities; instead they seek marginal adjustments strengthening and weakening our identities with these communities and their influence over our lives. This same pattern of broad agreement on abstract principles and disagreement on more specific options within the acceptable range will recur when considering each element of the underlying consensus of pluralism.

<sup>9</sup> Friedman, 1999: 31. See also Thatcher (2002: xviii).

<sup>10</sup> Norberg, 2003: 104-111 and 163-168.

<sup>11</sup> Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse, 2003: 521-22.

<sup>12</sup> Fukuyama, 1999.

<sup>13</sup> Fukuyama, 1999: 80.

<sup>14</sup> Norberg, 2003: 278-285.

<sup>15</sup> This discussion is greater influenced by Walzer (1983: 31-62). Walzer's discussion influenced a revival of interest in citizenship during the past 20 years; Kymlicka (2002: 284-326) admirably summarizes much of this work.

<sup>16</sup> Perhaps recent immigrants and the young must undergo naturalization or maturation processes, but these exist only to prepare such people for full citizenship, to familiarize them with their fundamental rights and commensurate obligations, and not to create a permanent group of second-class citizens or alien residents with lesser or no rights.

<sup>17</sup> Norberg, 2003: 148-9.

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<sup>18</sup> Carens, 1987.

<sup>19</sup> See William Tabb, 2003.

<sup>20</sup> Immigrants and youth might be barred from these rights, but naturalization and maturation processes exist only as temporary restrictions until people are prepared to accept the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.

<sup>21</sup> Thatcher, 2002: 415.

<sup>22</sup> Friedman, 1999: 139-42.

<sup>23</sup> Galbraith, 1967; Walzer, 1983. This idea is also supported by public opinion research showing most Americans have sufficient support for both capitalism and democratic government that they seek marginal adjustments when their values conflict, rather than unregulated capitalism or pure democracy (McClosky and Zaller, 1984: 184-188).

<sup>24</sup> Friedman, 1999: 107.

<sup>25</sup> Norberg, 2003: 72-94.

<sup>26</sup> Norberg, 2003: 90.

<sup>27</sup> Fukuyama, 2004.

<sup>28</sup> Thatcher, 2002: xviii.

<sup>29</sup> Friedman, 1999: 145-166.

<sup>30</sup> Thatcher, 2002: 441 and 463.

<sup>31</sup> According to Norberg (2003: 189), "Microsoft's Bill Gates, the very personification of modern capitalism, himself devotes more to the campaign against disease in the developing countries than the American government does. Between November 1999 and 2000, through the \$23 billion Bill and Melinda Gates Health Fund, \$1.44 billion went to vaccinate children in developing countries from common diseases and to fund research into HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB."

<sup>32</sup> Friedman, 1999: 468-75.

<sup>33</sup> Despite feeling over-taxed, most citizens continue to believe that governments should be committing more resources to such problems as protecting the environment, promoting the nation's health, solving the problems of big cities, reducing crime, improving education, and providing assistance to the poor (Niemi, Mueller, and Smith, 1989: 73-91).

<sup>34</sup> Norberg, 2003: 192-97.

<sup>35</sup> Thatcher, 2002: 449-458.

<sup>36</sup> Norberg, 2003: 82.

<sup>37</sup> Thatcher, 2002: 431.

<sup>38</sup> Bhagwati (2004: 101) argues that the bulk of research shows that "the fear that globalization puts total social spending at risk because globalization punishes such spending needs to be discounted." For example, he claims that politicians in globalizing countries have incentives to promote social spending to protect

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their citizens from the vicissitudes and volatility of the global economy. Overall, he finds governments in globalizing conditions will increase or decrease social spending depending on their assessments of the overall capacities and needs of their society.

<sup>39</sup> Nozick, 1974.

<sup>40</sup> Thatcher, 2002: xviii; See also Norberg, 1993.

<sup>41</sup> Klosko (2000) argues that the underlying consensus in a liberal pluralist society is largely built around the concept of procedural justice.

<sup>42</sup> Nozick, 1974. Widespread support for market justice is reported by Lane (1986) and McClosky and Zaller (1984: 80-94). However, the notion that markets also generate injustice is suggested by the World Values Survey showing that the most important reason why people live in need is because of "injustice in our society" (Inglehart, Basanez and Moreno, 1998: V97).

<sup>43</sup> Walzer, 1983; Miller and Walzer, 1995; Miller, 1999.

<sup>44</sup> Thatcher, 2002: 431.

<sup>45</sup> Thatcher, 2002: 424.

<sup>46</sup> Nozick, 1974: 149-182.

<sup>47</sup> Thatcher, 2002: 416; Norberg, 2003: 90-94; DeSoto, 2000.

<sup>48</sup> Bhagwati, 2004: 53.

<sup>49</sup> Dollar and Kraay, 2001.

<sup>50</sup> Burtless, Lawrence, Litan, and Shapiro, 1998.

<sup>51</sup> Norberg, 2003: 89.

<sup>52</sup> Dahl, 1998: 100-118.

<sup>53</sup> Norberg, 2003: 38-40.

<sup>54</sup> Bhagwati, 2004: 93-94.

<sup>55</sup> Norberg, 2003: 40. This proposition is collaborated by Bruce Russett (1990) and other contributors to the literature on "the democratic peace." The CATO institute's Tom Palmer (2002:5) puts the same idea conversely: "There is an old adage: when goods cannot cross borders, armies surely will."

<sup>56</sup> Friedman, 1999: 112.

<sup>57</sup> Shapiro, 2002.

<sup>58</sup> Thatcher, 2002: xxii.

<sup>59</sup> Friedman, 1999: 139.

<sup>60</sup> Norberg, 2003: 274.

<sup>61</sup> Norberg, 2003: 177; Thatcher, 2002: 458.

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<sup>62</sup> Kymlicka, 2002: 312-315.

<sup>63</sup> The World Values Survey shows widespread support for reform, as opposed to revolutionary change or maintenance of the status quo (Inglehart, Basanez and Moreno: 1998: V249).

<sup>64</sup> Friedman, 1999: 81.

<sup>65</sup> Hardt and Negri (2000) provide a quasi-Marxist analysis insofar as they emphasize the forces of domination that accompany globalization and insofar as they give multinational corporations as imperialist role in Empire.

<sup>66</sup> See various selections in Steger (2004: 153-254)

<sup>67</sup> Lukes, 2004.

<sup>68</sup> Hawkesworth, 2004.

<sup>69</sup> One exception to this pattern is the effort by Bhagwati (2004: 106-121) to address the charge that globalism promotes cultural imperialism.

<sup>70</sup> Steger, 2001: 54-61.

<sup>71</sup> John Rawls (1999) created his "original position" to explicitly recognize and contain those assumptions that he understood as necessary bases for his principles of egalitarian liberalism.

<sup>72</sup> While Rawls contends that the overlapping consensus of pluralism involves only political ideas, not metaphysical or philosophical ones, Stephen K. White (2000) suggests that pluralism requires a "weak ontology." I extend White's argument to suggest that pluralism requires a variety of thin or minimal assumptions about human nature, the nature of society, and epistemology.

<sup>73</sup> Perhaps the classical articulation of this idea is by T.H. Huxley (1888) who insisted that even if evolution was influenced by the struggle for existence and the survival of the strongest, human societies could choose to follow socialist values of cooperation and helping the weak survive.

<sup>74</sup> This widely accepted assumption is discussed in Schumaker, Kiel, and Heilke (1996: 50).

<sup>75</sup> Steger, 2001: 54-61.

<sup>76</sup> Fukuyama, 1992: xiv-xv.

<sup>77</sup> Fukuyama, 1992: xvi.

<sup>78</sup> Norberg, 2003: 286-291.

<sup>79</sup> Schumaker, 1991: 174-202

<sup>80</sup> Fukuyama, 1992: 143-208.

<sup>81</sup> Norberg, 2003: 136-144. This assumption seems important to counter the Marxist argument that the productive capacities of free-market capitalism will outstrip our demand for economic goods and services and that over-supply will eventually lead to the downfall of the capitalist system.

<sup>82</sup> Postman, 1985.

<sup>83</sup> Fukuyama, 1992: vi-xvii.

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<sup>84</sup> Gilbert, 2000. Jon Gertner (2003) provides an interesting discussion of research in affective forecasting.

<sup>85</sup> See, for example, Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) and Peck (2003). This literature finds that beyond a certain point, increases in wealth provide little if any increase in happiness.

<sup>86</sup> Sandel, 1984.

<sup>87</sup> Norberg, 2003: 278-85.

<sup>88</sup> This vast literature is well summarized by Thiel (1997).

<sup>89</sup> Mitchell, 1983.

<sup>90</sup> Occasionally, some democratic theorists such as Benjamin Barber (1983: 139) seem to make this claim, but more careful readings suggest that they affirm the tentative social understandings that democracy provides.

<sup>91</sup> For example, Glen Tinder (1991: 225-38) endorses the concept of humane uncertainty to express liberalism's disdain for claims to ultimate truth. George Soros (1998) endorses the concepts of fallibility and an open society to capture Karl Popper's insistence on human imperfection in our search for ultimate truth.

<sup>92</sup> Schumaker, Kiel, and Heilke (1996: 49-58) discuss the deductive science of classical liberalism. Globalists may also implicitly base their principles on a deductive Cartesian science, though I am unaware of any explicit attempt to do so. However, the following sort of deductive argument seems prominent in globalist thinking.

- The existence and dignity of each individual cannot be doubted.
- The subjectivity of the good cannot be doubted.
- In order to pursue their subjective conceptions of the good, individuals therefore must have rights of life, liberty, and property (insofar as they own their labor that gives value to property under their possession).
- The principles of free-market capitalism follows from the right of individuals to exchange their labor and property for other goods.
- The principles of representative democracy and limited government follow from the right of individuals to have their liberties and property rights abridged only with their consent.
- The principles of deregulation, privatization, and minimal public welfare provisions are applications of the principle of limited government in an era following the Cold War period when strong states over-regulated the economy, created bloated bureaucracies to deliver excessive public programs and goods, and provided welfare rights that violated property rights.

While there is an intuitive appeal to this sort of deductive science being able to arrive at the "truths" of globalism, most of these propositions and deductions can be challenged. Additionally, deductions of this sort can lead not only to justifications for the inequalities of the market but to the equalities of human rights, as suggested by Alan Gewirth (1984).

<sup>93</sup> Even an ascetic monk whose only ultimate end is divine grace would be benefited by the possession of money, since money can be used to buy time and material necessities enabling him to devote even more attention to the pursuit of God.

<sup>94</sup> Fukuyama, 1992: xv.

<sup>95</sup> Fukuyama, 1992: 71-81.

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- <sup>96</sup> See, for example, Gutmann and Thompson (2004).
- <sup>97</sup> Political rationality does not solve problems but only addresses them, because the extent to which political programs and policies remove the problems they address can only be evaluated pragmatically after their implementation. Decision-making in the market cannot address various problems due to well-known difficulties such as the free-rider phenomenon in the provision of public goods, neighborhood effects that burden people who are negatively influenced but not parties to free market transactions, and poverty effects that reduce market supply of the goods that poor people cannot purchase.
- <sup>98</sup> Many social theories, including the economic and public choice theories that sustain democratic capitalism, are understood to have underlying assumptions that are limited and even false, but these assumptions are nevertheless regarded as "fruitful" because they lead to propositions that help us understand and navigate the real world.
- <sup>99</sup> Norberg, 2003: 25-37.
- <sup>100</sup> Gwartney, *et al.*, 2001.
- <sup>101</sup> See, for example, Amartya Sen (2002).
- <sup>102</sup> Stiglitz, 2002: A18.
- <sup>103</sup> Ferradas, 2003.
- <sup>104</sup> Scheve and Slaughter, 2004.
- <sup>105</sup> Martin and Schumann (1996) suggest that such deprivation will not lead to a revolution to correct the problem, as globalist leaders have learned how to deflect citizen dissent through such strategies as providing "tittytainment" for the masses.
- <sup>106</sup> See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld>.
- <sup>107</sup> Ratner, 2003.
- <sup>108</sup> Schumaker, Kiel, Heilke, 1996: 242-243.
- <sup>109</sup> Norberg, 2003: 38.
- <sup>110</sup> Fukuyama, 1992: 48-50.
- <sup>111</sup> Longworth, 2001: 19.
- <sup>112</sup> Longworth, 2001; Hamilton, 2004: 77-78.
- <sup>113</sup> Dahl, 1998: 35-43.
- <sup>114</sup> Crenson and Ginsberg, 2004.
- <sup>115</sup> Barber, 1984 and 2003.
- <sup>116</sup> Norberg, 2003: 40.
- <sup>117</sup> Marble, 2003.
- <sup>118</sup> Stiglitz, 2002: A20.



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- <sup>119</sup> Fukuyama, 2002: 82-88.
- <sup>120</sup> Bussolini, 2003. As Sen (2002:A6) argues, the U.S. finds itself at the center of a global market of a commodity that endangers world peace, as “its share has gone up to almost 50 percent of the total sales in the world.”
- <sup>121</sup> Norberg, 2003: 278.
- <sup>122</sup> Fukuyama, 1999.
- <sup>123</sup> Thatcher, 2002: 430-435.
- <sup>124</sup> Walzer, 1983.
- <sup>125</sup> Schaar, 1967.
- <sup>126</sup> Hayek, 1982.
- <sup>127</sup> Sen ??
- <sup>128</sup> Lim, 2000.
- <sup>129</sup> Norberg, 2003: 25-26; Bhalla, 2002.
- <sup>130</sup> The difference principle of Rawls (1999) claims that inequalities must both improve the conditions of the least advantaged and be attained under conditions of fair equal opportunity. Since conditions of fair equal opportunity – of maximal efforts to erase the effects of undeserved natural talents and social circumstances – are far from attained, Rawlsians could well complain about the inequalities of wealth that occur under globalization on such grounds.
- <sup>131</sup> Norberg 2003: 57.
- <sup>132</sup> Bhalla, 2002; Sali-i-Martin, 2002.
- <sup>133</sup> Norberg, 2003: 54.
- <sup>134</sup> Pogge, 2004: 12-14.
- <sup>135</sup> Rupert, 2000: 32.
- <sup>136</sup> Hirst and Thomson, 1996: 67-72.
- <sup>137</sup> Pogge (2004) cites United Nations Development Program (1999: 154).
- <sup>138</sup> United Nations Development Program, 1999: 3.
- <sup>139</sup> Milanovic, 2002: 51-92.
- <sup>140</sup> The point that Bhagwati (2004: 66-67) is making is that the incomes of peoples in places like the US and Bangladesh are simply incomparable, given the vastly different circumstances of people living in these different places. Differences in costs of living and differences in the consumption patters of one's neighbors are just the most obvious of such differences.
- <sup>141</sup> Sen, 2002: A5.