

GENERAL INTEREST

Democratic Ideals and Economic Imperatives in the Resolution of Downtown Redevelopment Issues

Paul Schumaker

THE LITERATURE ON urban politics usually asserts that economic considerations overwhelm democratic concerns in the formulation of developmental policies. Vigorous pursuit of economic development is held to undermine democracy in at least three ways. The first of these—economic imperatives (such as the need to provide additional employment opportunities, enhance land values, and generate tax revenues)—are usually the primary considerations influencing decisions on developmental policies (Peterson 1981, 17-38). When economic imperatives preoccupy policymaking, noneconomic values in local political cultures are often ignored (Stone 1987, 3); in most communities, pursuit of development means putting profits before widely accepted norms involving human-scale community and participatory democracy (Kann 1986, xi). The second undermining factor is that the power brokers behind developmental policies are often transnational corporation managers (Jones and Bachelor 1986), local business elites (Cummings 1988), independent development agency administrators (Stoker 1987), and entrepreneurs who profit from higher rents on property in high-growth areas (Logan and Molotch 1987). Such power wielders are unaccount-

able to and often unresponsive to citizens or their elected representatives. In addition, democracy is weakened when developmental policies result in systematic bias by which relatively advantaged people are persistently favored over the relatively disadvantaged (Stone 1980; Elkin 1987, 83-101). Commercial interests dominate residential neighborhoods, organized interests dominate unorganized ones, and the lower class and minorities are consistent losers in developmental outcomes (Fainstein et al. 1983).

In response to these themes, several urbanists have sought to establish the role of political and democratic considerations as determinants of urban developmental policies. In the most general effort, Wong (1990) contrasts two models of urban policymaking—economic constraint and political choice. In the economic constraint model, economic considerations are primary and political factors do not significantly alter the policy directions imposed by economic ones. But Wong believes that a political choice model better conceptualizes the factors that determine developmental policies. In this model, various political factors such as “legal barriers, bureaucratic procedures, electoral considerations, and political compromises”

shape the particular policies that emerge in response to economic opportunities, interests, and constraints (1988, 4).

Perhaps the most interesting and influential theoretical work in urban politics in recent years has sought to provide general models of how economic considerations and democratic politics interact to produce developmental policies. According to the growth machine model, the benefits of economic growth provide a general consensus among elites in favor of developmental policies, but conflict often emerges over the location of particular projects. As a result, local governments are called upon to resolve land-use issues, giving political organizations that oppose growth (such as environmental and neighborhood groups) opportunities to reshape developmental policies in ways that address political and democratic concerns (Logan and Molotch 1987). According to regime theory, the enactment and implementation of developmental policies is not an automatic process; civic cooperation involving the participation of many public and private actors is necessary. Thus, explanations of developmental policies must consider not only the economic opportunities they provide but also the political process of mobilizing and coordinating resources—including the support of many citizen groups—that are necessary to achieve developmental policies that provide broad economic benefits (Stone 1989). Such challenges to the economic constraint model suggest that developmental policies can be consistent with democratic ideals.

The controversy between adherents to the economic constraint model and those to the political choice model has spawned a literature relating economic and political factors to developmental policies in large samples of American cities (Feiock and Clingermayer 1986; Clingermayer and Feiock 1990; Rubin and Rubin 1987; and Fleischmann, Green, and Kwong 1992). While these studies show that political factors as well as economic factors have some impact on developmental

policies, the political factors analyzed do not include measures of democratic performance in cities, and thus these studies provide no assurance that economic considerations do not overwhelm democratic concerns in the developmental policy arena.

The case study literature on the resolution of developmental issues in particular cities has better addressed democratic concerns, but what emerges from such studies is the impression that some policy issues in some cities have been resolved in a manner consistent with some democratic ideals while other developmental issues in other cities have violated democratic norms. For example, downtown redevelopment in New Haven was apparently achieved in a democratic manner because it was led by Mayor Lee who acquired a broad base of public support for developmental policies (Dahl 1961; Stone and Sanders 1987). Democratic forces also captured many benefits of various developmental projects in Burlington (Vermont), Cleveland, and other progressive cities (Clavel 1986). However, developmental policies were pursued at the expense of adequate citizen participation in Chicago and Minneapolis (Henig 1982), by independent agencies which were removed from democratic control in New York (Caro 1974), and despite the protests of the poor and minorities in cities such as Detroit, New Orleans, and Denver (Fainstein et al. 1983). Such studies have suggested some democratic concerns that can be affected through the vigorous pursuit of economic growth, but democratic concerns have been addressed in a rather limited and ad hoc manner. The authors have not consulted democratic theory to specify various democratic standards which might have been achieved or violated, and they have not provided clear measurement systems indicating the extent to which various democratic standards were attained or compromised.

This article addresses these deficiencies by identifying three democratic ideals that may be more or less compromised by economic

development initiatives. Methods for measuring the extent to which these ideals are violated and/or achieved are then briefly presented. The bulk of the study assesses the extent to which nine issues regarding the development of enclosed shopping malls in Lawrence, Kansas, were resolved in ways that were consistent or inconsistent with each ideal.

The extent to which economic considerations overwhelm democratic ones obviously can vary from city to city and according to the nature of the developmental projects being proposed. Because Lawrence has a number of characteristics that seem related to less aggressive developmental policies (Feiock and Clingmayer 1986; Fleischmann, Green, and Kwong 1992), shopping mall developments there probably provide an optimal opportunity for economic considerations to yield to democratic ones. These characteristics include a council-manager form of government, low fiscal strain on local governments, moderate growth rates, low unemployment, and an economic base that is perhaps less dependent on private investment decisions than on state appropriations for the university located there. Economic considerations may also be less overwhelming on shopping mall proposals than on projects to enhance the manufacturing base of the city, because retail facilities have a lesser impact on its export economy. In short, these Lawrence issues provide a crucial case for democratic considerations to temper economic imperatives. If a rigorous test of democratic performance cannot be passed on these issues, it is doubtful that democratic considerations can trump economic considerations on other kinds of developmental issues in other more economically vulnerable cities.

Three Ideals of Pluralist Democracy

In pluralist democracies, policymakers should strive to realize the goals of principle/policy congruence, responsible representation, and complex equality (Schumaker 1991, 18-35).

Principle/Policy Congruence

The criterion of principle/policy congruence addresses the concern that economic imperatives may displace dominant cultural values as guides to decision making on developmental issues. Principle/policy congruence is achieved when policy decisions reflect the principles (or general social, economic, and political goals) that are dominant in local political cultures. Local cultures can emphasize many diverse values, but interviews with participants and surveys of Lawrence citizens have revealed that some principles are dominant within Lawrence and relevant to shopping mall and downtown redevelopment issues generally (Schumaker 1991, 52-53). These principles are summarized as follows:

Economic Growth: Local governments should encourage economic growth by providing tax incentives, services, and other inducements to attract new industry and commerce to the community.

Land-Use Restrictions: City officials should protect the community from development of facilities that adversely change the character of residential neighborhoods or the downtown.

Public Spending: Local governments should provide more and better services and facilities even if taxes must be raised proportionately.

Citizen Participation: In local politics, it is usually best to let decisions on major community projects be made by voters.

In Lawrence, the goal of principle/policy congruence is thus furthered by mall proposals that promote economic growth, that pose minimal threats to the downtown or neighborhoods adjacent to downtown, that tap the willingness of citizens to bear higher taxes for better public services, and that offer extensive opportunities for citizen participation. Developing a mall proposal consistent with various aspects of the political culture represented a huge challenge for developers and community policymakers.

Responsible Representation

The criterion of responsible representation addresses the concern that developmental policies are often made by business elites and other actors whose dominance is of questionable legitimacy. It specifies that developmental policies should primarily reflect the preferences of elected representatives and the broader public. A scale of responsible representation based on whether the dominant preferences of various actors are reflected in policy outcomes is shown in Table 1.¹

Responsible representation is lowest when adopted policies reflect the dominant views of neither representatives nor citizens. External domination (Level 0) occurs if an outside developer is able to build a mall despite the opposition of most local councilmembers (representatives), citizens, economic and social elites in the community (notables), heads of relevant governmental agencies (bureaucrats), group leaders (mobilizers), and individual activists. External domination also occurs if no developer comes forward to implement a mall proposal that has been

generated by a process of public planning and enjoys the support of most representatives, citizens, and other participants within the community. Minority domination (Level 1) occurs if a mall proposal is adopted because representatives, despite their own opposition and that of citizens, defer to support for the project from notables, bureaucrats, mobilizers, and/or activists. Minority domination also occurs if a project supported by representatives and citizens is rejected because representatives cave in to opposition from notables, bureaucrats, mobilizers, and/or activists.

Intermediate levels of responsible representation occur when representatives and citizens have conflicting preferences such that developmental proposals are consistent with the dominant preferences of representatives or citizens but not of both. Attaining electoral office has empowered representatives to be trustees and exercise their own independent judgment on policy issues, and democratic performance is higher (at Level 2) when they adopt proposals that they believe serve the interests of community than when they defer to minority interests (as at Level 1). However, when the majority of representatives and the majority of citizens have conflicting policy preferences, a higher level of democratic performance (Level 3) is attained when representatives defer to citizen preferences and act as instructed delegates (or when there is a binding referendum that ensures that dominant citizen preferences trump representative judgments).

The highest levels of responsible representation occur when the dominant preferences of representatives and citizens coincide and when their views are reflected in developmental decisions. A higher level of democracy is attained when notables, bureaucrats, mobilizers, and activists agree with representatives and citizens—when consensus (Level 5) is achieved—than when the will of the majority (Level 4) is imposed against the opposition of some or all of these actors.

Table 1: Responsible Representation Measured by Consistency of Policy Proposals with Various Actors' Dominant Preferences

Actors	Proposals are Congruent (+) or Not Congruent (-) with, or Not Relevant (NR) to, Actors' Dominant Preferences					
	-	-	+	-	+	+
Representatives	-	-	+	-	+	+
Citizens	-	-	-	+	+	+
Notables	-	+	NR	NR	-	+
		or			or	
Bureaucrats	-	+	NR	NR	-	+
		or			or	
Mobilizers	-	+	NR	NR	-	+
		or			or	
Activists	-	+	NR	NR	-	+
Results						
Actor support	0	1	2	3	4	5
Representation if proposal is						
Accepted	0	1	2	3	4	5
Rejected	5	4	3	2	1	0

Legend: 0=External domination. 1=Minority domination. 2=Trusteeship. 3=Instructed delegation. 4=Majority rule. 5=Consensus.

The level of responsible representation that is achieved for particular mall projects thus depends on the distribution of support for these projects among citizens, representatives, and various other types of participants as well as on the policy outcome. Democratic ideals suggest that external and various forms of minority domination should be avoided and that consensus be sought, but only intermediate levels of responsible representation may be attainable given the diversity of views that can prevail.

Complex Equality

The complex equality criterion addresses the concern of systematic bias in decision making—that there may be persistent divisions or cleavages within communities (for example, on the basis of class or race) and one side (for example, the lower class or minorities) may consistently lose. Complex equality requires that developmental policies be most responsive to those interests in the community that normally fail to have their preferences reflected in policy or that there be reasonable explanations for why normally subordinate interests should bear additional policy defeats. The fairness of the overall pattern of responsiveness in community policymaking would seem to be enhanced if mall policies are more responsive to subordinate interests than to dominant ones. If such policy decisions add to the cumulative losses of subordinate interests in the community, one must ask if there is some reasonable explanation for the apparent bias. If there is no reasonable explanation—if, for example, a subordinate interest participated as extensively as its counterpart and if its position were as popular as that of its counterpart—then policy decisions could be regarded as unjust, as violations of the ideal of complex equality.

Research Methods

Two methods were employed to determine whether the outcomes of nine mall issues

were consistent with the ideals of principle/policy congruence, responsible representation, and complex equality. As part of a larger study of democratic performance on 29 Lawrence issues, four mall issues that arose and were resolved between 1978 and 1987 were analyzed using a comparative issues approach (Schumaker 1991, 36-48). Five additional issues arose subsequent to that study; these have been analyzed using a much simpler methodology which relies on the perceptions of central participants.²

In brief, the comparative issues approach involved mapping and analyzing the political principles and the policy preferences of the participants on the mall issues and Lawrence citizens generally. Thus, principle/policy congruence was analyzed by first determining, through survey research, the principles that are dominant (or commanded majority support) in the political culture of Lawrence; this was done by determining the distribution of citizen support for various alternative principles (e.g., whether or not local governments should subsidize economic growth, restrict property rights in order to be more sensitive to the rights of neighbors, and so forth). The relevance of dominant principles in Lawrence to specific mall proposals was then indicated by significant differences in the principles of mall supporters and opponents. For example, if mall supporters were significantly more pro-growth than were mall opponents, economic growth principles would be relevant to the issue. And if the outcome was supported by those with dominant pro-growth principles, principle/policy congruence would be achieved. Responsible representation was determined by surveying citizens and interviewing participants about their preferences, sorting these participants by the roles they occupied (e.g., representatives, bureaucrats, notables, etc.) and determining the amount of support for each mall proposal by the occupants of each role. Complex equality was analyzed by categorizing citizens and participants by class, gender, etc., and deter-

mining the level of support for each mall proposal for persons within each category. If most persons within a category (men for example) supported a mall while most persons in the categorical counterpart (women) opposed the mall, and the differences between the categories were statistically significant, a (gender) cleavage was indicated, the winning side was determined, and various explanations for the dominance of the winners were explored.

The five more recent mall proposals were analyzed using data derived from interviews with the city and county commissioners who resolved the issues, the city manager, the president of the Lawrence Chamber of Commerce, and the chair of the Downtown Improvement Committee. Each person was asked to indicate the dominant cultural principles that were relevant to each issue and to indicate the degree of consistency of each proposal with each relevant principle. If at least half of the interviewees agreed that a proposal was either consistent or inconsistent with a dominant cultural principle, an instance of principle/policy congruence or incongruence is reported. Interviewees were then asked to estimate the amount of support for each project among commissioners, community notables, the city staff, group leaders, individual activists, and other (inactive) citizens; these estimates were averaged to attain overall support scores for each set of actors and to assess the extensiveness of responsible representation on each issue. Each interviewee was also presented a list of typical community cleavages (as between whites and minorities, upper class and lower class, etc.) and asked to indicate if any of these divisions occurred on each issue. If respondents perceived a cleavage, they were asked to identify the positions of the competing sides and why they thought that the winning side prevailed. In the subsequent analysis of complex equality, cleavages on issues are reported if they were perceived by at least half of the interviewees.

Downtown Redevelopment and Democracy in Lawrence

Lawrence is one of the largest metropolitan areas in the country without an enclosed shopping mall; at least it held this distinction until April 1990, when a relatively small, factory-outlet shopping center opened its doors along the city's riverfront. Prior to that event, eight proposals to build an enclosed shopping mall, either in the outskirts or in downtown Lawrence, were rejected by the city or county commissions.

The Lawrence shopping mall saga began in October 1978, when Jacobs, Visconsi, Jacobs (JVJ)—a nationally prominent developer of shopping malls—proposed building a typical suburban-style mall just beyond the southern city limit.³ Fearing that the Cornfield mall would lead to the deterioration of the central business district (CBD), the city commission denied JVJ's request to rezone the site, and community leaders persuaded JVJ to design a downtown mall. The resulting Bunker proposal was shelved during the summer of 1980, when opponents argued that its location and size would destroy, rather than save, the CBD. A public planning process then led to another downtown proposal (the Sizeler project), which emphasized adaptive reuse and in-fill rather than wholesale demolition. But before Sizeler secured financial commitments from the city, a group of local architects and developers unveiled pretty pictures of an alternative Towncenter mall, to be located in a more blighted downtown location. Believing that Towncenter enjoyed more public support than Sizeler, a newly elected city commission abandoned the Sizeler project in the fall of 1983. For several years, Towncenter was supported by the city commission but its development made little progress. Finally, in the fall of 1986, Towncenter unveiled new plans for a more extensive project which belied the earlier presentations. A public referendum was demanded, and the project was soundly defeated in April 1987.

Within three months, the city and county commissions received three new proposals for suburban malls. JVJ resurrected its initial proposal, renamed Lawrence Square. A Warmack mall was proposed in a rapidly developing area beyond the southwestern edge of the city, and a Collister proposal was submitted to rezone an area for a mall beyond the northwestern city limit. However, each of these proposals was rejected because they all undermined the city's comprehensive plan designating the downtown as its principal commercial district; these decisions have subsequently been upheld in both state and federal courts.

While these suburban malls were under consideration, the city commission formed a Downtown Improvement Committee (DIC) to generate yet another downtown proposal. But the DIC was unable to come up with an acceptable method for financing its plan calling for new department stores, slot shops, and parking ramps to be interspersed among existing stores in the middle of downtown and to be tied together by a series of skywalks.

Shortly after the DIC proposal was abandoned (in May 1988), plans were unveiled for a factory outlet shopping center to be built along the Kansas River, on the northern edge of the central business district. Despite some protests regarding its environ-

mental impacts, the city commission expeditiously adopted the various policies necessary to facilitate its development. While the Riverfront Plaza is only two-thirds the size of a typical mall and fails to provide all the shopping opportunities found in such malls, its construction has put the shopping mall issue in Lawrence to rest at least temporarily. But the question remains: Were democratic ideals furthered by the rejection of the more extensive mall proposals and by the acceptance of the Riverfront Plaza?

Principle/Policy Congruence. Table 2 summarizes principle/policy congruence for each of the mall issues. The data indicate whether each proposal was consistent or inconsistent with economic-growth principles and restrictive land-use principles as well as with other principles which are dominant in Lawrence's political culture. These data reveal several important points.

The first point is that most of the shopping mall proposals were consistent with dominant cultural values supporting economic growth. Consultants estimated that \$40-60 million in sales leaked out of Lawrence to nearby shopping centers in Kansas City and Topeka and that any of the proposed malls would have retained such revenues within the community. They also estimated that a mall would add 500 to 700 new jobs to the local economy and contribute

Table 2: Congruence of Nine Mall Proposals with Dominant Cultural Values in Lawrence, Kansas

Dominant Cultural Values	Specific Mall Proposals Shown as Congruent (+) or Not Congruent (-) with, or Not Relevant (NR) to, Dominant Values								
	Cornfield	Bunker	Sizeler	Towncenter	Collister	Warmack	Lawrence Square	DIC Plan	Riverfront
Encourage economic growth	+	NR	NR	+	+	+	+	+	+
Regulate land use	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
More public spending	-	NR	+	+	NR	NR	NR	+	+
Increase citizen participation	NR	NR	NR	-	NR	NR	NR	+	+
Results									
Policy outcome	Reject	Reject	Reject	Reject	Reject	Reject	Reject	Reject	Accept
Policy/principle congruence	Mixed	Positive	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed	Negative	Most Positive

DIC=Downtown Improvement Committee.

about a million tax dollars annually to local governments. Nevertheless, economic growth was not equally well served by each proposal. For example, the economic benefits of the Bunker mall may have been largely offset by the costs of demolishing four blocks in the heart of the downtown; because over 70 existing businesses had to be closed or relocated to accommodate the Bunker mall, many people with strong pro-growth principles opposed the project (making dominant pro-growth principles irrelevant to that issue). And while the Riverfront Plaza generated fewer jobs and lower tax revenues than projected by the larger proposals, policymakers believed it was more consistent with pro-growth principles. They feared that other proposals could simply redistribute sales from existing stores to the new mall, but they expected the Riverfront to attract new customers to Lawrence and thus contribute to its export economy because its factory-outlet feature responded to an unfilled niche in the regional market and because its location extended the downtown, rather than encroaching on it or competing with it. Thus, while the rejections of most of the previous mall proposals were inconsistent with dominant economic growth principles, policymakers could assert that the Riverfront Plaza was highly responsive to dominant pro-growth principles.

Another point shown is that most of the rejected mall proposals were at odds with restrictive land-use principles in Lawrence asserting that policymakers should protect the community from developments that adversely change the character of residential neighborhoods or the downtown. Most Lawrence citizens regard downtown as the heart of the community, and value its historical and aesthetic qualities (Schumaker and Maynard-Moody 1988); they viewed the suburban mall proposals as threats to downtown, and thought that several downtown proposals required excessive demolition of the existing downtown and intruded on nearby residential neighborhoods. Accord-

ing to policymakers, only the DIC plan and the Riverfront project were consistent with dominant land-use principles.

Also, throughout the shopping mall saga in Lawrence, complete principle/policy congruence was difficult to achieve. While most proposals were consistent with dominant economic growth principles, they simultaneously undermined dominant protective land-use principles. Furthermore, the closed process of planning the Towncenter mall violated cultural norms calling for extensive citizen participation on important community issues. (This resulted in a demand for a referendum on the proposal and its rejection by voters.) Finding a mall proposal that was consistent with the various aspects of the political culture was a huge challenge. The data show that only the DIC plan and the Riverfront Plaza were consistent with each of the various dominant principles relevant to the shopping mall proposals.

In addition, proposals that are consistent with dominant cultural values may still fail to enjoy widespread public support. For example, most Lawrence citizens are, in principle, willing to pay more taxes to finance important public improvements.⁴ But diffuse support for liberal public spending principles did not translate into specific support for the Sizeler, Towncenter, and DIC proposals. In Lawrence liberal public spending principles are dominant, but not overwhelmingly so, as they are held by about 60 percent of its citizens. Some of these liberal public spenders failed to support specific downtown redevelopment projects which undermined their land-use principles, their citizen-participation principles, or many other possible concerns.⁵

Finally, despite the difficulties in achieving principle/policy congruence, this aspect of democratic performance was achieved by approving the Riverfront Plaza. By rejecting earlier proposals that were inconsistent with certain aspects of the political culture, proposals emerged at the end of the shopping mall saga that finally enabled the community

to pursue downtown redevelopment in ways consistent with the democratic ideal that policies ought to reflect the various dominant cultural values relevant to the issues at hand.

Responsible Representation. Table 3 presents estimates of the support for each proposal among elected representatives, citizens, notables, bureaucrats, group leaders, and individual activists. The levels of actor support and responsible representation that resulted on each proposal are indicated in the last two rows.

Generally, policymakers achieved high levels of responsible representation in resolving the mall issues. Because most representatives, citizens, notables, bureaucrats, group leaders, and individual activists opposed each of the suburban mall proposals, acceptance of the malls would have been instances of external domination, an imposition of the will of external actors against the preferences of Lawrence citizens and participants; rejection of the malls (and of the DIC plan) were consensual. While the Bunker and Towncenter malls were supported by most notables and bureaucrats, they were opposed by most representatives, citizens, and group leaders; majority rule was achieved by rejection of these two malls.

Most problematic in terms of responsible representation was the resolution of the Sizeler proposal. As shown in Table 3, most notables, bureaucrats, group leaders, and individual activists supported the project, and during its incubation period the project enjoyed the unanimous support of the city commission. In April 1983, however, two new commissioners were elected who had indicated ambivalence toward the project during the campaign and who became opposed to the project once in office. Two other new commissioners preferred the Sizeler proposal but they acted as instructed delegates and abandoned it because they accurately perceived widespread citizen opposition. Perhaps a higher level of responsible representation could have been achieved if the reluctant commissioners had tried to persuade the public of Sizeler's merits. But in a democracy, representatives cannot be strongly criticized for responding to dominant public opinion.

Of the various mall proposals, only the Riverfront Plaza enjoyed the support of representatives, citizens, and other various participants. Thus, the acceptance of only the Riverfront was consistent with the ideals of responsible representation.

Table 3: Actor Support and Responsible Representation: Percentage of Various Actors Supporting Mall Proposals

Actors	Mall Proposal								
	Cornfield	Bunker	Sizeler	Towncenter	Collister	Warmack	Lawrence Square	DIC Plan	Riverfront
Representatives	0	0	68	44	0	0	0	40	90
Citizens	34	20	45	28	33	34	40	38	72
Notables	12	67	100	88	25	27	45	42	68
Bureaucrats	0	50	100	100	8	6	22	40	90
Mobilizers	14	38	90	40	5	5	12	50	68
Activists	35	29	55	54	20	20	20	22	56
Results									
Actor support	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	5
Representation	5	4	3	4	5	5	5	5	5

DIC=Downtown Improvement Committee.

Legend: 0=External domination. 1=Minority domination. 2=Trusteeship. 3=Instructed delegation. 4=Majority rule. 5=Consensus.

Complex Equality. Table 4 summarizes the analysis of complex equality by showing which sides of various social and ideological divisions provided the most support for the Lawrence mall proposals. Differences in support between various sides of a cleavage *may* lead to violations of the ideal of complex equality if the outcome resulted in an additional defeat for a persistently subordinate interest in the city and if there is no reasonable explanation for the apparent bias against the subordinate interest.

The table shows that there were no significant differences by race in support of the various mall proposals. As a result, neither rejection nor adoption of any mall proposal can be interpreted as contributing to a pattern of systemic bias against racial minorities in Lawrence.

In some cases, there was no cleavage but simply a significant difference among interests. For example, 47 percent of men and 8 percent of women participants favored the first Cornfield Mall proposal. This significant gender difference is reported because it might be argued that women were more victorious than men when the Cornfield proposal was defeated. Despite such a significant gender difference, the rejection of the proposal was consistent with the majority of men *and* women, and thus both tended to be

winners on the issue. On such issues, no real gender cleavage emerged because no side won at the expense of the majority on the other side, and complex equality was not threatened. In any event, Table 4 shows that women tended to win on the mall issues. Because women are normally a subordinate interest in Lawrence (Schumaker and Burns 1988), these victories on the mall issues contributed to complex equality.

In other cases, significant cleavages existed but there was no historical pattern of domination and subordination among competing interests. For example, an analysis of recent policy decisions in Lawrence reveals that there have been no persistent biases against the lower class (Schumaker 1991, 174-88). Thus, the defeat of the lower class on the Cornfield proposal and the subsequent victory over the upper class on the Sizeler issues continues a historical pattern of equal responsiveness to competing class interests. The ideal of complex equality was not violated by class bias when resolving the mall issues.

In still another pattern, significant cleavages were evident and the outcome favored a normally subordinate interest in the community. For example, recent policy outcomes in Lawrence have been more responsive to the preferences of residents of the more af-

Table 4: Social and Ideological Cleavages: The Interests Most Supportive of Various Mall Proposals

Supportive Interests	Mall Proposal								
	Cornfield	Bunker	Sizeler	Towncenter	Collister	Warmack	Lawrence Square	DIC Plan	Riverfront
Race	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gender	Men ^a	Men ^a	Men ^a	Men ^b	-	-	-	-	-
Class	Lower ^b	-	Upper ^b	-	-	-	-	-	-
Neighborhood	-	Outskirts ^c	Outskirts ^c	Outskirts ^c	Outskirts ^c	Outskirts ^c	Outskirts ^c	-	-
Growth v Preservation	Growth	-	-	Growth	Growth	Growth	Growth	-	-
Term of Residence	-	-	-	-	Short ^d	Short ^d	Short ^d	-	-
Fiscal Ideology	Conservative ^c	Liberal ^a	Liberal ^d	Liberal ^a	Conservative ^c	Conservative ^c	Conservative ^c	Liberal ^a	-

DIC=Downtown Improvement Committee.

Circumstances describing most supportive interests:

^a A significant difference but no cleavage existed among interests.

^b Significant cleavages but no historical pattern of domination and subordination existed among competing interests.

^c Significant cleavages existed and the outcome favored a normally subordinate interest in the community.

^d Significant cleavages existed and the normally subordinate interest lost on a mall issue.

fluent neighborhoods at the outskirts of town than to center city residents (Schumaker 1991, 188-92), but these interests lost on the mall issues. Most residents of the less affluent inner-city neighborhoods emerged victorious on the suburban mall proposals (which they feared would hurt the central city) and on those downtown projects which they thought would invade their neighborhoods. Similarly, recent outcomes in Lawrence have favored pro-growth activists over those who most value neighborhood, environmental, and historical preservation (Schumaker 1991, 177), but such pro-growth activists lost on the mall issues. Thus, the victories of central city residents and preservationists on the mall issues contributed to complex equality by furthering parity in responsiveness between competing interests.

On a few occasions, significant cleavages existed and the normally subordinate interest lost on a mall issue. For example, policymakers perceived a cleavage between long-term and short-term residents of the city on the recent suburban mall proposals. By rejecting the Lawrence Square, Warmack, and Collister proposals, they ignored the preferences of those people who had recently moved to Lawrence and were less committed to the downtown than were long-term residents. In so doing, they continued a previous pattern of favoring long-term residents over short-term ones (Schumaker 1991, 177). According to the ideal of complex equality, such apparent bias against short-term residents requires reasonable explanations; as such explanations, policymakers claimed that democratic ideals were well served because longer-term residents were much more involved as participants on these issues and because they had majority opinion on their side.

The mall issues also provoked conflict between fiscal liberals (those who support public improvements through higher taxes) and fiscal conservatives (those who want to minimize public spending and taxes). Fiscal conservatives supported the suburban malls

because these developments could be built without direct governmental subsidies, and fiscal liberals supported the downtown redevelopment projects. Because fiscal conservatives have tended to dominate liberals in Lawrence (Schumaker 1991, 196-200), their losses on the suburban mall proposals have enhanced equal responsiveness among these interests. However, the defeat of various downtown redevelopment proposals enhanced conservative domination over liberals, suggesting that the ideal of complex equality might have been violated. Fiscal conservatives strongly opposed the Bunker, Towncenter, and DIC proposals, and they won when these proposals were rejected. But, in the end, slightly more liberals also opposed these projects than supported them, and thus these outcomes cannot be regarded as defeats for liberals. Only on the Sizeler issue was there a clear cleavage between fiscal conservatives and liberals. And conservatives had a legitimate explanation for their victory: they had public opinion on their side.

Had policymakers approved most of the larger mall proposals, they would have violated the norm of complex equality by increasing the domination of suburban neighborhoods over central city ones, of men over women, and of the pro-growth activists over preservationists. Only the DIC plan and the Riverfront Plaza proposals seemed to avoid the problem of systematic bias, or of exacerbating the inequalities between dominant and subordinate interests. Democratic performance was better served by adopting the Riverfront not because it was more fair to subordinate groups but because it was more widely supported than the DIC plan.

Conclusions

The outcomes of the Lawrence shopping mall saga contradict the conventional wisdom that democratic ideals must yield to economic imperatives in resolving developmental issues. The various suburban, Bun-

ker, and Towncenter proposals were largely consistent with pro-growth principles but violated widely held norms that land-use policies should protect the downtown and residential neighborhoods. Their approval would have indicated that the policy process was dominated by external actors, bureaucrats, notables, or special interests. Their approval would have also contributed to systemic bias against residents of central city neighborhoods, women, and preservationists. Approval of the Sizeler proposal would also have contributed to systemic bias, and approval of the DIC project would have required representatives to act irresponsibly. Only the Riverfront proposal was consistent with the democratic ideals of principle/policy congruence, responsible representation, and complex equality. Thus, by proceeding with only the Riverfront development, Lawrence policymakers resolved these issues in ways that achieved a high level of democratic performance.

While these results are compatible with the political choice, growth machine, and regime theory models of urban policymaking, they do not constitute convincing evidence against the economic constraint model because they were achieved on policy issues and in a contextual environment where economic considerations are less urgent. These results, however—and the conceptual and methodological frameworks used to investigate these cases—suggest the need for more complex formulations of the relationship between economic imperatives and democratic performance. Three types of complexities should be developed.

The concept of economic imperatives is too deterministic and should be replaced by the more problematic concept of economic considerations. Development proposals may promise significant economic benefits for the community, but most proposals also impose significant burdens. As a consequence, many people who are strongly committed to economic growth in principle will oppose particular developmental projects (such as the

Bunker and Sizeler proposals) which they view as imposing too many displacement and project costs on the community. Additionally, projects (like Riverfront) that promise fewer jobs, tax revenues, and other economic benefits may be favored over more economically beneficial projects if they impose fewer economic, aesthetic, psychological, and other less tangible costs. The fact that projects yield broad economic benefits does not make their development imperative. While economic benefits and costs are always considerations, of course, how they influence developmental project outcomes depends on matters such as the following: (1) levels of support in the community for economic growth and for conflicting community goals such as neighborhood and historical preservation; (2) possibilities for creating more beneficial and/or less costly alternatives (like the Riverfront) to a particular proposal; and (3) distribution of these benefits and costs among various powerful groups in the community. Conceptualizing developmental projects as having economic considerations, rather than as being economic imperatives, invites us to develop hypotheses about the kinds of developments that are least likely to conflict with democratic ideals and engender political resistance. For example, the Lawrence saga suggests that the larger and more intrusive a project, the greater the likelihood of its incompatibility with democratic politics.

The concept of democratic politics is itself too imprecise and needs to be replaced with specific—and sometimes conflicting—democratic ideals and performances. In this study, the ideals of principle/policy congruence, responsible representation, and complex equality have been proposed, but other ideals can also be developed and analyzed. Distinguishing among various aspects or dimensions of democracy is important because economic development projects can differentially affect these dimensions. In Lawrence, for example, the DIC proposal was compatible with principle/policy congruence and

complex equality, but its development would have undermined the democratic ideal of responsible representation. Overall, the Lawrence data suggest that economic development proposals more frequently threaten responsible representation than complex equality, but this hypothesis should be investigated in other cases before a conclusion is made that urban theorists have overemphasized the problem of systemic bias.

The relationships between economic considerations and various dimensions of democratic performance are likely to vary significantly across communities. Perhaps most cities readily permit (and indeed seek) developmental projects that simply promise a variety of economic benefits. Especially in cities having high unemployment, a declining tax base, and other conditions of economic stress, developmental proposals may seem to be economic imperatives, prompting officials to ignore democratic considerations. But democratic ideals may become increasingly important in other communities, such as Lawrence, under a variety of contextual conditions. One might hypothesize, for example, that democratic considerations are more influential than economic ones in more affluent communities where jobs are plentiful, where large public institutions like universities dominate the economic base, and where post-materialist values flourish (Inglehart 1990). But the economic characteristics of communities may not be the most important contextual factors affecting the extent to which communities empower themselves by putting democratic considerations ahead of economic ones. Regime theory suggests that informal political arrangements of political cooperation give cities the power to achieve their democratically derived political goals, even in the face of economic obstacles (Stone 1989). Rather than assuming the conventional wisdom that economic considerations dominate democratic ones when resolving developmental issues, urbanists need to develop theories that specify more precisely the economic conditions, the informal political

arrangements, and other contextual conditions that enable cities to resolve developmental issues in ways that reflect various democratic ideals.

Paul Schumaker is professor of political science at the University of Kansas. This article extends his earlier work on urban democracy presented in *Critical Pluralism, Democratic Performance, and Community Power* (University Press of Kansas) and in *the American Journal of Political Science and Urban Affairs Quarterly*. He is currently conducting a 12-city study identifying the principles of distributive justice that underlie the policy initiatives of public officials.

Notes

1. A more refined scale of responsible representation is presented in Schumaker (1991, 24-29).
2. For purposes of future research, it is important to discover whether the second, easier method which uses central actors' perceptions is an adequate substitute for the comparative issues method. Unless the comparative issues approach can be truncated, it is unlikely that analyses of democratic performance across large samples of cities can be conducted, inhibiting the development of theories explaining the contextual factors that enhance and inhibit democratic performance. While a full discussion of the adequacy of the simpler interview method cannot be provided here, it can be asserted that there was extensive reliability in the perceptions of those interviewed.
3. These issues are discussed and analyzed more extensively in Schumaker (1992).
4. This aspect of Lawrence's culture contributed to the defeat of the Cornfield mall because it made plausible the argument that citizens supported public expenditures to locate an appropriate mall downtown.
5. While the DIC plan was consistent with most relevant aspects of Lawrence's political culture, it lost critical support from both participants and citizens because of extensive conflict over how to allocate the tax burdens associated with the project among downtown businesses and the public-at-large.

References

- Caro, Robert A. 1974. *The power broker*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

- Clavel, Pierre. 1986. *The progressive city*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.
- Clingermayer, James, and Richard Feiock. 1990. The adoption of economic development policies by large cities: A test of economic, interest group, and institutional explanations. *Policy Studies Journal* 18 (Spring): 539-51.
- Cummings, Scott. 1988. *Business elites and urban development*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1961. *Who governs?* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Elkin, Stephen L. 1987. *City and regime in the American Republic*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Fainstein, Susan S., Norman I. Fainstein, Richard Child Hill, Dennis Judd, and Michael Peter Smith. 1983. *Restructuring the city*. New York: Longman.
- Feiock, Richard, and James Clingermayer. 1986. Municipal representation, executive power, and economic development policy administration. *Policy Studies Journal* 15 (December): 211-30.
- Fleischmann, Arnold, Gary P. Green, and Tsz Man Kwong. 1992. What's a city to do? Explaining differences in local economic development policies. *Western Political Quarterly* 45 (September): 677-99.
- Henig, Jeffrey. 1982. *Neighborhood mobilization: Redevelopment and response*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. *Cultural shift*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jones, Bryan D., and Lynn W. Bachelor. 1986. *The sustaining hand*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Kann, Mark E. 1986. *Middle class radicalism in Santa Monica*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Logan, John, and Harvey Molotch. 1987. *Urban fortunes: The political economy of place*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Peterson, Paul E. 1981. *City limits*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rubin, Irene S., and Herbert J. Rubin. 1987. Economic development incentives: The poor (cities) pay more. *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 23 (September): 37-58.
- Schumaker, Paul. 1991. *Critical pluralism, democratic performance, and community power*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- . 1992. Cornfield malls, downtown redevelopment, and democratic performance. Report 186. Lawrence: Institute for Public Policy Research, University of Kansas.
- Schumaker, Paul, and Nancy E. Burns. 1988. Gender cleavages and the resolution of local policy issues. *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (November): 1070-95.
- Schumaker, Paul, and Steven Maynard-Moody. 1988. *Downtown redevelopment and public opinion: A survey of citizen attitudes for the downtown improvement committee*. Report 135. Lawrence: Institute for Public Policy Research, University of Kansas.
- Stoker, Robert P. 1987. Baltimore: The self-evaluating city? In *The politics of urban development*, 244-66. Clarence N. Stone and Heywood Sanders, eds. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Stone, Clarence N. 1980. Systemic power in community decision making. *American Political Science Review* 74 (December): 978-90.
- . 1987. The study of the politics of urban development. In *The politics of urban development*, 3-22. Stone and Sanders, eds. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- . 1989. *Regime politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Stone, Clarence N., and Heywood Sanders. 1987. Re-examining a classic case of developmental politics: New Haven, Connecticut. In *The politics of urban development*, 159-81. Stone and Sanders, eds. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Wong, Kenneth K. 1988. Economic constraint and policy choice in urban policymaking. *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (February): 1-18.
- . 1990. *City choices: Education and housing*. Albany: State University of New York Press.