


Downtown Lawrence:

Marketplace and Heart of a Political Community

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Like other American cities, Lawrence is both a marketplace and a political community. Both residents and non-residents of Lawrence see the city as a place to work and earn income, to buy and sell goods and services, and to invest in new business ventures. Workers, merchants, consumers, and investors hope to satisfy their material wants and reap economic profits through their free choices and voluntary activities in the Lawrence marketplace. But citizens of Lawrence—especially those who have lived in the city for many years and who intend to make it their home for the foreseeable future—seek other goals beyond those offered through the marketplace. Ideally, Lawrence citizens use the political process to define the kind of community they want; they specify a variety of economic, social, cultural, and environmental goals that they strive to attain through collective actions, often through means that involve coercive governmental policies and that limit people's freedoms within the marketplace. In practice, three city commissioners—a majority of the community's elected legislative body—can determine community goals. During the second half of the twentieth century, various commissioners have tried to understand what kind of community its citizens have wanted. They have listened to the proposed projects and policies of the administrative and professional staff of the city government, developers, and businessmen. They have heard reactions of various interest groups and neighborhoods and a wide assortment of political activists. And their decisions have been instrumental in shaping the Lawrence community.

In many American communities, city councils have been content to see their cities as little more than marketplaces, and their laissez-faire policies have allowed developers and other market forces to define the community in ways that maximize short-term economic gains.¹ In a smaller number of American communities, city councils have intervened strongly to control developers and market forces in an effort to promote social, cultural, aesthetic, historical, and environmental goals that are poorly served by an unregulated marketplace.² Lawrence commissioners have pursued a middle path between “the unfettered market” and “the authoritarian governmental control” approaches to the city's political economy. Majorities on the commission have generally pursued “slow growth,” “managed growth,” or “smart growth”—which are various names for limited governmental stimulation and control of market activities. This middle path (and the benefits of pursuing a middle path) is especially evident in the evolution of downtown Lawrence.



Aerial view of downtown Lawrence, fall 2000. |

There is widespread and strong affection for downtown Lawrence among its residents, and many Lawrence citizens and policymakers regard the downtown as "the heart of the community."³ There has also been widespread support in the community for governmental policies that stimulate and encourage a vigorous, multi-use central business district and that regulate land uses that adversely affect historical, social, environmental, and aesthetic values.⁴ Such views have led to many political actions and governmental policies designed to preserve and promote the downtown. While political forces have modestly constrained developments on the outskirts of the community, market forces have been more severely constrained by "politics" when developments threaten the downtown.

Lawrence's downtown is one of three important places in Lawrence that seem responsible for attracting people to the community during the past half-century.⁵ The University of Kansas and the Alvamar residential area have also enabled Lawrence to grow and thrive; their contributions to the community's political economy suggest that more public and more private approaches to development also have important symbiotic roles to play in a mixed, balanced, and prosperous community. While this chapter focuses on the development of downtown Lawrence and the role that both public and private forces have played in its evolution, it is important to consider how both public and private developments in the broader community—such as those at KU and in Alvamar—have affected the downtown and continue to influence many of the issues that will confront the downtown during the twenty-first century.

A History of Downtown Lawrence

During the first hundred years of its existence, Lawrence was a small college town that also served as a commercial center for local agriculture. During the first half of the twentieth century, the population of Douglas County stabilized at 25,000. As a result of some people leaving their farms and moving into the city and of small increases in the size of KU, Lawrence experienced modest population growth (from 11,000 to 18,600) between 1900 and 1950. During this period, economic activity was concentrated downtown. Retail shops, automobile dealerships, grocery stores, professional offices, and other places of business activity were largely located within a block of Massachusetts Street, between Sixth and Eleventh Streets. Lawrence government provided basic services—sewers and water, police and fire protection, trash collection, and road maintenance—and there was little differentiation between the downtown area and the rest of the community in the provision of these services. Prior to the 1950s, the downtown was the sole marketplace of the Lawrence community and there were relatively few political issues that prompted city government to influence the character of the downtown for social, cultural, or environmental reasons.

Since 1950, the population of Lawrence has more than quadrupled, bringing new commercial opportunities to the community that could not be contained within the downtown. Even as the downtown has expanded—its boundaries now extend to the Kansas River to the north, Watson Park and Kentucky Street to the west, South Park to the south, and Rhode Island Street to the east⁶—its centrality to the economy of the community has dramatically decreased. While 300 businesses are presently located downtown and they employ almost 5,000 people, only 15 percent of the members of the Chamber of Commerce now have downtown locations and less than 20 percent of all retail business is conducted downtown. The growth of the community and the development of business activity in the outskirts of the community have prompted many changes in the downtown, changes often stimulated by political action and regulated by city government.

World War II precipitated these changes. In 1942, Sunflower Ammunition Plant began employing 20,000 workers near DeSoto, and the availability of the automobile enabled many of these workers to reside and/or do business in Lawrence. The end of the war and the return of veterans seeking a college education resulted in dramatic increases in student enrollment at KU, from 6,300 in 1945 to 11,000 by 1949.⁷ Between 1940 and 1960, Lawrence experienced

a 75 percent increase in population, and homes began to spring up south of Twenty-third Street and west of Iowa Street to accommodate the 25,000 citizens living in Lawrence by 1960. During the '50s, these roads became thoroughfares that attracted unplanned business activities. During the '60s, the Malls Shopping Center sprang up on Twenty-third Street and the Hillcrest Shopping Center opened on Iowa Street, signaling a shift of commercial activity away from the downtown.

Early Efforts to Revitalize the Downtown. By the late 1940s, some community leaders recognized the need for proactive political and governmental action to direct city growth and enhance the downtown. In 1945, a Civic Action Committee, headed by legendary KU Basketball Coach Phog Allen, formed and developed a plan to create a number of public improvements in Lawrence, including more downtown parking and renovating store fronts on Massachusetts Street.⁸ In 1948, the Lawrence Chamber of Commerce, led by Buzz Zook, called for the revitalization of the downtown, and began a successful effort to develop off-street parking. In 1950, the city adopted a new commission-manager form of government. This change was initially sought to make more effective the delivery of governmental services, but over time, this change resulted in the hiring of professional city managers and planners who saw the need for an increased role for city government in shaping the downtown.

In 1970 Buford Watson became city manager. He brought to the job a strong desire to revitalize the downtown and experience acquiring federal grants to finance downtown improvements. Using a \$300,000 urban-renewal grant, the city commission under the leadership of Nancy Hambleton approved a plan to make Massachusetts Street "pedestrian friendly." By 1974 Massachusetts was converted from a four-lane highway to "a drive-through parking lot." Parallel parking was abandoned and "saw-tooth" curb-cuts allowing diagonal parking were installed. This arrangement radically reduced the width of the right-of-way and enabled trees, shrubs, and ground cover to be planted. Downtown businessmen and city officials continue to see this public improvement as giving the downtown a head start in remaining a thriving commercial district.

Later in the 1970s, the city staff, under the direction of Watson and City Commissioner Barkley Clark, undertook several additional initiatives to protect and promote the downtown. In 1974, the Planning Department and the Lawrence Douglas County Planning Commission began to create a comprehensive plan for the City of Lawrence—*Plan '95*—that would designate the downtown as the primary business district for the community. *Plan '95* was adopted by the city commission in 1977 and identified the downtown as "the heart of the community." It called for making various public improvements in the central business district and for using zoning and site plan ordinances to limit developments on the outskirts of the community that might attract commercial activity away from the downtown. *Plan '95* was, of course, written by businessmen and professional staff with a strong commitment to the downtown, but public opinion surveys showed that Lawrence citizens maintained a vision of the community that corresponded to that expressed in *Plan '95* and that most citizens were committed to principles that gave the public and the city government key roles in structuring the community's political economy.⁹ It appears that the political culture of Lawrence supports the following ideals:

- The downtown is "the heart of the community." Its health should not be determined by market forces alone but should be subject to political control by the public and public officials.
- Economic growth and commercial prosperity are highly valued. City government should not restrain economic and population growth and should actively stimulate such growth, as long as it does not have a significant negative impact on other community goals.
- Public revenues should be invested in public improvements that benefit the community as a whole, even if these expenditures require modest tax increases.
- While private development and public investments are generally valued, growth should be managed and controlled in ways that ensure that such developments and invest-

ments do not adversely affect residential neighborhoods, the downtown, and various historical, environmental, aesthetic, and social values.

- The character of the community must not be controlled by developers and businessmen (especially those from outside the city who underappreciate local concerns), by private elites within the community, or by the professional staff within local governments. City commissioners who are accountable to and responsive to public preferences must authorize public policies regarding Lawrence's political economy and major commercial developments. Information about these developments must be readily available to citizens, and opportunities for public participation in decision making must be extensive.

During the late 1970s, an issue arose that provided the community a concrete opportunity to implement these principles: the building of a new city hall. Watson perceived that the 600 block of Massachusetts had become blighted, and he envisioned a vital downtown that extended through that block to the Kansas River. With the support of the city commission, he proposed investing \$3 million in a new city hall to anchor the north end of the downtown. Lawrence citizens narrowly approved this public investment in a referendum, and the city commission took additional steps to enhance the area: a used car lot and other vacant lots were converted to Constant Park and an industrial building (Bryan Anderson's "toy factory") was bought and demolished to create off-street parking across from city hall.¹⁰

The Mall Wars. The commitment of Lawrence citizens and its city government to the downtown was thus well established by 1978 when a developer from Cleveland (Jacobs, Visconti, Jacobs or JVJ) proposed building a large suburban shopping mall on a 62-acre tract of land on South Iowa Street, just beyond the southern city limit. Opposition to "the Cornfield Mall" materialized immediately. Under the leadership of Jack Arensberg, Win Campbell, and Bob Schumm, the Downtown Lawrence Association (DLA) mobilized other downtown businessmen against the mall and convinced city commissioners and other community leaders that the proposed mall would inevitably lead to the deterioration of the Central Business District.¹¹ In the spring election of 1979, voters cast ballots for candidates who campaigned in opposition to the Cornfield Mall, and the city commission turned down JVJ's request that the land be annexed and zoned to permit commercial development. Thus, a ten-year saga began to "save the downtown" from mall developers.¹²

In June 1979 business and governmental leaders in Lawrence formed an organization called Action 80 to explore with JVJ the possibility of locating a mall downtown. A year later, JVJ proposed clearing the area bounded by Seventh Street to the north, Massachusetts Street to the west, Ninth Street to the south, and Rhode Island Street to the east, and building in the downtown what was essentially a suburban-style mall.¹³ Critics led by Barbara Waggoner, Edger Boles, and Myles Schachter mobilized under the banner Citizens for a Better Downtown, labeled the proposal "the Bunker Mall," and complained that a massive brick mall would separate the proposed shopping center from the rest of the downtown and destroy the downtown's pedestrian-friendly atmosphere. They asked, "Why destroy the downtown in order to save it from competition from a cornfield mall?"

These issues politicized downtown issues and made downtown redevelopment the key issue in elections for the city commission. In 1981, voters elected new commissioners including Nancy Shontz and Tom Gleason, who promised a new approach to downtown issues. The new commission complained of the "top-down" approach to redevelopment that empowered developers and the professional staff of the city but left citizens in a reactive role of criticizing "elite initiatives." They proposed that the city no longer react to developer initiatives and market forces but instead create a comprehensive downtown plan based on intensive "bottom-up" involvement of interested citizens. The city commission retained a consultant, Robert B. Teska Associates, who had effectively criticized the JVJ proposals.¹⁴ Teska was directed to work with concerned citizens and groups, develop a variety of plans that emphasized "adaptive re-use and in-fill rather than wholesale demolition," and solicit and select a developer whose proposals

would be sensitive to the community's historical, aesthetic, and social values.¹⁵ In September 1982 a New Orleans-based firm, Sizeler Realty Company, was selected, and it produced a plan that was generally a smaller, less disruptive version of the JVJ plan. It would locate a mall a half-block east of Massachusetts and better integrate the new construction into the existing downtown. But the public seemed ambivalent about the project and, in spring 1983, elected a new commission that shared that ambivalence. The new commissioners—David Longhurst, Howard Hill, Mike Amyx, and Ernie Angino—requested additional downtown proposals, citing design flaws, cost considerations, and skepticism about the commercial feasibility of the Sizeler project (could the developer get major department stores such as Sears and JC Penney to anchor its mall?).

That request was answered in fall 1983, when Dwayne Schwada and other local developers, engineers, and architects proposed a relatively small and inexpensive two-story Towncenter Mall, to be located at the north end of Massachusetts Street. Presented with a "pretty picture" of Towncenter, the new city commission abandoned the Sizeler project. For three years, the commission asserted its commitment to the Towncenter proposal, and in October 1986, a site plan for the project was finally released.¹⁶ This plan showed a project more typical of suburban malls than the pretty pictures that had been released three years earlier; most importantly, the footprint of the mall had grown, spreading west, and requiring that Vermont Street as well as Massachusetts be closed. The project offended many citizens and prompted community activists—self-described "rabble-rousers" such as Pat Kehde and Phil Minkin—to organize as a new "Citizens for a Better Downtown" and to collect petitions calling for a public referendum on the proposal. The election in spring 1987 killed Towncenter. Less than 30 percent of the voters cast pro-mall votes on the referenda questions and each of the pro-Towncenter commissioners was replaced by an anti-mall challenger.¹⁷

By July 1987 the city and county commissions had received three new proposals for suburban malls. JVJ resurrected—under a new name "Lawrence Square Mall"—its initial proposal to build a mall on the "Armstrong site" on South Iowa Street at the southern edge of town. An Arkansas-based developer (Ed Warmack) simultaneously proposed building a mall at the corner of Clinton Parkway and Wakarusa Drive, and Ed Collister, a local attorney representing a group of local investors, suggested a site in northwestern Lawrence, on Sixth Street at Wakarusa Drive. Community activists and downtown interests quickly mobilized against each of these proposals, and the planning, city, and county commissions rejected them during the spring of 1988.¹⁸ JVJ then took the city to court, arguing that the community was using its zoning authority to unlawfully protect downtown merchants from the competition that a suburban mall would provide. However, U.S. District Court Judge J. Saffels ruled on March 6, 1989, that the governing bodies had a legitimate interest in adhering to *Plan '95* and its designation of the downtown as the community's primary business district;¹⁹ that decision upheld the idea that Lawrence was more than a marketplace open to all businesses; as a political community, it could pursue its noneconomic goals through the land-use regulations of its governments.

Meanwhile, the city commission formed a Downtown Improvement Committee (DIC) to generate yet another downtown proposal. The DIC, chaired by Burdett Loomis and composed of a broad array of business interests and neighborhood activists, tried to rebuild the "bottom-up" planning process that had been waylaid with the rejection of the Sizeler project. After much public discussion, the DIC proposed a relatively innovative free-flowing development in which new department stores, "slot shops," and parking ramps would be interspersed among existing stores in the middle of downtown and be tied together by a series of skywalks. The DIC plan reflected cultural values in Lawrence; it promised economic growth while simultaneously protecting the historical and environmental values associated with the downtown and adjacent neighborhoods; it tapped the willingness of citizens to support some public expenditures to make public improvements downtown; and it was formulated using an open democratic process. Proponents of the DIC could not, however, convert these diffuse public sentiments into recognizable public support for their specific project, perhaps because they lacked a means of communicating the strengths and viability of the project to a citizenry that received most of its information

about the plan from the *Lawrence Daily Journal-World*, which viewed the whole project with skepticism. Proponents of the DIC plan also failed to entice key constituencies to expend their resources on behalf of the project. The immediate cause of the defeat of the proposal was the inability of downtown merchants to unify behind a method of financing such public improvements as parking garages through creation of a special benefit district that required businesses throughout the downtown to share the costs of these public improvements.²⁰

Shortly after the DIC proposal was abandoned in May 1988, plans were unveiled for a "Riverfront" factory-outlet shopping center to be built on the Bowersock property just east of city hall, along the southern bank of the Kansas River. Proposed by the Chelsea Corporation (a development firm with central offices in New Jersey and New York) and spearheaded by David Longhurst (a recent mayor with strong business interests downtown), the Riverfront proposal—like the DIC proposal—conformed to dominant community values. Perhaps because it extended the downtown without intruding on it or the adjacent East Lawrence neighborhood to any significant degree, this project enjoyed widespread support from the public and its elected representatives. Chelsea extracted a subsidy from the city in the form of a \$2.3 million parking garage just south of the mall and additional public funds for such improvements as a promenade along the river. The city could finance these improvements, however, through bonds that did not impose any financial burdens on existing property owners, because parking revenues could be used to help pay off the bonds. The Riverfront Mall opened in December 1990 amid expectations that it could fill an emerging niche in the retail market, that people from the broader region would travel to Lawrence to take advantage of the bargains that an outlet mall promised, and that these travelers to Lawrence might also spend some money in the rest of downtown. In short, the Riverfront Mall was expected to contribute to the community's "export economy" and not simply result in a redistribution of sales.

As the '90s progressed, these expectations proved illusory. Perhaps the development of a second outlet mall, the Tanger Factory Outlet Center in North Lawrence, created a larger supply of such stores than the area could support. But most observers saw the concept of outlet stores as a fad, one that declined when consumers recognized that savings were less than expected and failed to compensate for the reduction in consumer choice among available products. In 1999, with traffic in the mall diminishing and tenants leaving,²¹ Chelsea decided to cur its losses and sold the mall to a consortium of local investors headed by Dolph Simons Jr., publisher of the *Lawrence Journal-World*. It is widely expected that this shift in ownership will accelerate the conversion of the Riverfront building from a shopping mall to a (Marriot) hotel and office space. But no informants view the failure of the Riverfront as a shopping mall as a threat to the downtown. A new suburban mall proposal is unlikely given the fading interest in malls among the public,²² given the 1989 District Court decision upholding the ability of the city commission to deny developers the zoning required for such a mall, and given the demonstrated capacity of the downtown to rejuvenate and redefine itself during the 1990s.

The Post-mall Era. As the various mall controversies began to dissipate, a new definition of the downtown began to emerge. When downtown issues focused on the threat of a suburban mall or the inclusion of a downtown mall into the existing area, most citizens and policymakers thought of the downtown as a place—or *the* place—for retail shopping. But when these issues faded, city commissioners—especially John Nalbandian—began to recognize that the downtown was an area of multiple uses.

An important impetus for this transformation in definition occurred in 1986, when a change in Kansas liquor laws permitted citizens to exercise the "local option" of permitting establishments to sell "liquor by the drink." Although beer bars and private clubs had existed in Lawrence since 1950, restrictions on the sale of liquor in bars and restaurants had encouraged Lawrence residents and KU students to wine and dine in Kansas City, Missouri (and discouraged traffic into Lawrence for such purposes). The change in liquor laws created opportunities for restaurants, bars, and places of entertainment to thrive downtown. The arrival of such establishments as the Free State Brewery, Liberty Hall, Miltons, and Abe and Jake's res-

restaurant and bar in the Barbed Wire Building are transforming the downtown from a "nine-to-five shopping market" to a "24-hour community." The ability to sell liquor and wine enabled restaurants to become more abundant and profitable, and the new dining opportunities downtown brought more people into the area during the evenings. Bars, music halls, and other places of entertainment began to flourish. In 1999, twenty-six restaurants were serving customers in the downtown.²³ These changes have made the downtown an attractive place to reside, especially for students and younger adults, and apartments and condominiums have become common above the stores on Massachusetts Street.

Of course, the downtown had long been a multiuse district, as professional offices and governmental buildings had coexisted with retail shops downtown throughout the century. But the new "multiuse" definition of the district prompted a greater emphasis on professional offices and public buildings, as well as entertainment and residential uses. According to Marcia McFarlane, former director of Downtown Lawrence, Inc. (DLI),²⁴ dozens of professional offices have been created in the "nooks and crannies" of recent redevelopments and renovations of downtown buildings, the most prominent example being the recent remodeling of the Quantrill building. And city government has continued to improve, expand, and build new structures downtown, not simply to support a declining downtown but to enhance public spaces that are available for public purposes. The extensive renovation of the community building on Eleventh Street, the conversion of the swimming pool into an aquatic center, and the insistence on locating a new Arts Center downtown illustrate that the downtown is increasingly seen as a place that must support public uses.

During the 1980s, the political process in Lawrence was used to block mall projects that threatened the downtown and to explore public subsidies for those larger projects downtown that were deemed compatible with its historical and pedestrian-friendly qualities. During the 1990s, the community's political process has been employed in three major ways to support the downtown and ensure that its development conforms to dominant community values.

First, the city has continued to spend public funds downtown, providing extra public services and locating public facilities in the area. In addition to investing \$3 million on the promenade, decked parking, and road improvements associated with the Riverfront mall, the city spent \$2.6 million on the aquatic center renovation. According to City Manager Mike Wildgen, the downtown is also supported through the provision of extra city services annually, for example, by assigning additional officers to police the nightlife; by maintaining the flower beds, parking lots, and streets; and by investing in street lights, storm and sanitary sewers, and water lines. In December 2000, the city began operation of a public transportation system; most bus lines are routed through the downtown in a way that should reinforce its role as the central marketplace and "the heart of the community."

Second, the city has provided modest subsidies to businesses and private groups to attract the kinds of development that the community wishes downtown. The city spent \$100,000 to provide sixty-seven long-term, public parking spaces adjacent to the Borders bookstore, as part of a package to entice this national chain to locate downtown rather than on South Iowa Street. Downtown 2000—the development under construction in the 900 block of New Hampshire that will feature retail shops, office space, apartments, and decked parking—will receive more than \$8 million in financial help, in the form of general obligation bonds, repaid in part by revenue from Tax Increment Financing (TIFs), to support the public portions of the project.²⁵ A new Lawrence Arts Center will be included in the project, at a cost to the city of more than \$4.2 million.

But perhaps most importantly, the city has used its regulatory powers—especially a historical preservation ordinance—to guide and control redevelopment in the area. An impetus for the public to increase regulation of downtown developments occurred in 1987, when residents of Old West Lawrence awoke one morning to discover that bulldozers had begun to demolish older, historically significant homes in the 800 block, between Tennessee and Kentucky streets, to clear the land for the new Douglas County Bank. Alarmed that the community had not been adequately consulted and given adequate opportunities to participate in

such matters, activists on behalf of historical preservation pressed the adoption of a Historical Resources Ordinance, which in 1988 became Chapter 22 of the City Code. The stated purpose of this code includes "promoting the educational, cultural, economic, and general welfare of the community" and "enhancing the attractiveness of the city" by "providing a mechanism to identify and conserve the distinctive historic and architectural characteristics of the city." National and State Registers already included several downtown properties such as the Douglas County Courthouse, Watkins Museum, the Carnegie Library, the Eldridge Hotel and the Barb Wire Building, and these designations enabled the State Historical Preservation Officer (SHPO) to regulate developments in the immediate environment surrounding these buildings. But the new Historical Preservation Ordinance enabled the community to identify additional "historically significant" buildings (such as those currently housing Goldmakers, the Brown Bear Brewery, Quintons, and the English Lutheran Church). Developments and renovations within 250 feet of such structures (and within 500 feet of buildings on the national and state registers) are now subject to review by a seven-member Historical Resource Commission composed of historians, architects, realtors, and lawyers who are appointed by the city commission. These provisions mean that developments in most of the downtown are now subject to historical, architectural, and aesthetic considerations. According to Dennis Enslinger, the historic resources administrator in the City/County Planning Department, "these provisions set community expectations for the visual aspects of downtown, and require developers to agree to community standards."²⁶ Perhaps the most visible example of the impact of this ordinance is the retention of the northern and western facades of Borders Books.

New Downtown Complex, 600 block of Massachusetts. Gene Fritz developed this historized infill commercial design for national chain clients and local professionals who want to take advantage of Lawrence's downtown commercial and cultural dynamic that so many downtowns in the United States envy. The design takes its stylistic cues from historic storefronts, uses a brick facade, and tries to assert a scale appropriate for a downtown building. Preservationists approved this facadistic approach, even with its disturbing Victorian tower, as well as the new drives facade placed on the exterior of the old bank building on the corner.

More recently, Gould Evans Associates prepared a *Downtown Urban Design Concept Plan*, which the city commission adopted by resolution in 1997. Working with input from DLL, adjacent neighborhood associations, the League of Women Voters and a steering committee, the plan provides ten urban design principles and guidelines for achieving these principles. For example, the plan requires developers to make compromises that will maintain the downtown character, calls for incentives to foster adaptive reuse of existing buildings, designates Massachusetts as a "primary pedestrian-oriented street with ancillary vehicular circulation," and limits the footprints of individual buildings to about 25,000 square feet while calling for increased density throughout the downtown area.²⁷

These public initiatives have created a context in which developers are increasingly sensitive to the noneconomic goals of the community. For example, two new developments are scheduled for completion in 2001 and early 2002: the stores and offices being built on the west side of the 600 block of Massachusetts by Gene Fritz, and the "Downtown 2000" project: the "Downtown 2000" project in the 900 block of New Hampshire developed by Jeff Shmalberg and Martin Moore. Each of these projects has proceeded with little controversy because the developers have used a process of on-going consultation with the city's planning staff and interested citizens. Such consultations have occurred with an intent to develop projects that are compatible with the historical, environmental, aesthetic, and social goals of the community.

The post-mall period has thus seen the downtown continue to prosper, by adding retail, professional, and residential uses through adaptive reuse of older buildings and by adding new buildings on underutilized land, developments that respect community goals. The city government has supported these changes through public improvements in the area, through subsidies of private developments, and by enforcing regulations. But most of the initiatives and investments that have changed the downtown in the '90s came from private businessmen and developers. While much attention has been given to the investments of national



chains like Borders and Urban Outfitters in the downtown, the extensive contributions of local investors should not be overlooked. Chuck Magerl and his associates have invested in Wheatfields Bakery and Restaurant as well as in the Free State Brewery. David Millstein has rebuilt Sunflower Outdoor and Bike Shop after it was destroyed by fire in 1997. Mike Elwell has redeveloped the Granada Theater and Abe and Jake's at the Barb Wire Building as important centers of entertainment. Even churches, such as Plymouth Congregational, have shown their commitment to the downtown by improving and expanding their buildings.²⁸ These private developments have augmented the downtown as a marketplace and contributed to "the heart of the community" for two reasons. First, national chains have generally been willing to have their developments conform to public regulations as a small price to pay for doing businesses here. Second, local developers have understood that their businesses will thrive to the extent that the downtown thrives and that they can contribute to a strong downtown by providing developments that enhance the social goals that the public has for downtown.

Some supporters of the unfettered market complain that these governmental involvements have been excessive, giving downtown businesses unfair advantages over their competitors elsewhere in the city or imposing undue controls on downtown businesses. Some advocates of community control over market forces complain that these governmental involvements have been minimal and that the community has squandered opportunities to develop a downtown that achieves the highest standards of urban planning. But such complaints about governmental involvement have been fairly subdued and have had little impact on the development of the downtown in the 1990s. During this period there has been a broad consensus that private developers should initiate and fund fundamental changes downtown and that city government has an important but limited role to play in enhancing the downtown.

Future Challenges to the Downtown

The current prosperity of the downtown does not ensure its future. Indeed, the attractiveness of the downtown contributes significantly to the growth of the community which in turn brings about challenges to it.

The South Iowa Power Center. The most obvious current external threat to downtown is the development of South Iowa Street as the community's second regional commercial center—as a "power center" or concentration of "superstores" that attract other retail businesses.²⁹ Because most auto dealers are located in the area and because of the recent influx of "big-box department stores" and "discount houses" (by the expansions of K-Mart and Walmart and the construction of Target, JC Penney, Sears, and Kohls), retail sales on Iowa Street now exceed those downtown.

This expansion of retail establishments on South Iowa has occurred with minimal political efforts to regulate and control it. Many of the new developments have been built on property that had been zoned to permit such stores, and when new zoning has been required, it has occurred on a piecemeal basis and without much controversy. DLI and merchants in the downtown have not sought political controls that limit South Iowa developments. On principle, downtown interests are not "against competition" and do not want to be perceived as trying to protect their businesses. Practically, most downtown businesses do not see the big boxes on South Iowa as competing with them.

According to Marcia McFarlane of DLI, "The downtown and South Iowa serve different consumer needs." The downtown provides "unique and premium merchandise," while stores on South Iowa Street sell "less pricey goods." The downtown has "specialty shops" while the discount stores deal in general merchandise. The downtown is more than a concentration of retail shops; it is a place where people come for social and public purposes that are facilitated by its pedestrian-friendly and human-scale environment. South Iowa Street is little more than a collection of auto dealers and discount stores; even the largest entertainment facility in the area (the Southwind 12 Movie Theatre) is largely disconnected from coffee houses, bars, and

other public spaces where people gather for social purposes. In short, competition between the downtown and South Iowa is reduced because they are two very different sorts of marketplaces, and to the extent that they do compete, the downtown is advantaged by its noneconomic qualities, by its being "the heart of the community." As a consequence, the explosion of big boxes on South Iowa has not reduced retail sales downtown, downtown merchants have not fled to the periphery, and property values and rents downtown are higher than ever—all measures that downtown is still "the place to be."³⁰

Diamond Head as a Third Power Center. Nevertheless, as Lawrence continues to grow in the twenty-first century, the downtown may be threatened by the emergence of additional power centers. Because most of Lawrence's growth is projected to be toward the west and northwest, a power center is being planned near the intersection of K-10 and U.S. 40 (Sixth Street). Lawrence investor Kenny Liu and his urban planner, Price Banks, are expected to develop this area known as "Diamond Head" into a major regional commercial center within the next ten to twenty years.

Many observers of Lawrence issues predict such a development for several reasons. First, almost all of the land east of K-10 and south of US-40 has been platted as a major residential subdivision. Second, state and local officials understand the need to widen U.S. 40, making it a four-lane highway between Wakurusa Drive and K-10. Once this has occurred, residential construction can also be anticipated north of U.S. 40, just west of the new Free State High School. Third, extensive commercial development has already occurred in the area, especially along Wakurusa Drive, where research companies and office buildings have sprung up, and along Sixth Street, where "super stores," shopping plazas, and restaurants and motels are increasingly evident. The persons living and working in this growth area are five or more miles from the downtown and from South Iowa Street, and they seek shopping opportunities nearby. A more concentrated power center at the intersection of U.S. 40 and K-10 may be a better response to this need than the continued strip commercial developments that are now occurring. It is unclear, however, whether such a power center will be an asset to the community or whether it will bring unattractive sprawl to the western gateway to the city and threaten the downtown.

The hope that a third power center in this location will serve the community well is largely based on the community's confidence in Bob Billings. In this view, Billings exemplifies the virtues of "enlightened" private development, and his capacity to control developments west of town arouses optimism that a third power center there will be beneficial to Lawrence. To understand this view, a short consideration of the Alvamar development in western Lawrence is necessary.


Between 1967 and 1985, a group of investors led by Billings and John McGrew acquired 3,000 acres of land west of Kasold Avenue, between Sixth Street (U.S. 40) and Clinton Parkway. Because the purchase price of this land and the costs of developing it were relatively low, Billings and his associates faced few pressures to turn a quick dollar on their investment. They could invest millions to build a 36-hole golf course and country club, knowing that this investment would increase greatly the value to surrounding land and attract wealthy residents to the area. And they could sell land to the school district at a fraction of its market value, knowing that attractive new schools and public facilities in the area would enhance demand for their property. Between 1967 and 1997, more than \$1 billion was invested in the construction of high-quality homes and professional offices in the Alvamar area. This construction proceeded with little public and governmental involvement. Public subsidies were not required, because Alvamar could pay the costs of sewers, roads, water lines, and sidewalks, and it could build these costs into the purchase price of its developments. Governmental regulations to protect neighborhoods from undesirable side effects of developments were seldom an issue because Alvamar created neighborhoods in areas where there were no prior occupants to protest the effects of the new construction. And, through restrictive covenants and architectural controls, Billings established land-use and building standards that exceeded anything that governments might impose. As a result, Alvamar became a vast, well-planned, and prosperous sub-community within Lawrence, one suggesting that private developers—working with mini-

mal governmental assistance and regulations—can contribute greatly to the prosperity of the community. Because of Billings's track record, it would seem plausible that a third power center in the Alvarado area would be a community asset.

Two problems, however, undermine this rosy scenario. First, Billings does not own the land where a third power center would be created, and it is not clear that private developments there would conform to the same high standards that Billings established for Alvarado. Second, developments at Alvarado and elsewhere in western Lawrence may have unleashed political and social forces that undermine support for the downtown.

Most observers perceive that Lawrence residents have somewhat different attitudes about the downtown depending on where they live. In general, those residents east of Iowa Street are more attached to the downtown; they tend to be "oldtimers" who have come to appreciate the qualities of the downtown and who see it as an indispensable heart of the political and social community. In contrast, many of the residents west of Iowa Street, especially those in Alvarado, are newer to the community. Some are professionals and executives who work in Topeka or Kansas City. Others are KU alumni who have made their fortunes elsewhere but have retired in Lawrence to take advantage of the cultural activities at KU and to attend Jayhawk athletic events. Such people think of the downtown as a nice quaint area, but there is little depth in their allegiance to it. These people are more likely to be "newcomers" to the community who are used to living in places—for example, Overland Park and Lenexa—with minimal central business districts and extensive commercial strips. They are less likely to become active in efforts to "save the downtown." They are more likely to oppose regulations on peripheral developments that threaten the downtown or public subsidies intended to benefit the downtown. In short, growth in western Lawrence appears to be creating a context where there is less public support for saving the downtown and for the kinds of historical, aesthetic, social, and environmental goals that have been sought by supporters of the downtown. The decline of such support could lead to a situation where the public and its elected representatives are less vigilant against the sorts of threats that a third power center in northwestern Lawrence could pose for the community.

The Fear of Imitating Aggieville. The future of the downtown will depend not only on its capacity to repel the "external" threats from second and third power centers but on its ability to handle internal problems. According to Dennis Enslinger, one of the key factors in the success of downtown has been its proximity to Kansas University. Jayhawk fans spend lots of money downtown before and after KU games, and KU students come downtown to shop and be entertained. But these sources of success can also be a problem, as many observers fear that the downtown could become another "Aggieville," the commercial district in Manhattan that hosts a vibrant nightlife for students at Kansas State University. Whenever a retail store closes its doors and is replaced by a bar or student-oriented restaurant, some Lawrence citizens fear an accelerating turnover in downtown businesses. They fear that the current mix favoring retailers who serve the broader public (and not just KU students) will be transformed into a place that caters excessively to the nightlife of students. To address this issue, the Lawrence City Commission passed an ordinance in 1994 that sought to limit the number of new "pure bars" downtown. Based on the assumption that the current mix of retail shop and bars is appropriate, the regulation does not seek to limit bars already in existence. But it constrains the entry of new bars into the downtown by requiring that 55 percent of their gross receipts come from the sale of food. During summer 1999, the Brown Bear Brewing Company lost its liquor license for failing to meet this requirement.³¹ The incident illustrates the difficulty that city officials have in regulating downtown businesses to attain a desirable mix of uses downtown. Why is the 1994 mix of bars and other businesses appropriate for the future? Why is 55 percent in nonliquor sales a reasonable benchmark for characterizing a business as a restaurant and not a bar? While such questions beg the legitimacy of specific regulations that the city has created and enforces, the capacity to regulate business in the area is an essential tool for the public in its efforts to ensure that the downtown is more than a marketplace. The regulatory



Borders Books. When Borders decided to move into the downtown in 1996, the so-called "Border Wars" started over the company's intention to demolish an historic livery stable and automobile dealership at Seventh and New Hampshire Streets. In the end, preservationists settled for the retention of the facade of the old building. Borders still got its suburban-like parking lot to the south of the new building. However, the battle put large national chains on notice that if they wanted to move into downtown, they would have to respect its historic context.

capacity of the city enables the public to pursue its social values in the heart of the community. If the downtown is a public space subject to democratic controls and if the public wants a downtown that is different from Aggieville, then the political process must be used to propose and experiment with a variety of regulatory policies that will achieve the noneconomic goals that the community has for the downtown.

The Threat of National Chains. The possibility that the downtown might turn into a miniature replica of the Plaza in Kansas City is another internal problem that must be addressed. For many supporters of downtown, the Plaza has been adversely transformed in recent years by the infusion of national chains into the area. What was once a unique district now peddles the same goods that are available in shopping centers around the country. The recent arrival of The Gap, Abercrombie and Fitch, Borders Books, and Urban Outfitters illustrates the increasing interest that national chains have in locating in downtown Lawrence. The arrival of Borders prompted the locally owned Adventure Bookstore to close shop, and other small locally owned businesses are wary of the loss of customers to the benefits that large national chains can offer. If the downtown is a pure marketplace and all that matters are economic values, then the replacement of small local businesses with large national chains presents few problems. Indeed, some observers see the arrival of national chains as an important boost to the downtown, attracting additional traffic downtown and thus more customers for local businesses. But if the downtown is "the heart of the community" and provides social values such as the greater sense of connection and friendship that exists between customer and merchants in locally owned stores, then an invasion of national chains into the downtown is a significant problem.

While regulatory policy can be helpful in preventing the downtown from turning into Aggieville, such policies seem to be of little use in preventing the downtown from emulating the Plaza. National chains have the resources to enter the market, and they often are willing to conform to the regulations regarding land use, historical preservation, and other issues. If the public wants to keep the mix of businesses downtown tilted toward locally owned shops and away from national chains, they have little choice but to actively encourage small local businesses to set up shop downtown. By providing a \$50,000 grant for such purposes to DLI, city officials have made an initial investment toward retaining the unique qualities of the downtown. Through this subsidy, the public has, in essence, hired DLI to be its agent in ensuring that locally owned business will be included in an appropriate mix of downtown businesses. It can identify local businessmen that might be interested in locating downtown; it can identify rental spaces that are becoming available for businesses; and it can try to match the two. It could proactively build smaller incubator spaces that would appeal to start-up retailers. It could subsidize the rents of locally owned businesses. In short, if national chains become a significant threat to the social goals that the public has for the downtown, the public can use governmental subsidies to encourage the kind of businesses they want. Because the downtown is more than a marketplace—because it is also the heart of the community—the public policies of city government are the means by which citizens can tax themselves to pursue their noneconomic goals for the downtown.

Conclusions

Downtown Lawrence is the envy of many communities in Kansas and throughout the nation.³² The root cause of this success is the implicit recognition that the downtown is more than a marketplace, that it is the heart of the community and a public space in which Lawrence

citizens can pursue their historical, aesthetic, environmental, and social values. The public has consistently demonstrated its support for this political and social conception of the downtown by opposing projects that threaten it, by supporting regulations and public spending that enhance it, and by electing city commissioners who protect and promote it.

These broad public sentiments are not, however, sufficient by themselves to achieve a downtown that reflects the goals of Lawrence citizens. Processes of political democracy must be in place to translate public sentiments into public policies and projects that achieve public goals. In Lawrence, the democratic process has evolved over time in ways that have enabled the city to be quite effective at achieving its noneconomic goals downtown.

Between (roughly) 1945 and 1980, the city had a political process that can be characterized as "skilled democracy."³³ During this era community notables and city administrators acted on behalf of public goals in revitalizing the downtown; by developing off-street parking, transforming Massachusetts Street into a pedestrian-friendly corridor, investing in public buildings such as the city hall, and creating a comprehensive plan for the city that designated the downtown as the primary commercial district of the city, these public leaders created a context in which Lawrence was well positioned to withstand the threats to the downtown posed by proposals for suburban malls. The political process at this time was only formally democratic, as there was little citizen involvement.

The "mall wars" precipitated a change in the political process toward a more "participatory democracy." Through "bottom-up" planning processes, through the active involvement of neighborhood associations and other citizen-based groups like Citizens for a Better Downtown, and through demands for public referenda on major mall proposals, citizens directly protested developments that they saw as undermining their noneconomic goals for the downtown. During this period, the political process was highly conflictual, and conflict served the useful function of informing citizens about the public values that were at stake downtown and mobilizing them into taking those political actions necessary to save the downtown.

Since the end of the mall wars in the late 1980s, such conflict has dissipated and the political process has undergone another transformation. The key aspect of this process is the cooperative relations that have evolved between developers, public officials, and citizen-based organizations. During this era of "consensual democracy," public values regarding the downtown have been fairly well institutionalized. Developers understand that their projects must conform to such regulations of the city as those in the Historical Preservation Ordinance. They have come to realize that their chances of developing a successful project with public support depend on their creating designs that conform to the values of involved groups and activists. Thus, developments are increasingly the result of a public planning process in which a variety of interests and goals are accommodated. The public-private partnerships that have occurred during this period (best exemplified by the "Downtown 2000" project) have enabled the downtown to expand, add density, and provide a wider variety of uses, while maintaining the essential qualities that have endeared it to Lawrence citizens.³⁴

"Cooperative democracy" does not, however, ensure that Lawrence citizens can achieve all of their political and social goals with respect to the downtown. It is a form of public-private cooperation that involves relatively few people and, indeed, depends on the apathy and quiescence of most citizens. It is a form of democracy in which public authority and public purse strings are influenced by a small number of activists and special interests who impose their conception of public values on the downtown (and the broader community). Stronger forms of democracy require wider and more thoughtful discussions among citizens about their goals for the downtown. Strong democracy requires that more citizens are proactive in articulating and pursuing their vision of the community as well as more vigilant about possible threats to it.³⁵ The future of the downtown will depend on whether the current period of consensual democracy will leave citizens too apathetic to pursue their noneconomic goals for the community. If Lawrence citizens hope to ensure a downtown that exemplifies their goals, they will have to be more active in articulating and pursuing these goals through the democratic process. A strong democratic process is inherently open—the goals that democratic citizens want

cannot be specified until the process has evolved. Through a strong democratic process, Lawrence citizens have the best chance of creating a community—including a downtown “heart of the community”—that corresponds to their evolving social goals.

Notes

1. Paul Peterson, *City Limits* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
2. Pierre Clavel, *The Progressive City* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1986).
3. Identification of the downtown as “the heart of the community” occurs in such important governmental documents as *Horizon 20/20: The Comprehensive Plan for the City of Lawrence and Unincorporated Douglas County*. See p. 75 of the reformatted and revised edition of *Horizon 20/20*, available at the Metropolitan Planning Office in the Lawrence City Hall. *Horizon 20/20* was initially adopted by the city commission in January 1997; an amended version was adopted in June 1998.
 Citizen surveys confirm that most citizens regard the health of the downtown as essential to the quality of life in the community. See, for example, Paul Schumaker and Steven Maynard-Moody, “Downtown Redevelopment and Public Opinion: A Survey of Citizen Attitudes for the Downtown Improvement Committee,” Institute for Public Policy and Business Research Report No. 135 (Lawrence Kans.: The University of Kansas, 1988).
4. Paul Schumaker, *Critical Pluralism, Democratic Performance, and Community Power* (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1991).
5. This idea was expressed by several informants who were interviewed during the summer of 1999 while researching this paper, but it was most forcefully articulated by Gary Toebben, who served as president of the Lawrence Chamber of Commerce from 1981 to 1999.
 To preserve the confidentiality of these informants, I attribute ideas to specific persons only when they have expressively given permission to be identified. Ideas provided in quotation marks without attribution are derived from those informants who remain anonymous to preserve the promise of confidentiality given to them.
6. This designation of the downtown is provided by Gould Evans Associates, *Downtown Urban Design Concept Plan*, which was prepared for the City of Lawrence in 1996 and adopted by resolution of the city commission in 1997.
7. David Dary, *Lawrence, Douglas County, Kansas: An Informal History* (Lawrence, Kans.: Allen Books, 1982), 338–44.
8. Dary, *Lawrence, Douglas County, Kansas*, 343–44.
9. Schumaker, *Critical Pluralism*, 49–69 and 118–127. The goals and principles listed below are an interpretation of public opinion in Lawrence regarding the downtown based on several surveys conducted throughout the 1980s.
10. Schumaker, *Critical Pluralism*, 1–2 and 121–22.
11. The negative impact on central business districts from suburban malls was well documented by urban scholars. See, for example, Clifford Weaver and Christopher Duerksen, “Central Business District Planning and the Control of Outlying Shopping Centers,” *Urban Law Annual* 14 (1977): 57–79.
12. A more extensive discussion and evaluation of the nine mall proposals discussed in this section can be found in Paul Schumaker, “Democratic Ideals and Economic Imperatives in the Resolution of Downtown Redevelopment Issues,” *State and Local Government Review* 26, no. 1 (winter 1994): 7–20.
13. See *Downtown Retail Center Evaluation*, prepared for Action 80, Inc., Lawrence, Kans., by Crawford, Westbrook and Associates, December 1980.
14. See Teska’s *Downtown Redevelopment Study*, prepared for the City of Lawrence and the Lawrence-Douglas County Planning Office, December 1980.
15. Mary Hoenk, “City Includes Three Retail Options in Downtown Plan,” *Lawrence Journal-World*, Nov. 4, 1981.
16. Tim Bonfield, “City Views Mall Layout Design Plan,” *Lawrence Journal-World*, Oct. 28, 1986.
17. David Bangert, “Voters Reject Downtown Mall,” *Lawrence Journal-World*, April 8, 1987.
18. Tim Bonfield, “City Vote Unanimously Denies Suburban Mall Zoning Request,” *Lawrence Journal-World*, April 14, 1988.
19. *Jacobs, Visconsi, Jacobs v. City of Lawrence*, U.S. District Court, D. Kansas Civ. A no. 882248-s. In 1991, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this decision.
20. Tim Bonfield, “3–2 Vote Derails Project as Mayor Switches Sides,” *Lawrence Journal-World*, May 25, 1988.
21. As of summer 1999, only about 25 shops remained.
22. According to economic development specialists such as Gary Toebben (president of the Chamber of Commerce) and Linda Finger (director of City/County Planning), “malls are no longer a threat to the downtown.” Instead, malls are seen as “dinosaurs” and “teenager hangouts” that repel more affluent middle-aged consumers.
23. It is reported that some property owners receive three inquiries regarding rentals from prospective restaurateurs for each inquiry about space for retail stores.
24. DLI succeeded the old DLA and provides promotional benefits and political representation for 175 downtown businesses.

25. TIFs are public subsidies that are intended to pay for themselves and be without cost to taxpayers. TIFs provide funds to improve facilities and increase their economic productivity. The increased sales and property taxes resulting from these improvements are used to pay off the TIF supported bonds.
26. Dennis Enslinger, interview by author, Lawrence, Kans., July 8, 1999. Enslinger points out that the ordinance allows developers to contest the regulations that HRC might impose on a project—because they can appeal first to the city commission and then to the courts—but the public process that has been created has largely succeeded in creating a situation where “everyone comes to agreement on development and renovation standards.”
27. Gould Evans Associates, *Downtown Urban Design Concept Plan* (Lawrence/Douglas County Planning Department, 1996), 3–10.
28. Several informants mentioned that churches play a very important role in a multiple-use downtown. They attract thousands of people downtown for services and meetings, and these people frequently use other downtown businesses while in the area.
29. The question of whether South Iowa should be designated as a “community” or a “regional” commercial center has been controversial. *Horizon 20/20* specifies that “Downtown Lawrence should remain the primary regional retail commercial center” (p.75), but it also acknowledges that Iowa Street south of the University “has evolved into a regional commercial center serving shopping and entertainment needs within the community.” Some observers note that this ambiguity could become a legal issue if the city used its zoning powers to thwart commercial developments on South Iowa Street because they threaten the downtown as the city’s primary commercial district.
30. This is not to say that developments on South Iowa Street pose no difficulties for Lawrence. The area contains a variety of problems associated with urban sprawl: for example, inadequate green spaces, undistinguished architecture, and traffic congestion. The area has also contributed an enormous amount of square footage of retail space to the community. According to KU Urban Planner Kurt McClure, the city has more retail space than its population can support. However, this may constitute a greater problem for businesses on South Iowa than for those downtown if consumer demand remains strong for the specialty goods that are marketed downtown and if most of the excess capacity is in general merchandizing.
According to Planning Director Linda Finger, “The biggest effect that South Iowa has had on downtown is that it keeps the downtown on its toes. It compels landlords, merchants, and other businessmen to make more investments and improvements in their downtown facilities.”
31. Peter Hancock, “Food-sale Rule May Force Bar to Go Belly Up,” *Lawrence Journal-World*, August 24, 1999.
32. Josh Funk, “Top Priority: Downtown Lawrence’s Success Rooted in Long-term Planning,” *Lawrence Journal-World*, May 30, 1999.
33. The term “skilled democracy” has been used by contemporary political theorists to describe John Stuart Mill’s classic conception of representative government; see, for example, James Wiser, *Political Philosophy: A History of the Search for Order* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), 314–16. According to Mill, good government occurs when formal democratic procedures are in place, but the effective policy makers are two steps removed from citizens. In this model of representative government, the most skilled or qualified persons—those with the most education, experience, knowledge, and other resources to accomplish community goals—are given opportunities to initiate and effectuate policy. These “public servants” can be either holders of administrative office or community leaders without formal governmental office. In either case, plans and actions of these skilled leaders are closely monitored by elected legislators, who are empowered to veto actions that are believed to depart too greatly from public wishes. The public retains its sovereignty by having the formal power to cast ballots every few years for their representatives and to remove those representatives who have failed to be sufficiently vigilant in controlling the skilled public servants.
34. This type of democracy resembles what Clarence Stone has called a “developmental political regime.” See his *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946–1988* (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1989). In developmental regimes, public and private actors effectively cooperate in order to develop a new project. Stone finds that new forms and processes of cooperation better serve communities than the more conflictual democratic processes that had earlier characterized urban politics, but he also recognizes some problems with regime politics (or consensual democracy). If the cooperating partners represent only a small segment of the community, they can pursue goals that fail to address the social problems that confront most citizens, and they produce policies that advantage those within the governing regime while imposing disproportionate costs on those outside the governing coalition.
35. Benjamin Barber, *Strong Democracy* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1984).