Community Policymaking as a Game

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Abstract

A sports simile is useful for describing and evaluating the
power of various kinds of players and the political standings among
various interests (or teams) in the resolution of community issues.
The application of a sports simile to investigations of large
samples of issues can facilitate the identification of instances of
illegitimate domination by such players as bureaucrats, community
notables, and leaders of organized groups, and it can document
patterns of unjustified inequalities in responsiveness among
competing interests. When ideals from democratic theory are
interwoven into the sports simile, the rules of the game in
community policymaking are clarified and extended. But the sports
simile remains a limited framework for examining the resolution of
issues because it focuses on the power of players and teams in
political competition and ignores the important role that political
principles play in resolving policy issues.

Community Policymaking as a Game

Politics is often described and analyzed as a game. Sometimes such analyses are theoretically sophisticated and rigorous, as in game theory and in Norton Long's classical examination of "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games" (1958). But most efforts to employ the game metaphor to politics are criticized because they focus on the trivial "surface glitter of current issues" and the "shifting players in the political game" (Alford and Friedland, 1985: 4) or because allusions to the political game are used in a reactionary way to defend political outcomes that can be regarded as unjust even though they resulted from procedurally fair contests (Balbus, 1975).

This paper will present a "sports simile" as a conceptual framework for describing and analyzing community policymaking processes. I will argue that systematic examinations of current issues including tabulations of the wins and losses of various kinds of players and teams on these issues allow us to estimate the distribution of (the first face of) power (Lukes, 1974) and thus to assess the extent to which policy decisions are democratic and just. I will also argue, however, that the sports simile is limited as a conceptual framework because it ignores the important role of democratic norms and political principles in the resolution of policy issues.

This argument rests on a theoretical framework that is reported in _Critical Pluralism, Democratic Performance, and Community Power_ (1991). The core of that framework involves three concepts: responsible representation, complex equality, and principle-policy congruence. Responsible representation is achieved when power is appropriately distributed among various kinds of persons; while policy outcomes should usually be responsive to the preferences of activists, the leaders of community organizations, economic and social notables, and the administrators of municipal governments, direct power should be exercised primarily by elected representatives and secondarily by citizens. Complex equality is achieved when the power of various "interests" within communities (e.g., the lower class and the upper class) is equal or when inequalities in the power of such interests have reasonable explanations. Principle-policy congruence occurs when policy decisions reflect the principles (or general policy goals) that are dominant within local political cultures. This paper will argue that the sports simile facilitates analyses of the extent to which communities achieve responsible representation and equality among interests, but it provides no basis for analyzing the legitimacy of inequalities of power among interests or for assessing principle-policy congruence. Thus, the sports simile allows only a partial analysis of the extent to which important democratic ideals are realized in community policymaking.

In _Critical Pluralism_ a "comparative-issues methodology" was developed to measure the extent to which one community (Lawrence, Kansas) achieved responsible representation and complex equality

(as well as principle-policy congruence). In brief, that
methodology involved the examination of a sample of 29 recent policy
issues in Lawrence. Interviews were conducted with 239 of the main
participants in these issues, and public opinion surveys were
conducted on five occasions to discern citizen preferences on these
issues. Details of this methodology can be found in Schumaker
(1991: 36-48). In this paper, we will focus on the results of that
analysis illustrating the sports simile and informing us about
democratic performance.

Issues as Games

A game of community politics occurs when a public policy
proposal is debated such that various players and diverse interests
in the community participate in its resolution. These political
games can be very important -- certainly more important than sports
games -- because their outcomes affect many persons in the
community.

The Agenda-Setting Game. In community politics, there is no
league commissioner who sets a fixed schedule of contests, as issues
are created continuously by the players themselves. Smart players
will, of course, seek to control the schedule. They raise issues
when policy changes would provide them benefits and when they think
they can win. They avoid issues where losses threaten their
interests, especially if they might lose.

Some issues that are raised often lack clear definition.
Perhaps "saving the downtown" has been the most controversial issue
in Lawrence throughout the 1980's, but the nature of the issue is
still debated. For some, the issue is whether or not the city
should permit a enclosed shopping mall in the outskirts of town.
For others, the issue is how to improve the downtown (for example,
by attracting major department stores, by providing better parking
facilities, by better promoting the downtown, and so forth). Such
diverse definitions of the downtownissue are part of the community's
"systemic agenda"; they are matters "commonly perceived by members
of the community as meriting public attention and as involving
matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental
authority" (Cobb and Elder, 1972: 85). Nevertheless, the issue of
how to "save the downtown" is too imprecise for analysis as a policy
game.

For a game to be scheduled, the issue must be precisely framed;
it must be on "the institutional, governmental, or formal agenda,
which may be defined as that set of items explicitly up for active
and serious consideration of authoritative decisionmakers" (Cobb and
ELder, 1972: 86). In Lawrence, developers have proposed several
major enclosed shopping malls, and the public policy changes needed
to facilitate these proposals became important, well-defined issues
resolved by the City Commission.[1] Though many persons would have
preferred free-standing department stores as alternatives to these
shopping mall proposals, the absence of such a proposal has kept the
matter off the governmental agenda. While the free-standing
department store issue has been raised as part of the systemic

agenda of the community, it has remained more of a wish of some than an issue to be resolved in the game of community politics.

Thus, the scheduling of issues -- getting them on the governmental agenda or keeping them off the agenda -- and the defining of issues in ways that they can be considered by governing bodies comprises the initial "agenda-setting" game of politics. For the game of community politics to be democratic, there must be a fair distribution of "the second face of power", important issues and policy alternatives must not be suppressed, and issue agendas must be undistorted (Dahl, 1982: 45-47). Research showing the difficulties that relatively powerless actors encounter in getting their issues on the agenda (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970) suggests that there are greater inequalities of power in setting the agenda than in resolving issues on that agenda. Insofar as the sports simile takes as givens the issues that are on the governmental agenda, it provides an incomplete model for the analysis of community power.

The Issue-Resolution Game. The sports simile views community politics as a series of contests over issues on the governmental agenda of a community. Once an issue has been successfully raised and placed on the governmental agenda, participants emerge, take sides,[2] and struggle against one another in hopes of achieving a policy victory. An understanding of the issue-resolution game requires clarification of policy outcomes, the players and teams involved in the game, the rules of the game, and the settings of these games.

Success in Policy Games

The outcomes of games of baseball, basketball, and football are clear; the scoreboard tells us who won and who lost. But the outcomes of community issues are more like those of boxing matches. Sometimes there is a knockout, an outcome so unambiguous that everyone agrees on the result. And sometimes there are split decisions (and even draws) where each side has scored points, and observers disagree as to who has scored the most.

Disagreements about who won and who lost occur for many reasons. Often participants compromise and then argue over who got the most and who gave the most. Often issues involve many decisions; when these decisions favor first one side and then the other, the overall outcome is subject to different interpretations. And often policy adoptions favor one side, who then find their victory short lived when such policies fail to be implemented. The outcomes of political issues are thus necessarily subjective; the outcomes are in the eyes of various beholders. This difficulty, however, does not preclude high levels of intersubjective agreement about outcomes and, thus, scientific assessments of the winners and losers on specific issues.

The Scoring of Outcomes. The outcomes of various kinds of community issues need to be assessed using an equivalent scale. An important underlying dimension of all issues is the degree to which outcomes involve policy change, as the resolution of some issues

result in the status quo and the resolution of other issues involve some changes in previous policies and laws and in new programs and developments. To measure the degree of policy change in the resolution of each issue in the Lawrence study, a procedure was designed that incorporates the judgments of involved actors (Schumaker, 1991: 43). According to this procedure, outcome scores ranged from 0 to 100 depending on the extent to which challengers of the status quo were more (or less) satisfied with the outcome than were defenders of the status quo. If all supporters of the policy change were highly satisfied with the resolution of the issue and all opponents of the change were highly dissatisfied, a maximum policy change score of 100 was assigned. If all opponents of the policy change were highly satisfied with the resolution of the issue and all supporters of the change were highly dissatisfied, a minimum policy change score of 0 was assigned. If supporters and opponents were equally (dis)satisfied, an outcome score of 50 was obtained, indicating that the issue resulted in a draw. When the resulting policy outcome scores for a sample of issues are related to the preferences of various types of people, it is possible to determine which players succeed in the game of community politics.

Congruence. Certain types of actors succeed or win when decisions are congruent with their dominant preferences, and certain types of actors fail or lose when policy decisions are incongruent with their dominant preferences. For example, the defeat of a proposal to build a Towncenter Mall was a loss for bureaucrats and notables (who tended to support the project) but a victory for representatives and citizens (who tended to oppose the project).

Congruence measures are useful for describing the democratic performance of governments on specific issues. For example, high levels of responsible representation are achieved on issues like Towncenter when policy outcomes are consistent with the dominant preferences of elected officials and citizens, and low levels of responsible representation are achieved when policy outcomes are incongruent with the dominant preferences of elected officials and citizens and reflect instead bureaucratic and/or notable preferences (Schumaker, 1991: 23-30). Congruence measures are also useful for describing the degree of equality among interests in the resolution of community issues. For example, if the outcomes of a significant number of issues are more consistent with the preferences of the upper class (or whites or men) than with the preferences of the lower class (or minorities or women), the unequal won-loss records of these interests would imply their unequal political standing.

Responsiveness. Measures of responsiveness are also useful for summarizing the success of various kinds of players and interests in community politics over a large sample of issues. Responsiveness is measured by the correlations between policy outcomes and the preferences of various types of players and interests.[3] If responsible representation is high, policy outcomes should be most responsive to the independent judgments of representatives (Schumaker, 1991: 147-50) and the preferences of citizens, but there should also be positive responsiveness to other participants. If policy outcomes are equally responsive to various interests (such as

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minorities and whites), the ideal of complex equality would seem to be satisfied.

Power. Congruence and responsiveness do not necessarily imply power. In team sports, some players may be on the winning side even though they do not contribute significantly to the outcome. Similarly, in the game of politics, some types of players may be winners (in the sense that outcomes are consistent with their preferences) even though these players have not had any impact on outcomes. For example, policymakers may be unaware of citizen preferences on an issue and uninfluenced by them, yet their decision may be congruent with the preferences of most citizens. To have power, a group of persons should not only attain outcomes that are responsive to their preferences; their preferences must also cause the outcomes (Nagel, 1975). Thus, it is easier to win on an issue than to exercise power.

Empirical evidence about causality -- about whose preferences affect policy outcomes -- is difficult to establish. If an outcome is consistent with dominant bureaucratic, elite, activist, and citizen preferences, the majority of persons in each of these categories of actors are winners, but it is only possible to speculate about which, if any, of these actors influenced the outcome. Before concluding that citizen preferences, for example, were the determining factor -- and thus that citizens wield power -- the careful analyst might look at other issues where most citizens preferred one outcome and where most bureaucrats, elites, and activists preferred a different outcome. If citizen preferences still prevailed on such issues, the inference that citizens determine outcomes would be more valid.

Inferences about who are the impact players in community politics -- about which types of actors affect policy outcomes -- thus require an analysis of the outcomes of a fairly large sample of issues. By determining how closely policy outcomes correspond to citizen preferences independently of the preferences of other kinds of actors, the direct power of citizens can be inferred. By determining how closely policy outcomes correspond to bureaucratic preferences independently of the preferences of other kinds of actors, the direct power of bureaucrats can be inferred, and so on.

The Players and Their Positions

To assess responsible representation, players must be classified in terms of the roles they play. The game of basketball provides a useful metaphor for understanding these players and their positions. At center are elected representatives, who are always in the middle of the action and who are often expected to dominate the game. Although representatives may be central to the action, they may also work in the shadows of their teammates. At the forward positions are public bureaucrats and community notables. Their talents may prompt other players to pass them the ball and to let them lead their teams, but the ambitions of bureaucrats and notables may make them ball-hogs, dominating the action and alienating even their own teammates. Mobilizers often work on the

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outside -- organizing and representing relatively uninvolved
players -- but they can also be comfortable in the middle of the
action with the big men. Individual activists are more like point
guards. They affect the pace of the game, give assists to other
players, and play tough defense, especially against the fast breaks
engineered by opposing teams. In the stands are the citizens.
Though not active players, the citizens in the audience can strongly
identify with the players on their teams, and their support and
encouragement can make the difference between victory and defeat.

Representatives. According to democratic theory, elected
office is an important political resource. Being elected by and
accountable to citizens gives representatives authority and thus the
right to predominate in the resolution of issues (Pitkin, 1972;
Eulau and Karps, 1978). However, responsible representation may
suffer if representatives fail to use the authority vested in them.
According to some early versions of pluralism, representatives are
merely umpires or referees in the battle among various interests
rather than players who resolve issues on the basis of their own
independent judgments (Dahl, 1961: 184-89; Wolff, 1965). And elite
theorists suggest that elected officials are mere agents for the
important players in the game: the business elite (Hunter, 1953).

Table 1 provides data from the Lawrence study assessing the
influence of representatives in comparison with other types of
players in the community. Column 2 shows that in 88 percent of the
29 cases in the Lawrence sample, policy outcomes were consistent
with dominant preferences of representatives.[4]   Policy decisions
were more congruent with the dominant preferences of representatives
than with the preferences of any other type of actor. Column 3
reports zero-order correlations between policy outcomes and the
preferences of various kinds of actors; these estimates of policy
responsiveness show that policy outcomes are more strongly related
to the preferences of representatives than to those of other players
(and citizens). Column 4 reports the regression coefficients
relating the preferences of each type of actor to outcomes while
controlling for the preferences of other types of actors; these
estimates of direct power show that representatives are the only
participants wielding such power in Lawrence. Thus, representatives
appear to be more central players than suggested by the umpire or
agent images. Like centers in basketball, they are dominant
players, but they usually depend on the support of players in other
key roles.

-- Table 1 goes here --

Bureaucrats. According to progressive "good-government" ideals,
bureaucrats (i.e., non-elected administrative officials such as city
managers, city planners, and the heads of various municipal
departments) should be minor players in the resolution of community
issues; they ought to implement and administer -- not influence --
policy decisions (White, 1927). However, the strict "dichotomy
between politics and administration" has proven untenable (Jones,
1985) because bureaucrats must define and refine the policy
decisions of representatives as they implement them and because

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bureaucrats often possess extensive policy expertise and make policy recommendations. If the recommendations of bureaucrats become public policy because representatives simply defer to the professionalism, credentials, and rules-of-thumbs of administrators, bureaucratic power is illegitimate. But if representatives (and citizens) are persuaded by arguments of bureaucrats -- if the judgments of representatives coincide with bureaucratic recommendations -- responsible representation occurs and democratic ideals are achieved (Walzer, 1983: 304; Schumaker, 1991: 28).

In the Lawrence study, bureaucrats did take positions on most issues, and policy outcomes usually coincided with their positions. But while there is a significant relationship between bureaucratic preferences and outcomes ($r = .33$), there is no evidence that bureaucrats had direct power. Representatives never adopted bureaucratic recommendations unless they were persuaded by them, and representatives resolved five issues in ways that were contrary to the recommendations of bureaucrats.

Community Notables. In all communities, some citizens have disproportionate control over economic resources and/or social status. Community power theorists have, therefore, identified economic and social notables as important players in community policymaking[5] and argued extensively over their power (see, for example, Dahl, 1961: 63-84 and Domhoff, 1978).

Because notables often contribute to the quality of life and economic interests of a community (Stone, 1980: 982-4), representatives have good reasons for responding to their goals, but when money and honor invade the sphere of power -- when representatives and citizens have not been persuaded to support the priorities of economic and social elites -- the power of notables becomes illegitimate (Walzer, 1983: 304).

As shown in Table 1, the predominant positions of notables involved in specific issues prevailed 72 percent of the time. Overall, outcomes were usually responsive to notable preferences ($r = .48$), and there is a positive, though statistically insignificant, direct relationship between notable preferences and outcomes ($B = .31$). But there were no issues when notable preferences prevailed against the dominant preferences of formal decision-makers; thus, there is no evidence that policymakers simply deferred to the economic resources or social status of notables by resolving issues in ways that respond to elite preferences rather than to their independent assessments of community needs.

Mobilizers. Conventional wisdom asserts that organized groups also play powerful roles in the resolution of policy issues. Indeed, early pluralists argued that groups were the most important actors in politics as public policies were based on the reconciliation of group demands. However, groups are not players in the game of community politics, because groups do not act politically -- only group leaders (and other group representatives) act. To empower potential groups, (such as those of businesses or neighborhoods), mobilizers must emerge to organize individuals and represent them in

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the policy process. Mobilizers are all those persons claiming to
represent an organized group of people on policy issues -- and whose
claim is accepted by other players (Cigler, 1991). Mobilizers are
distinguished from other players in the game of community politics
by their control of the resources of the groups that they
representation.

The power of mobilizers is legitimate when they accurately
represent their group constituents and when they persuade other
players of the appropriateness of their policy goals. In contrast,
when mobilizers fail to articulate the dominant preferences of their
group constituents, when they exaggerate their membership base, or
when they enjoy access to decision-makers that is not enjoyed by
other (organized and unorganized) players, the legitimacy of their
power becomes questionable (Schattschneider, 1960: 20-43).

In Lawrence, 70 percent of all issues were resolved in ways
consistent with dominant mobilizer preferences (and group
pressures);[6] however, the direct effect of mobilizer pressure on
policy outcomes is negligible (B=.01). When dominant group
pressures prevailed, outcomes almost always reflected the
preferences of representatives and citizens as well. In short,
representatives did not set aside their own independent judgments
and simply adopt the policies sought by leaders of the strongest
groups in the community.

Individual Activists. Especially at the local level, citizens
who are normally apolitical sometimes become involved in issues that
affect them or their core beliefs. Such individual activists enter
the game without the benefits of office, without control of
extensive economic resources or high levels of social prestige, and
without organizational resources, bringing instead such resources as
their time, their expertise, and their emotions to issues. They seek
to affect outcomes by their persuasive participation (e.g., by
contacting elected officials, by addressing representatives at
commission meetings, and by writing letters to the editors of local
newspapers).

Because individual activists have few resources other than
their persuasiveness, their empowerment is usually approved by
democratic theorists. However, if activists fail to represent the
preferences of citizens-at-large and/or if activists oppose the best
interests of the community, the legitimacy of their power becomes
problematic. The interests of the inactive must be balanced with
the interests of the active, and activists must be made responsible
to the larger community.

The data in Table 1 shows that issues are usually resolved in
ways that are consistent with the views of most activists and that
activist preferences are significantly related to policy outcomes
(r = .43). However, there is no evidence that activists have direct
influence on outcomes. For the most part, individual activists
succeed in the resolution of community issues because their
preferences coincide with those of representatives and/or the
broader public.

Citizens.   Most citizens are not active on community issues,
but they are often interested spectators whose support can be
crucial in determining policy outcomes (Schattschneider, 1960).
Democratic theorists have, of course, argued about the power of the
audience in determining policy outcomes.

     Democratic theorists assume that citizens are the best judge of
their own interests and are capable of reasonable judgments about
public interests and that the interests and judgments of each
citizen should count equally in the determination of policy goals
(Dahl, 1989: 83-105).   Such assumptions lead to the idea that
representatives should normally be responsive to the preferences of
their constituents (Pitkin, 1972: 208-40).   Nevertheless, most
proponents of representative democracy reject populist ideals
asserting that the "will of the people" should determine policy
outcomes (Macpherson, 1973).   Instead they believe that the impact
of citizen preferences on policy outcomes should be indirect and
episodic.[7]   Citizens should elect representatives who usually share
their policy orientations.   On highly visible issues,
representatives may act as instructed delegates and respond to
public opinion.   If state laws allow for referenda on certain
issues, citizen preferences can override representative judgments.
By such means, citizen preferences should be second only to those of
representatives in the determination of policy outcomes.   But,
representatives may sometimes reach policy decisions that are
inconsistent with dominant public opinion.   If such decisions are to
be regarded as legitimate, representatives need to persuade the
public that they have not allowed the professional credentials of
bureaucrats, the economic resources and social status of community
notables, or the organizational assets of group leaders to take
priority over the will of the people in the policy process.

     The data in Table 1 indicate that these ideals regarding
responsible representation were usually realized in the resolution
of Lawrence issues.   The outcomes of most issues (72 percent) were
consistent with dominant citizen preferences,[8] and the level of
policy responsiveness to citizens (r = .58) was second only to the
level of responsiveness to representatives.   However, the direct
power of citizens was clearly limited to the few issues where
representatives acted as instructed delegates and where referenda
were held; overall, the independent impact of citizen preferences on
policy outcomes was small and statistically insignificant.

     In summary, democratic theory suggests that the dominant
players in the game of community politics should be elected
representatives, but citizens should also be relatively powerful.
By virtue of their election, representatives should make independent
judgments about policy outcomes.   By virtue of their membership in
the community, citizens should determine policy goals.   Normally,
representatives should command center stage and the audience of
citizens should approve their actions -- cheering them on.
Administrative officials, community notables, mobilizers, and
individual activists also can play important roles in the game of
community politics.   Their role is to persuade representatives and
citizens that certain policy outcomes are desirable.   If their

persuasive efforts succeed, something approaching a consensus may
emerge as policy proposals enjoy widespread support. If their
persuasive efforts fail, responsible representation may suffer,
especially if elected officials make decisions that are unsupported
by the public and which suggest that they have delegated their
authority to bureaucrats or notables or have bowed to the pressures
of mobilizers or individual activists. The Lawrence study suggests
that responsible representation was normally achieved in the
resolution of the most visible issues in that community. But this
does not mean that other communities are governed democratically or
that all issues in Lawrence are resolved democratically. Perhaps
elite (notable) domination occurs on important decisions made by
private organizations. Perhaps bureaucratic domination occurs on
routine, street level decisions. Perhaps interest-group domination
occurs on noncontroversial allocational issues. A broader
application of the sports simile is required to describe and explain
the extent of responsible representation under a broader array of
circumstances.

The Teams

     In addition to classifying persons by their positions, players
can be classified according to the interests -- or teams -- to which
they belong. When discussing community issues, people often
perceive conflicts as pitting conservatives against liberals,
minorities against whites, the Growth Machine against
preservationists, and so forth, and such perceptions often capture
the essential characteristics of the contending forces.

     To discern the opposing teams in politics, the participants on
issues must be identified and analyzed to determine if there are
demographic or attitudinal cleavages. A cleavage occurs when the
majority of persons defined by some characteristic (e.g., men, the
upper class, liberals, or Democrats) are on one side of an issue and
when the majority of persons having the opposite characteristic
(e.g., women, the lower class, conservatives, or Republicans) are on
the opposite side of an issue, and the differences between groupings
are statistically significant.

     Teams in politics are thus different from sports teams in three
important ways. First, teams in sports are usually on-going
organizations with stable personnel (at least over the course of a
season), but the specific players on teams in community politics
change from issue to issue. Second, players are members of a single
team in sports, but in politics players are simultaneously members
of several teams (e.g., the characteristics of the mayor may make
her simultaneously a member of the middle class, a preservationist,
a fiscal liberal, a Democrat, etc.). Third, in sports the Yankees
or Celtics are all on the same side, but in politics the members of
the Growth Machine or preservationists may not be united on an
issue. Indeed, it is rare for complete cleavages to occur on
community issues. In the game of politics, a conflict pitting the
Growth Machine against preservationists occurs if most people with
pro-growth attitudes support one position and most people with anti-
growth attitudes oppose that position.

In this section some of the major cleavages, or divisions, in local politics are described, the teams that compete in each division are defined and labeled, and the won-loss records of these teams over 29 Lawrence issues are indicated (in Table 2). At the end of the section, explanations for the unequal standings in various divisions are considered but such explanations are drawn from democratic theory rather than the sports simile. If the Bulls dominate the Bucks in the Central Division of the NBA, we are usually content with the explanation that the Bulls were simply the better team. But if Whites dominate Minorities in the Race Division of community politics, we want to know whether the explanation for such dominance is consistent with our democratic ideals.

-- Table 2 goes here --

The Class Division. Because a person's social class is thought to affect his interests, policy preferences, participation, and power, Neo-Marxists (Harvey, 1973) stratification theorists (Stone, 1980), social control theorists (Bouley, 1979), elite theorists (Hunter, 1953), and ethos theorists (Banfield and Wilson, 1963) have all emphasized the importance of class in the game of community politics. Nevertheless, the nature of class conflict in American cities remains controversial, as many analysts have argued that class conflict is relatively muted in the U.S. (Sombart, 1976) and/or that the lower classes compete with the upper classes on a relatively equal basis (Dahl, 1961).

In post-industrial societies, the Marxist conception of class -- based on whether or not a person is an owner of the means of production -- is less useful than definitions of class focusing on the various socioeconomic resources possessed by persons (Parkin, 1979). Thus, the conventional method of assigning persons to a particular class is to determine their income, educational attainment, and occupational prestige. Members of the upper class occupy positions atop an index of socioeconomic status (SES) based on these measures. Members of the lower class, of course, have few socioeconomic resources, while those of the middle class occupy intermediate positions on the SES scale.

The political standings presented in Table 2 indicate that class conflict occurred among participants on about one-third of the issues in the Lawrence sample, but was less evident among citizens.[9] Class conflicts thus appear to be a significant feature in Lawrence policymaking, though not as prominent as suggested by class-based models of politics. The standings also show that Middle Class participants dominate those from the Upper and Lower Classes.[10] While the sports simile serves to uncover and highlight these findings, it leaves unanswered two fundamental questions. What accounts for the dominance of the Middle Class? And is the dominance of the Middle Class legitimate?

The Neighborhood Division. Because people tend to segregate themselves, residing in neighborhoods with others of similar socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and life-style, teams are often identified based on the property values of the neighborhoods where

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players live. The Country Clubbers live in plush neighborhoods with expensive homes. The Cellar Dwellers live in neighborhoods having older and smaller homes and in apartment buildings; in some instances, residents literally do occupy the cellars of these apartments. Between these two teams reside the Split Levellers, who occupy neighborhoods of moderately-priced bungalows, ranch-style, and, of course, split-level homes.

Because Country Clubbers, Split Levellers, and Cellar Dwellers often live in neighborhoods that reflect their socioeconomic resources, neighborhood conflict partially overlaps class conflict. However, people choose to live in particular neighborhoods for other reasons than the affordability of homes, making neighborhood conflict an imperfect reflection of class conflict.[11] Because community issues are often territorial in that their policy alternatives have differential effects of specific neighborhoods, neighborhood-based conflict is pervasive; 18 of the 29 Lawrence issues exhibited neighborhood cleavages. And the Country Clubbers and Split Levellers dominated the Cellar Dwellers in the resolution of these issues.

The Racial Division. Because racial minorities are over-represented in the lower class (Lineberry, 1977: 58-61), because blacks, Hispanics, and other minorities have often asserted a racial consciousness (Verba and Nie, 1972: 157-60), and because minorities have been victims of racial discrimination, minorities often have different policy preferences than their white counterparts. Thus, in most cities racial conflicts on issues are common, and policy outcomes are likely to be more responsive to whites than to minorities. However, in Lawrence there too few racial cleavages to detect any persistent inequalities between whites and minorities.[12]

The Gender Division. Recent research has demonstrated a gender gap in the policy goals of men and women in local government (Burns and Schumaker, 1987: 138-47). For example, women seem to be more supportive of public-welfare and neighborhood-protection measures, while men are more supportive of economic-growth policies. As a result, gender cleavages -- pitting mostly men against mostly women -- may be common on local issues; such conflict occurred on more than half of the Lawrence issues. Previously, we reported more male domination than indicated in Table 2 (Schumaker and Burns, 1988), but a couple of recent policy reversals were responsive to the preferences of women, suggesting the growing effectiveness of women in local politics and that political standings are -- like the standings in sports -- continuously subject to revision.

Other Demographic Divisions. Players in the game of community politics differ not only in terms of class, race, and sex, but also on a variety of other social characteristics. For example, ethnic and religion cleavages may occur on issues, though such cleavages were not particularly prominent in Lawrence. Instead, the following additional demographic divisions have been examined and reported in Table 2.[13]

The Age Division, with players classified as:
Rookies (those less than 30 years old),
Veterans (those between 30 and 55 years old), and
Seniors (those greater than 55 years old);

The Town-Gown Division, composed of:
Towns (those unaffiliated with Kansas University), and
Gowns (students and employees at KU);

The Sector Division., composed of:
Publics (those working for governmental agencies), and
Privates (those working in either the competitive or
corporate private sector of the economy);

The Residency Division, with players classified as:
Hometowners (persons residing in Lawrence for more than 20
years),
Newcomers (those living in Lawrence between 5 and 20 years),
Visitors (those living in Lawrence less than 5 years);

Table 2 reveals that cleavages based on age and sector-of-employment were relatively frequent, but that town-gown conflict was relatively muted, a finding that is perhaps surprising in a university town like Lawrence. Viewing community policymaking as a game points out the dominance of Veterans, Seniors, Hometowners and Privates and the impotence of Rookies, Visitors, and Publics, raising the question of whether these inequalities are justified.

Attitudinal Cleavages. In addition to bringing diverse demographic backgrounds to political issues, players in the game of community politics have diverse beliefs and values that affect their stances on these issues. As a result, cleavages on community issues are often described on the basis of the attitudinal characteristics of the competing players. While attitudinal cleavages are sometimes reflections of various demographic conflicts, the weak link between demographic variables and political attitudes (Dawson, 1973) gives attitudinal cleavages an importance of their own.

The Ideological Division. Self-reported definitions of ideological orientations significantly differentiated the participants on half of the Lawrence issues, and self-defined conservatives, with a record of 12-1-2, were much more successful in the resolution of these issues than were self-defined liberals. While such ideological categories are useful, students and players of the game of community politics often employ other labels to describe clusters of players sharing some specific political beliefs or values.

The Partisan Division. Perhaps the most traditional attitudinal cleavage in local politics involves the Partisan Division, as conflict between Republicans and Democrats (and other party organizations) was certainly prevalent in the era of machine politics (Stone, Whelan, and Murin, 1986: 85-101). While parties

still organize political conflict in some cities, nonpartisanship
has diminished the role of parties in local conflict and may thus
have reduced the role of partisan identification as well (Welch and
Bledsoe, 1988).   Table 2 shows that partisan division still occurs,
but partisanship is less pronounced on the Lawrence issues than
other attitudinal cleavages.   When such cleavages occur, Republicans
tend to defeat Democrats, suggesting that Lawrence's nonpartisan
institutions may have a Republican bias (Hawley, 1973).

        The Ethos Division. As parties became less important in local
politics, Banfield and Wilson (1963; 1971) suggested that the most
important attitudinal cleavage on local issues pitted those with a
"public-regarding" or "holistic" ethos against those with a
"private-regarding" or "individualist" ethos.   While this
classification scheme has been challenged (see, for example,
Hennessy, 1970), political conflict may sometimes occur along the
lines suggested by the ethos theory. Persons with a "Managerialist"
ethos believe "there is an overriding public interest that is
superior to particular interests," that "this general interest is
more easily discovered through cooperation than through conflict and
competition," and that "technical problem solving is the central
task of local government; 'politics' is therefore to be minimized"
(Stone, Whelan, and Murin, 1986: 110).   In contrast, Politicos doubt
the existence of a public interest, challenge the neutrality of
experts and professionals, and thus seek political representation of
their alternative views.

        Managerialists tend to be conservatives and Republicans while
Politicos are more likely to be liberals and Democrats, resulting in
some overlap between the Ethos Division and the Ideological and
Partisan Divisions.[14]   However, ethos was a better predictor than
other attitudinal variables on some Lawrence issues, particularly
those involving governmental structure and organization (Schumaker,
1991: 70-78), suggesting the importance of the Ethos Division in the
game of community politics. Table 2 shows that such ethos-based
conflict occurred on eight Lawrence issues, and that Managerialists
dominated Politicos on such issues.

        Divisions of Special Interest.   Another attitudinal cleavage in
community politics pits fiscal conservatives against fiscal
liberals.   Fiscal conservatives are primarily concerned with
reducing local taxes; they can be called "Market Providers" because
of their belief that private enterprises, through market forces,
better provide for human needs than do governments. Fiscal liberals
are primarily concerned with increasing the extensiveness and
quality of municipal services; they can be called "Public Providers"
because of their belief that more public goods should be provided by
government.   During the era of tax revolts in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, cleavages between Market Providers and Public Providers
were especially prominent (Clark and Ferguson, 1983).   Table 2 shows
that such divisions continue to be important,[15] and that Market
Providers dominate Public Providers in the political standings of
Lawrence.

Perhaps the most important attitudinal cleavage in local politics in the 1980s has been that between persons who think local governments should actively and strongly promote economic growth -- "The Growth Machine," as Molotch (1976) calls them -- and persons wanting "slow" or "responsible" growth who might be called "Preservationists." Analyses of economic-development issues can be facilitated by focusing on the battles between the Growth Machine and Preservationists, because class, race, ideology, and so forth are not strong predictors of attitudes about growth policies.[16] Such cleavages were found on 12 of the 29 Lawrence issues, and while the Growth Machine was more victorious than Preservationists, they were not as dominant as suggested by theoretical models portraying local policymakers as captives of economic imperatives (Peterson, 1981).

Explanations for Unequal Political Standing. Just as the standings on the sports pages help fans keep track of the success of teams in the games of baseball, football, and basketball, so do political standings help to keep track of the success of various interests in community politics. In Lawrence, the standings reveal the dominance of certain interests: the Middle Class, Country Clubbers, Split Levellers, Men, Veterans, Seniors, Privates, Hometowners, and various kinds of conservatives. But the standings are merely descriptive; they do not explain the dominance of these interests. In sports, we are usually content with the descriptions provided by the standings, as we assume that the dominant teams are simply more skilled at the games they play. But in politics, we wonder if the dominant teams merit their places atop the standings and whether the subordinate teams are simply the victims of unjustified discrimination. The sports simile provides no basis for analyzing the legitimacy of the unequal success of various interests in community policymaking, but democratic theory does.

According to democratic theory, political participation is a good thing and ought to be rewarded (Pateman, 1970). This suggests that teams with more participants or whose participants are more deeply involved in acts of persuasive participation (such as contacting public officials) and mobilization (such as organizing groups and holding rallies) should be relatively successful. The Lawrence study showed that differences in participation do account for some of the inequalities of political standing. In the Age Division, for example, Rookies were less likely to participate than Veterans and Seniors, and when they did participate, they wereless likely to make extensive use of persuasive modes of participation (Schumaker, 1991: 192-6). Similarly, the inequalities in the Residency Division are largely explained by the fact that Hometowners were much more likely to participate than Visitors. Nevertheless, participation differences do not always explain unequal responsiveness to competing interests. In Lawrence, the Cellar Dwellers were at the bottom of the Neighborhood Division despite participating at least as extensively as their rivals.

Democratic ideals surely allow particular interests to recruit and elect candidates having their backgrounds and attitudes, and such persons are expected to use their elected offices to resolve

issues in ways that are responsive to these interests (see, for example, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, 1984). This suggests that interests having greater representation on the city council should be relatively successful. The Lawrence study showed that differences in representation do account for some of the inequalities of political standing. The Lower Class was underrepresented on the commission and they were at the bottom of the Class Division (Schumaker, 1991: 186), and Privates have been overrepresentated on the commission, leading to their dominance in the Sector Division. Still, differences in representation do not always explain the political standings. In Lawrence, Public Providers are overrepresented on the commission, but they are still dominated by Market Providers.

Democratic ideals also specify that policy decisions should reflect public opinion (Page and Shipiro, 1983). This suggests that those teams whose positions are most supported by the public should be division leaders. The Lawrence study showed that the Middle Class was more likely than the Upper or Lower Classes to have public opinion on its side, leading to the dominance of the Middle Class in the Class Division. And the public usually supported Managerialists over Politics, explaining Managerial dominance in the Ethos Division. But again, differences in public support do not always explain political standings. In Lawrence, liberals were defeated by conservatives on several issues even though the public supported their policies.

Democratic ideals also specify that policy decisions should reflect those values that are dominant within local political cultures (Nivola and Rosenbloom, 1986: 5; Nisbet, 1975). This suggests that those teams whose positions are most consistent with cultural values should dominate those teams whose positions are contrary to dominant cultural values. Perhaps the subordination of Visitors in the Residency Division was due to their failure to assimilate dominant cultural values, but there is no evidence that the success of other dominant interests was explained by their having greater allegiance than their adversaries to dominant cultural values (Schumaker, 1991: 174-202).

Nevertheless, the different values and goals of different interests do help explain the political standings. Those teams whose goals coincide with "the economic interests of the city" (Peterson, 1981) are advantaged over those interests seeking to protect their neighborhoods and homes from the disruptive effects of economic development or those goals give priority to social services and welfare over economic growth. Thus, controlling for "economic imperatives" does help to explain the dominance of the Growth Machine over Preservationists and of men over women (Schumaker and Burns, 1988). To be able to explain the dominance of the Growth Machine (or men) in terms of economic imperatives is not, however, the same as justifying such dominance. While explanations involving participation, representation, popular support, and political culture are rooted in democratic norms, the economic-imperative explanation is incidental and perhaps contradictory to democratic ideals. If economic imperatives are more important than

participation, representation, popular support, and political culture in determining the winners and losers in community policymaking, democratic ideals are undermined.

This does not mean that inequalities are always legitimate if they are explained by differences among interests in their participation, representation, popular support, and allegiance to cultural values. For example, the subordination of the Lower Class is (at least partially) due to its underrepresentation among elected officials. But such underrepresentation is itself problematic if it is due to structural features of the electoral system, as the absence of wards and partisan labels may discourage the Lower Class from voting (Welch and Bledsoe, 1988: 42).

In short, the sports simile facilitates identification of simple inequalities among various teams or interests in the game of community politics. Explanations of these inequalities must then be sought. Some of these explanations, such as the idea that economic imperatives doom certain interests to a subordinate position, fail to justify these inequalities, as least from the perspective of democratic theory. Other explanations drawn from democratic theory and focusing on differences in participation, representation, popular support, and political culture may justify the observed inequalities, but such explanations can also be questioned. Why does one interest participate more than another? Why does one interest have more representation than another? Why does public opinion or dominant cultural values support one side more than another? The concept of complex equality calls for analysis of the root causes of the simple inequalities in political standings that occur in the game of community politics.

The Rules of the Game

"It's not who wins or loses, but how the game is played" is a cliche that the sports simile applies to the evaluation of community policymaking. Political issues are viewed as a game precisely because there is no (scientifically) correct resolution of these issues. There can be endless conflict about the best policy alternative, but if an issue is resolved according to democratic rules and under fair conditions, the outcome is legitimate no matter which alternative prevails.

It is sometimes asserted that players in community politics "adhere (broadly) to the democratic rules of the game" (Everson, 1982: 30). But while the rules in sports are normally well-defined and understood by the players, the rules of the game in community politics are often vaguely defined and poorly understood. A greater understanding of these rules might be attained by classifying them into three categories -- the rules of polyarchy, the rules of pluralism, and the rules of law -- and showing how the ideals of responsible representation, complex equality, and principle-policy congruence clarify and extend these rules.

The Rules of Polyarchy. According to Dahl and Lindblom (1976: 277), the rules of polyarchy provide for regular, open, and

contested elections for office. The polyarchical rule that
policymaking authority is conferred on the winners of competitive
elections enhances responsible representation in two ways. First,
electoral victory empowers representatives, giving them the formal
authority to control non-elected power-wielders such as bureaucrats,
private elites, and special-interest groups. Second, elections
make representatives accountable to citizens, giving them incentives
to make policy decisions consistent with public preferences. In all
American cities, the game of community policymaking is governed by
the rules of polyarchy.

Nevertheless, the mere presence of contested elections
neither ensures that elected representatives will appropriately
exercise the authority vested in them or that citizens will succeed
in controlling representatives. The concept of responsible
representation facilitates consideration of the extent to which the
goals of contested elections are achieved in the resolution of
community issues. The ideal of responsible representation asserts
that the goals of polyarchy are unrealized when representatives
fail to exercise their authority, when citizen preferences are
ignored, and when policy processes are consequently dominated by
private elites, bureaucrats, special-interest groups, or other
activists. The ideal of responsible representation also specifies
that the goals of polyarchy are partially realized when
representatives are empowered but citizen preferences are ignored
(e.g., when representatives act as trustees) or when representatives
fail to use their authority but where citizen preferences are
satisfied (e.g., when representatives act as instructed delegates).
Finally, the ideal of responsible representation specifies that the
goals of polyarchy are fully realized when representatives exercise
their independent judgments and make decisions that reflect the will
of their constituents.

In Lawrence, the goals of polyarchical rules were normally
upheld because representatives did exercise their authority over
bureaucrats, notables, and special interests and resolved issues on
the basis of their independent judgments. But the additional goal
of polyarchical rules -- that citizens agree with the judgments of
their representatives -- was less well realized, as the dominant
preferences of representatives and citizens collided on 11 issues
(almost 40 percent of the time). Because policy disagreements
between representatives and most citizens block the attainment of
the highest levels of responsible representation, their frequent
recurrence in Lawrence is disconcerting and suggest the desirability
of changing electoral rules in ways that enhance the congruence of
citizen policy preferences with those of representatives.

The Rules of Pluralism. In addition to the formal rules of
polyarchy, pluralists have suggested that the game of politics is
governed by the rules of pluralism -- those informal and unspecified
understandings of "fair dealings" among various interests in the
community (Brand, 1985). The rules of pluralism seem to provide
broad norms suggesting that specific policy outcomes are fair if the
views of all interests have been given a fair hearing and if some

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attempt has been made to alleviate the most onerous burdens that policy decisions might impose on specific interests.

The concept of complex equality extends the rules of pluralism. While the concept of fair dealings focuses on providing an equal opportunity to participate for all interests, the concept of complex equality focuses on the equality of treatment that is provided for those who do participate. Discriminatory treatment of various interests -- based on their class, race, gender, age, or other characteristics that are not germane to the validity of their positions on issues -- clearly violates the norm of fair dealings. However, political defeat on specific issues is not necessarily evidence of discriminatory treatment, since some interests will win and others will lose even if processes are characterized by fair dealings.

In order to determine if complex equality has been violated and discriminatory treatment has occurred, the outcomes of a variety of issues must be observed. If one interest tends to dominate competing interests in a variety of policy battles and if such dominance lacks a legitimate explanation, there is prima-facia evidence of discrimination and, consequently, evidence that the fair-dealing rule of pluralism has been violated.

The political standings in Lawrence show that those interests representing more liberal values (e.g., Politicos, Public Providers, and Preservationists) and having fewer resources (e.g., the Lower Class, Cellar Dwellers, women, and the young) tend to be less successful than their counterparts. For the most part, these inequalities could be explained by differences in representation, participation, and public support. But these standings can suggest the presence of political discrimination by uncovering inequalities having explanations of problematic legitimacy or having no apparent explanation.

The Rules of Law -- and Dominant Cultural Principles. Rules of law can be important in transforming battles on community issues from mere power struggles into principled discussions about the desired destinations of the community. Rules of law often contain policy decisions, reached in previous contexts that were relatively deliberative and free of the press of immediate interests and power applications, about the general principles that should guide the resolution of future issues. Rules of law can thus serve as a constraint on the most powerful interests whose preferences may conflict with established laws. Zoning laws and comprehensive plans illustrate these features of the rule of law. The Growth Machine may wish to build more intensive developments than permitted by existing zoning laws, but such laws (and rules that make the revision of these laws difficult) serve to constrain the power of the Growth Machine.

While rules of laws can domesticate political power and bring principles to bear on the resolution of community issues, there is no assurance that laws embody appropriate principles or that laws are authoritative enough to provide clear guidance for policymakers

in their deliberations (Lowi, 1979: 92-126). The criterion of principle-policy congruence complements the rules of law, serving some of the same functions that laws provide in regulating conflict on community issues while extending the arbitrators of conflict resolution from specific statutes and legal precedents to broad community norms and goals. When the game of community politics is played under the constraint of principle-policy congruence, policymakers attempt to resolve community issues in ways that are consistent with relevant principles or general policy orientations that are held by most citizens in the community. While the rule of law brings policy precedents to bear on community issues, the criterion of principle-policy congruence brings the most widely-accepted cultural values to bear on these issues. If players understand that policymakers are predisposed to resolve issues on the basis of public support for relevant political principles, players are encouraged to appeal to political principles, enabling issues to be debated in terms of competing principles. The criterion of principle-policy congruence thus shares with rules of law the function of making the game of community politics more than a mere power struggle. The criterion of principle-policy congruence helps to frame concrete issues in terms of their relationships to the general goals that people have for their communities (Schumaker, 1991: 49-140).

In short, the rules of polyarchy are the most fully applied rules of the game in American communities, but the norm of fair dealings among interests and existing laws can also influence the processes and outcomes of political games. In order to enhance democratic performance, it is desirable that the game of community politics be governed by the ideals of responsible representation, complex equality, and principle-policy congruence. If violations of these ideals were regarded as violations of the rules of the game, more critical evaluations of policy outcomes could be provided by the sports simile.

Settings of Political Games

The outcomes of sporting events are influenced by their settings. Boris Becker is more likely to win on the grass courts of Wimbledon than on the clay courts of the French Open, and the opposite was true for Chris Evert. And almost all football and baseball teams seek the home field advantage. Settings also influence the outcomes of games of community politics, as certain players and teams can be advantaged or disadvantaged by the contexts in which community issues are resolved. Although political scientists have studied extensively the effects of political, economic, and social contexts on public policy, they have yet to determine how the political setting affects the distribution of power among various players and the (in)equality of influence of various teams. One of the purposes of this paper is to encourage studies of responsible representation and complex equality (and principle-policy congruence) in various settings beyond Lawrence so that the effects of context on the outcomes of political games could be better understood. In this section some of the more important aspects of the context of political games are briefly considered.

Governmental Structures. The distribution of power among
players and teams may be most affected by the extent to which cities
have adopted reformed institutions featuring the council-manager
plan (rather than mayoral systems), at-large (rather than ward)
constituencies, nonpartisan (rather than partisan) electoral
ballots, and public employment based on civil service qualifications
(rather than political patronage). If such structures enhance the
power of bureaucrats (Kirlin and Erie, 1972), notables (Morlock,
1974), and organized groups (Northrup and Dutton, 1978), while
reducing the responsiveness of city officials to citizen preferences
(Lineberry and Fowler, 1967), cities adopting reformed institutions
may experience less responsible representation. If the nonpartisan
and at-large features of reformed governments reduce the influence
of the lower class and minorities (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb,
1984: 202; Welch and Bledsoe, 1988: 42), cities having such
electoral structures may experience less complex equality.

Social Diversity. Cities having more heterogeneous populations
(in terms of social class, race, ethnicity, and so forth) are
thought to have a greater diversity of interests in the community, a
greater network of organized groups, more players competing in the
resolution of issues, and less concentrated power (Trounstine and
Christensen, 1982: 42).   Perhaps social diversity thus leads to the
kind of hyperpluralist politics where representatives lack the
capacity to resist the pressures of competing interest groups
(Jones, 1983: 190-1), reducing responsible representation. But
perhaps social diversity also results in influence being less
concentrated in the hands of any particular interests, increasing
parity in the political standings and hence complex equality.

Economic Conditions. The economies of cities vary, and
differences in the economic structure of communities may affect the
distribution of political power. Some communities are primarily one-
company towns. When the economic prosperity of a community is
dependent on one or a few employers, the owners and managers of the
dominant firms are likely to dominate local politics (Jones,
Bachelor, and Carter, 1986: 159-178). As more industries locate in
a community, such domination should decline and responsible
representation may increase.

In addition to economic diversity, other economic conditions
may affect the game of community politics. Indeed, one aspect of
the economic setting of all communities is that economic wealth is
highly valued, encouraging communities to compete with each other
for companies that will employ citizens, invest in the community,
and contribute to the community's tax base (Peterson, 1981).
Particularly when communities have declining tax bases and high
unemployment, incentives will be strong to create policies that
attract and retain business, enhancing inequalities between such
competing interests as the Growth Machine and Preservationists.

Although the impacts of the settings of political games on
outcomes require additional investigation, there is little doubt
that political institutions, social conditions, and economic factors

influence the outcomes of political games. However, settings do not determine the outcomes of these games. There is always the chance that the Knicks will beat the Celtics, even if the game is played in the Boston Garden, and there is a chance that Preservationists can beat the Growth Machine, even in settings that favor developmental interests.

The Limitations of the Sports Simile

By viewing community politics as a game in which players and teams seek to win on policy issues, a sports simile has been adopted that focuses attention on certain aspects of community politics while neglecting others. To conclude, three limitations to the sports simile will be addressed.

While the sports analogy focuses on conflict over the resolution of policy issues, community politics also involves electoral competition. Indeed, some theories of community politics suggest that political players adopt policy positions to maximize the possibility of acquiring office (Downs, 1957), rather than seeking office in order to win on policy issues. Electoral competition and conflict over the resolution of issues are each central to community politics, existing side-by-side and affecting each other, but their different power processes suggest the need for their independent investigation.[17] Electoral politics is intermittent and provides only limited opportunities for citizens to influence the direction of governmental policy. In contrast, conflict over the resolution of community issues is continuous, and players have opportunities to influence outcomes, especially in local politics.

The sports simile is also limited because it focuses attention on the conflictual aspects of politics and de-emphasizes the non-conflictual aspects of politics. Community politics can be a collective endeavor in which citizens and their leaders provide benefits for the common good and solve problems which threaten that common good. This is the nonzero-sum, consensual aspect of community politics which exists along side the more prominent zero-sum, conflictual aspect of community politics that is stressed by a sports analogy. Community politics is also an individual endeavor, as people have opportunities for self-development through participation in resolving important community issues. The politics of providing collective goods and the politics of self-development exist along side the politics of issue conflict that is emphasized by the sports simile, but a focus on conflict is not inappropriate. As long as people share a common territory and make policy decisions that affect one another, but are subject to the conditions of scarce resources and of having different views about how to distribute these resources, people will compete with one another in the game of community politics. Indeed, such conflict is probably essential for the effective provision of collective goods and for self-development. The idea that there is a single conception of what constitutes a collective good or that there is "one-best-solution" to community problems has unraveled; facilitating the participation of diverse interests in what at least begins as a conflictual process may be essential for discovering the public good

and appropriate solutions to community problems (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989). Furthermore, it is political conflict, not consensus, that requires individuals to develop capacities for tolerance, for thinking more deeply about public interests, and for weighing competing interests and arguments.

Finally, the sports simile is limited because it draws attention to the role of power in the resolution of community issues and de-emphasizes the role of principles in these issues. The outcomes of sporting contests are not affected by the principles of the players, nor are they intended to be. As long as players abide by the rules of their sport, victory should go to the strong, the swift, and the skilled. In sports, we want the most powerful of opponents to collide in head-to-head competition, and though we may cheer for the players and teams that exemplify the principles of sportsmanship, we don't feel cheated if the strongest team wins.

Principles play -- or should play -- a larger role in the game of politics. While conflicts between powerful interests might intrigue us, they also tend to offend and, perhaps, frighten us. In sports, power is limited; even the heavyweight champion of the world commands no one other than his beaten rivals. In politics, power can expand, threatening many interests. Political power thus needs to be constrained, not only by the power of other actors, but by principles. Political principles domesticate political power, making it civil, public, and ultimately democratic.

Games of politics are thus different from sporting games because players are expected to appeal to principles in exercising their power. If players cannot articulate principles that support their position, of if they articulate principles that are not widely shared, their power is limited (at least in a pluralist society). Principles are important because politics is seldom a game in which contending sides are simply pitted against each other. As Schattschneider (1960) has argued, politics is a game where other actors and even the audience are invited into the struggle. Winning on political issues seldom involves overpowering one's opponent in head-to-head competition; instead, winning on political issues involves generating more support than your opponent, and this involves appealing to others, often through the use of political principles.

Table 1

Power in Lawrence:

The Extent to Which the Policy Outcomes Have
Reflected the Preferences of Various Types of Actors

Various Types of Actors	Congruence[1]	Responsiveness[2]	Direct Power[3]
Representatives	88	.72**	.62**
Bureaucrats	65	.33**	-.24
Notables	72	.48**	.31
Mobilizers	70	.48**	.01
Individual Activists	71	.43**	-.19
Citizens-at-large	72	.58**	.26
			Adjusted R^2 = .44

**: S.L. < .05

[1]Congruence is measured by the percentage of 29 Lawrence issues
having outcomes consistent with the dominant preference of various
types of actors.

[2]Responsiveness is measured by the zero-order correlations across
the Lawrence issues between the percentage of various type actors
who supported policy change and the degree to which policy outcomes
achieved change.

[3]Direct power is measured by the beta-weights obtained by regressing
the preferences of various types of actors on policy outcomes while
controlling for the preferences of other types of actors.

Table 2

Political Standings:
Wins and Losses of Various Interests
on 29 Lawrence Issues

	Participants				Citizens			
	W	L	T	PCT	W	L	T	PCT
The Class Division								
The Middle Class	7	2	0	.778	3	1	0	.750
The Upper Class	3	5	1	.389	4	1	0	.800
The Lower Class	2	5	1	.313	0	1	0	.000
The Neighborhood Division								
Country Clubbers	12	5	1	.694	1	0	0	1.000
Split Levellers	8	4	1	.653	1	0	0	1.000
Cellar Dwellers	4	11	1	.281	0	1	0	.000
The Race Division								
Whites	1	0	1	.250	0	0	0	--
Minorities	0	1	1	.250	0	0	0	--
The Gender Division								
Men	8	6	2	.563	0	1	0	.000
Women	7	9	0	.438	2	0	0	1.000
The Age Division								
Veterans	8	0	1	.944	3	0	1	.875
Seniors	8	1	1	.850	5	1	1	.786
Rookies	1	9	1	.136	1	4	1	.250
Town-Gown Division								
Towns	3	1	0	.750	3	0	0	1.000
Gowns	1	3	0	.250	0	3	0	.000
Sector Division								
Privates	9	2	1	.792	3	0	0	1.000
Publics	2	9	1	.208	0	1	0	.000
Residency Division								
Hometowners	5	1	0	.833	1	0	0	1.000
Newcomers	2	2	0	.500	0	1	0	.000
Visitors	0	4	0	.000	0	1	0	.000
Ideological Division								
Conservatives	12	1	2	.867	1	2	0	.333
Liberals	1	11	2	.143	2	0	0	1.000
Partisan Division								
Republicans	6	1	0	.857	2	0	0	1.000
Democrats	1	6	0	.143	1	1	0	.500

Table 2 (continued)
Political Standings

	Participants				Citizens			
	W	L	T	PCT	W	L	T	PCT
Ethos Division								
Managerialists	7	1	0	.825	2	0	0	1.000
Politicos	1	7	0	.125	0	2	0	.000
Divisions of Special Interest								
Market Providers	10	1	1	.875	2	0	1	.750
Public Providers	1	10	1	.125	0	2	1	.167
Growth Machine	7	4	1	.625	3	2	0	.600
Preservationists	4	7	1	.375	1	2	0	.333

Endnotes

[1]Although Lawrence calls its legislative body a "commission" and its members "commissioners," its form of government corresponds to the Council-Manager plan.

[2]The "taking of sides" in the issue resolution game greatly facilitates analysis. In the agenda-setting game, the preferences of various actors may be highly diverse, making it arbitrary to specify two sides to the issue. But when a concrete proposal is placed on the governmental agenda, supporters and opponents of the bill emerge. Of course, some players resist taking sides, as some persons seek to mediate between supporters and opponents and others continue to seek other policies than those on the governmental agenda. Those persons with unambiguous preferences on concrete policy issues are the focus of the present study.

[3]The preferences of representatives, citizens, bureaucrats, notables, and individual activists on each issue are simply the percentages of each of these types of actors supporting policy change who had unambiguous preferences on the issue as measured by interviews with the participants and by citizen surveys.

[4]In the other three cases, representative either had their preferences overturned in referenda or acted as instructed delegates, putting aside their independent judgments and acting on the basis of their accurate perceptions of citizen preferences.

[5]While Dahl (1961: 68) found little overlap between social and economic notables, the Lawrence study uncovered significant overlap among persons occupying these roles and in their preferences on policy issues. Thus, economic and social notables are treated as a single category here.

[6]Because mobilizers represent members of their organizations, mobilizer preferences were calculated only after the preferences of each group leader was weighted to account for their membership base. See Schumaker, 1991: 44-5.

[7]Most democratic theorists recognize that the "will of the people" -- the predominant preferences of citizens on concrete issues -- is often unknown to decision-makers (as public opinion polls are seldom available), that the preferences of individual citizens may be unstable and ill-informed, and that the aggregated public choice is sometimes an arbitrary amalgamation of the preferences of individual voters (Riker, 1982).

[8]The Lawrence study also showed that the outcomes of 85 percent of the issues were consistent with public preferences as perceived by representatives. Those outcomes that were inconsistent with dominant citizen preferences usually had reasonable explanations (see Schumaker, 1991: 164-72).

[9]Because cleavages are defined on the basis of statistical differences and because the samples of citizens are much larger than those of participants, methodological considerations would lead to finding more cleavages among citizens than among participants. The fact that there are more cleavages among participants than among citizens throughout Table 2 indicates that participants are much more likely than citizens to align themselves on community issues on the basis of their interests (as defined by demographic variables) and values (as defined by attitudinal variables).

[10]Among citizens in the Class Division, the standings reveal more wins than losses altogether. There are two reasons why this occurs here and in other divisions. First, an issue may involve an alignment of, for example, the Upper and Middle Classes against the Lower Class; in such a situation, both the Upper and Middle Classes could record victories (or losses) while only the Lower Class recorded a loss (or a victory). Second, the standings include issues where there were significant differences but not cleavages among interests. If, for example, 90 percent of the Upper Class supported a policy outcome but only 55 percent of the Lower Class supported that outcome, the Upper Class would be credited with a victory but the Lower Class would not be credited with either a victory or a loss (see Schumaker, 1991: 179).

[11]The correlation between the existence of class cleavages and neighborhood cleavages across the 29 Lawrence issues was $r = .34$. An ordinal scale measure of various cleavages is discussed in Schumaker, 1991: 240, fn 10).

[12]This does not necessarily mean that Lawrence has solved racial problems. Indeed, in Lawrence the greatest racial problem may be that minorities are too discouraged to even participate as there were very few blacks, Hispanics, and native Americans involved in the 29 issues.

[13]The categories employed to characterize certain demographic cleavages are sometimes arbitrarily defined, and the labels used to discuss categories contain some literary license. No doubt, there are many persons in their late twenties who are hardly Rookies playing in their first season of politics. Perhaps persons who have lived in a community all their lives (true Hometowners) have significant political differences from persons who have lived in a community for only 20 years (Hometowners, as defined here). One of the methodological difficulties is that different cutpoints seem appropriate for classifying persons on different issues. For example, persons between 55 and 65 years old have policy preferences on social issues that make them teammates of middle-aged Veterans rather than of those over 65 years old. However, on other issues, persons between 55 and 65 years old and persons over 65 years old share similar preferences. Rather than analyze such complexity, consistently-defined categories are used for illustrative purposes.

[14]In the Lawrence study, ethos cleavages were moderately correlated with ideological ones ($r = .57$) and strongly correlated with partisan ones ($r = .72$).

[15]The cleavage between Market Providers and Public Providers is quite independent of other demographic and attitudinal cleavages. In the Lawrence study such cleavages were most highly related to ideological cleavages (r = .62). While the fiscal orientations of players are an important component of their overall ideological identification, they are not synonymous with ideology.

[16]Interestingly, cleavages between the Growth Machine and Preservationists most strongly overlapped those based on gender (r = .75) with men, of course, supporting the Growth Machine.

[17]Dahl (1961) has shown how electoral politics (centering on party nominations) and the politics of specific issue-areas (urban redevelopment and education) are characterized by different models involving different types of key actors and different decision-making processes.

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