
Protest Outcomes in the Soviet Union

Author(s): David Kowalewski and Paul Schumaker

Source: *The Sociological Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Winter, 1981), pp. 57-68

Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Midwest Sociological Society

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106086>

Accessed: 20-03-2017 19:31 UTC

REFERENCES

Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:

http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106086?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents

You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at

<http://about.jstor.org/terms>



Midwest Sociological Society, *Wiley* are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *The Sociological Quarterly*

Protest Outcomes in the Soviet Union*

David Kowalewski, *Lafayette College*
Paul Schumaker, *University of Kansas*

Prevailing research on political protest—which use data on events in pluralist societies—stresses the importance of target characteristics and the distribution of social support as explanatory variables affecting protest outcomes. This paper questions the applicability of these findings for explaining protest outcomes in hegemonies. An analysis of 303 protest events in the USSR yields the conclusion that measures of the internal strength of protest groups are the most important determinants of the effectiveness of Soviet dissident groups.

In recent years social scientists have conducted theoretical and empirical investigations into the determinants of the outcomes of conflicts between political authorities and protest groups (Oberschall, 1973; Gamson, 1975; Schumaker, 1975). These investigations, however, have focused on protest movements operating within the relatively open context of Western pluralist societies. Thus our understanding about the effectiveness of protest undertaken in a variety of political contexts is limited. Through an examination of the factors associated with the success or failure of contemporary protest groups within a closed, hegemonic society—the Soviet Union—this paper seeks to contribute to existing theory and research on political protest. In part one, a fundamental distinction is made between polyarchies and hegemonies, and hypotheses are developed suggesting that the factors which enhance the effectiveness of protest within one general type of political system (polyarchies) may be quite different from the factors which enhance it within the other type (hegemonies). In part two, the data used to test hypotheses regarding the variables associated with protest effectiveness in the Soviet Union are discussed.

Protest Effectiveness in Hegemonies

Protest groups are to be distinguished from “interest groups” which have stable representation within a political system, and from revolutionary groups which seek to overthrow the existing regime. Unlike interest groups, protest groups are comprised of citizens whose interests are underrepresented on a regular basis in the policymaking arenas of society. Unlike revolutionary groups, protest groups seek the limited goal of changing the policies of the regime. Such groups exist within every polity, but their effectiveness appears to vary across political systems depending on the character of the regime.

A classification of political regimes into polyarchies and hegemonies can be used to analyze the effectiveness of protest in different political contexts (Dahl, 1973:1-25). Polyarchies are open pluralist systems where institutions are structured to facilitate widespread citizen participation in the policy process. Hege-

monies are closed monistic systems where extensive controls are placed on the organization, representation, and expression of citizen preferences. Unlike pluralist regimes, hegemonic regimes claim a monopoly of political truth and hence are less likely to tolerate dissenting groups. Thus protest groups are likely to win fewer concessions and suffer more repressions when making demands on hegemonic rather than pluralist regimes.

The working hypothesis, however, is that polyarchies and hegemonies do not vary only in their treatment of protest groups. We contend that the factors which affect such treatment depend on whether the protesters are operating within a polyarchy or a hegemony. The specific hypotheses to be developed in this regard are based on the assumption that the fundamental character of political conflict varies substantially in polyarchies and hegemonies. As suggested by Oberschall (1973:28–29), in polyarchies “conflict is an open system, since groups initially outside the conflict . . . may be progressively drawn into the conflict and commit some resources to one or the other side.” Thus, in polyarchies, conflict is contagious (Schattschneider, 1960:1–19). Because polyarchies encourage the broad participation of the public in the policy process, it is unlikely that policy decisions will be resolved only through the participation of protest groups and their targets. Rather, a conflict initially involving only the protest group and its target will normally draw the attention of an “audience” which soon becomes actively immersed in the conflict. In such regimes a “spillover” of conflict from the initial forum into the broader public arena is common. In short, a protest event in polyarchies can best be characterized as an N–player game (Brams, 1975:199–242) where the two principal players—the protest group and the immediate authorities—both compete for the support of third, fourth, or N–players. Whether “third parties” (other organized and influential groups) support the protesters or the authorities is a key determinant of the outcome of political protest in a polyarchy (Lipsky, 1970).

In hegemonies, however, the closed nature of the system makes “third parties” within the polity much less relevant to the resolution of protester regime conflict. In such regimes, protest conflicts can best be described as 2–player games; that is, they are generally restricted to the protesters and their immediate targets. Not only are third parties discouraged from participating in the conflict, but groups supporting the protesters are less likely to induce the political authorities to accord the dissidents favorable treatment.

If political protests can best be characterized in N–player games in polyarchies and as 2–player games in hegemonies, then the following hypotheses should be confirmed.

(1) *Although in polyarchies variation in protest outcomes is partially explainable in terms of variation in the characteristics of protest targets, in hegemonies, variation in protesters’ targets should have little impact on protest outcomes.*

Students of protest in polyarchies have observed that outcomes are dependent upon the level of government which is the target of the protest. For example, civil rights protesters in the 1960s in the United States frequently found that they were simultaneously attaining repressive policy outcomes from local government officials while attaining concessive outcomes from federal officials (Sears, 1969: 527; Misner, 1969:109). Moreover, in the United States executive targets were

generally more responsive to ghetto communities which experienced riots in the 1960s than were legislative targets (Feagin and Hahn, 1973:247). Also, American student protesters found that while university administrators often capitulated to their demands, state legislatures were passing punitive measures against them and their supporters (Urban Research Corporation, 1970). In short, the large number of different government actors involved in the resolution of protest in polyarchies, and the fact that these different targets face different constituent pressures, mean that protest movements attain different policy outcomes depending on the characteristics of the targets.

The more monolithic nature of hegemonic regimes, however, suggests that protest outcomes in these systems are little explained by variation in target characteristics. The highly centralized, unitary nature of hegemonic power structures leaves little room for target discretion. Specifically, we hypothesize that whether protest groups target their demands at national, provincial, regional, or local officials in the Soviet Union, or whether they make demands of Party or State officials, these targets are expected to show little difference in their response. Whereas protesters in polyarchies can make demands on officials at one level of government while simultaneously seeking to expand the conflict and attain the support of government actors at others levels, this option is not expected to be effective for protesters in hegemonies. In the Soviet Union, dissidents are likely to find officials at all levels of the power structure taking relatively similar positions in response to their protest.

(2) *Although the structure of social support has a significant impact on protest outcomes in polyarchies, social support variables should have little impact on protest outcomes in hegemonies.*

The importance of expanding the scope of conflict and winning the support of third parties for protesters in polyarchies is stressed in both theory and research findings. According to Lipsky (1970:4–5), protest in polyarchies “is a highly indirect process in which communications media and the reference publics of protest targets play crucial roles.” Lipsky argues that protest groups in such regimes require the support of third parties if they are to win policy concessions from targets. Likewise in an examination of 212 protests targeted at officials in American cities, Schumaker (1975) found that social support variables were the most important factor explaining outcomes. There is little reason, however, to expect these findings to pertain to protest in hegemonies. The relative absence of open public contestation for power by authorities in hegemonies gives them fewer incentives to be sensitive to the preferences of third parties. Further, third parties are less likely to use their resources on behalf of protest groups when such actions are discouraged and often repressed by public officials in such regimes. Thus, we would expect that third parties are both less active and less significant in the resolution of protest incidents occurring within the Soviet Union than within polyarchies like the United States.

(3) *Variables describing protest group characteristics will be significantly related to protest outcomes in hegemonies.*

In polyarchies, the characteristics of a protest group—organizational structure, strategies and the like—to some degree affect its ability to attain successful outcomes in confrontations with political authorities (Gamson, 1975; Schumaker, 1975). But because protest outcomes in polyarchies are also highly de-

pendent on the characteristics of protest targets and on the distribution of social support, group characteristics are not the most important determinants of protest outcomes in pluralistic societies.

As indicated in our first two hypotheses, the characteristics of protest targets and the distribution of social support are less important determinants of protest outcomes in hegemonies. In such systems, protest events are best characterized as 2-player games in which the strength of a protest group—relative to the strength of the target—is a major factor influencing outcomes. In hegemonies, protesters can rarely count on influential third parties to apply resources in their behalf. It follows that protesters in such systems must rely primarily on their own resources in conflicts with political authorities. In 2-player conflicts, outcomes depend on which player has the greater resources. Whereas in *N*-person games a weak player can win by alliance with other players, in 2-person games a weak player must try to augment internal strength.

Thus two protest group characteristics which should determine outcomes in hegemonies are the variables of size and utilization of constraints. Gamson (1975:51) suggests that “numbers, one might think, mean power for a challenging group.” In the 2-player conflicts characteristic of hegemonies, group size should be especially important. Usually only a very large group can expect to apply sufficient pressure on official targets to induce them to respond favorably.

A second group characteristic enhancing protester effectiveness may be the utilization of constraints, that is, those resources available to protesters enabling them to place heavy burdens on targets (Gamson, 1968: 74–76). Although the evidence is surely inconclusive on the effectiveness of using constraints, some data suggest that they have been less than crucial resources for protesters in polyarchies. For in such regimes a major determinant of protester success is winning the support of third parties. This support is most easily attained by the use of moral suasion (Lipsky, 1970:186–92). The use of constraints, however, alienates those third parties whose support is crucial for the protesters (Eisinger, 1974:593; Sears and McConahay, 1973:158–69). For this reason, some research suggests that protesters who avoid the use of constraints have been more successful than groups which use such tactics (Schumaker, 1975).

Yet, because third parties play relatively insignificant roles in determining the outcomes of protest within hegemonies, moral suasion should be a less important resource for groups making demands against these regimes. If third parties are generally not involved in the resolution of protest conflicts, and if hegemonic regimes are generally not attentive to third party influence, moral appeals for support by these groups will be relatively unproductive. Thus, in the 2-player conflicts occurring in hegemonies, an effective political resource can be the use of constraints. By applying or threatening to apply such costly contingencies on protest targets as disruption, property damage or personal injury, protesters can create a situation where it becomes rational for targets to minimize costs by responding to the protesters favorably (Oberschall, 1973:177). In a 2-player game, the use of constraints can add to the strength of protesters without adverse “backlash” effects. Thus, the strategic use of constraints by protesters in hegemonies may tip the balance of power toward the protesters, enhancing their chances of attaining a favorable policy outcome.

Whereas both target and external support characteristics are critical variables

affecting protest outcomes in polyarchies (Bailey, 1972:85; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977), force variables are hypothesized to be more important determinants of outcomes in hegemonies.

Data and Measurement

To test the above hypotheses, a sample of 303 protest events occurring in 1965–78 within one hegemonic system, the USSR, was collected and analyzed. A comparison of the determinants of outcomes in polyarchies—specifically with those in the USSR—is especially valuable. The Soviet regime represents an extreme case of hegemony; on the basis of several indicators, the USSR can be classified at the far repressive end of a permissive-coercive continuum (Feierabend et al., 1971:120).

The following inclusion criteria were used. All demonstrations were conducted by negatively privileged groups engaging in unconventional expressions of dissatisfaction against Soviet regime policies. All were physical events at which group members assembled publicly to manifest their grievances, rather than merely to write expressions of dissatisfaction such as organizational declarations, petitions, or letters to regime organs opposing official policies or practices. All protests were made by social groups. Expressions of dissatisfaction by lone individuals or families, unless specifically delegated by a larger group, were omitted. All events were public; protests conducted in private dwellings or in prisons, labor camps, or psychoprison were excluded. Also omitted were protests by non-Soviet citizens. All the events were conducted openly by group members making their identities known; anonymous protests, such as the secret hangings of banners and so forth were not included. All the protests were targeted at regime officials. Thus border-escape attempts, protest demonstrations in front of embassies, public press conferences with foreign correspondents and so on were excluded. Finally, cases with insufficient data were eliminated.

An event was selected for inclusion if reported in at least one *samizdat* (Soviet dissident) source. As others (Boiter, 1972) have noted, these sources possess a high level of authenticity, accuracy, objectivity, and completeness of detail. The sources most productive of reports of demonstrations include *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii* (1968–1977), *Materialy samizdata* (1975–1977), and *Sobranie dokumentov samizdata* (1965–1977).

As is common in studies of protest movements, no claim for the perfect representativeness of the sample can be made. However the wide range of sources consulted suggests that the dataset is roughly typical of the totality of dissent in the USSR. (For a complete listing see Kowalewski, 1979.) Indeed the group structure of the event set fits closely with qualitative comprehensive surveys of the Human Rights Movement in the Soviet Union (see Corcoran, 1977).

The incidents are a subset of events comprising what has been called the “Human Rights Movement” in the Soviet Union, which began to gain momentum in the mid-1960s with the arrest and trial of two writers, Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuri Daniel (see Corcoran, 1977). The events were conducted by 21 groups or “movements” (see Table 1) in 98 localities and 13 Union Republics. They embrace a wide variety of protest forms, including demonstrations in front of courtrooms during trials of dissidents, sit-down strikes by Jews demanding emi-

Table 1. Demand Group and Protest Frequency

Demand Group		Percent	
<i>Universalist</i>			11.5
Civil Rights Groups*		11.5	
Professional Intellectuals	10.2		
Students	1.3		
<i>Particularist</i>			88.4
National		61.3	
Jews	31.4		
Germans	2.0		
Crimean Tatars	14.2		
Meskhethians	4.6		
Russians	0.3		
Estonians	0.3		
Latvians	0.3		
Lithuanians	2.6		
Ukrainians	4.6		
Georgians	0.3		
Armenians	0.7		
Religious		23.5	
Lithuanian Catholics	6.9		
Uniate Catholics	2.0		
Russian Orthodox	4.0		
Baptists	9.9		
Pentecostals	0.7		
Economic		3.3	
Workers	3.0		
Peasants	0.3		
Professional		0.3	
Artists	0.3		
Total (N = 303)			99.9**

*Sources reported no collectivities other than these groups in these categories.

**Rounding error.

gration visas, strikes by Soviet plant workers, mass marches on police buildings and the like.

Although space considerations preclude a detailed examination of each protest group in the USSR, a thumbnail sketch of the social structure of the Human Rights Movement can be presented here. Soviet dissident groups can be characterized according to the generality of their demands. A small percentage of groups (11.5 percent in my sample) can be labelled Universalist, because they make demands for policy changes which would have an impact on the entire citizenry. For example, civil rights circles advocate reforms such as free elections, an end to press censorship, and so forth. The great majority of such groups are comprised of Russian students and professional intellectuals. Groups with similar demands, however, are known to exist in Belorussia, Latvia, and other republics.

Most groups (88.4 percent) can be labelled Particularist, because their demands would immediately affect only themselves or their general subcategory.

These subcategories include professional, economic, religious, and national groups. Prominent among professional groups are writers and artists who demand greater professional autonomy in their work. Economic dissent from Soviet workers against wage cuts, unfavorable working conditions and the like, has been relatively infrequent. More often religious groups have protested regime policies such as church closure and confiscation of religious articles. The greatest volume of religious dissent has arisen from Baptists and Lithuanian Catholics. National groups have contributed a great deal to the totality of dissent in the USSR. National dissent can be conveniently divided into indigenous and repatriatory protest. Indigenous national protest groups are located in their homelands but desire greater ethnic autonomy or separation from the USSR. Ukrainians and Lithuanians have been such groups which have protested most vociferously for their national rights. Repatriatory national protest groups live outside the geographical areas they regard as their homelands. Such groups engage in protest activities against the Soviet regime's refusal to allow them to reside in the desired areas and to permit an independent cultural life. Jews and Crimean Tatars have been at the forefront of repatriatory national protest, but Germans, Meskhetians, and others have also made their dissatisfactions known.

To measure the response of Soviet regime officials to protest group demands, we have constructed an outcome-favorability index based on the benefits and costs to the group resulting from the conflict. Outcomes are favorable if benefits or concessions were high and costs or repressions were low. Concessions were measured by means of an ordinal responsiveness scale. Concessions are low if the demands of the group were completely unmet and high if fully met. Repressions were measured by examining the detentions and injuries meted out to the group. Repressions are low if no members of the protest group were detained or injured at the event, high if several were so punished. The concession-attainment and repression-avoidance scales were then combined to form a one hundred-point outcome-favorability index.

Certainly the index measures only a portion of the total costs and benefits presumably resulting from protest conflicts. Members of protest groups in the Soviet Union frequently suffer a wide variety of other costs ranging from anonymous telephone threats to dismissals from universities. Similarly, members enjoy a variety of other benefits, including a sense of solidarity with other like-minded citizens, the learning of political skills and the like. Because these phenomena are measured only with great difficulty, however, and because the causal link between these phenomena and actual protest demonstrations is tenuous at best, a less ambitious strategy of only measuring the more concrete and immediate effects of protest events was followed.

Target characteristics were measured according to both the level of the official organ in the Soviet political hierarchy (target level) and its role as official functionary of Party or State structures (target function).

External support for protest groups was measured by examining the presence or absence of expressive support for the groups at the demonstration by other groups listed in Table 1 or by interested by-standers. As hypothesized above, third parties are rarely involved in protest conflicts in the Soviet Union (3.0 percent of all cases). To ensure against misleading findings, a second measure of external support was constructed. Because Western foreign correspondents fre-

quently express support for Soviet dissidents (Smith, 1977:28; Bonavia, 1973), the events were coded according to whether or not such a party was present at the demonstration.

Finally, force variables were gauged according to two ordinal scales. Size was measured according to the number of protestors at the demonstration, while constraint-utilization was estimated by the degree of militancy used by the group.

Findings

Target Characteristics. Table 2 suggests that the response of political authorities in hegemonic regimes to protest groups is independent of target characteristics. The percentages of favorable outcomes resulting from protest demonstrations show that whether protesters make their demands on the incumbents of national or other various subnational offices in the Soviet Union, their chances of success are equally small. Moreover, no substantial differences were found between the responses of State and Party officials. Thus, the data support our first hypothesis. Protest outcomes in hegemonies are seemingly unaffected by variation in the characteristics of protest targets. The monotonicity of Soviet target response to protest groups stands in sharp contrast to the differentiation in the response of targets in polyarchies. Whereas protest groups in polyarchies can often shift their protest from an unfavorable to a favorable target, this option seems less feasible for protest groups in hegemonies.

Table 2. Target Variables and Protest Outcomes

Percentage of Protests Having Favorable Outcomes*		
Target Level	Favorable Outcome	N
Local	17.0	88
Regional	6.2	65
Provincial	18.5	54
National	17.7	96
Target Function		
State	13.7	234
Party	20.3	69
Total N		303

*On the criteria for inclusion of events in the sample, scale categories, reliability coefficients of variables, construction and validity tests of the outcome-favorability index, and a listing of data sources, see Kowalewski (1979 and 1980). Samizdat (dissident) and related sources were utilized. Due to the frequent need for clandestine and quick production and dissemination of dissident material in the Soviet Union, occasionally anonymity is preferred and minor factual errors are detected (Telesin, 1973). However generally the authenticity, accuracy, objectivity, and completeness of these sources, as noted by several observers (Biddulph, 1975:109-110; Boiter, 1972), is very high. For an extended discussion of these properties of Soviet dissident literature, see Kowalewski (1978).

For simplicity of presentation, Table percentages represent figures for collapsed categories of the extended scales: Outcome = Favorability (Unfavorable = 1-50; Favorable = 51-100); Size (Small = 1-49; Large = 50-5000 and over); Militancy (Non-Militant = quiet petition and negotiation or expressive peaceful demonstration or rally; Militant = march, obstruction, strikes and boycotts, direct action, or physical attack). Pearsonian correlations, however, represent relationships between the extended scales.

Table 3. External Support Variables and Protest Outcomes

Percentage of Protests Having Favorable Outcomes		
	Favorable Outcome	N
Domestic Group Support		
No Support	15.0	293
Support	20.0	10
Presence of Western Correspondents		
Absent	15.2	270
Present	15.2	33
Total N		303

External Support Variables. The second hypothesis states that protesters in hegemonies should find their success or failure relatively independent of social support variables. That protest outcomes in the USSR would thus be unaffected by public opinion is confirmed by the data in Table 3. The level of outcome-favorability for protesters was unrelated to the presence of domestic or foreign support at the demonstration. There is little indication that external support by third parties substantially affects the outcomes of specific protest incidents in the Soviet Union. This finding contrasts sharply with studies of protest in polyarchic polities which suggest that public officials are very sensitive to the roles of external actors when responding to protester demands. The data seemingly provide a persuasive case that protest in the USSR is best characterized as a 2-player game in which outsiders play a minimal role.

Protest Group Characteristics. Unlike target features and external support variables, the characteristics of protest groups explain a good deal of variance in the response of Soviet officials. We hypothesized that in hegemonic polities, size and constraint-utilization would be important protest resources, enhancing the likelihood that dissident groups would attain favorable policy outcomes in conflicts with political authorities. The data strongly support the notion that size is highly predictive of protest outcomes in the USSR. Table 4 shows that large groups obtained favorable outcomes 21.9 percent of the time; in contrast, small groups were successful in only 9.6 percent of the cases.

Even more striking is the relationship between constraint-utilization and outcome-favorability. Militant groups were much more likely to obtain a desirable result (37.8 percent) than groups avoiding the use of constraints (6.8 percent).

Numerous examples could be adduced to illustrate the findings. When a small group of Soviet Germans quietly petitioned the Central Committee in Moscow for emigration visas, all were detained and shipped back to their homes (Khronika, 1977). Likewise when a small number of Lithuanian Catholics in Vilkauskis petitioned the raion executive committee to register their church, their demands went completely unmet (Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania, 1976). Similarly, as a small group of Soviet Jews were requesting the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow for emigration visas, police

Table 4. Force Variables and Protest Outcomes

	Favorable Outcome	r	Significance	N
Size of Group				
Small	9.6			166
Large	21.9	.24	.001	137
Militancy of Group				
Non-Militant	6.8			221
Militant	37.8	.41	.001	82
Total N				303

forced the entire group into buses and drove them to drunk tanks where they were incarcerated for several days (Khronika, 1976).

When bus drivers throughout Siauliai, Lithuania, however, called a wildcat strike to protest cancellation of pay increases, Party officials quickly arrived and immediately met their demands (Elta, 1976). Similarly, after Ministry of Culture officials in Moscow attempted to censor an art exhibit, 150 angry artists removed all their paintings and boycotted the exhibit. A compromise was soon reached and most of the paintings went on display (Samizdat, 1976). Finally, when Meskhetian repatriation movement leader Enver Odabashev was arrested, thousands of his followers converged on the Saatly oblast Party building in Azerbaidzhan and refused to disperse until their demand for his release was met; Odabashev was set free (Khronika, 1969).

Regression statistics showing the relationship between size, constraint-utilization, and outcome-favorability are shown in Table 5. Relationships for which the unstandardized regression coefficients are twice the standard error are taken as statistically significant. The figures show that the larger the demonstrating group, the more likely the use of constraints ($\beta = .37$). When constraint-utilization is controlled, however, the relationship between size and outcome-favorability is reduced to just below statistical significance. Larger demonstrations are more effective primarily because constraints are more likely to be used, which in turn enhances the likelihood of favorable outcomes.

Table 5. Force Variables and Protest Outcomes: Multiple Regression Analysis

	Standardized Regression Coefficient	Unstandardized Regression Coefficient	Standard Error	Significance
<i>Militancy</i>				
Size	.37	0.31	0.05	S
<i>Outcome-Favorability</i>				
Militancy	.37	5.12	0.78	S
Size	.10	1.20	0.67	NS

Note: N = 303

When groups utilize constraints, however, they are more successful whether they are large or small. When size is controlled, the more militant demonstrations are significantly more successful ($\beta = .37$). Thus, militant groups can increase the probability of favorable outcomes regardless of size.

Conclusions

The foregoing analysis suggests that political protest in the Soviet Union—and perhaps in other hegemonies as well—is very different from protest in polyarchies. While protest in polyarchies is best characterized as an N-player game where the public and other officials are important in the resolution of conflicts between protest groups and political authorities, protest in hegemonies is best characterized as a 2-player game where other actors are much less important in the determination of outcomes. In hegemonies, protest appears primarily as a power struggle between two sides—the protesters and their immediate target—and protest groups are most effective when enhancing their coercive resources. Because of the superior power resources of official targets in the USSR, protesters are not likely to succeed in attaining their demands. There is little question that relative to protesters in polyarchies, protesters in hegemonies win few favorable policy outcomes.

Yet protesters can be successful in the Soviet Union when they increase their force capacity by enhancing size and constraint-utilization. Alone the two variables explain 17 percent of the variance in outcome-favorability. It appears that in the Soviet Union authorities respond favorably most frequently to groups which confront them with strong countervailing force. Seemingly the major hope for protesters in hegemonies is to develop the coercive resources which can provide a cutting edge to their demands.

REFERENCES

- Bailey, R. 1972. *Radicals in Urban Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Biddulph, H.L. 1975. "Protest strategies of the Soviet intellectual opposition." Pp. 96–115 in R.L. Tökes (ed.), *Dissent in the USSR*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Boiter, A. 1972. "Samizdat: primary source material in the study of current Soviet affairs." *Russian Review* 31 (July):282–85.
- Bonavia, D. 1973. *Fat Sasha and the Urban Guerrilla: Protest and Conformism in the Soviet Union*. New York: Atheneum.
- Brams, S.J. 1975. *Game Theory and Politics*. New York: Free Press. *Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania*. 1976. No. 25. Brooklyn: Lithuanian Catholic Priests' League of America.
- Corcoran, E. 1977. *Dissension in the Soviet Union*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University.
- Dahl, R.A. 1973. *Regimes and Oppositions*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Eisinger, P.K. 1974. "Racial differences in protest participation." *American Political Science Review* 68: 592–606.
- Elta Information Service. 1976. No. 203. New York: Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania.
- Feagin, J. and H. Hahn. 1973. *Ghetto Revolts*. New York: Macmillan.
- Feierabend, I., R. Feierabend, B. Nesvold and Frank Jaggard. 1971. "Political violence and assassination." Pp. 54–142 in W. Crotty (ed.), *Assassination and the Political Order*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Gamson, W. 1968. *Power and Discontent*. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey.
- . 1975. *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey.
- Jenkins, J. and C. Perrow. 1977. "Insurgency of the powerless." *American Sociological Review* 42:249–68.
- Khronika tekushchikh sobytii. 1968–1977*. New York: Khronika Press. Vols. 1–45.

- Kowalewski, David. 1978. *The Protest Uses of Symbolic Politics*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas.
- . 1979. "The structure of Ukrainian dissent." *Ukrainian Quarterly* 35:43–49.
- . 1980. "The protest uses of symbolic politics in the USSR." *Journal of Politics* 42:439–60.
- Lipsky, M. 1970. *Protest in City Politics*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Materialy samizdata. 1975–1977. Munich: Arkhiv samizdata, Radio Liberty Research.
- Misner, G. 1969. "The response of police agencies." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 382:109–19.
- Oberschall, A. 1973. *Social Conflict and Social Movements*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Samizdat Bulletin. 1976. No. 34. San Mateo, Cal.: Samizdat Bulletin.
- Schattschneider, E.E. 1960. *The Semi-Sovereign People*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
- Schumaker, P. 1975. "Policy responsiveness to protest group demands." *Journal of Politics* 37:488–521.
- Sears, D. 1969. "Black attitudes toward the political system in the aftermath of the Watts insurrection." *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 13:515–44.
- Sears, D. and J. McConahay. 1973. *The Politics of Violence*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Smith, H. 1977. "Soviet Jewry." Pp. 23–35 in J. Schenker, National Conference on Soviet Jewry Leadership Assembly. Washington, D.C.: National Conference on Soviet Jewry.
- Sobranie dokumentov samizdata. 1965–1977. Munich: Arkhiv samizdata, Radio Liberty Research. Vols. 1–22.
- Telesin, J. 1973. "Inside Samizdat." *Encounter* (February):25–34.
- Urban Research Corporation. 1970. *Legislative Responses to Student Protest*. Chicago: Urban Research Corporation.