Critical Pluralism, Democratic Performance, and Community Power

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Preface

For the discipline of political science, theories about community power have been very important, because they have focused on questions about the democratic performance of (local) governments. Do elected representatives exercise more political power than do the private elites, governmental bureaucrats, or special-interest groups in the policymaking process while remaining responsive to citizen preferences? Are there legitimate explanations for the dominance of certain interests (e.g., "the Growth Machine," people from upper-income neighborhoods, and whites) over their counterparts (e.g., "Preservationists," people from lower-income neighborhoods, and minorities)? Are the general policy directions of local governments consistent with dominant values within local political cultures? Orthodox pluralism, which constituted the theoretical mainstream of political science for many years and which is exemplified by Robert Dahl's *Who Governs?* has suggested that these questions usually have affirmative answers and that American cities are governed democratically.

Orthodox pluralism has, however, come under severe attack. Private elites, governmental bureaucrats, or special-interest groups are said to be the main power wielders in community politics, and citizens are said to be too distracted by private concerns to play a role in the resolution of community issues. The Growth Machine is believed to dominate opponents of rapid economic development because of "systematic bias" in local decision making, and the poor and minorities are alleged to be victims of pervasive discrimination in some communities. Policy decisions in important issue areas are thought to be determined by economic imperatives rather than by dominant cultural values. Because of these challenges to orthodox pluralism, a wide variety of theoretical perspectives has emerged as alternatives to pluralism, and pluralism is undergoing revisions that recognize deficiencies in democratic performance by local governments.

My intention in writing this book is to contribute to the revision of pluralism in ways that incorporate some of the main concepts and methods developed by critics of pluralist orthodoxy. If pluralism is to remain a viable theoretical perspective for studying local government, it should enable community power analysists to provide continual vigilance against failures of democratic performance. Thus, my main objective is to develop a conceptual framework and methodology for analyzing both the successes and the failures that communities experience in achieving three normative ideals of pluralist democracy. One ideal is that of responsible representation: The power to resolve public policy issues should reside primarily with elected representatives and secondarily with the voting public, and the power of private elites, bureaucrats, and special-interests should be limited. A second ideal is that of complex equality of political influence among various segments of the community: inequalities in the success of competing segments over a wide range of issues must have reasonable explanations. A third ideal is principle-policy congruence: public policies should reflect the dominant principles (or the general policy goals) of citizens within local political cultures.

In the empirical portion of this analysis I focus on the extent to which these three goals have been achieved on twenty-nine issues that have arisen and been resolved in Lawrence, Kansas, between 1977 and 1987. I have developed a "comparative-issues" methodology that is based primarily on Dahl's decisional method but that incorporates aspects of competing methodologies for studying community power. Structured interviews were conducted with most participants in this sample of issues, providing a rich data base measuring the abstract principles, policy preferences, and participation of representatives, bureaucrats, notables, group leaders, and individual activists. Biannual public opinion surveys were conducted to provide data about the principles and preferences of citizens. Although such data are subject to the obvious limitations associated with their collection in one community, they facilitate a detailed analysis of central political questions in that community.

This study should be of primary interest to urban theorists who are concerned with local democracy, but it may also be of interest to other political scientists who are interested in broader theoretical and methodological issues within the discipline. David Ricci has argued that *The Tragedy of Political Science* is the incompatibility of the discipline's normative attachment to democratic ideals and its professional commitment to the scientific study of political life. According to Ricci, this problem has arisen because positivists within political science have maintained that normative prescriptions and scientific analysis are incompatible in two different ways. Some positivists have argued that scientific research undermines the underlying premise of democratic life; for example, survey research showing that most citizens are ill informed and apathetic about politics vitiates normative democratic theories about the importance of an active and informed citizenry. Other positivists

have argued that there is simply an unbridgeable gap between normative and empirical analyses; in this view, normative or philosophical studies make arguments about democratic ideals, while scientific studies must remain silent about normative ideals and concern themselves solely with actual political practices. For many years "postbehavioralists" have urged political scientists to reject positivism and wed normative and empirical analyses, but few studies demonstrate how this might be done. *Critical Pluralism* presents one approach to the postbehavioral enterprise by suggesting that an evaluative political science requires the specification of political ideals, the measurement of the extent to which these ideals are realized in practice, and the development of theories stating the conditions of higher levels of political performance.

Although this study is intended primarily for professional political scientists, democratic theorists may be especially obligated to make their work as accessible as possible to the broader public. Toward this end, I have tried to minimize the jargon that plagues social science research, to use the simplest adequate statistical procedures, and to relegate many disciplinary, theoretical, and methodological details to the notes.

The book is organized as follows. In Chapter 1 I introduce the main question that is addressed in this study: To what extent (and under what conditions) are local policy issues resolved democratically? Discussion focuses on the answers to this question provided by four major theoretical perspectives on community power: elite theory, orthodox pluralism, the economistic paradigm, and regime theory. In Chapter 2 I clarify the ideals of responsible representation, complex equality, and principle-policy congruence and outline the analyses that must be conducted to determine the extent to which pluralist democracies achieve these ideals in practice. In Chapter 3 I describe the study of Lawrence, focusing on the comparative-issues methodology that facilitates the analysis of the democratic performance of local governments. In Chapter 4 I discuss nine pairs of contrasting principles and the distribution of support for these principles within Lawrence's political culture.

The next six chapters describe the twenty-nine concrete issues that are the central units of analysis of this study. Readers interested in more general theoretical conclusions might focus on the discussion (at the beginning of Chapter 5 and in the Appendix) of the methodology for discerning these principles that are relevant to these concrete issues, and then proceed directly to those chapters addressing policy areas of greatest interest to them.

The next three chapters summarize and analyze the achievement of democratic ideals in Lawrence. Chapter 11 discusses principle-policy congruence or the concern that policy outcomes should reflect the principles that are most dominant in local political cultures. Chapter 12 discusses responsible representation or the concern that direct power in resolving community issues should reside with representatives and (to a lesser extent) citizens. Chapter 13 discusses complex equality or the concern that there should be legitimate explanations

for unequal policy responsiveness to the preferences of members of different classes, races, sexes, and other social groupings. A concluding chapter then summarizes the analysis in terms of its implications for the "rules of the game" in pluralist politics.

Although most of the costs of conducting this research have come out of my own pocket, partial support has been provided by grants from the University of Kansas General Research fund and by allocations for supplies and computer time from the Department of Political Science. The secretarial staff in the department—especially Ginny Shipley, Kit Pittier, Joanne Sedricks, and Virginia Postoak—have also helped with such tasks as keypunching and preparation of tables.

Other people have contributed to this study and to the preparation of the manuscript. I would first like to thank the 239 participants in the Lawrence issues who provided interviews and the more than 2,000 citizens who answered survey questions during the course of the project. I would also like to thank the students enrolled in my course on "Power in American Communities" at the University of Kansas who participated in the surveys of citizens. Since over fifty students contributed to the completion of the surveys, they cannot all be named here, but I would like to acknowledge Bill Romstedt and Jerry Mitchell, who interviewed some of the participants and served as capable research assistants.

I would also like to thank Jeff Henig, Bryan Jones, and an anonymous reviewer for their many helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this manuscript. Special thanks must also be given to Russell Getter, John Bolland, and Nancy Burns, who helped nurture this project at various stages in its development. My initial interests in the themes covered here were sparked by earlier collaborations with Getter on the "policy responsiveness" and "responsiveness bias" of local governments. Bolland provided me with the results of his 1983 and 1985 reputational studies of elites in Lawrence and is the coauthor of the section on community notables in Chapter 12. Burns contributed to my understanding of "complex equality" through our collaborative work on gender conflicts and the unequal treatment of women and also provided comments on earlier versions of the manuscript.

I am most appreciative, however, of the contributions of my wife, Jean, who provided encouragement through the many years invested in this study and made many valuable suggestions through her careful editing of the manuscript.

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Evaluating Democratic Performance in Community Policymaking

The governing bodies of American cities are besieged by various types of participants representing different interests and articulating alternative principles about the proper resolution of community issues. What principles ought to be reflected, and what principles are reflected in policy decisions? Who should have power, and who does have power when making policy decision on such issues? Although democratic theory is concerned with providing concepts and generalizations that answer these questions, it has been plagued by as much conflict as have concrete community issues. In short, there are several theories providing alternative descriptions, explanations, and evaluations of the democratic performance of city governments.

THREE POLICY ISSUES IN LAWRENCE

This book provides a new conceptual framework and methodology for analyzing democratic performance in American communities and applies this framework to twenty-nine recent policy issues that have been raised and resolved in Lawrence, Kansas. To place this study within the context of the theoretical debate about the democratic performance of city governments, a brief introduction to three of these issues is useful.

Replacing a Toy Factory with a Parking Lot

In September 1979 the five-member Lawrence City Commission voted unanimously to approve a resolution to build a small parking lot at 600 Massachusetts Street, a location adjacent to the newly built City Hall and to the offices of the *Lawrence Journal-World*, the city's only daily newspaper. City Manager Buford Watson had urged this project not only to serve City Hall's

parking needs but also as a means of stimulating downtown redevelopment. At that time, the issue generated little controversy, and two months later the commission authorized $310,000 in parking revenue bonds to finance the project. Part of this cost was to permit acquisition of the property, which included an old toy factory owned by Bryan Anderson. Anderson, however, refused an offer of $115,000 for the building and began to mobilize opposition to the parking lot. Arguments were advanced that the parking lot was not needed (as nearby lots were underused), expensive (each space would cost $7,763), premature (future needs were projected without benefit of a comprehensive downtown plan), and unsafe (the entrance and exits of the lot might not be sufficiently visible to oncoming traffic). City commissioners responded that the bonds had already been issued and were not callable and that Anderson was simply raising the issue in hopes of "turning a handsome profit" on the building.[1]

Discontent mounted as activists who had long opposed the dominance of "pro-growth" and "good government" forces in Lawrence were joined by people concerned with the direction of downtown development. A public opinion survey showed that 58 percent of those citizens having informed and unambiguous preferences opposed the parking lot, but neither such opposition nor 500 signatures on a petition protesting the project swayed the "city fathers." Only Marci Francisco, the sole woman commissioner, opposed the parking lot. With the quiet support of the Downtown Lawrence Association (DLA) the commissioners voted to demolish the toy factory, Anderson was awarded $185,000 for his building in a court settlement, and the parking lot was built.

The resolution of this issue was generally applauded by the administrative staff of the city, downtown businesspeople, the *Journal-World*, and other supporters of economic development. In contrast, Commissioner Francisco, neighborhood activists, and left-leaning opponents of "the Growth Machine"[2] viewed the outcome as an example of the unresponsiveness of Lawrence government to citizen protest and participation. The commission's handling of the parking-lot issue was much discussed during the next local election, and the voters responded by putting into office candidates who were generally critical of the prevailing orientations in Lawrence government.

Controversy over the City Manager

In February 1982 Buford Watson, who had served as city manager of Lawrence since 1970 and who had consistently been a strong supporter of economic growth, received a letter from newly elected City Commissioner Tom Gleason requesting his resignation. Watson refused to resign, setting the stage for a highly controversial battle over whether he ought to be retained or fired. There were few specific accusations of wrongdoing by Watson; rather the objec-

tions to him were based on broader philosophical concerns of equity and responsiveness. He was charged with favoring the well-to-do and business interests and ignoring minorities and neighborhood organizations. His administrative style was also questioned as opposition activists viewed him as "the boss of the Growth Machine," and dissident commissioners argued that he advocated staff proposals too strongly and failed to provide policy alternatives and information relevant to both sides of an issue. Watson's fate was widely discussed—in the *Journal-World*, in community organizations, and among the public generally. Surveys showed that 75 percent of the public was aware of the issue, with 70 percent of these aware citizens supporting Watson's retention. The Chamber of Commerce, most community leaders, and most activists on the issue rallied to Watson's defense, and a committee was formed to gather petitions to recall Gleason.

Watson served at the pleasure of the commission. It took only three votes to fire him, and the composition of the commission was such that firing Watson was a distinct possibility. In addition to Gleason, voters had elected Nancy Shonz, a long-time observer of local government who frequently spoke out for neighborhood and environmental concerns against the interests of the Growth Machine; it was clear that Shontz had little affection for Watson. The third possible vote against Watson seemed to be that of Mayor Marci Francisco, who was elected in 1979 by a neighborhood-based constituency. Francisco had acquired a reputation for independence and unpredictability because she frequently dissented from the policy decisions of her fellow commissioners during the 1979–81 period and because of her "alternative lifestyle," which included adopting a bicycle as her sole means of transportation. After three weeks of controversy, the commission met in executive session to decide Watson's fate. But instead of voting to fire or retain Watson, they adopted a set of review procedures. Mayor Francisco, upholding her reputation for unpredictability, was credited with "disarming the charged and emotional atmosphere" surrounding the issue. Although she voted against Watson three months later when the issue was on the agenda, the crisis had passed, and Watson was subsequently retained.

Watson, who was later (in 1986) elected president of the International City Management Association, was not the only winner on the issue. His support was especially strong among the reputed leaders of the community, the Chamber of Commerce, people living in more affluent neighborhoods, men, conservatives, and Republicans. These people were victorious on the issue, as they expected Watson's retention to result in the continuance of policies embodying their concerns about Lawrence government—that it should promote economic growth, protect property rights, keep taxes low, and generally run City Hall like a business. Neighborhood activists, the lower class, women, liberals, and Democrats were among those participants who tended to oppose Watson. For these people, Watson's retention was a setback, as it diminished the

possibility of new policy directions involving slower growth, more neighborhood protection against disruptive development, more governmental services and welfare, and a greater infusion of "political" concerns about openness and fairness into the policymaking process.

East Lawrence Downzoning

Shortly after Watson was retained, a local developer, Dick Edmondson, built two houses on a lot in East Lawrence zoned for multiple-family dwellings. Neighborhood residents—the majority of whom were women—took the matter to the East Lawrence Improvement Association (ELIA) and expressed concern for maintaining the single-family character of their neighborhood against an increasing number of multifamily, retail, and business developments. Since large portions of East Lawrence were zoned to accommodate such developments, the ELIA sought a "massive downzoning" that would provide more restrictive zoning designations for 700 lots in the neighborhood. Their contention was that such downzoning would bring these lots into conformity with existing uses or, if the lots were vacant, with the character of the neighborhood. They hoped to stabilize the neighborhood, protecting it from speculative construction by developers. Of course, developers and real estate interests who owned some of these lots objected to such new restrictions on their property rights. While receiving widespread attention in the press, interest in this issue was mostly restricted to the neighborhood involved. Surveys showed that 70 percent of the citizens of Lawrence were unaware of the controversy, and they had no clear preference regarding its outcome. Shontz, Gleason, and Francisco were predictably sympathetic, and by a 3–2 vote, much of East Lawrence was downzoned.

This decision of the commission emphasized neighborhood protection principles over property rights principles. Those persons asserting neighborhood protection principles—predominantly women, the lower class, and liberals—wielded more power on the issue than men, the upper class, and more conservative actors who asserted the right to develop their property as they saw fit.

THEORIES ABOUT COMMUNITY POWER

These three cases are too few to permit confident conclusions about democratic performance, but they can help to illustrate the conflicting perspectives that scholars typically employ when analyzing community power. In the remainder of this chapter, the evaluations and interpretations that might be provided by the proponents of four theoretical perspectives—elite theory, pluralism, the economistic paradigm, and regime theory—are considered. Later, the pool of cases will be expanded to allow for more systematic analysis.

Elite Theory

Elite theorists maintain that, despite the trappings of formal democracy, political power within American communities is concentrated in the hands of a small number of people—mostly like-minded upper-class businessmen who eschew public office and rule indirectly and perhaps covertly without being accountable to the public through electoral processes. Such elite domination, it is argued, has three results. First, public policies are unresponsive to the wishes and needs of the broader public. Second, those interests within the community (such as the lower class, minorities, and neighborhood organizations) who might oppose the elite agenda repeatedly fail to obtain their objectives. Third, the elite goal of economic development is given unquestioned priority over other community goals such as protecting neighborhoods from the disruptive effects of development, providing social services, and facilitating citizen participation in the policymaking process.

From the perspective of elite theory, the outcomes of the parking lot, city manager, and downzoning controversies suggest that democratic ideals are seldom realized, at least on important issues. According to elite theorists, the parking lot issue illustrates a typical pattern of elite domination. Despite widespread grassroots opposition and adverse public opinion, city commissioners built the parking lot because it served elite interests in promoting growth. On this issue, elites (the wealthiest and most socially prominent members of the community) remained behind the scenes, avoiding extensive participation or the application of overt pressure, because city commissioners could be counted on to act as agents for elite interests. In the city manager issue, elite theorists might suggest another pattern of elite domination. The removal of Watson threatened elite interests in having a businesslike regime committed to economic growth and low taxes. Thus, community elites rallied to Watson's support, mobilizing community organizations, shaping public opinion, and pressuring city commissioners. On the Watson issue, elite domination required extensive involvement, but the great social and economic resources available to elites ensured the success of that involvement. On the East Lawrence downzoning issue, elite theorists might hold that the realtors and developers who opposed downzoning did not command elite resources;[3] because elites were not involved in the issue, it could be resolved in a fairly democratic fashion. From the perspective of elite theory, this case better illustrates the maximum capacities of democratic political institutions than it does the possibility of the regular attainment of democratic ideals.[4]

Elite theorists provide several interpretations and explanations for these failures of democratic performance. First, elite domination may be due to "fear, pessimism, and silence" among those in the community who oppose elite initiatives and policies, but whose participation is retarded by their resulting political alienation.[5] This interpretation is illustrated by the claims

of some opponents of Watson that Mayor Francisco's swing vote on the issue would have been initially cast against Watson if she had heard the complaints of other disgruntled citizens who remained silent during the controversy because they feared harassment by the city staff and community elite.

Elite domination may also occur because of elite capacities to define the policy agenda and to suppress issues that threaten elite interests.[6] To illustrate this interpretation, elite theorists might point to the fact that the issue of firing Watson has not resurfaced. By threatening to recall Tom Gleason—the commissioner who initially sought Watson's removal—elites have created a context in which liberal commissioners who might prefer new blood in the city manager's office refrain from raising the issue.

Elite domination may also arise from the ability of elites to create a political culture and shape public attitudes in ways that ensure acquiescence to their goals.[7] From this perspective, widespread support for Watson and his businesslike regime was not due to most citizens' independently concluding that his regime served their interests but rather to elites' successfully selling citizens on the value of Watson's priorities and style.

Finally, elite domination may be due to the incentives that predispose public officials to be systematically biased toward those who control capital, who lead community organizations, and who have high social status—in short, to the elite of the community.[8] In order to provide more services without raising taxes, officials are encouraged to attract and retain businesses and citizens who add to the tax base of the community. Because organizations facilitate collective actions on behalf of public goals (as when the Chamber of Commerce recruits new businesses to town) and can influence electoral support, officials are inclined to defer to the wishes of organizational leaders. Officials are also inclined to respond to the preferences of citizens with high status because of their reputed competence, civic-mindedness, and other admirable qualities. In short, when those with abundant resources confront those without such resources, officials are biased toward elites. This explanation would seem to explain fully the outcomes of the three Lawrence issues. The parking lot and Watson issues pitted those with resources against those without them, and the systematic biases of officials were evident in the resolution of these issues. Since no elite resources were brought to bear on the East Lawrence downzoning issue, commissioners were able to respond to grassroots concerns.

Pluralism

Compared with elite theorists, orthodox pluralists would maintain that the three Lawrence issues were resolved quite democratically. First, pluralists would not disregard the East Lawrence downzoning issue simply because elites showed no interest in it. Indeed, pluralists might regard the downzoning controversy as a "key issue" because it imposed extensive regulations affecting

the property values and quality of life of many residents.[9] Most importantly, pluralists would argue that the issue was resolved in a way that furthered democratic ideals by providing a victory for grassroots organizations. Second, pluralists would note that the decision to retain Watson was responsive to the preferences of most citizens (as revealed by public opinion polls), in accordance with democratic ideals. Third, pluralists would question the assumption that commissioners simply acted as puppets of elites (or bureaucrats) when they built the parking lot. Instead, pluralists would suggest that the commissioners reached independent judgments that the parking lot served the public interest. These judgments proved to be unpopular, and voters had the opportunity to express their dissatisfaction by subsequently electing new commissioners who might better represent their preferences. For pluralists, democratic ideals do not require that representatives always respond to grassroots concerns or to popular majorities. For pluralists, democracy simply requires that voters be permitted to cast an overall retrospective judgment on the decisions of representatives at the next election.

Thus, pluralists tend to provide positive evaluations of the democratic performance of local governments in resolving community issues. They deny that power is concentrated among unrepresentative elites and claim that it is widely dispersed; various citizens—even those lacking substantial economic and social resources—can enter the policy arena, mobilize supporters, get a fair hearing, and perhaps achieve success in affecting policy outcomes. Pluralists refute the critical evaluations of elite theorists in several ways. First, they argue that elected officials (rather than private elites) are the most influential people in the resolution of community issues and that the voting public retains substantial "indirect influence."[10] Second, pluralists point out that there are many interests (i.e., groupings of people on the basis of common policy preferences) who participate in community politics. Though these interests may not have equal power, most legitimate interests are at least partially accommodated through pluralist bargaining processes.[11] Third, pluralists deny that the elite goal of economic development constitutes a policymaking imperative; instead, they maintain that community policies are "muddled through" as competing goals are compromised and as particular goals are first emphasized and then de-emphasized in response to diverse community pressures.[12]

Pluralists provide several interpretations and explanations for the achievement of democratic ideals. In response to the argument that elites are dominant because of the silence of potential adversaries, pluralists argue that elite interests are increasingly challenged. Pluralists maintain that social and economic modernization lead to political diversification, with the emergence of many interests and organizations that compete with traditional elite ones.[13] From the pluralist perspective, each Lawrence issue was highly politicized; each involved open and intense conflict among different interests and organizations. Such contemporary conflict and politicization contrasts with earlier

periods of political development in which citizens simply deferred to rule by patricians[14] or bureaucrats.[15]

Second, pluralists question the ability of elites to restrict and control the policy agenda; they point instead to the vast and fragmented policy arenas that arise within communities. Dominance by a unified elite is thwarted by the numerous and diverse issues raised and suppressed, by the large number of governing bodies that exist in each community, and by the delegation of authority to administrative agencies, public task forces, and private organizations.[16] Thus, pluralists would notice that—except for the recurrent involvement of the city commissioners and the city manager—different participants representing different interests raised, participated in, and influenced the outcomes of the three Lawrence issues.

Third, pluralists would deny the existence of a monolithic and repressive political culture that stifles opposition to elite goals. Instead, pluralists would point to the existence of distinct subcultures within the nation and within communities.[17] They would argue that only the most abstract democratic principles are consensually embraced and that this consensus quickly dissolves when these cultural values are at stake in concrete policy issues.[18] For example, most participants in the East Lawrence downzoning issue may have affirmed the abstract idea of "property rights," and elites may have been instrumental in shaping cultural support for property rights. Nevertheless, such an acceptance of elite ideals did not prevent different interpretations of the practical implications of property-right norms. On the one hand, opponents of downzoning interpreted property rights to mean permitting property owners to develop their land as they pleased. On the other hand, proponents of downzoning interpreted property rights to mean that the value of their property should be protected from intrusive developments that threatened their neighborhoods. In short, pluralists argue that local political cultures embrace many competing values and goals. Cultural consensus on certain abstract ideals facilitates peaceful and civil resolution of issues but does not suppress the expression of policy differences.[19]

Perhaps the most common pluralist interpretation of why communities achieve high levels of democratic performance is that the policymaking process is open and fair—not biased, as elite theorists maintain.[20] In this interpretation, pluralists view issues as arising when opposing interests contest a policy outcome, and the role of public officials is to act as referees between contending forces. Few pluralists would assert that the public officials who adjudicate these issues are entirely neutral in the sense that their decisions are guided by an objectively defined public interest. Instead, pluralists believe that democratic accountability provides officials with incentives to tilt their policies in favor of those interests that should be favored according to the democratic rules of the game. Perhaps the parking lot issue should have been resolved in favor of its pro-growth proponents because most of the commis-

sioners who refereed that controversy campaigned on pro-growth platforms and were presumably given a public mandate to further growth. Perhaps the city manager issue should have been resolved in favor of Watson's supporters because cultural values favored Watson's "good government" regime and because public opinion supported Watson personally. And perhaps the decision to downzone much of East Lawrence was an appropriate response to the intensity of homeowner preferences and the extensiveness of ELIA participation on the issue. In short, pluralists suggest that—on the basis of normative democratic principles—policymakers should resolve issues in ways consistent with their campaign promises, with dominant cultural values, with public opinion, and/or with the distribution of political participation. Empirically, pluralists suggest that electoral considerations prompt officials to favor the side of an issue having the greatest number of active supporters, the most public support, and the most congruence with dominant cultural values.

Beyond the Elitist-Pluralist Debate

Between 1950 and 1975, elite theorists and pluralists debated the democratic performance of local governments. Table 1.1 summarizes some of the main questions addressed in this debate and the answers to these questions provided by each camp.

Different normative standards regarding democratic performance seem to have accompanied this debate. Seeking a further democratization of political life, elite theorists argued that pluralists too quickly concluded that power was already democratically distributed, and they rejected the concepts, methods, and findings provided by pluralists.[21] Seeking "realistic democracy" and hoping to prevent various "democratic distempers,"[22] pluralists rejected approaches and findings provided by elite theorists.[23] Partisans in the debate argued primarily about the adequacy of alternative methodologies.[24] As these arguments became both more polemical and more obscure, most political scientists concluded that the field was hopelessly ideological and that a scientific theory of community power was unachievable.

Several more recent developments have, nevertheless, reduced tensions between elite theorists and pluralists and stimulated the resurgence of scientific analysis about democratic life in American cities. First, there is increasing tolerance of diverse approaches to the analysis of community power, as scholars ask, "What can this approach tell us?" rather than "What are the shortcomings of this approach?"[25] For example, the reputational approach—a favorite methodology of elite theorists involving informants' judgments about the most powerful people in a community—may provide little information about the influence of the least powerful members of a community, but it is useful for identifying some of the most powerful people in a community

Table 1.1 The Debate between Elite Theorists and Pluralists: A Summary

The Issues	The Views of Elite Theorisits	The Views of Orthodox Pluralists
What indicates that a person has power?	Reputation for power and/or control of power resources, especially large economic organizations.	Active and effective participation in the policy process.
How many people exercise significant amounts of power?	Very few. Real power is reserved for "the people at the top."	While only a few exercise extensive power, opportunities exist for many persons to exercise some influence.
What types of people are most powerful?	Private elites, especially owners and managers of large corporations.	Elected governmental representatives.
Are there significant limits on the influence of the most powerful actors?	Very few. Influence flows downward from unified elites, through subordinates and voluntary associations. Ordinary citizens are subjects, not influential participants.	Private elites are accountable to public officials, and public officials are responsive and accountable to voters. There is significant upward flow of influence from citizens.
How much coordination or fragmentation is there across policy arenas?	Elite interlocking provides cohesiveness among various policymaking bodies.	Policymaking is specialized. People powerful in one arena are not likely to be powerful in other arenas.
How well are the views of various interests represented in defining policy issues?	Poorly. Issues reflecting the interests of "the relatively powerless" are suppressed.	Reasonably well. All legitimate interests get a fair hearing.
How well are the views of various interests represented in the resolution on policy issues?	Poorly. Like-minded elites dominate the policy process, coopting the opposition and making only token concessions to other interests.	Very well. Issues tend to be resolved by compromise.
How difficult is it for average citizens to get involved in policymaking?	There are numerous obstacles to effective citizen mobilization and involvement.	Citizens can effectively mobilize their slack political resources and participate when their primary interests are involved in specific policy issues.

Table 1.1 The Debate between Elite Theorists and Pluralists: A Summary (continued)

The Issues	The Views of Elite Theorisits	The Views of Orthodox Pluralists
Do all citizens have access to important political resources?	No. The most important political resources—control of capital, organizational leadership, and status—are concentrated among few people.	Yes. Power resources are unequally but noncumulatively distributed. Most people have some useful political resources.
How open is the power structure to change?	Elites perpetuate a strong class structure. Access to upper levels of power is restricted. Meaningful policy changes to improve the life chances of the lower class are resisted.	Class structure is weak and fluid. Access to upper levels of power is open to those with merit. While rapid change is difficult to achieve, incremental changes in policies have furthered the interests of the disadvantaged.

and some of the resources they possess.[26] The decisional method—a favorite methodology of pluralists, which involves the identification of the participants in specific community issues—may fail to discern the power that people exercise in keeping certain issues from being considered by city officials.[27] However, such a method can describe who succeeds and who fails in resolving issues.[28] Increasingly community power analysts recognize each of these methods as providing information that is a "piece of the puzzle" in the study of community power.

Second, both elite theorists and pluralists now seem to accept the idea that communities differ in democratic performance. Reputational, decisional, and other methods have been used to measure differences in the distribution of power across large samples of cities.[29] Comparative analyses suggest that communities having more social and economic diversity and "unreformed" political institutions and processes that allow for greater representation of such diversity tend to have more dispersed (pluralistic) power structures that are more responsive to citizen preferences and achieve more equality in responding to diverse interests.[30]

Third, community power analysts have moved away from the juxtaposition of the simple portraits of community power provided by the orthodox elite and pluralist models portrayed in Table 1.1. Some authors have argued, for example, that elite theory has gradually been absorbed into a broader "managerial perspective," which emphasizes the organizational and bureaucratic bases of political power.[31] This perspective suggests that power is undemocratically concentrated not only among owners and managers of large corporate organizations but also among governmental bureaucrats and manag-

ers who strive to achieve their own goals (e.g., the growth of their agencies) and values (e.g., professionalism) at the expense of democratic goals.

Meanwhile, several pluralist models have emerged, and these alternatives to orthodox pluralism have often pointed out failures in democratic performance, even when policymaking processes are basically pluralistic. For example, proponents of the "hyperpluralist model" suggest that power is sometimes widely dispersed among many active, demand-making groups within the community and that governmental officials lack the "means or the will to resist any of the many competing demands that barrage it."[32] Hyperpluralist politics are viewed as both ineffective (because policy processes are paralyzed into inaction) and undemocratic (because electoral victory fails to endow representatives with sufficient power to resist the parochial demands of special-interest groups). "Privatized pluralism" has been presented as another perverted form of pluralism that occurs when policymaking devolves to many policy arenas (e.g., education, mass transportation, housing, and so forth), and where bargaining is restricted to a few participants in each arena.[33] For example, the land-use policy arena may be restricted to professional planners, local developers, and other members of the Growth Machine. If other groups and the broader public are shut out of land-use policy formulation, the emergent policies predictably favor the private interests of those involved rather than the broader public interest.

More generally, some scholars argue that a new generation of pluralist theory has supplemented the orthodox pluralist model.[34] Still retaining the basic pluralist contention that power is widely distributed, proponents of this new pluralist model recognize a variety of obstacles to the full realization of democratic ideals. For example, though orthodox pluralists suggest that normally inactive citizens can be readily mobilized to defend their interests, proponents of the newer versions of pluralism recognize "the collective action problem." According to Mancur Olson, mobilization is unlikely even when all members of a group could reap policy benefits through a collective effort; potential members of the group may decide to be free riders and hope that others will bear the costs of mobilization while they reap the (indivisible) benefits.[35] As a result, many important interests are likely to be unrepresented in the bargaining processes of pluralism. Furthermore, some who support the newer versions of pluralism recognize that while many groups share in power, business groups occupy a privileged position in community decision making.[36]

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, both elite theorists and pluralists increasingly accepted—at least in part—central ideas from the other camp. Elite theorists lost their obsession "to ferret out an elite composed of business leaders"[37] and usually accepted the pluralist contention that political officials are indeed key actors in the game of community politics.[38] Pluralists acknowledged the existence of persistent inequalities, such as that some interests (especially business interests) seem more successful than other interests in the

community. In effect, elite theorists conceded that community politics were more democratic than they had portrayed them earlier, and pluralists conceded that such politics were less democratic than they had portrayed them earlier. They also agreed that the extent to which democratic ideals were realized varied across communities and policy areas.

The Economistic Paradigm

In the early 1980s a new perspective emerged—the economistic paradigm most forcefully developed by Paul Peterson—which seemed to transcend the elitist-pluralist debate by suggesting that what was important in the study of community power was not the evaluation of policy outcomes in terms of democratic criteria but rather the explanation of these outcomes in terms of economic incentives.[39] According to Peterson, both elite theory and pluralism provide a partially correct view of local politics; allocational policies are best explained by pluralism, and developmental policies are best explained by elite theory.

Allocational policies involve the delivery of basic housekeeping public services (such as garbage collection) to a small segment of the community (such as particular neighborhoods). Such policies neither contribute nor detract from the economic well-being of the community; although some citizens may derive benefits, and other citizens may be burdened, allocational policies have neutral economic consequences for the community as a whole. As a result, elites have no great interest in allocational policies. When issues regarding allocational policies arise, other interests in the community (e.g., public employees, neighborhoods, ethnic and minority groups) confront each other and issues are resolved pluralistically. Thus, because the East Lawrence downzoning issue was such an allocational issue, pluralist concepts are helpful in analyzing it.

Developmental policies involve attempts to attract industry to the community or to enhance the physical infrastructure of the city (with roads, sewer systems, and so forth) in order to sustain growth. According to Peterson, developmental policies have positive economic consequences for the community because they attract new resources such as capital, skilled labor, and jobs. Business leaders often become involved in developmental policymaking because their firms prosper in a healthy economic climate, because they have expertise in achieving growth, and because they can attain a "halo effect" as civic-minded "pillars of the community" by contributing to projects that benefit the city.[40] Such businesspeople often become members of the community elite who dominate "closed and consensual" decision-making processes[41] that ignore political concerns about equity and responsiveness to public preferences. In short, proponents of the economistic paradigm suggest that the "unitary" economic interest of the city is a much more important concern in formulating developmental policies than are political concerns about democracy.[42] Because

building the parking lot contributed to downtown redevelopment, it was a developmental issue best explained by concepts from elite theory.[43]

The economistic paradigm is intended to be explanatory rather than evaluative, but its application results in uncritical endorsement of community decision-making processes. Even when developmental policies harm particular citizens, they are justified in Peterson's perspective because they promote the overall "city interest." Elite dominance of developmental policy is justified because it facilitates economic growth. Citizen participation is discounted because it can disrupt a "quiet arena of decision making where political leaders can give reasoned attention to the longer range interests of the city."[44] Inattention to welfare issues is justified because "the competition among local communities all but precludes a concern for redistribution."[45] And—from the economistic perspective—it is rational for concerns about equality to yield to concerns about economic efficiency at the local level.[46] Such normative implications of the economistic paradigm have made Peterson bashing a major cottage industry in political science[47] and have resulted in efforts to create yet another theoretical perspective on community power.

The Regime Paradigm

Formulated principally by Clarence Stone and Stephen Elkin, two urban political theorists at the University of Maryland, the regime paradigm directly challenges the economistic paradigm by calling for explicit evaluations about the character of governing coalitions in cities—otherwise known as "urban regimes"—in terms of political, as well as economic, criteria. Regime theorists recognize that those who govern cities have strong incentives to promote economic growth (as Peterson had shown), but they argue that such policies as providing tax exemptions or service inducements for businesses often fail to enhance economic prosperity and may have unacceptable political costs. The extent to which the policies of urban regimes have positive economic and political consequences depends on the character of governing coalitions, which vary across communities and within particular communities over time. According to Stone and Elkin, urban regimes are generally dominated by an alliance of public officials and local businesspeople, but these arrangements can be relatively open (or pluralistic) when electoral forces enhance the representativeness of public officials, or they can be relatively closed (or elitist) if various community interests are ignored.[48]

Regime theorists specify several criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of urban regimes. Most generally, regime theorists argue that the policies of governing coalitions should serve the public interest rather than the private aims of the governing elite. The "problem of oligarchy" arises when governing arrangements permit elites to protect their position and secure special privileges.[49] Although regime theorists imply that policies should be evaluated on a scale

of the extent to which they serve the public interest, they recognize that providing objective measures on such a scale is difficult, if not impossible. Was the outcome of the parking lot issue inconsistent with the public interest because some private interests reaped a disproportionate reward? Was the outcome of the Watson issue inconsistent with the public interest because some people alleged that Watson sometimes sought to protect his position? Clear departures from the public interest can occasionally be documented,[50] but on most policy issues the public interest cannot be positively identified either in theory[51] or in practice. Elkin recognizes that "the commercial public interest"—a summary evaluative standard encompassing the economic, social, and political consequences of policies—is a highly subjective concept; indeed, he understands politics to be a "struggle and debate" over the definition of the commercial public interest in specific circumstances.[52] Thus, while regime theorists remind us of the importance of the public interest as an evaluative standard, they do not provide an objective operational definition for it in specific cases.

According to regime theorists, another criterion for evaluating urban regimes is their effectiveness in coping with problems that arise within the community.[53] According to Elkin and Stone, effective problem solving does not entail finding the one best solution known only to some experts. Instead, an effective problem-solving process is "very much one of trial-and-error."[54] From this perspective, the process of finding desirable solutions (or promoting "social intelligence") is impeded by governing arrangements that tend to "reject new ideas and policies, even though social conditions are changing and new problems are emerging"[55] and that provide inadequate feedback "capacity to detect error" from initial policy proposals.[56] While effective problem solving is certainly an important normative goal of urban governance, it is difficult to specify the degree of effectiveness of any particular policy. Was the parking lot an effective solution to redevelopment at the north end of downtown Lawrence? Though the case can be made that the parking lot proved to be an effective step in cleaning up the blight in that area, the case can also be made that an alternative use of that land could have sparked even more desirable developments in the area at less cost. The effectiveness of a policy can be measured only against the effectiveness of alternative (and often untried) solutions to the underlying problem. Policies that seem effective in solving particular urban problems may be undesirable because they contribute to other problems. Regime theorists recognize that there are no objective standards for evaluating the effectiveness of public policies.

A third criterion for evaluating urban regimes, suggested by Stone and Elkin, is justice or fairness, defined as the absence of "systematic bias" or the absence of "the problem of factionalism." Factionalism occurs when there are "permanently subordinate group[s]"[57] because "public officials are disposed to favor some actors and some kinds of policies over others and some

political actors are substantially better placed than others to realize their purposes."[58] When applying their concerns about systematic bias to the Lawrence issues, regime theorists would probably applaud the downzoning decision because it provided a victory for normally subordinate interests. They would probably also question the outcomes of the parking lot and Watson issues because they provided additional losses for these subordinate interests. However, regime theorists have not argued that justice requires strict political equality—that a policy victory for the rich should be balanced by an equally important policy victory for the poor. And, by recognizing that certain interests are better positioned than others to contribute to effective policymaking, regime theorists recognize that some inequalities in power are legitimate.[59]

A final criterion for evaluating urban regimes, according to Stone and Elkin, is the extent to which they contribute to an active, informed, and public-spirited citizenry. When the population is large, fragmented, and preoccupied with private life, and when urban regimes are closed to citizen involvement, "the problem of mass vulnerability" arises.[60] For Elkin, the most important goal associated with the political institutions of the city is to facilitate the transformation of economic (private) men and women into (public) citizens. "The goal is to make citizens more intelligent about public life . . . to help form a citizenry capable of governing itself in conformance with its liberal [i.e., commercial] aspirations."[61] Thus regime theorists remind us that citizens should be capable of intelligently pursuing policies that reflect *their* broader political and economic goals. Such a goal is important because regime theorists believe that the development of such a citizenry will reduce systematic bias and improve social intelligence.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

All communities continuously confront a variety of policy issues such as the parking lot, city manager, and downzoning controversies. Community power theorists are in the business of applying democratic theory to the analysis of such issues. Nevertheless, the present state of development of this important subfield of political science[62] is such that community power theorists cannot offer objective assessments of the democratic performance of communities nor scientifically informed prescriptions for communities to improve their democratic performance.

The elitist-pluralist debate was important for the analysis of community power because each theoretical perspective addressed democratic ideals. Elite theorists and pluralists provide many case studies describing the realization of, and departures from, these goals, and they develop theories that seek to explain the successes and failures of democratic performance.[63] Nevertheless, various disputes between elite theorists and pluralists impede the development

ment of scientific consensus about the extent to which policymakers achieve democratic ideals and the determinants of more democratic regimes.

Proponents of the economistic paradigm have sought to resolve the elitist-pluralist debate by specifying the policy arenas where elite theorists and pluralists provide generally correct interpretations of community decision making, but—at least implicitly—economistic theorists suggest that the aggregate economic interest of the city is the *only* appropriate criterion for evaluating the resolution of community issues. Thus, this paradigm turns community power analysts away from the study of democratic ideals.

In contrast, regime theorists have approached the study of urban governance in a promising way. They have placed explicit normative concerns at the center of analysis and have suggested appropriate criteria for assessing democratic performance, but they have yet to develop objective measures of the extensiveness of the problems of oligarchy, ineffectiveness, factionalism, and mass vulnerability. Regime theory "directs us toward an investigation of the conditions under which elite tendencies are checked,"[64] but such investigations are only beginning.

A suitable paradigm for the analysis of community politics requires the specification of democratic ideals, the measurement of the extent to which these ideas are realized in practice, and the development of theories specifying the conditions of higher levels of democratic performance. The purpose of this book is to contribute to these aspirations of community power theorists by drawing on the strengths of previous paradigms of community power in order to develop a conceptual framework and methodology for addressing, in a scientific manner, three main questions about the democratic performance of American communities:

1. What principles (or general policy directions) guide the resolution of community issues, and do these principles usually reflect the dominant values of citizens within local communities (as Elkin suggests they should) or do they generally reflect economic imperatives (as Peterson suggests they must)?

2. To what extent are political communities dominated by the private elite (as argued by elite theorists), by governmental bureaucrats (as suggested by the managerial perspective), or by special-interest groups (as suggested by the hyperpluralist model), and under what conditions are community issues resolved through democratic processes that instead empower citizens and elected representatives (as claimed by orthodox pluralists)?

3. To what extent do political communities exhibit systematic biases that result in the political subordination of such people as the lower class, minorities, and women (as suggested by regime theorists), and do the inequalities in power that are observed in the resolution of community issues have legitimate explanations (as implied by orthodox pluralists)?

2

Three Ideals of Pluralist Democracy

It is easy to criticize local governments for failing to realize such goals as popular rule or equality, but these goals are beyond the ideals of pluralist democracy and are not widely embraced by most Americans.[1] To facilitate an internal critique of local government—to determine the extent to which governments live up to the goals that they (and their citizens) set—identification of the fundamental and widely accepted ideals of pluralist democracy becomes necessary. Identification of such ideals is complicated, however, because pluralist democracies permit—and indeed encourage—debate about about the ideals of good government. Although any attempt to specify central and consensual goals is thus bound to be problematic, most scholars and citizens committed to pluralist democracy agree that the following three ideals should normally be realized:

1. Principle-policy congruence. Policy decisions should reflect the principles (or general social, economic, and political goals) that are dominant in local political cultures;
2. Responsible representation. Policymaking processes should empower (primarily) elected representatives and (secondarily) the voting public but should also be responsive to the persuasive participation of public administrators, community notables, group leaders, and individual activists;
3. Complex equality. Inequalities in the power of various "interests" within communities (e.g., the lower class and the upper class) should have reasonable explanations.

These ideals have been chosen for analysis for several reasons. First, they reflect the broad themes discussed in the various theoretical perspectives on community power, and they address central concerns of democratic theorists. Second, they span the ideals of people with different ideological orientation

within pluralist politics. Third, they can be clearly spelled out both conceptually and operationally, and thus lend themselves to scientific analysis.

The focus of this chapter is on the concepts of principle-policy congruence, responsible representation, and complex equality, placing them within democratic theory, with an emphasis on their appeal to the ideological "friends" of pluralism—conservatives, liberals, and democratic socialists.[2] Methodological considerations about measuring the attainment of these hypotheses about their attainment are also introduced.[3]

If "normative pluralism" is the label given to efforts to justify pluralist ideals,[4] and if "orthodox pluralism" is the label applied to those empirical studies that describe governments achieving pluralist goals,[5] then "critical pluralism" might be the label assigned to analyses that measure and explain variances in the extent to which governments approach pluralist ideals. In this book I develop a conceptual framework and methodology for determining the extent to which communities achieve principle-policy congruence, responsible representation, and complex equality. I apply critical pluralism to the analysis of twenty-nine issues resolved in Lawrence between 1977 and 1987.

PRINCIPLE-POLICY CONGRUENCE

In monistic communities, public policies reflect absolute principles set forth by some authoritative source (for example, Karl Marx or the Qur'an), but in pluralist communities public policies should reflect the principles most widely accepted within local political cultures. Political principles specify general social, economic, and political goals for the community; the ideas that government ought to promote economic development and that government should regulate and slow growth illustrate competing political principles. According to pluralists, abstract theoretical or philosophical reasoning cannot determine which of these principles should guide public policy; what matters is which of these principles is most widely accepted within the political culture. If the importance of economic growth is widely recognized among Lawrence citizens and if such growth is facilitated by a parking lot at 600 Massachusetts Street, then the ideal of principle-policy congruence will (at least partially) justify the demolition of Bryan Anderson's toy factory. If slow-growth principles are dominant in Lawrence's political culture, however, the rejection of the parking lot would further the ideal of principle-policy congruence.

Principle-policy congruence is important because the policies of pluralist democracies are "intended to reflect the long-term values and policy objectives embodied in the political culture."[6] Because a central tenet of conservatism is that governmental actions should reflect the traditional principles

about the aims of government held by most citizens, conservatives are committed to principle-policy congruence.[7] Additionally, democratic theorists more to the center and left of the ideological spectrum also suggest the importance of this ideal. For liberal democrats and democratic socialists, responding to dominant principles within a culture enhances the authority of the public because such principles provide general guidelines to policymakers about the public's desired destinations for the political community.[8] By responding to dominant principles, public input transcends unstable, more easily manipulable policy-specific preferences.[9] By responding to dominant principles, officials can also transcend the narrow and immediate interests of those having the most social and economic resources in the community.

Several kinds of information must be available to determine whether principle-policy congruence is achieved in the resolution of specific community issues. First, dominant cultural principles must be known. Second, the relevance of particular principles to specific community issues must be demonstrated. Third, policy outcomes must be related to those principles that are dominant in a local culture and relevant to an issue.

Determining Dominant Principles within Political Cultures

Despite conservative aspirations for cultural consensus about traditional values, there is often extensive disagreement within pluralist communities about political principles. In pluralist communities, some citizens want their government to promote economic growth, but others do not. Some citizens believe in unrestricted property rights (enabling property owners to use their land as they see fit), but others believe more strongly in "neighborhood rights" (involving restrictions on those uses of property that harm neighbors or the community as a whole).[10] Citizens can also disagree on the importance of many other political principles, and different principles may be dominant in different cultures.

Given this diversity, the question arises, which principles predominate in local political cultures? Although informed observers can provide insightful judgments about local political cultures,[11] survey research is a more precise instrument for measuring the distributions of support for alternative policy principles that exist within a particular community. Such research shows that pro-growth principles predominate in Lawrence, but neighborhood-protection principles are more widely accepted in the community than are property-rights principles.

Determining the Relevance of Principles to Specific Issues

More difficult than determining the distribution of support for various political principles is the task of determining the dominant principles within a culture that are relevant to a specific issue. The art of politics largely involves persuading people that particular popular principles are at stake on concrete issues.[12] For example, opponents of downzoning argued that extensive restrictions on their property rights would curtail the widely sought goal of economic growth, and proponents of downzoning argued that such restrictions were necessary to achieve neighborhood protection, another widely accepted principle.

Was either or were both of these claims correct? Clearly, a principle is not necessarily at stake on an issue simply because someone has claimed that a particular policy outcome will further a widely accepted goal. However, there is compelling evidence that certain principles are at stake on an issue if support for these principles is systematically distributed among supporters and opponents of a particular policy outcome. On the one hand, if most proponents of downzoning held neighborhood-protection principles and most opponents of downzoning held contrasting property-rights principles, these principles would seem to have been at stake. On the other hand, if pro-growth and slow-growth principles were randomly distributed among proponents and opponents of downzoning—if there was no general relationship between principles and preferences regarding the issue—there would be little basis for concluding that principles regarding growth were at stake. A method for determining the principles relevant to issues is presented in detail in the Appendix.

Assessing Policy Outcomes

The outcomes of community issues are often ambiguous because participants and observers can have different interpretations of the goals sought (e.g., Did Bryan Anderson really want to keep his toy factory, or did he simply want a higher price for his property?), of the decision (e.g., Was the policy of subjecting City Manager Watson to more frequent reviews a genuine compromise, or was it a token concession to his opponents?), and of the ultimate impacts of the decision (e.g., Would the downzoning ordinance really halt intrusive developments in East Lawrence?). Such ambiguities ensure that the interpretations of outcomes of community issues are necessarily subjective. This difficulty, however, does not preclude attaining high levels of intersubjective agreement in measuring outcomes and using these measures for evaluating principle-policy congruence.

To obtain comparable measures of policy outcomes in disparate issue areas, a procedure has been designed that incorporates the judgments of the people

involved and produces policy outcome scores ranging from zero (when issue outcomes uphold the status quo) to 100 (when outcomes result in changes in previous policies and laws and in new programs and developments).[13] For example, the parking lot issue was assigned an outcome score of 100, reflecting the unanimous judgments of participants that the demolition of the toy factory and the building of the parking lot constituted a victory for the proponents of change. The city manager issue was assigned an outcome score of 7.5, which reflects some judgments that the status quo was slightly altered (by the provision to review Watson's performance more closely) even though Watson was retained. The East Lawrence downzoning issue had an outcome score of 90, which reflects widespread judgments that the new downzoning ordinance contained most of the policy changes sought by neighborhood-protection forces while providing some concessions to those who sought to maintain existing policies that permitted higher-density land uses.

Once one knows what dominant community principles are relevant to an issue and the perceived policy outcome, the question of whether principle-policy congruence has been achieved would seem straightforward. If dominant pro-growth principles were relevant to the parking lot issue and if the outcome of the issue was a clear victory for those citizens who wanted economic growth, principle-policy congruence appears to have been achieved. However, pluralist politics are complex, and initial appearances can be deceptive. Building the parking lot may have been congruent with the dominant and relevant principle of promoting growth, but it may have been incongruent with other dominant and relevant community principles, such as responding to citizen participation. In short, several dominant, competing cultural principles may be relevant to an issue, providing conflicting guidance.

Hypotheses about Principle-Policy Congruence

The most important hypotheses about the determinants of principle-policy congruence would seem to address the question, Which dominant principles relevant to an issue are most likely to be reflected in policy outcomes? In this study, three hypotheses are considered.

First, policy outcomes may reflect those dominant cultural principles most relevant to specific issues. For example, neighborhood-protection principles may have been more relevant than economic-growth principles to the East Lawrence downzoning issue. The downzoning decision may simply have reflected the urgency or centrality of protectionist values and the questionable relevance of growth principles to the issue.

Second, policy outcomes may reflect the principles most widely supported by citizens and participants within a political culture. For example, both economic-growth and citizen-participation principles may be dominant within Lawrence, but there may be more disagreement about the value of citizen par-

ticipation than about growth. Thus, the parking lot issue may have been resolved in a way consistent with economic-growth principles and inconsistent with citizen-participation principles because there is more consensus about economic-growth principles in the local culture than about citizen participation.

Third, the extent to which policy outcomes reflect principles may depend on whether these principles promote the economic interests of the city—regardless of the distribution of support for these principles within the political culture. For example, Buford Watson may have been retained as city manager because he supported pro-growth principles but rejected redistributive public-welfare principles that, while dominant in the culture of Lawrence, undermine economic imperatives.[14]

In summary, principle-policy congruence is important for pluralist democracies because its attainment ensures that policymakers have respected the broad concerns that prevail among the public. However, principle-policy congruence may be difficult to achieve because a variety of conflicting dominant cultural values may be relevant to an issue. Policymakers may respond to this difficulty by enacting policies that embody the principles most widely held in the community or most relevant to specific issues, or they may simply ignore dominant cultural principles and decide issues on the basis of economic imperatives.

RESPONSIBLE REPRESENTATION

Authoritarian governments maintain that legitimate governmental power resides in the hands of absolute rulers, but pluralist communities prefer representative government. A major contribution of liberalism to the ideals of pluralist democracy has been the insistence that predominant power reside with elected representatives. Representatives normally exercise their independent judgment when resolving community issues, but remaining accountable to voters, they are open to the persuasive participation of others. Although conservatives often seek institutions that maximize the independence of representatives, and though socialists often seek institutions that maximize the direct power of citizens, conservatives and socialists normally accept representative democracy.[15]

Democratic elections of representatives have, of course, reduced the danger of authoritarian rule in pluralist societies, but responsible representation can still be thwarted if elected representatives fail to use their authority. Maladies of elite rule and bureaucratic rule can occur if representatives simply rubber-stamp the policies of community notables and public administrators. Responsible representation can also be thwarted if elected officials defer to the demands of interest group leaders or individual activists. In order for local communities to achieve responsible representation in the resolution of policy issues, power must be appropriately distributed among representatives, citizens,

community notables (elites), governmental bureaucrats, interest group leaders, and individual activists. Table 2.1 provides a scale of responsible representation based on whether the dominant preferences of these various participants are reflected in policy outcomes.

Evaluating the Extent of Responsible Representation

To assess the level of responsible representation that occurs on specific issues, the preferences of various kinds of people (listed across the top of Table 2.1) must be mapped and related to policy outcomes. More specifically, representatives must be interviewed to determine their preferences (understood as independent judgments) about issues and their perceptions of citizen preferences. Public opinion surveys must be conducted to measure actual citizen preferences. Participants (other than representatives) who have sought to influence the outcome of each issue must be identified and categorized as notables, bureaucrats, group leaders (mobilizers), and/or individual activists, and their preferences must be ascertained. The procedures used to map these preferences are described in more detail in Chapter 3, but this brief discussion should be sufficient to indicate that the preferences of each type of actor must be determined through a variety of surveying and interviewing procedures.

In pluralist societies, unanimity among representatives, citizens, and other types of actors is unlikely. Because democratic theorists have emphasized the idea of majority rule as the procedure for resolving disagreement, policy outcomes should be congruent with dominant preferences. In practice, policy outcomes may be congruent (shown by plus signs in Table 2.1) or incongruent (shown by minus signs) with the dominant preferences of the various types of people.[16] The patterns of congruence and incongruence specified in Table 2.1 indicate the level of responsible representation achieved on specific issues.

Responsible representation is low (ranging from Level 1 to Level 4) if a policy outcome is inconsistent with the preferences of the majority of representatives involved in the resolution of an issue. Election to public office has "elevated" representatives to a "superior position" relative to citizens at large and other types of participants.[17] Except for those issues that legally require public referenda, representatives are empowered to use their independent judgments in deciding issues. In this context, the "independent judgments" of representatives are the outcomes that, after full consideration of the merits of policy proposals, representatives believe are appropriate for the community. Roll-call votes are not always indicative of the preferences of individual representatives; representatives are sometimes "pressured" by others and sometimes defer to them. Policy outcomes are not always indicative of the preferences of representatives as a whole; the majority of representatives may fail to hold independent judgments congruent with policy decisions. Thus, responsible representation is relatively low when most representatives indicate (as in in-

Table 2.1 Variations in Responsible Representation on Issues: Relationships between the Dominant Preferences of Various Actors and Policy Outcomes

Levels of Responsible Representation	Elected Representatives	Citizens		Notables		Bureaucrats	Mobilizers		Individual Activists
		Actual	Perceived						
1. External domination	−	−	−	−		−	−		−
2. Elite or bureaucratic dominance	−	−	−	+	or	+	−		−
3. Minority dominance (and misrepresentation)	−	−	NR or +	NR		NR	+		+
4. Representatives act as instructed delegates	−	+	+	NR		NR	NR		NR
5. Unsupported control by formal authorities									
A. Voters act through referendum	−	+	NR	NR		NR	NR		NR
B. Representatives act as trustees	+	−	−	−		−	−		−
6. Elite or bureaucratic persuasiveness	+	−	NR	+	or	+	−		−
7. Minority persuasiveness	+	−	NR	NR		NR	+	or	+
8. Majority will	+	+	+	NR		NR	−	or	−
9. Mass will	+	+	+	−	or	−	+		+
10. Consensus	+	+	+	+		+	+		+

+ : Outcome congruent with dominant preferences.
− : Outcome incongruent with dominant preferences.
NR : Not relevant to determination of responsible representation; dominant preference can be either congruent or incongruent with policy outcomes.

terviews conducted for this study) that they believe that a policy outcome is unfortunate or inappropriate but that political (or some other type of) constraints prompted them to defer to the preferences of others. Responsible representation is relatively high when most representatives indicate that a policy outcome is desirable and appropriate. Although democratic performance depends on whether policy outcomes reflect the dominant independent judgments of representatives, a more refined scale of responsible representation must take into account the preferences of other kinds of actors.

Responsible representation is lowest (Level 1 in Table 2.1) when policy outcomes are inconsistent with the dominant preferences of each of the various types of local citizens involved in the resolution of community issues. For example, in Boston, the majority of representatives, citizens, bureaucrats, notables, mobilizers (group leaders), and (individual) activists appear to have opposed a court-ordered busing policy as a means of integrating public schools in the mid-1970s.[18] An "external" participant—in this case Federal District Court Judge Arthur Garrity—dominated the resolution of the issue. In the Boston busing controversy, responsible representation was thwarted by the limited authority of representatives in controlling policies involving legal and constitutional issues. This case serves as a reminder that responsible representation may not lead to progressive social policies and thus is not an absolute ideal that ought to be achieved in the resolution of all policy issues.

If policy outcomes reflect the preferences of bureaucrats and/or notables but are inconsistent with the dominant preferences of representatives, citizens, mobilizers, and activists, the relatively undemocratic conditions of bureaucratic or elite dominance (Level 2) have been attained. Because policy outcomes reflect the preferences of some local participants (bureaucrats and/or notables), democratic performance is higher than when external actors make policies that are at odds with the dominant preferences of all local actors. However, as shown in Table 2.1, bureaucratic and/or elite dominance is a situation in which representatives remain unconvinced by bureaucratic or notable arguments but abandon their independent judgments about the policies that best serve the community. In such a situation, the conclusion that representatives have illegitimately deferred to the professional credentials of bureaucrats or to the economic or social resources of notables is easily derived.[19] Community power literature alleges numerous instances of bureaucratic or elite dominance, but because these studies fail to consider the preferences of other actors in any systematic way, it is unclear whether these are cases of elite and/or bureaucratic domination as defined here.[20]

If policy outcomes are consistent with the dominant preferences of mobilizers (group leaders)[21] and/or individual activists but inconsistent with the dominant preferences of representatives and citizens, Level 3 of responsible representation—minority dominance—occurs. In such a situation, representatives have not been convinced that the dominant demands of group leaders

or activists serve the community, but they respond to such demands for several reasons. For example, they may be concerned about the intensity of preferences; if policy proposals impose severe burdens on affected groups and individuals, elected representatives may find justification in bowing to these intense and active interests. Representatives may also capitulate to the dominant demands of mobilizers and activists for pragmatic reasons (e.g., in order to prevent community conflict and electoral retaliation).

Responsible representation may also be at Level 3 because misrepresentation has occurred; this possibility is indicated in Table 2.1 by decisions congruent with dominant citizen preferences as perceived by representatives but incongruent with actual citizen preferences. In the absence of information about the actual preferences of citizens, representatives may perceive dominant group and activist preferences as reflecting dominant citizen preferences. In this situation, officials may believe that they are acting on instructions from citizens, and their errors of perception about the preferences of all citizens may reduce democratic performance. Nevertheless, minority dominance, based on nonelite participation, is considered more democratic than bureaucratic or elite dominance. Professional credentials, wealth, and status should not enhance political power; participation and representation of other citizens should be the controlling factors.

Level 4 of responsible representation, instructed delegation, occurs when the majority of representatives support a policy, when they perceive accurately that most citizens oppose their position, and when they consequently abandon their independent judgments and act as agents of the public. When policies reflect the preferences of all citizens, a higher level of democracy is attained than when policies reflect the preferences of only the active elements within the citizenry. Unfortunately, responsible representation is limited because representatives do not concur with dominant citizen preferences and because representatives have relinquished their authority to voters in situations where voters have (implicitly) consented to having representatives act as their trustees. Nevertheless, responsible representation is not seriously impaired when representatives act as instructed delegates who defer to public opinion. After all, elections make representatives accountable to voters.

If the majority of representatives and citizens have conflicting policy preferences, democratic performance is enhanced (to Level 5) when the proper formal authorities are empowered. State constitutions, statutes, and municipal charters are prior agreements that specify the appropriate powers of representatives and citizens. For the most part, constitutions delegate policymaking authority to elected representatives. Such agreements also specify when and how final authority reverts back to voters by providing for referenda on certain kinds of issues when appropriate petitions are submitted.

If there is a provision for a referendum and citizens invoke a referendum, the voters have authority. Responsible representation is at Level 5A when voters

override the judgments of representatives and impose dominant citizen preferences through referenda. Both levels 4 and 5A concern instances in which policies reflect citizen preferences but not representative preferences. However, when issues are resolved through a legal referendum, more responsible representation (Level 5A) is achieved than when representatives defer to public opinion (Level 4).

If there are no provisions for a referendum, representatives have authority, and responsible representation is higher when representatives act as trustees (at Level 5B) than when they act as instructed delegates (at Level 4). Representatives are trustees of the overall welfare of the community, which may be more visible to them than to citizens; in comparison with voters, representatives are more involved in issues and (potentially) achieve a greater understanding of the merits of policy proposals. Rather than acting as passive agents of the public and capitulating to citizens' wishes (which may be ill-informed and based on unrealistic expectations or short-term considerations), representatives may be obligated to try to persuade the public to support their views. In Level 5B situations, representatives appropriately use their authority and make decisions on the basis of their own judgments, even though citizens and other participants disagree. Higher levels of responsible representation require that other participants support these judgments.

Levels 6 and 7 of responsible representation deal with situations in which the preferences of representatives and citizens are at odds, representatives use their authority to resolve issues, and their decisions are supported by other actors. At Level 6, notables and/or bureaucrats agree with the judgments of representatives. This situation is different from elite or bureaucratic dominance (Level 2) because at Level 6 the majority of representatives have independent judgments that coincide with notable or bureaucratic views. Representatives have not deferred to these actors but have been persuaded by them. When the power of bureaucrats and notables is rooted in their persuasiveness, those individuals contribute to responsible representation.

Though representatives are persuaded by bureaucrats and notables at Level 6, they are persuaded by mobilizers or activists at Level 7. Policy outcomes are more democratic when representatives attend to such citizen-based concerns than when representatives are persuaded by bureaucrats or elites.

Levels 8, 9, and 10 of responsible representation deal with situations in which the dominant preferences of representatives and citizens coincide, and their views are reflected in policy outcomes. Although each of these situations is relatively democratic, other types of participants disagree with the result. At Level 8, policy outcomes and representative judgments reflect the "majority will" (or dominant citizen preferences), but most mobilizers and/or activists hold conflicting preferences. At Level 9, policy outcomes and representative judgments reflect dominant citizen, group, and activist preferences, but

either bureaucrats or elites dissent. Finally, at Level 10, policy outcomes reflect the dominant preferences of representatives, citizens, notables, bureaucrats, mobilizers, and activists. This level of responsible representation is labeled "consensus" because of the overall pattern of broad support for the outcome, not because the community is without dissent on the issue. Indeed, a policy would not become an issue if there were no dissent.

According to this conception of responsible representation and based on data to be presented in Chapter 12, the parking lot, city manager, and downzoning issues were resolved in ways that avoided such maladies of democratic performance as elite rule, bureaucratic rule, and domination by special interests. Assuming that most thought that the community was best served by retaining Watson and subjecting him to more frequent reviews, Level 10 of responsible representation was achieved on the city manager issue, as this outcome was responsive to the predominant views among citizens and various types of participants. Responsible representation was somewhat lower (Level 8) on the East Lawrence downzoning issue. Although the resolution of this issue was consistent with the independent judgments of commissioners, the judgments were not supported by most bureaucrats, notables, or individual activists. Finally, responsible representation was lowest (at Level 6) on the parking lot issue. Despite the judgments of representatives that the city was best served by proceeding with the parking lot, the issue was resolved in a way that most activists and citizens opposed. While none of these decisions violated the norms of representative democracy, they illustrate that there can be different levels of responsible representation within pluralist communities.

Hypotheses about Responsible Representation

A wide variety of conditions surrounding the policymaking process may thwart or facilitate higher levels of responsible representation. For example, characteristics of the policymaking body may affect responsible representation. Elected commissions and boards are perhaps more responsive than are appointed governing bodies,[22] and those commissions dominated by representatives associated with mass-based organizations (e.g., neighborhood groups) may be more responsible than commissions dominated by representatives associated with elite interests (e.g., those supported by the Chamber of Commerce). The extensiveness of citizen participation may also affect responsible representation; for example, high voter turnouts may contribute to responsible representation, even though extensive issue-specific participation may retard democratic performance.[23] The characteristics of citizens may also affect responsible representation; for example, an aware and informed public may encourage democratic policy outcomes. Finally, responsible representation may suffer because of tensions between capitalism and democracy; for example, demo-

cratic outcomes may be difficult to achieve on issues in which the economic interests of the city are at stake—where economic needs rather than the preferences of people determine outcomes.[24]

In summary, the extent to which the ideal of responsible representation is achieved varies across issues and across communities, depending on whether representatives exercise their political authority in ways that are responsive to their constituents and other participants. Representatives should be open to persuasion by the expertise of bureaucrats, but they should not simply defer to bureaucratic recommendations. Representatives should be open to the arguments of private elites about the economic and social needs of the community, but they must not be pressured by the economic and social resources that elites command. Representatives should be open to the demands of group leaders while not becoming captives of the organizational resources of special interests. Representatives need to listen to the intense preferences of issue-specific activists, though such concerns must be balanced against the public interest. On most occasions, representatives need to be responsive to public opinion, but responsible representation involves making independent assessments about the effectiveness and fairness of policies and not acting as delegates who make policy merely on the basis of public opinion.[25] Responsible representatives provide community notables, governmental administrators, group leaders, and activists with opportunities to participate and to persuade other citizens of the legitimacy of their preferences. However, responsible representation is impaired if such participants prevail in the resolution of issues without being persuasive.[26]

COMPLEX EQUALITY

Tyrannies permit the strong to dominate the weak. In racist societies, Caucasians normally dominate Africans and Asians. In sexist societies, men normally dominate women. There are many forms of tyranny, but they share a common feature. One segment of society has extensive political power, which it employs to ensure that issues are resolved in ways that uphold its interests and world view. The counterparts of the dominant interest are the victims because their interests and aspirations are continuously ignored.

Socialists have been concerned about political inequalities, and they often advocate "simple equality."[27] Simple equality would occur if political power were equally distributed between the upper and lower classes, whites and minorities, men and women, and so forth.[28] To achieve simple equality on a specific issue, the policy outcome would have to be equally responsive to the preferences of different segments of the community. To achieve simple equality over a broad range of issues and over time, the victories of the upper

class, whites, or men on certain issues would be offset by the victories of the lower class, nonwhites, or women on other issues of comparable importance.

Because simple equality would, by definition, end tyranny, it is an attractive ideal, but pluralists have never fully embraced this ideal. Many issues have outcomes that are inherently dichotomous (as was the decision either to build or not to build the parking lot), and they cannot be compromised in ways that are equally responsive to all interests. Equal political power among competing interests will remain an impossibility. If power could be magically distributed equally today, it would become unequally distributed tomorrow, when the next issue is resolved in ways more responsive to one interest than to another. Most importantly, it is not clear that different interests *should* be equally powerful.[29] Perhaps the inequalities that occur can be explained, and perhaps these explanations justify the inequalities.

Consider the inequalities in power between classes in Lawrence. The lower class seemed to lose on the parking lot and the city manager issues, but it succeeded in having East Lawrence downzoned. Suppose that this pattern of power became even more pronounced on other issues, with the lower class almost always being defeated by the middle and upper classes. This pattern illustrates a condition of simple inequality, and members of the lower class would probably view themselves as the victims of the upper class. Nevertheless, merely describing such inequality is inadequate. In order to evaluate whether these inequalities are justified and to prescribe ways of achieving more equality, discovering the causes of inequality becomes important.

Perhaps upper-class domination of the lower class is due to the underrepresentation of the lower class among elected officials. In pluralist policymaking processes, representatives are supposed to be the most powerful participants, and their judgments are likely to be colored by their class backgrounds. The failure of the lower class to elect commissioners who represent their interests can explain the lack of policy responsiveness to the preferences of the lower class.

Perhaps upper-class domination of the lower class is due to the greater participation of the upper class in the resolution of issues. In pluralist processes, representatives are supposed to listen to the arguments of participants, and they are sometimes persuaded by these arguments. The failure of the lower class to participate in these roles can explain their lack of power.

Perhaps upper-class domination is due to support of positions relatively popular with the public. In pluralist processes, representatives should be sensitive to public opinion. If the positions of the lower class are unpopular, they are not likely to be successful in the resolution of community issues.

Finally, perhaps upper-class domination is due to their holding political principles that are more dominant in local political cultures than are the principles held by the lower class. In pluralist processes, policy decisions should

reflect dominant community principles. If members of the lower class support policies that undermine dominant community values, their lack of political power is understandable.

Simple inequalities can thus occur because of inequalities in representation, participation, public support for conflicting policy preferences, and cultural acceptance of competing political principles. However, these simple inequalities may not undermine the pluralist goal of complex equality. The ideal of complex equality occurs when there are no significant unexplained inequalities in the political power of competing interests.[30] Conservatives and some liberals who hold differentiating (i.e., inegalitarian) principles of justice[31] can thus accept the ideal of complex equality because it permits legitimate inequalities of power.

The criterion of complex equality is thus "reasonable." Pluralists do not label every political inequality tyrannical, but if there are no adequate reasons for significant political inequalities, a prima facie case exists that discrimination has entered into the policymaking process. If the relative powerlessness of the lower class cannot be explained by class differences in representation, participation, popular support, compatibility with the political culture, or other plausible and compelling reasons, it can be concluded that class biases exist. When complex equality is unattained, policymakers discriminate against the lower class—or other subordinant interests—simply because they are lower class. Similarly, when complex equality is unattained, policymakers respond to upper-class people simply because they have more money, more education, and more status. Such discriminations violate pluralist ideals because such matters as wealth, educational background, social status, race, and gender should be irrelevant to the legitimate possession of power.[32]

Though the criterion of complex equality is reasonable, it can also be "radical"; it invites investigation of the causes of inequality. Simply because an inequality can be explained does not mean that it can be justified. If the subordination of the lower class is due to its underrepresentation among elected officials, questions about the legitimacy of such underrepresentation can—and probably will—be raised by those with concerns about inequality. The underlying causes of underrepresentation may be traced to structural features of the electoral system; perhaps lower-class and minority underrepresentation is due to the absence of partisan labels and wards in many local communities.[33] If so, institutional changes can be prescribed and sought. If the subordination of the lower class is due to its holding principles that conflict with dominant cultural values, questions can be raised about the legitimacy of dominant cultural values. Socialists are likely to trace resistance to redistributive principles to the systemic power of capitalism and the ability of capitalists to create cultural values conducive to the needs of capitalism.[34] If so, a transformation of cultural values will be urged as a means of achieving more political equality.[35]

The criterion of complex equality facilitates explanation and evaluation of the inequalities of power between opposite interests defined by various political cleavages. Three phases of analysis must be conducted to determine if communities achieve complex equality.

In the first phase, a sample of issues must be scrutinized to determine the presence or absence of various types of cleavages. Cleavages are defined on the basis of the predominant characteristics – rather than the universal qualities – of the individuals who oppose each other on issues. If *most* members of the upper class wanted to retain Watson but *most* members of the lower class wanted to fire him, there would have been a class cleavage. More specifically, a cleavage occurs when the majority of people defined by some characteristic (e.g., the upper class) are on one side of the issue, the majority of people with the opposite characteristic (e.g., the lower class) are on the other side of the issue, and the differences are statistically significant.

Although the discussion of complex equality has focused on class cleavages, other kinds of cleavages may be widespread on community issues and may exhibit more extensive and less legitimate inequalities than do those that occur along class lines. Table 2.2 lists the types of cleavages investigated in the Lawrence study and the interests that may oppose each other when these cleavages occur.

If class, racial, ideological, or other types of cleavages are observed on community issues, the second phase of analysis – the question, Which interests tend to prevail? – must be answered. Just as the standings on the sports pages help fans keep track of the win-loss records of teams in baseball, basketball, and football, so can political standings help keep track of the success of various interests in community politics. Is the Lower Class in last place in the Class Division? Does the Growth Machine dominate Preservationists on economic development issues? Is there a tight race in the Gender Division suggesting parity between men and women? In Chapter 13, I describe a procedure that involves relating the preferences of various interests to policy outcomes to determine the win-loss records of the interests listed in Table 2.2 on the twenty-nine issues examined in this study. These standings indicate that there are extensive simple inequalities among various interests; as in sports, the "have-nots" – those interests that are poor in social and economic resources – are at or near the bottom of the standings in the game of community politics.

The third phase of analysis involves attempts to explain these inequalities. Because inequalities in the success of various interests may be explained by inequalities in representation, participation, popular support, and cultural values, measures of these variables must be attained and incorporated in multivariate models relating the preferences of competing interests to policy outcomes. If the preferences of competing interests are equally potent determinants of policy outcomes when the effects of such variables are controlled, the ideal of complex equality is achieved.

Table 2.2 Various Community Cleavages and the Interests That Oppose Each Other When Such Cleavages Arise

Class
The Upper Class: those in the top quartile of a scale of socioeconomic status (SES)
The Middle Class: those in the middle quartiles of SES scale
The Lower Class: those in the bottom quartile of SES scale
Neighborhood
Country Clubbers: those living in upper-income neighborhoods
Split Levellers: those living in middle-income neighborhoods
Cellar Dwellers: those living in lower-income neighborhoods
Racial
Whites
Minorities
Gender
Men
Women
Age
Rookies: those less than 30 years old
Veterans: those between 30 and 55 years old
Seniors: those over 55 years old
Length of Residence in the Community
Hometowners: those residing in the community more than 20 years
Newcomers: community residents for 5 to 20 years
Visitors: community residents less than 5 years
Sector of Employment
Public: those who work for governmental agencies
Private: those who work in the private sector
University-Community
Gown: students and employees at the university
Town: those unaffiliated with the university
Ideological
Liberals: those who define themselves as liberals
Conservatives: those who define themselves as conservatives
Partisan
Republicans: those who define themselves as Republicans
Democrats: those who define themselves as Democrats
Ethos
Managerialists: those who think government should emphasize businesslike efficiency and other "good government" values
Politicos: those who think government should emphasize such political values as openness and fairness
Other Attitudinal Divisions
The Growth Machine: those who prefer rapid economic growth
Preservationists: those who prefer no or slow growth
Market Providers: those who prefer low taxes and limited public services
Public Providers: those who prefer more extensive public services, even if taxes must be raised

SUMMARY

Principle-policy congruence, responsible representation, and complex equality are ideals that can be used for evaluating the resolution of policy issues in pluralist communities. Orthodox pluralists seem to assume that the ideals of principle-policy congruence, responsible representation, and complex equality are usually achieved. Those who subscribe to critical pluralism would be less certain, and they would want to provide continual vigilance against failures in democratic performance. Toward this end, the development of a conceptual framework and measurement instruments for analyzing principle-policy congruence, responsible representation, and complex equality are critical. No doubt these ideals will be more fully realized in the resolution of some issues than others, and some communities will have policy processes that more fully achieve these ideals than will other communities. Investigations into the conditions that facilitate and hinder the achievement of these ideals may yield prescriptions for realizing more fully the normative aspirations of pluralist democracy.

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Critical Pluralism and the Rules of the Game

Because pluralists deny that issues such as whether to build new parking facilities, fire the city manager, or downzone property can be resolved by appeals to "the truth" (i.e., "certain knowledge," "true science," or "absolute right"),[1] pluralist theory is procedural rather than substantive. Because pluralists are uncertain about the correctness of substantive policy alternatives, they judge policy outcomes by the processes that lead to them. People can argue endlessly about the best policy alternative for resolving a community issue, but pluralists believe that if an issue is resolved according to democratic rules and under fair conditions, the outcome is legitimate no matter which alternative prevailed. Three types of democratic rules might be identified:

1. The Rules of Polyarchy—Policymakers should be determined through contested elections.
2. The Rules of Pluralism—Participants should adhere to the informal norms of dealing fairly with others, tolerating the participation of opponents, and recognizing the legitimate claims of others.
3. The Rules of Law—Policymakers must respect those statutes, ordinances, and court rulings relevant to community issues.

Because pluralists have asserted that players in community politics "adhere (broadly) to the democratic rules of the game,"[2] pluralists are often regarded as apologists for those players and interests that prevail in the game of community politics.[3] To overcome this charge and attain the capacity for making critical judgments about the resolution of community issues, pluralists must develop a better understanding about the rules of the game and better methods of detecting violations of these rules. The criteria of responsible representation, complex equality, and principle-policy congruence were developed for such purposes. In this chapter we will consider how these criteria clarify and

extend the meaning (both conceptually and operationally) of the rules of polyarchy, the rules of pluralism, and the rules of law.

For policy outcomes to be fair, they must be resolved under fair conditions, as well as according to democratic rules. Just as the home court can be an advantage in sports, so can various community settings bias policy outcomes in ways that undermine their legitimacy. Thus, we will end this chapter with a discussion of how extended applications of the conceptual framework and comparative-issues methodology employed to examine the resolution of policy issues in Lawrence can facilitate future investigations into the biases of various political settings.

RESPONSIBLE REPRESENTATION AND THE RULES OF POLYARCHY

The criterion of responsible representation is an extension of the rules of polyarchy. According to Dahl and Lindblom, the rules of polyarchy provide for regular, open, and contested elections for office.[4] The polyarchical rule that policymaking authority is conferred on the winners of competitive elections enhances democratic performance in two ways. First, electoral victory gives representatives the authority to control nonelected power wielders such as bureaucrats, private elites, and special-interest groups. Second, elections make representatives accountable to citizens. Nevertheless, the formality of contested elections neither ensures that elected representatives will appropriately exercise the authority vested in them or that citizens will succeed in controlling representatives. On specific issues, representatives may capitulate to bureaucrats, notables, or special interests, and on too many issues, representatives may pursue policies at odds with dominant citizen preferences. When such outcomes occur, they belie the goals of contested elections: to empower representatives and to ensure that their decisions are normally consistent with citizen wishes.

Although the rules of polyarchy are satisfied by the mere existence of genuinely contested elections, the concept of responsible representation facilitates consideration of the extent to which the goals of contested elections are achieved in the resolution of community issues. The scale of responsible representation presented in Chapter 2 specifies the conditions when the goals of polyarchy are unrealized: when representatives fail to exercise their authority, when citizen preferences are ignored, and when policy processes are consequently dominated by (for example) private elites, bureaucrats, or special-interest groups. The scale of responsible representation also specifies the conditions where the goals of polyarchy are partially realized: when representatives are empowered but citizen preferences are ignored (e.g., when representatives act as trustees) or when representatives fail to use their authority but where

citizen preferences are satisfied (e.g., when representatives act as instructed delegates). Finally, the scale of democratic performance specifies the conditions when the goals of polyarchy are fully realized: when representatives exercise their independent judgments and make decisions that reflect the will of their constituents.

The comparative-issues methodology permits investigation of the levels of responsible representation that are achieved on specific issues. By measuring the policy preferences of citizens and various kinds of participants and by relating these preferences to policy outcomes on various Lawrence issues, this method showed that responsible representation was sometimes partially and sometimes fully realized in Lawrence. The goals of polyarchical rules were normally upheld in Lawrence because representatives did exercise their authority over bureaucrats, notables, and special interests and resolved issues on the basis of their independent judgments. The additional goal of polyarchical rules—that citizens agree with the judgments of their representatives—was less well realized, as the dominant preferences of representatives and citizens collided on eleven issues (almost 40 percent of the time).

Pluralists recognize that some conflict will occur between the judgments of representatives and the preferences of citizens and have avoided providing assertions about how much conflict is too much conflict. Nevertheless, because policy disagreements between representatives and most citizens block the attainment of the highest levels of responsible respresentation, their frequent recurrence in Lawrence is disconcerting. A populist approach to the problem—more referenda—is insufficient from a pluralist perspective, for referenda simply enable citizen preferences to prevail over representative judgments and thus may fail to bring about policy agreements between representatives and citizens. Instead, pluralists usually focus on the process by which representatives are elected and question whether electoral structures encourage the kind of issue voting that enhances the selection of representatives who hold policy positions similar with those of most citizens.[5] For example, issue voting may be facilitated by political parties that provide voters with distinct policy choices.[6] If so, nonpartisanship in Lawrence and most other communities may inhibit issue voting, hinder policy agreement between representatives and citizens, and thus, reduce responsible representation.

In summary, the concept of responsible representation extends the rules of polyarchy by suggesting that the mere presence of contested elections is not sufficient to achieve the goals of empowering representatives and achieving policy agreement between representatives and citizens. The comparative-issues methodology permits assessment of the achievement of polyarchical goals. The application of this method in Lawrence showed that representatives were able to control bureaucrats, private elites, and special interests but that representatives often made decisions that were at odds with citizen wishes.

COMPLEX EQUALITY AND THE RULES OF PLURALISM

The criterion of complex equality is an extension of the rules of pluralism—those informal and often unspecified understandings of "fair dealings" among various interests in the community. The rules of pluralism seem to provide broad norms, suggesting that specific policy outcomes are fair if the views of all interests have been given a fair hearing.[7] While the concept of fair dealing focuses on providing an equal opportunity to participate for all types of people whose interests are at stake on community issues, the concept of complex equality focuses on the equality of treatment that is provided for those who do participate. Discriminatory treatment of various types—based on class, race, gender, age, or other characteristics that are not germane to the validity of their positions on issues—clearly violates fair dealing among interests. However, political defeat on specific issues is not necessarily evidence of discriminatory treatment, since some interests will win and others will lose, even if processes are characterized by fair dealing.

In order to determine if complex equality has been violated, and discriminatory treatment has occurred, the outcomes of a variety of issues must be observed. If one interest (or grouping of people posited to have some common interests or preferences) tends to dominate competing interests in a variety of policy battles and if such dominance lacks a legitimate explanation, there is prima facie evidence of discrimination and, consequently, evidence that the fair-dealing rule of pluralism has been violated.

The comparative-issues methodology facilitates analysis of complex equality because it detects the presence of various kinds of cleavages on specific issues, permits calculation of the success rates of competing interests that define these cleavages, and probes various explanations of unequal responsiveness to competing interests. When applied to the twenty-nine issues in Lawrence, the comparative-issues methodology uncovered numerous cleavages among participants. It showed that those interests representing more liberal values (e.g., Politicos, Public Providers, and Preservationists) and having fewer resources (e.g., the lower class, Cellar Dwellers, women, and the young) tend to be less successful than their counterparts. It showed that, for the most part, these simple inequalities had legitimate explanations; dominant interests usually won because they were better represented, they participated at higher levels, or their positions were more consistent with public preferences and dominant cultural principles.

The comparative-issues methodology can also support charges of political discrimination by uncovering inequalities having explanations of problematic legitimacy or having no apparent explanation. For example, we can explain the dominance of Country Clubbers over Cellar Dwellers by structural economic incentives that provide strong biases against the preferences of residents of lower-income neighborhoods and others who oppose economic

development. However, such an explanation may not legitimize this inequality. The high success rate of the middle class on issues in Lawrence was described but unexplained by the comparative-issues methodology; such unexplained inequalities suggest strong biases in favor of middle-class preferences. These examples indicate that the comparative-issues methodology can support critical evaluations about the ability of local communities to deal fairly with the diverse interests within them.

In sum, the second rule of the game in pluralist politics is that of fair dealing, more precisely defined as complex equality. This means that unequal treatment of various interests in the resolution of community issues must have legitimate explanations and not be merely discriminatory. Violations of this rule of complex equality can be uncovered by a comparative-issues methodology that shows the persistence of unequal responsiveness to competing interests, even when legitimate reasons for these inequalities are considered.[8]

PRINCIPLE-POLICY CONGRUENCE AND THE RULES OF LAW

The criterion of principle-policy congruence complements the rules of law, serving some of the same functions that laws provide in regulating conflict on community issues while extending the mechanisms of conflict regulation from specific statutes and legal precedents to broad community norms. Rules of law can be important in transforming battles on community issues from mere power struggles into principled discussions about the desired destinations of the community. Rules of law often contain policy decisions, reached in previous contexts that were relatively deliberative and free of the pressure of immediate interests and power applications, about the general principles that should guide the resolution of future issues. Rules of law can thus serve as a constraint on the most powerful interests whose preferences may conflict with established laws. Zoning laws generally, and the Comprehensive Plan of Lawrence (Plan 95) specifically, illustrate these features of the rule of law. The Growth Machine may wish to build more intensive developments than permitted by existing zoning laws; such laws (and rules that make the revision of these laws difficult)[9] serve to constrain the power of the Growth Machine and give Preservationists a better chance to compete on developmental issues. Plan 95 was written to guide the development of Lawrence, and it provides for the widespread community goal of retaining the downtown as the center of retail development in the community. Plan 95 has helped to ensure that the Cornfield Mall issue would be resolved in a way consistent with this community goal rather than simply on the basis of the balance of power between promall and antimall forces.

Although rules of law can domesticate political power and bring principles

to bear on the resolution of community issues, there is no assurance that laws embody appropriate principles or that laws are authoritative enough to provide clear guidance for policymakers in their deliberations.[10] The criterion of principle-policy congruence provides a second, more direct, way of bringing appropriate principles to bear on community decision making. Though the rule of law brings policy precedents to bear on community issues, the criterion of principle-policy congruence brings the most widely accepted cultural values to bear. If participants understand that policymakers act on the basis of those principles dominant in the political culture and relevant to the issue at hand, issues can be debated in terms of competing principles. The criterion of principle-policy congruence thus shares with rules of law the function of making the game of community politics more than a mere power struggle. The criterion of principle-policy congruence helps to frame issues in terms of their relationships to the general goals that people have for their communities.

The comparative-issues methodology facilitates investigation of principle-policy congruence by mapping the distribution of support within a community for various political principles, determining the extent to which these principles are relevant to particular issues, and suggesting the extent to which policy decisions are constrained by dominant principles in the community. The application of this methodology to Lawrence suggests that dominant community principles do not strongly shape the resolution of community issues.

The goal of having community politics regulated by dominant cultural principles seems undermined in several ways. First, the citizens of pluralist communities often fail to acquire shared understanding about important principles; when they are fairly evenly divided in their support of competing principles—as they are in Lawrence regarding the provision of public welfare and the regulation of morality—no principle may command the respect of policymakers. Second, neither citizens nor participants may succeed in relating their principles to their policy positions; when policy preferences are only weakly linked to people's principles, the relevance of articulated principles becomes problematic. Third, even when particular principles are clearly dominant in the culture and clearly relevant to a concrete issue, they may fail to provide clear guidance about the resolution of that issue because of the presence of other dominant and relevant principles that provide precisely the opposite guidance. On many developmental issues, for example, dominant economic-growth principles and neighborhood-protection principles provide conflicting guidance. Finally, the potency of dominant cultural principles may be undermined by structural economic imperatives. For example, even though most Lawrence citizens hold public-welfare and citizen-involvement principles, policymakers may recognize such principles as threats to the economic interests of the city and thus fail to allow these principles to regulate policy issues. Although these problems limit the regulative role of dominant principles in the resolution of community issues, the comparative-issues meth-

odology shows that there was some tendency to resolve issues in ways that reflected the most dominant principles in the local political culture.

In summary, the concept of principle-policy congruence provides an additional mechanism beyond the rule of law for managing the power struggles of participants in the game of community politics. If principle-policy congruence is accepted as an important criterion that should be satisfied, policymakers are encouraged to understand the broad policy orientations prevalent in their local political cultures and to make decisions accordingly. The comparative-issues methodology permits an assessment of the extent to which policy decisions are consistent with dominant cultural principles and helps to identify some of the obstacles to higher levels of principle-policy congruence.

BEYOND LAWRENCE: THE STUDY OF COMMUNITY SETTINGS

This study provides a conceptual framework for investigating the extent to which policy issues are resolved in particular communities in ways that correspond to three democratic ideals: responsible representation, complex equality, and principle-policy congruence.[11] An application of the comparative-issues methodology showed that Lawrence had certain deficiencies with respect to each of these ideals: responsible representation was limited by a number of cases of disagreement between representatives and citizens; complex equality was undermined by discrimination in favor of the middle class; and principle-policy congruence was more widespread for dominant conservative principles than for dominant liberal principles. Nevertheless, the overall assessment of the political process in Lawrence would seem generally positive. Lawrence has escaped the maladies of domination by external participants, bureaucrats, the private elite, and special interests. Most simple inequalities in the success of competing interests have legitimate explanations. Policy outcomes have been somewhat constrained by the most dominant principles in Lawrence's political culture.

Because the comparative-issues methodology that led to these conclusions has been applied to only a sample of Lawrence issues, there is no way of knowing whether other communities have fared more or less satisfactorily in terms of these three ideals. The mere fact that other cities provide different settings for resolving community issues suggests that cities differ in their attainment of pluralist goals.[12] Communities differ in their governmental institutions, social structures, economic bases, and political cultures. These differences may be systematically related to community differences in the achievement of responsible representation, complex equality, and principle-policy congruence. For example, unreformed governmental institutions may enhance the achievement of responsible representation, because partisan elections may

reduce the frequency of policy disagreements between representatives and citizens. Economic diversity may enhance the achievement of complex equality, for the concentration of economic resources in the hands of a few businesses may greatly threaten that equality. Perhaps Lawrence has achieved relatively high levels of complex equality because discrimination in favor of the Growth Machine is minimal in university communities where economic well-being is less dependent on the prosperity of local businesses than on state appropriations for higher education. Moralistic political cultures may enhance the level of principle-policy congruence; participants and citizens in moralistic cultures may understand politics as involving political principles and linking their principles to concrete issues. The moralistic aspects of Lawrence's political culture may enhance—just as the individualistic aspects of its political culture may reduce—the level of principle-policy congruence achieved in Lawrence.[13] However, it is only possible to speculate about how diverse settings affect the attainment of pluralist goals; political scientists have yet to examine the relationships between political settings and the achievement of responsible representation, complex equality, and principle-policy congruence—at least as conceptualized and measured in this study. Thus, a broader application of the comparative-issues method to a variety of communities is necessary in order to understand the effects on democratic performance of various aspects of community settings.