ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND COMMUNITY CONFLICT:

A COMPARATIVE ISSUES APPROACH

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ABSTRACT

The formulation of municipal policies concerning 12 recent economic development issues in Lawrence, Kansas, is examined to test hypotheses about the composition of pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions and about the relationships between coalitional characteristics and policy outcomes. Although the characteristics of pro-growth and anti-growth actors generally conform to the models developed by Mollenkopf and others, significant variation in coalition characteristics across issues is found. Pro-growth coalitions are most successful when they are led by a mayor acting as a developmental entrepreneur and when the pro-growth coalition is composed primarily of upper-stratum actors. But pro-growth coalitions are likely to be defeated when these conditions are absent and when large anti-growth coalitions are mobilized, expanding the scope of conflict. These results provide elaborations upon prevailing theories that stress the importance of "political entrepreneurs" and the presence of "systemic bias" in community conflict over economic development policies.

City governments have a strong interest in promoting economic development in order to generate jobs, increase tax revenues without increasing

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taxes or tax rates, and thus enhance the quality of municipal services. But whether or not economic growth constitutes a "unitary interest" of the city has been a subject of recent debate among urban scholars (e.g., Peterson 1981; Fainstein et al. 1983). Most economic growth policies, especially those involving the development of a city's export economy, no doubt have consequences, due to the multiplier effect, that serve the public interest understood in utilitarian terms. However, it is also clear that many economic development policies have adverse consequences that are contrary to the interests of some residents and thus prompt their mobilization; these adverse effects include residential displacement, environmental stress, and the opportunity costs associated with investing in capital goods rather than in social consumption. As a result, policies seeking to promote economic development usually generate extensive conflict within communities.

Such conflict is the focus of this paper. In part 1 we argue that prevailing models of community conflict concerning economic development policies are suggestive of general, or modal, tendencies; but these models fail to observe the presence within communities of extensive variations in the compositions of pro-growth and anti-growth (or slow-growth) coalitions and in policy decisions. In part 2 a methodology is outlined facilitating a comparison of coalitional characteristics and policy outcomes across a small sample of economic development issues within Lawrence, Kansas. In part 3 the modalities and the variations in coalitional characteristics for 12 economic development issues in Lawrence, are presented. In part 4, variances in the characteristics of pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions are related to policy outcomes. These results are then discussed in terms of their implications for conflict theory and for the theories of "political entrepreneurship" and of "systemic bias," which are widely cited descriptions and explanations of economic development policy outcomes.

PREVAILING VIEWS ABOUT COMMUNITY CONFLICT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Building on the earlier foundations of Dahl (1961), Williams and Adrian (1963), Salisbury (1964), and others, the theoretical literature on community conflict surrounding economic development policies has expanded dramatically during the past 10 years. (See, for example, Wolfinger, 1974; Mollenkopf 1975, 1983; Molotch 1976; Stone 1976, 1980; Peterson 1981; Trounstine and Christensen 1982; Fainstein et al. 1983; Fosler and Berger 1983; Jones, Bachelor, and Wilson 1986.) Two general types of questions have been particularly addressed in this literature: (1) What types of actors are most likely to support or oppose economic growth policies? Or, more generally, what are the characteristics of pro-growth and anti-growth (or

slow-growth) coalitions within communities? (2) Which types of actors usually win in community struggles over economic development? Why? And under what conditions do anti-growth forces succeed in halting economic growth projects?

Perhaps the most ambitious effort to define the "city trenches" (Katznelson 1981) or "fault lines" (Fainstein et al. 1983) dividing communities over economic development policies is that of Mollenkopf (1983), who suggests a relatively universal pattern of pro-growth and anti-growth actors. Believing that economic growth constitutes a collective good and contributes to electoral success, mayors and other elected officials take the initiative in creating a pro-growth coalition. (See also Dahl 1961; Salisbury 1964). Public administrators also play a key entrepreneurial role in pro-growth coalitions, for they view economic growth as a necessary means of enhancing revenues and thus enhancing program budgets (Claggett 1983). Local business interests—including bankers, downtown merchants, realtors, and newspapers—all see the opportunity for increased trade in economic growth and are generally active participants in pro-growth coalitions (Morlock 1974). Public-sector employees tend to view wage increases as dependent on increased tax revenues generated by economic growth, and they may also participate actively. In addition, middle-class residents, especially those living in newer neighborhoods, who are insulated from the costs of economic development but dependent on its benefits to achieve upward mobility, are likely to be mobilized in support of economic development. These diverse actors are normally mobilized in support of growth policies by the Democratic Party in large cities and by the Republican Party in suburbs and middle-sized communities.

In contrast, anti-growth forces are generally led by neighborhood organizations and ad hoc protest groups composed of displaced blacks and ethnics as well as other interests threatened by specific economic development programs. In addition, ecologically oriented upper-middle-class professionals are often mobilized in an anti-growth coalition (Fainstein et al. 1983).

While this descriptive model of pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions may hold in many cases, its limitations have been implicitly suggested by Clark and Ferguson (1983), who find that cities vary dramatically in their political cultures and thus in the kinds of actors involved in and supportive of various economic and budgetary policies. The detailed case studies of urban redevelopment in specific cities provided by Fainstein et al. (1983), Fosler and Berger (1982), and Fleishman and Feagen (1985) reinforce this notion of significant cross-community variations in the patterns of community conflict on growth policies. Even within communities, specific economic development issues can spawn conflicts within the business community or within the middle class, between core and peripheral areas

or neighborhoods of the city, between groups seeking capital accumulation and those wishing social consumption, and even among lower-income neighborhoods (Fainstein and Fainstein 1983:255). If there is such great diversity of cleavages within communities on economic development issues, caution must be exercised against overgeneralizing about the characteristics of pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions. Simple models depicting conflict on urban economic policy as involving business interests versus neighborhood interests may be theoretically limited and thus provide a faulty guide to political action.

In response to the question, "Who wins on development issues?" Stone (1980) has suggested the presence of "systemic bias" in favor of pro-growth interests, due to the dependence of public officials on the resources, status, and organizational involvements of upper-stratum, pro-growth actors.

Just as one can concede Mollenkopf's modal pattern of community conflict, one can concede Stone's depiction of the modal pattern of policy outcomes. Yet policy outcomes, like coalitional characteristics, exhibit important variations. It can be argued, for example, that economic development policies may sometimes fail without the support of various types of actors considered to be influential by alternative models of community power: elected officials (Eulau and Eyestone 1968; Dahl 1961), public administrators (Lineberry 1977; Newton 1976), private elites (Hunter 1953; Domhoff 1983), policy activists (Verba and Nie 1972; Zeigler and Tucker 1978:5-7), interest and protest groups (Lowi 1979; Yates 1977), and voters (Hoffman 1976; Clark and Ferguson 1983).

To achieve the necessary support of such actors, the presence of a "policy entrepreneur" may be crucial (Eyestone 1978; Mollenkopf 1983). Salisbury (1964) and Jones, Bachelor, and Wilson (1986) suggest that mayors are in a strategic position to act as entrepreneurs and lead pro-growth coalitions because of their base of electoral support and ability to mobilize public opinion through their control of information, their central positions in the networks of communication between public and private interests, their control over the professional planning bureaucracies, and their capacity to mobilize private and public—including state and federal—resources. Salisbury (1964) and Claggett (1983) suggest that a city manager may also be able to play the role of policy entrepreneur, although Jones, Bachelor, and Wilson (1986) suggests that the manager is much more restricted in this role. In short, economic development initiatives may fail in the absence of a supportive and strong mayor or, perhaps, city manager.

If pro-growth forces can fail when adequate leadership is lacking, anti-growth forces may be able to overcome systemic bias under certain conditions. For example, both Mollenkopf (1983) and Fainstein and Fainstein (1983: 258-268) argue that anti-growth forces were more successful in the 1970s than either previously or subsequently. And Henig (1982) suggests

that successful neighborhood mobilization can occur, especially under such conditions as cultural homogeneity, the presence of preexisting neighborhood organizations, and a competitive balance of power within a community.

In general, a neopluralist perspective (Manley 1983) on community conflict would suggest that both pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions have a variety of potential resources available to them, and the resolution of specific issues is strongly influenced by the ability of each side to mobilize these resources. However, the most critical resources needed by each side are only vaguely suggested in the literature. As suggested above, the success of pro-growth coalitions seems to depend upon the leadership of "policy entrepreneurs" and the presence of upper-stratum actors. For anti-growth coalitions, however, the critical resources may be different. According to conflict theory, relatively disadvantaged groups must expand the scope of conflict to be successful (Schattschneider 1960), mobilizing the support of other influential "third parties" (Lipsky 1970) and public opinion (Schumaker 1975). Building a large and diverse coalition against the project through legitimate means of public protest may thus be critical to the success of anti-growth forces (Gamson 1975:51).

In short, prevailing models of community conflict provide useful depictions of the type of actors that generally support or oppose economic development policies and useful descriptions and explanations of policy outcomes. But they do not adequately relate coalitional patterns to policy outcomes. In this paper, we expand on these models by testing the following four hypotheses dealing with coalitional patterns and with the relationships between coalitional characteristics and economic development policy outcomes.

Hypothesis 1: The composition of pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions follow *general* patterns defined by the positions, attitudes, and demographic characteristics of their members. Pro-growth coalitions typically attract members with the following characteristics:

a. elected officials
b. public administrators
c. local business interests and private elites
d. upper-status activists
e. residents of newer neighborhoods having higher property values
f. public sector employees
g. Republicans, at least in medium-sized communities.

Hypothesis 2: Despite these *general* patterns, there will be large variations in the composition of pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions on specific economic development issues. There will be little overlap in coalitional

membership across issues within a community, and, as a result, the dominant cleavages will vary across issues.

Hypothesis 3: The outcomes of economic development policies depend on the distribution of support for the project provided by several types of actors. The preferences and participation of public officials (especially mayors and city managers) and of issue-specific activists shape economic growth policies. But the preferences of broader publics are also important.

Hypothesis 4: The composition, hierarchical structure, and size of coalitions affect their success in achieving desired outcomes. Pro-growth coalitions are more successful when they are composed of a homogeneous group of upper-stratum actors. Anti-growth forces are more successful when they have heirarchical (i.e., centralized) leadership structures and when they are large.

TWELVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN LAWRENCE, KANSAS

This study is based on 12 economic development issues that have arisen and required policy decisions by the city commission during the past five years in Lawrence, Kansas. In addition to its convenience, Lawrence was selected because of its relatively liberal political culture (Schumaker 1984a:7) and its reformed institutions. According to prevailing theory, reformed institutions (principally the city management form of government with nonpartisan, at-large elections) are relatively responsive to business and other pro-growth interests (Banfield and Wilson 1963; Morlock 1974). However, the presence of a broad commitment to liberal values within a community might be thought to serve as a counterforce to reformed institutions, providing a receptive climate to anti-growth actors. The countervailing tendencies of reformed institutions and of a liberal political culture might thus provide a context where neither pro-growth nor anti-growth forces consistently prevail, resulting in considerable variation in the degree of success by pro-growth actors on economic policy issues.

This research is part of a larger study that examines the preferences of various community actors (e.g., elected representatives, administrative officials, private elites, various kinds of organized groups, activists, and voters) and the pressures these actors have exerted to influence policy outcomes on 30 community issues (Schumaker 1984b). Issues were selected for this larger sample because they were concrete manifestations of seven abstract policy concepts and because they exhibited diverse levels of controversy—thus avoiding the problems discussed by Bachrach and Baratz

(1962) of selecting only "key issues" (Schumaker 1984b:13). Two of these abstract concepts concern distributive policies and regulatory policies affecting economic development:

1. The Distributive Policy issue [SUBSIDY]: Should local government provide tax incentives, services, and other inducements to attract new industry to the community?
2. The Regulatory Policy Issue [LANDUSE]: Should property owners have the right to develop their land in accordance with market forces despite potentially adverse effects on neighborhoods and others in the community?

Of our original 30 issues, 13 appeared to be strong concrete manifestations of these two abstract policy concepts (Schumaker, 1984a:14). One of these issues has not yet been resolved, leaving 12 issues for analysis in this report. Each of these issues was selected prior to its policy decision being known, thus diminishing the chance of a biased sample. In Table I, these issues are listed along with data about the type of abstract concept they embody, their outcomes, and some characteristics about the pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions that developed around them.

For each issue, data were gathered concerning the preferences of elected and administrative officials, private elites, activists, and citizens, and the involvements of interest groups, protest groups, and task forces. Citizen preferences on the issues were derived from citizen surveys conducted during the springs of 1980, 1982, and 1984. The following sample sizes were obtained: for 1980, $n=532$; for 1982, $n=269$; and for 1984, $n=406$.

Data on activists, private elites, and groups were obtained from 203 telephone and personal interviews, mostly conducted between July 1983 and June 1984. We began with three lists as the basis for these interviews: (1) those persons, other than formal decision makers, mentioned as active in our issues by newspaper accounts or minutes of meetings, (2) those heads of community groups possibly being involved in governmental issues, and (3) the 100 persons ranked as most influential in a modified reputational study of Lawrence (Bolland 1984). Over 600 persons were contacted about their involvement and less than 5 percent refused interviews. However, many persons, especially group leaders and private elites, were not ultimately included in our sample, as they claimed no or very little involvement on our issues.

Respondents were asked standard questions about their socioeconomic backgrounds, their broad philosophical orientations toward local government, and their organizational affiliations. Then, they were asked to describe their involvement on each issue in our sample and, if active, to estimate their success. On the basis of these responses, further questions

Table I. Twelve Economic Development Issues in Lawrence, Kansas. Outcomes and Some Coalitional Characteristics

	Abstract Issue type	*Outcome*	*Pro-Growth Coalition*		*Anti-Growth Coalition*	
			SIZE	*HIERARCHY*	*SIZE*	*HIERARCHY*
1. Development of Cornfield Mall (CORN)	LANDUSE	13	20	.371	38	.304
2. Development of JVJ Downtown Mall (JVJ)	LANDUSE SUBSIDY	15	22	.405	53	.350
3. Development of Sizeler Downtown Mall (SZLR)	LANDUSE SUBSIDY	13	28	.426	23	.504
4. Down-zoning in Oread Neighborhood (OREAD)	LANDUSE	39	22	.496	25	.452
5. Down-zoning in East Lawrence (EAST)	LANDUSE	14	23	.226	22	.468
6. The Bluffs Development (BLUFF)	LANDUSE	30	16	.468	18	.367
7. Develop Rail-Served Industrial Park (RAIL)	LANDUSE SUBSIDY	15	55	.378	20	.527
8. Develop Research Office Park (TECH)	LANDUSE SUBSIDY	49	51	.373	7	.300
9. Authorization of IRBs to Competing Firms (IRB)	SUBSIDY	35	24	.288	32	.205
10. Build Parking Lot at 600 Masasachusetts (PARK)	LANDUSE	50	11	.533	35	.413
11. Improve Airport (AIR)	SUBSIDY	47	24	.195	10	.091
12. Improve North 2nd St. (N2ST)	SUBSIDY	37	22	.498	6	0

were asked about those issues in which the respondent was most involved. During this battery of questions, activists were asked to indicate their principal allies and opponents on each issue, enabling us to determine the composition of both pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions. Activists were also asked if they acted as individuals or as members of a group on each issue. If interviewees indicated a group involvement, they were asked a variety of questions about group goals, activity, stability, size, cohesion, leadership, and membership.

Thirty-six elected and administrative officials were also interviewed in May and June 1984, with a 100 percent response rate being achieved.

Among other matters, officials were asked about their preferences and involvements in each issue, their justifications for personal and collective decisions, their perceptions of activist and audience (public) preferences, and their views of those individuals and groups most influential on each issue.

Measures of policy outcomes [OUTCOME in Table I] on each issue area were derived from both official and activist interviews. The success of pro-growth forces is conceptualized as a continuous variable ranging between 10 and 50. If all pro-growth proponents agreed that they were highly successful and all opponents agreed that they were highly unsuccessful, an outcome score of 50 was assigned. If all pro-growth proponents agreed that they were highly unsuccessful and all opponents agreed that they were highly successful, an outcome score of 10 was assigned. If proponents and opponents of economic growth had equal aggregated success scores, the intermediate outcome score (30) was assigned. The outcome scores of activists and public officials were highly correlated ($r = .95$), lending validity to OUTCOME. Our summary OUTCOME measures reported in Table I are the average scores derived from official and activist perceptions.[1]

For each of these issues, we have obtained measures of the following factors hypothesized to effect economic development policy OUTCOMES:

A. *The aggregated "net" preferences* of elected representatives [REPS], public administrators [ADMINS], private elites [ELITES], issue-specific activists [ACTIVES], and VOTERS. The net preference score for each type of actor on each issue is simply the percentage of persons holding unambiguous anti-growth positions subtracted from the percentage of persons holding unambiguous pro-growth positions.

B. *The "pressure"* exerted by previously organized interest groups [PERMGRP], ad hoc issue-specific protest groups [PROTEST], and issue-specific task forces [TASK]. Group support scores are based not only on the position of involved groups, but also the "pressure" each group has exerted in pursuit of its position. In other words, group demands were weighted, such that a large, highly involved, high-resource group would exert more pressure than a small, marginally involved, low-resource group.[2] Measures of net demands by various types of groups within each issue area were then calculated by subtracting pressure scores of anti-growth groups from pressure scores of pro-growth groups.

C. *Pro-growth and anti-growth coalition characteristics*. Data on the size, composition, and hierarchy of both pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions on each issue were generated from the interview data with activists and public officials. To determine "membership" in an issue-specific pro-growth coalition, we included all activists and officials indicating a pro-growth position, all persons identified by public officials as influential in supporting

growth, all persons mentioned by pro-growth activists as their supporters, and all persons mentioned by anti-growth activists as their opponents. In a similar manner, we identified members of anti-growth coalitions on each issue. The SIZE of pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions is simply the number of persons so identified. The HIERARCHY of each coalition—indicating the extent to which visibility within the coalition is concentrated within a few persons or diffused among many persons—was determined using interval-level measures of reputed involvement. Each person in a coalition was given a score of reputed involvement equal to the number of times that person was mentioned by others as an influential or important supporter of the pro-growth (or anti-growth) position. Gini coefficients were then calculated for inequality of involvement.[3] To the extent that persons in a coalition are equally cited, a low gini coefficient was obtained, indicating a nonhierarchical or diffused coalition structure. To the extent that a few persons in a coalition were frequently cited while others were seldom cited, a high gini coefficient was obtained indicating a hierarchical or concentrated coalition structure.

Demographic and attitudinal data from interviewed coalition members were used to determine the characteristics of pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions in each issue. The following characteristics of coalition members are reported here: (1) socioeconomic status [SES], (2) mean property values of homes in their neighborhoods [PROPVAL], (3) self-reported ideological orientations [LIBCON], and (4) party identification [DEMREP]. Aggregating these data for all coalition members provided measures of central tendencies and variances on these characteristics within each coalition.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PRO-GROWTH AND ANTI-GROWTH COALITIONS

The typical composition of pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions is suggested by the data in Tables II and III. Table II reports correlations between some background characteristics of activists and their opposition or support for economic development issues (GROWINDX).[4] Table III summarizes the involvement and positions of such key actors as the Chamber of Commerce, the local newspaper, and political leaders on our 12 issues.

Hypothesis 1, which specifies the types of individuals and groups that typically participate in pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions, is generally supported by the data. The roles of various kinds of participants in these coalitions are elaborated upon below.

Elected Officials. As shown in Table III, various mayors and city com-

Table II. Background Variables and Involvement in Economic Development Issues (Zero-Order Correlations)

Background Characteristics	*Correlation with GROWINDX*
Public official standing (OFFICIAL)	.12
Elite standing (ELITES)	.15*
Reputational importance within elite (REPUT)	.35*
Network centrality within elite (CENTRAL)	.44*
Socioeconomic status (SES)	.05
Neighborhood mean property values (PROPVAL)	.41*
Employment in public sector (SECTOR)	−.11
Republican Party identification (DEMREP)	.32*
Ideological conservatism (LIBCON)	.09
Race (BLACK)	−.02

*p < .05.

Table III. The Involvement of Key Actors in Economic Development Issues (Number of Issues = 12)

	Involved	*Initated*	*Supportive*	*Opposed*
Incumbent mayor	11.0[a]	1.0	7.0	4.0
Other commissioners, 1980–1984 (averages)	7.9	0.1	4.5	3.4
City manager	11.0	1.0	10.0	1.0
Five top administrators in city government (averages)	5.8	0.2	4.0	0.8
Five most active business elites (averages)	6.0	0.8	5.6	0.4
Five most active neighborhood leaders (averages)	5.4	0	1.0	5.2
Groups				
Chamber of Commerce	9.0	4.0	8.0	1.0
Building trade unions	5.0	0	5.0	0
Lawrence *Journal World*	10.0	0	9.0	1.0
Neighborhood organizations	6.0	0	0	6.0
Organized developers/realtors/landlords	8.0	6.0	8.0	0
Task forces	4.0	4.0	4.0	0
Ad hoc protest	5.0	0	0	5.0

[a]Incumbent mayors were also involved in a twelfth issue (IRB), but the IRB issue had many resolutions over the five years of this study, with no consistent pattern of mayoral support.

missioners have been active on an average of two-thirds of the 12 issues. Elected officials generally were involved in those issues that arose while they served on the commission, and only occasionally were they involved in those issues that arose prior to or subsequent to their terms of office. However, Lawrence's mayors (as well as the commissioners) have varied in their level of support for economic development policies, as one mayor has tended to represent neighborhood interests and three others have not been consistently pro-growth. In general, elected officials do not differ significantly from other activists in the community in their level of pro-growth participation on economic development issues ($r = .12$ in Table II). Moreover, elected officials have not been initiators of pro-growth issues. The mayor and other city commissioners are important because of their formal decision-making powers, but their role is reactive (Stone 1980), as they attempt to balance the initiatives of developers, the Chamber of Commerce, and other pro-growth forces with the protests of those in the anti-growth coalition. In short, the weak mayors in Lawrence's council-manager form of government—who have few formal powers and who have no special electoral base due to their being selected by other commissioners on an annual basis—do not usually play the role of policy entrepreneurs.

Public administrators have been both less involved in and more supportive of economic development policies than elected officials. Seldom has any top administrator in city government opposed economic growth projects, and the city manager and director of the planning department supported all economic growth projects except for the Cornfield Mall. However, only these two officials were highly involved across our 12 issues.

Local business interests also participated to a high degree, and as hypothesized, they overwhelmingly supported pro-growth positions. Except for two down-zoning proposals, which were proposed by public officials and neighborhood organizations, the economic development issues were initiated by the Chamber of Commerce, businessmen, and developers. The Chamber was particularly important in initiating those issues involving multiple economic actors (e.g., AIR, N2ST, RAIL, and TECH). Developers, in contrast, initiated specific projects (e.g., CORN, JVJ, SZLR, BLUFF). In short, business interests were particularly influential in setting the agenda of economic development issues.

With respect to overall involvement, the Chamber of Commerce participated in the pro-growth coalition on nine of the economic development issues while opposing only one. The local newspaper was involved in 10 issues, taking the pro-growth side in nine of them. Area developers were unanimously in favor of those issues in which they participated, as were local bankers.

In general, activists identified as community leaders [ELITES] by a modified reputational analysis tended to be slightly more pro-growth than were

other activists (r = .15). Indeed, the greater a leader's reputation [REPUT] and centrality [CENTRAL] within the elite network, the greater was his or her pro-growth involvement. (See Table II.)

Surprisingly, the *socioeconomic status [SES] of activists* is not related significantly to pro-growth involvement (r = .05). This suggests that many anti-growth activists also have higher incomes, educational attainments, and occupational positions.

As expected, the *neighborhood* where activists reside is related significantly to their general involvement in economic development issues. Residents of newer neighborhoods having higher average property values [PROPVAL] tend to be pro-growth while residents of older neighborhoods having lower average property values tend to be anti-growth. Indeed, neighborhood organizations representing older areas of the community have been active on half of the issues in the sample, in each case taking anti-growth positions.

Contrary to expectations, persons employed in the *private sector* [SECTOR] tended to be slightly more pro-growth than those in the public sector (r = −.11). This can be largely explained by two factors, however. First, municipal employees tended not to participate, and any pro-growth tendencies they might have exhibited were not registered. Second, many of the public-sector employees who did participate were staff and faculty members at the University of Kansas; as is true with many universities, the politically liberal tradition there may well have fostered an anti-growth position among its employees.

Republicans [DEMREP] were hypothesized to take pro-growth positions on economic development issues, and the data support this hypothesis. Although this finding conflicts with Mollenkopf's emphasis on Democratic support for economic growth, it may be explained by the difference between Lawrence and other larger cities with a substantial blue-collar population and labor union membership. Indeed, in Lawrence the building trade unions took pro-growth positions on five economic development issues. But Lawrence is primarily a white-collar community, with a low unemployment rate, and the New Deal Democratic coalition is probably not a very potent force there.

While these findings provide general support for the first hypothesis, the magnitude of the observed relationships between personal characteristics and pro-growth activism is sufficiently low to suggest important differences among issues. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2, which suggests that the membership of pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions changes across issues. This hypothesis is more directly supported by the data summarized in Table IV, which show the intercorrelations among coalition membership across issues to be generally small. Only in a few isolated cases did coalition membership show substantial overlap between issues. (E.g., the Cornfield

Table IV. Significant Overlaps among Actors Across Issue Areas (Pearson Correlations where $p < .05$)

	JVJ	*SZLR*	*OREAD*	*EAST*	*BLUFF*	*RAIL*	*TECH*	*IRB*	*ARK*	*AIR*	*N2ST*
CORN	.28	−.49	—	.12	—	—	—	−.16	−.15	−.11	—
JVJ		−.17	—	.25	.09	—	.18	.16	.26	.09	—
SZLR			—	−.16	—	.22	.09	.28	.11	.14	—
OREAD				.13	.12	—	—	—	.09	—	—
EAST					.16	—	—	—	.35	—	—
BLUFF						—	—	—	.17	—	—
RAIL							.50	.20	.12	.23	—
TECH								—	—	.20	—
IRB									.30	.22	.12
PARK										.26	.15
AIR											—

Mall [CORN] and the Sizler Mall [SIZE] were viewed by activists as competing projects with persons supporting one proposal often opposing the other; the rail-based industrial park [RAIL] and the office research park [TECH] were seen as complementary projects to enhance the economic base of the community.) In most cases, coalition formation seemed to be issue-specific.

The hypothesis is further supported by our findings concerning the bases of conflict, which vary across issues; these data are summarized in Table V. First, theoretically important bases of conflict—socioeconomic status [SES], neighborhood property values [PROPVAL], partisanship [DEMREP], ideology [LIBCON], and sector of employment [SECTOR]—were

Table V. Significant Cleavages Across Issues

Issue/Cleavage	*SES*	*PROPVAL*	*DEMREP*	*LIBCON*	*SECTOR*
CORN	−.29*	—	−.31*	—	.47*
JVJ	—	.33*	—	—	—
SZLR	.27*	—	—	—	—
OREAD	—	.42*	.47*	—	.36*
EAST	—	.37*	.45*	−.37*	.38*
BLUFF	—	—	—	−.62*	—
RAIL	—	.43*	—	—	.27*
TECH	—	.35	—	—	—
IRB	—	—	—	—	—
PARK	—	.61*	.53*	−.37*	—
AIR	—	.61*	.38*	—	—
N2ST	—	—	—	—	—

*Indicates existence of a cleavage. Cells with zero-order correlation entries only exhibit relationships that are significant at the .05 level but do not exhibit a cleavage.

related, using Pearson correlation procedures, with involvement on each issue.[5] Those correlations that are statistically significant ($p < .05$) are reported in Table V. However, it is important to realize that a significant relationship between the backgrounds of participants and their positions on issues does not necessarily indicate a cleavage with respect to that background characteristic. A cleavage exists only when the majority of one side (e.g., the upper stratum) prefers one outcome while a majority on the other side (e.g., the lower stratum) prefers the policy alternative. For example, Table V shows that residents of neighborhoods having higher property values [PROPVAL] are more supportive of the research park that are residents of poorer neighborhoods ($r = .35$). However, the majority of activists from all neighborhoods supported this project. It would thus be misleading to suggest that there is an important neighborhood cleavage on the issue.

The typical bases of conflict discussed under Hypothesis 1 thus are not frequently manifested on specific issues. Only six issues exhibited significant cleavages between residents of newer and older neighborhoods, and only five issues exhibited significant cleavages between Republicans and Democrats. Even fewer issues exhibited class, sector, or ideological cleavages. Moreover, the 12 issues in the sample exhibit a wide range of patterns of conflict and cleavage—as anticipated by Hypothesis 2.

FACTORS AFFECTING POLICY OUTCOMES ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ISSUES

According to Hypothesis 3, the support of several types of actors—elected officials, public administrators, policy activists, interest and protest groups, elites, and voters—may all be important in achieving pro-growth outcomes. The data in Table VI support this hypothesis by suggesting that economic development policy outcomes are responsive to the preferences and pressures of each of these types of actors.[6] Public officials [REP, ADMIN] appear to be especially important elements within pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions. Since outcomes have been moderately responsive to VOTER preferences ($r = .46$), the role of public (or audience) support is also suggested (Schattschneider 1960; Schumaker 1984a).

Of special interest is the role of public officials as potential "policy entrepreneurs." The data show that the incumbant mayor almost always was successful—as his or her preferences [MAYOR] are highly correlated with outcomes ($r = .67$). Figure I shows the distribution of "corrected" zero-order correlations[7] between policy OUTCOMES and the involvements of individual mayors, commissioners, and public administrators. It

Table VII. Coalition Characteristics and Pro-Growth Outcomes (N = 12) (Zero-Order Correlations)

	Pro-Growth Coalition	*Anti-Growth Coalition*
SIZE	−.09	−.56*
Composition levels		
Mean SES	.40*	.37
Mean neighborhood PROPVAL	.19	−.44*
Mean party ID [DEMREP]	.59*	−.21
Mean conservatism [LIBCON]	.53*	−.07
Composition variances		
Variance in SES	−.56*	.13
Variance in neighborhood PROPVAL	−.36	−.69*
Variance in party ID [DEMREP]	.01	−.04
Variance in ideology [LIBCON]	−.13	−.10
Coalition HIERARCHY (gini coefficient)	.12	−.49*

*$p < .05$.

alitional SIZE and public support [VOTERS] ($r = -.68$) and between SIZE and commissioners' perceptions of public support ($r = -.92$).

CONCLUSIONS

Three principal conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, the study suggests the usefulness of a comparative-issues approach to the study of community politics and economic development policies (Schumaker 1981). This approach explains variation in policy outcomes in terms of intra-community variables involving such factors as the distribution of support, the presence of leadership, and the characteristics of competing coalitions. The wide intracity variance in coalitional characteristics both suggests an explanation for intracity variance in policy outcomes and suggests caution in cross-community comparisons of policy outcomes that ignore intra-community variation.

Second, the study contributes to Stone's theory of systemic bias. Like Stone (1976), we find public officials to be in reactive, adjudicatory roles rather than policy entrepeneurial roles. Elected officials are cross-pressured by elite-based pro-growth forces and anti-growth activists. But while Stone suggests a general tendency for officials to side with pro-growth forces based on their structural dependencies on elites, our findings suggest that the extent of such bias is variable. If elites do not dominate pro-growth

coalitions—and they do not on a number of issues in Lawrence—pro-growth forces may fail. Thus elites must participate in and dominate pro-growth coalitions if they are to succeed.

Our third conclusion concerns the theory of political entrepreneurship. Like Mollenkopf (1983), Salisbury (1964), Eyestone (1978), and others, our study suggests that policy entrepreneurs are important to the success of growth policies. But such entrepreneurs may not always emerge. When mayors are not directly elected and when they have few formal powers—as is the case in Lawrence and many other smaller reformed communities—they may not have the resource base to put together pro-growth coalitions. The city manager, lacking an electoral base and cautious about overstepping his or her "administrative" position, may also be restricted in the role of policy entrepreneur. It is perhaps for this reason that a number of smaller reformed cities have recently changed governmental forms to strengthen the position of mayor (Jones, Bachelor, and Wilson 1986).

Advocates of strong mayoral systems should, however, understand the consequences of their proposal. If the analyses in this study are correct, strong mayors are important to political entrepreneurship which can achieve the collective goals associated with economic growth. However, to the extent that economic growth is achieved by a political entrepreneur, systemic bias will be enhanced and policy will be more responsive to advantaged sectors of the community at the expense of disadvantaged populations. Anti-growth coalitions should not be misled into believing that enhancing the position of the mayor would lead to economic growth policies more responsive to their interests.[8]

NOTES

1. These perceptions of OUTCOME appear to be very consistent with policy decisions made thus far by the city commission. However, the relationship between these perceived outcomes and policy impacts is more problematic. For example, while proponents of the research park have persuaded city officials to extend city services to the site location, only two major developments have been built this far. Similarly, opponents of the Cornfield Mall proposal have thus far persuaded city officials to deny the rezoning necessary for the project, but recent irritation with the lack of progress on downtown mall proposals may lead to a receptiveness to future Cornfield Mall proposals.

2. To measure the pressure exerted by each group on an issue, we considered (1) group size, (2) the number of group members active on the issue, (3) cohesion, or similarity of preferences on the issue among group members, (4) duration, or the number of years the group had been in existence, (5) the level of activity by group leaders on the issue, and (6) the importance of the issue to the group. Perceptions of group members on these variables were averaged, and standardized scores were calculated and added to yield a measure of pressure by each group.

3. Since the gini coefficient has a maximum value of $(1 - 1/N)$, it is extremely sensitive

to small sample size. Each of the obtained gini coefficients was normalized by dividing them by (1 − 1/N); thus, each value of gini varies between zero and unity.

4. Each person received a score ($GROWISU_i$) for each issue (i) equal to the number of times he or she was cited as being in favor of the growth position minus the number of times he or she was cited as being opposed to the growth position. GROWINDX then sums these scores for the 12 issues in our sample.

The background characteristics reported in Table II are, for the most part, conventional or self-evident. ELITES is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not each actor is among the top 100 leaders in the community, as measured by a modified reputational study. REPUT, or reputed importance, is a rank-order measure of leadership based on the frequency that each actor was cited as being important to the achievement of community goals. CENTRAL, or network centrality, is a measure of the number of other network members with whom each actor is directly or indirectly linked in the continuous flow of information (Bolland 1984:78). While various measures of elite standing and GROWINDX are based on frequency of citations, these citations were derived from independent surveys measuring very distinct concepts, thus minimizing the possibility of high correlations due to contamination.

5. Our measure of involvement on each issue is the $GROWISU_i$ scores discussed above in note 4.

6. See Schumaker (1984b) for an explanation of why the concept of responsiveness, but not necessarily the concept of influence, is indicated by significant zero-order correlations between preferences and policies. The negative correlations regarding protest group [PROTEST] and neighborhood group [NEIGH] pressures actually indicate positive responsiveness, since the greater the pressure of these groups (against growth policies), the less successful have been pro-growth policies.

7. Since the number of times an individual was identified as a participant on any given issue is a direct function of sample size for that issue, simple correlation coefficients may overestimate (or underestimate) the relationship between involvement and success. Nor is a partial correlation coefficient a viable alternative, since many people participated in a mixture of pro-growth and anti-growth issues (and the pro-growth and anti-growth sample sizes differed). As a compromise, corrected product moment correlation coefficients were calculated between outcomes and the probability that a person was identified as a pro-growth (or anti-growth) participant by each member of the sample of pro-growth (or anti-growth) respondents.

8. In Lawrence, 70 percent of the citizens indicated, in the 1984 survey, a preference for a directly elected full-time mayor. Anti-growth activists led an unsuccessful attempt to have such a mayor in 1977, and support for the change is still particularly strong among anti-growth forces.

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